




Exploring justifications of “The Social 
Contract” between the Banking Sector, 












A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements of Edinburgh Napier University,  






The accompanying thesis submitted for the degree of PhD entitled, “Exploring 
justifications of ‘The Social Contract’ between the Banking Sector, Financial 
Regulators, and NGOs” is based on work conducted by the author in The 
Business School, Edinburgh Napier University.  
All the work recorded in this thesis is original unless otherwise acknowledged 
in the text or by references. None of the work has been submitted for another 
degree in this or any other institution, albeit lists of research aims, objectives 
etc. have been discussed in assessments toward the award of PgCert 
Business Management Research Methods (2018).  
An overview of the current research was presented at the Qualitative Research 
in Finance Conference, Dundee University, 4th June 2019.  Early work was 
presented at CSEAR Emerging Scholars Colloquium, Royal Holloway (2015). 
Conflict of interest statement  
The author declares no conflict of interest. 
 
Approximate number of words: 90,300 inclusive of direct quotes, tables, 











The banking sector is important to the UK, employing 1.2% of the workforce 
whilst contributing 5.5% of tax receipts; indeed, the credit creation role of 
banks is essential in modern economies.  Banks caused the financial crisis of 
2007/8 and subsequently the sector was beset by scandals, leading to calls 
for “a new social contract” between the banks and society (Tucker, 2009).   
The aim of this study is to explore public justifications of “The Social Contract” 
by the Banking Sector, Financial Regulators, and NGOs (the latter as 
representatives of “civil society”).  Social contracts may be represented by 
“public justifications”, the constructs of which are analysable using an empirical 
framework: “orders of worth” express a particular paradigm toward justice and 
the “common good”.  The orders of worth or “polities” - Market, Industrial, Civic, 
Domestic, Inspired, Reputation, Projective, and Green, are all characterised 
by dimensions such as investment criteria, qualified objects, qualified subjects, 
and inequalities of status relations. 
A qualitative content analysis approach is used to analyse texts such as 
speeches and annual reports for the presence or absence of, and 
compromises between, the polities.  As the first study of its type in banking 
and finance, the findings have implications for regulators, who should be 
aware of the newly identified “instrumental” compromise constructed by banks 
in their approach to regulation.  Regulators should also be aware of the 
increased risk of moral hazard arising from their own market-oriented 
justifications of the social contract.  A further contribution to the banking and 
finance literature is to problematise the limited use of ecological justifications 
in banks’ and regulators’ constructs of the social contract.   
Banks often focus on shareholders in their public justifications, demonstrating 
a gap between theory and practice in the pragmatic sociology literature: the 
normative exclusion of investors as qualified subjects is problematic given the 
important position shareholders hold in banks’ construction of their roles and 
responsibilities.  Further, development of the market polity is proposed to 
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1.1 Title of the study 
 
“Exploring justifications of “The Social Contract” between the Banking Sector, 
Financial Regulators, and NGOs” 
1.2 Introduction 
 
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 onwards had profound impacts on the 
economy, and hence social conditions in the UK and in many other regions, 
such as the US and Eurozone (inter alia Crotty, 2009, Wolf, 2013).  A complex 
web of institutional relations and behaviours led to the crisis, however the 
banking sector lay at its heart (Ertürk et al. 2011).  Subsequently, questions 
were raised regarding the relationship between the banking sector and the rest 
of society (Baker, 2010, Mullineux, 2011, Engelen et al., 2012): the Bank of 
England called for a new “social contract” with the banks (Tucker, 2009).  The 
aim of the current research is to explore conceptions and justifications of “The 
Social Contract” for banking.  In being exploratory, the intent is to open up an 
“argument to be debated” (Harney & Thomas, 2013, p.508) based on 
interpretations of practice.   
The term “social contract” is both commonplace1 and ill defined, albeit in 
formulations from Hobbes and Locke in the 17th century and Rousseau in the 
18th, very much concerned with the responsibilities of the “sovereign” toward 
the rest of society.  Being a socially constructed, dynamic and continually 
renewed set of relations, a social contract is a form of “political metaphysics” 
(Davies, 2017, p.24).  As such, a social contract is intangible, however 
ontologically has been considered hypothetical (Rawls, 1971), linked to 
empirical objects (Searle, 2006), or emergent (Searle, 2010).  A socially 
constructed, immanent, form of social contract may be challenged on 
ontological grounds as lacking empirical referents (Boltanski, 2011, p.3).    
                                            
1 The Financial Times uses the term over three hundred times in the most recent decade 
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If the first issue identified above is the intangible nature of the social contract, 
the next issue to address is which agents in society are party to “the contract”.  
The current research departs from classic theorists (Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau) and more contemporary views such as from Frederick (2013) and 
Hardin (2014), in considering the social contract beyond 
government/governed relations, similar to inter alia Gauthier (1986, 2013), and 
Narveson (2013).  It is appropriate to consider social contracts between 
“society” and specific stakeholder groups such as older people, or students, 
or in the current study, the banks.  In the banking sector there is a dialectic 
relationship between regulators and the regulated, a relationship that includes 
arbitrage, avoidance, compliance, and lobbying from the regulated firms.  
Regulators such as the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), with powers to constrain and loosen 
controls on bank licenses, permissions, activities and personnel, are an 
important part of societal relations with the banking sector. However, the 
current work is not solely concerned about regulation, rather the broader social 
contract or justification for economic arrangements, on which independent 
parties provide a useful counterpoint to the views from “within” the sector.  
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are recognised as “a serious 
element in environment and development issues” (Redclift, 2005, p. 213, Doh 
& Guay, 2006); the influence on firms from NGO pressure and activities such 
as boycotts is variable, contingent, sometimes effective (Baur and Palazzo, 
2011).  NGOs may be specifically focussed on banking and other financial 
activities and as such the three parties to the social contract for the banks are 
such finance sector focussed NGOs2, the financial regulators, and the banks 
themselves.    
1.3 Approach 
 
As “political metaphysics” a social contract is not measurable directly, which 
means that a proxy or empirical representation of the social contract or aspects 
thereof must be found.  Economic, governing, and regulatory agents 
                                            
2 Further consideration of NGOs as proxies for “society” is developed below 
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communicate their justification of economic and social relations in a number 
of observable ways (particularly in textual form) and as such, how the parties 
to a social contract for the banks construct their perspectives and justifications 
of social relations may be analysed. Banks communicate inter alia through 
annual reports and accounts, and sustainability reports; regulators and state 
actors make speeches and deliver reports, and NGOs campaign and 
communicate via reports and websites.  Hence, a rich resource of data is 
available which purports to represent the views and justifications of actors.  
There is an extensive record of research using textual analysis. Of the many 
possible approaches to analysing texts, the framework employed in the current 
research is derived from theories of public justification or “orders of worth”, 
developed originally by Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), and extended by 
Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye, (2000), and Boltanski & Chiapello (2007).  A 
qualitative content analysis is used to explore the justifications in texts, to 
expose significant absence and presence of types of justification, and how 
these justifications are used in compromise constructions.  Such analysis uses 
researcher’s interpretations and judgements, based on expertise within the 
financial sector, to allocate textual components to “orders of worth” and in so 
doing, expose the constructions of “the social contract” to a systematic form of 
analysis.  
The current study is exploratory. “Exploration” as a research approach is used 
when researchers possess “little or no scientific knowledge about the group, 
process, activity, or situation they want to examine but nevertheless have 
reason to believe contains elements worth discovering” (Stebbins, 2008).  In 
the current study, whilst terms such as “the social contract” are commonplace, 
there has been relatively little examination of the social contract for the banks 
and no previous studies have systematically analysed social contracts through 
the lens of public justifications.  At the beginning of this project, there was little 
knowledge about the applicability of tools to research the topic and as such, 
an “exploratory” approach is justified.  The study contends that the ontological, 
epistemological and deontological characteristics of the “social contract for the 
banks” may be analysed empirically within an existing framework: “orders of 
worth”.  By using such a framework for the first time in a specific sector, new 
insight is generated into the construction of agents’ public justifications around 
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banks and banking, and further a number of findings below problematise and 
challenge the construct of the “orders of worth” framework.  
The study is based on a realist ontology and a constructionist epistemology: 
banks are “real”, however actor’s perspectives on “the social contract” are 
socially constructed – as above, the social contract is intangible.  The research 
paradigm used is (weakly) constructionist and hence aligns with a qualitative 
approach dependent on judgement and interpretation.   
1.4 Aims and Objectives  
 
The overall aim of the research is to explore public justifications of “the social 
contract for the UK banks”. 
A number of objectives support the overall aim:- 
RO1:  Analyse contemporary understanding of “banks and the social contract” 
RO2:  Critically analyse the conceptual relation of public justifications to “the 
Social Contract” 
RO3:  Critically analyse the construction of justifications produced by UK 
Banks regarding their social contract  
RO4:  Critically analyse the construction of justifications from the regulatory 
agencies regarding the social contract of the banking sector 
RO5:  Critically analyse the construction of justifications from Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs) regarding the social contract of the 
banking sector 
RO6:  Develop recommendations for further research in, and development of 






1.5 Motivation for the study  
 
The current research is written in the long shadow of the financial crisis of 
2008.  Far from a particularly unusual event in financial systems (Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2009), the crisis nonetheless had notably significant effects on 
employment, GDP growth, sovereign debt (due to bank bailouts and automatic 
stabilisers such as unemployment benefits), as well as in declining trust in the 
banking sector (Admati & Hellwig, 2014).  Such erosion of trust is related to 
what Shafik (2016, p.2) decries as the “ethical drift” in the global financial 
sector, noting that misconduct fines for the major UK banks between 2009 and 
2016 exceeded £35bn, and that globally fines have reduced capital to support 
lending by circa $5 trillion.  Shafik (2016) acknowledges the historical and 
inevitable presence of “rogues” in the industry, however is concerned that 
broader systemic issues exist that could be addressed through a combination 
of law, regulation, market self-policing and cultural norms and practices 
“created by firm’s Boards and management” (p.3).  Cultural norms are 
synonymous with the explicit and implicit justifications for behaviour used 
within, and between firms.    
Regulation after the financial crisis has operated in position of uncertainty in a 
number of ways. Before 2007, regulators were to some extent culpable in 
allowing build-up of risk. The policy response has been criticised as being both 
too hesitant and too onerous – though there are limits to the ability of 
regulatory authorities to ward against emergent events or “black swans” 
(Taleb, 2010).  How justifications emerge in such testing and uncertain 
situations is what the theory of public justifications (also known as pragmatic 
sociology) “explores and makes visible” (Davies, 2017, p.19). 
The call from within the Bank of England for a new “social contract for the 
banks” (Tucker, 2009) appears to be a noteworthy event in response to the 
financial crisis.  Such calls are however generally not subject to critique; the 
commonplace term “the social contract” continues to be used without specific 
referents. As such, the success of “implementing” a social contract is difficult 
to determine (Offe, 2012). The current research is a first step in analysing how 
a social construct such as the social contract for the banks may be analysed.  
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1.6 Intended Contribution  
 
The current study is intended to contribute to knowledge in a number of ways, 
organised around prior research (literature), methods, and policy & practice.  
1.6.1 Contribution to Literature 
 
Discussed below, the foundational dependence between market and civic 
criteria for the social contract for the banks contributes to the banking and 
finance literature by extending understanding of the potential for “moral 
hazard” arising from a social contract justified by smooth market functioning 
as the superior principle. This study also contributes in another way to the 
banking and finance literature by highlighting a lacuna regarding ecological 
criteria toward the social contract, about which there has been scant attention 
paid by banks and regulators, nor indeed in banking and finance journals3.  
One of the outcomes of the study is the observation that, as constructed, the 
public justifications of social contracts for the banks do not satisfy all parties.  
In a summary of elements of the social contract for the banks, Figure 5 (p.294) 
below illustrates an “empty set” showing that the constructs of the social 
contract do not meet all parties’ requirements.  Additionally, a notably broad 
range of “qualified subjects” is found in texts, which obscures the nature of the 
contracting parties.  As such these findings extends the social contract 
literature by showing that a singular concept of the social contract is not found 
in practice.   
In addition to finding a new form of “instrumental” compromise construction 
between polities, the current study extends the pragmatic sociology/orders of 
worth literature by proposing changes to the market polity with respect to time, 
                                            
3 For example of all articles in the Journal of Banking & Finance from 2015-2019 inclusive, 
none mentioned “the social contract” or “public justifications”, two briefly mentioned Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR), which may be related to the social contract, two papers used 
CSR without consideration of the contested nature of the term (Dunne, 2008).  Similarly in the 
Journal of Banking Regulation there were no articles including “public justifications”, two briefly 
mentioned “social contract” and four briefly mentioned CSR.  In the same period there were 
no matches to the above search terms in the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. In the 
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance the only substantial engagement with the 
above terms comprises two papers (both 2019) out of a population of 158 total papers.  
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and problematises the explicit exclusion of shareholders/investors by 
Boltanski & Chiapello (2007, pp.365-366).  
1.6.2 Methodological Contribution 
 
This study responds to the call from Tregidga et al. (2012) for more interpretive 
work in the field of responsibilities and accountabilities (and accounting) of 
business.  Similar to Davies (2017) this research has an “interpretive aspiration 
to explain what is internally and normatively coherent about the approach to 
the social contract expressed by key actors” (p.xxii).  This means that the ways 
in which justifications are constructed are interpreted, made explicit, in order 
to create a resource for further dialogue and exploration of the social contract 
with the banking sector.   
The current research brings fresh insight into important areas as the first 
research known to present an extensive discussion of “orders of worth” in the 
context of the banking sector.  As such, the research provides a more 
transparent and fully explained examination of texts than is usually found in 
the literature wherein a more common approach is to summarise findings at 
the “polity” level rather than set out the dimensions used to construct that 
polity.  By testing the orders of worth framework in a new context, challenges 
to the method are raised and in turn, the findings problematise aspects of the 
theory of public justifications as currently constructed.  Findings of a gap 
between frameworks and practice are useful indicators for future development 
as an example of “the paradox that the world is always a functioning-
malfunctioning thing. Everything is broken” (Morton, quoted in McIntyre & 
Medoro, 2016, p.160). 
1.6.3 Contribution to Policy and Practice 
 
As “applied research” (Patton, 2002, p.217) versus basic or fundamental 
research, the current research is focussed on a specific sector at a specific 
time and place.  The implications for practice are, like much research, indirect: 
“most research does not have a direct impact on either policy or practice; 
rather it works over a long period, changing our assumptions about the world 
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and about the questions that need to be asked” (Furlong & Oancea, 2005, 
p.12).  The orders of worth framework as used below enables practitioners in 
“test” or conflict situations a more detailed understanding of the 
heterogeneous construction of “the social contract”.  Such a detailed 
understanding allows a deeper appreciation of both the possibilities of, barriers 
to, and fragile nature of, compromises.   
As exploratory research, there is the possibility of making visible objects, 
relationships, values that are not so very visible day to day.  In this sense, the 
current research is a form of critical sociology that considers “overarching 
sociological descriptions and normative stances” (orders of worth, as 
described below) (Boltanski, 2011, p.50).  As such, explanations of the 
construction of the social contract(s) of the banking sector may be 
emancipatory in the broadest sense within the ongoing dialectic of bank 
regulation.  A contrast to Boltanski (2011, p.51) is that whereas Boltanski sees 
social critique (of whatever form) as necessarily using the “means […] of 
ordinary actors […] get a grip on what is happening” the current research uses 
multiple perspectives (society voiced through NGOs, governmental through 
regulators, and banks through their own words) to develop the construction of 
social contract(s).  As such the data includes what may in Boltanski’s terms be 
viewed as the oppressive forces of domination (the banks, even regulators as 
agents of government). Inclusion of banks’ texts could then be viewed as 
counterproductive; however, one of the purposes of the research is to 
understand the construction of social contracts for all the parties to “the social 
contract” which means the inclusion of banks’ texts in the analysis below is 
warranted.  
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis comprises the following chapters: 
Chapter 1: Introduction presents the topic of the current research, the aims 
and objectives, and motivation for the project.  The anticipated contribution to 
literature, methodologies, policy, and practice is considered. 
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Chapter 2: Context of the research chapter considers two contexts: the 
banking sector, and the topic of “the social contract”.  Banks are shown to be 
crucial to a credit based economy such as that in Britain today.  The social 
contract as a concept has a rich and varied ancestry that can only be touched 
upon the current study.  Critique of the concept and prior consideration of the 
“social contract of the banks” is analysed.  
Chapter 3: Public Justification considers justificatory regimes as represented 
by “orders of worth” (also referred to as sociology of worth (SOW), conventions 
theory, or pragmatic sociology).  The analysis concludes that orders of worth 
represent plural and coexisting – and conflicting – conceptualisations of “social 
contracts”.  Prior research analysing the construction of justifications using the 
orders of worth framework are reviewed. 
Chapter 4: Methodology analyses theoretical paradigms and perspectives, the 
research strategy, data collection and methods of analysis, interpretation and 
evaluation (qualitative content analysis).  This chapter set outs a detailed 
approach to analysing texts using the orders of worth framework, justifies the 
research approach in the light of prior research and with respect to the aims 
of the current project and finally considers claims for quality of the research. 
Chapter 5: Findings presents the analysis of NGO, banks, and regulatory texts.  
Each text is analysed with respect to the dimensions of the “orders of worth” 
framework.  The analysis is concerned with presence and absence of 
dimensions of orders of worth and in allocating those dimensions to a specific 
polity such as the “market” polity or “civic” polity.  Additionally the analysis is 
sensitive to the forms of compromise between polities observed in the texts.  
The chapter sets out the findings of the analysis and critically examines these 
in the light of prior discussion of research into public justifications, and the 
concept of the social contract. 
Chapter 6: Discussion builds on the above initial analysis to develop a richer 
understanding of the way in which stakeholders to the banking social contract 
present their justifications of how the social contract ought to be 
operationalised.  Constructions of the social contract are characterised by 
presence and absence of polities, and of treatment of “the common good”. 
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Text constructions analysed further are the approach to investors as “qualified 
subjects”, compromise constructions, presence and absence of critique, time 
construction in the market polity, representations of risk.  The concept of 
“ontological diffusion” is developed.  Finally, the chapter makes some 
observations on the analytical process around absence/presence and the 
implications for the OOW framework, difficulties found in ambiguity of 
attribution, and a form of visual overview of the findings is presented and 
critiqued.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Objectives, Contribution and Future Research 
comprises an evaluation of the results of the study with respect to the stated 
aims and objectives, and the contribution of the research project. The 
implications of the research are considered with respect to social 
contractarianism, pragmatic sociology, banking and finance, and for research 
methods. Limitations of the study are acknowledged and recommendations for 
future research are made.    
1.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has introduced the scope, aims and objectives of the current 
research as well as giving an indication of the motivation for the research and 
intended contribution.  
The following chapter begins by setting the context of the research in the UK 








This chapter considers two contexts: the banking sector, and the topic of “the 
social contract”. Initial sections analyse the functions of banking and the 
impacts from bank failure on external stakeholders.  Financial regulators are 
parties to the social contract for the banks (Tucker, 2009, Mullineux, 2011, 
2014) and so the current approach to regulation is discussed.  Subsequent 
sections explore some of the main developments in social contract theory and 
prior research into “the social contract for banks”.  
2.2 Banking and Financial Regulation 
 
2.2.1 Banks and the Economy 
 
The banking sector is significant within the UK economy: providing 5.5% of tax 
receipts (PWC, 2019, p.1) and 1.2% of employment (p.2). Due to high demand 
for banking skills, higher wages lead to the sector contributing 7.8% of UK 
employment taxes (PWC, 2019).  
The “economy” refers to all the business activity producing goods and 
services, the productive capacity (capital) that allows goods and services to 
be produced, and the consumption of goods and services (Gillespie, 2011).   
Linking the disparate aspects of the economy is the flow of money, largely in 
electronic form rather than notes and coins. Finance could be said to be 
“fundamental to the way we organise our affairs” (Cowton, 2002, p. 393) and 
further, Bearden (1989, pp.49-50) in a discussion of US banks that is equally 
applicable in the UK notes, “Bank leadership in essence decides whether 
companies and industries will be nurtured with new investment or starved by 
disinvestment. Their unique structural role and tendency to take a unified 
stance underlie the power that banks yield”.  
Banks have several roles: they provide money transmission services (which 
do not affect the value of assets) as well as products that do purport, and are 
23 
 
designed to, affect the value of assets such as savings accounts.  Banks have 
two main sources of income – interest that they charge, and income (over 
50%) from ‘provision’ services, which would include advisory activities 
(Jeucken & Bouma, 2001).  Through these roles, banks’ activities are 
pervasive through the economy, a state referred to as “omni finance” (Bowman 
et al., 2012a). In Figure 1 below, banks feature in the functions represented 
by every arrow in the simplified schema of money flows through the economy, 
and indeed “As the source of credit intermediation between lenders and 
borrowers, banks provide essential domestic and international financial 
services to consumers, businesses and government” (BIS, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1 Flow of funds - adapted from (Jeucken and Bouma, 2001, p. 27) 
Twentieth century models of economies were often based on rather narrow 
studies of, for example, the U.S. which had no financial crises after the Second 
World War until 2007/08. The main result of a narrow focus was that “banks 
and other intermediaries were merely a “veil” between savers and borrowers 
in the nonfinancial sector, rather than profit-seeking firms that make loans 
opportunistically” (M.C.K., 2013).   The implications of this narrow view of the 
workings of the economy are discussed in considerable detail in Keen (2011).  
The main points being: that financial crises had been ruled out in economic 
modelling (p.204), that the money supply was seen as “exogenous” to the 
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market (p. 244) and therefore completely under the control of central banks, 
and that the financial system is viewed as stable and with a tendency toward 
equilibrium rather than “inherently” unstable (p. 299).  In contrast to the 
orthodox view, and heavily influenced by Minsky, Keen contends that, given a 
monetary economy must use “token” or inherently worthless money (e.g. 
paper – or ones and zeroes in a computer application) rather than a commodity 
(such as gold, silver) then every transaction is de facto a transaction involving 
a bank (p. 355).  This in turn implies that credit-creating banks are an essential 
feature of modern economies (p. 356).  Similar views regarding the centrality 
of credit creation to the modern capitalist economy are found in Ingham (2008), 
Pettifor (2012, in part a review of Ingham’s work), Werner (2009a), Werner 
(2009b), Werner (2011), Werner (2012) and comprise the central theme of 
Ryan-Collins et al. (2012) which considers “where money comes from”.   
Werner (2012) shows that credit creation can explain growth, bubbles and 
recessions in a “credit theory of money”, and further, contends this ability to 
direct credit is “too important” within the management of the economy to be 
left to the banks. 
A further role of banks, and financial intermediaries more generally, is in 
enabling monetisation of firms’ profits: something that happens every day but 
had been a “paradox” in economics for over a century.  Bruun and Heyn-
Johnsen (2009) in their discussion paper aver that the paradox of monetary 
profits was unsuccessfully approached by Marx, Keynes and Schumpeter 
(their discussion then focuses very much on the first two of these economists). 
In short, if a firm has capital M with which to produce goods of value C = M, 
then the cost of those goods includes raw materials and other inputs (energy, 
say) and labour costs.  To make a profit then, the goods need to be sold for 
more than C, so that the firm receives income > M.  However goods are bought 
by labour, and they have been paid less than C – they cannot afford to buy 
sufficient goods to make a profit for the firm.  And whilst other labourers for 
other firms could buy this example firms goods, in aggregate it becomes clear 
that the income for workers is insufficient to actually buy the goods they made 
(even at cost C, which is greater than income by definition), and this means a 
profit cannot be made.  The firm now has a stock of finished goods that cost 
C to make.  If that stock of goods was collateral for a loan from an investor or 
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creditor then as long as the loan value is > C then the firm has more money at 
the end of this cycle of production than at the start and a profit can be 
monetised (or the surplus could be used to increase production in the next 
cycle). Keen (2010) takes a circuit model based approach to show that credit 
turnover can occur more quickly than periods of production which enables flow 
of funds greater than the original stock of money (loans).  In order for firms to 
continue, credit is essential and the banks role in evaluating collateral for loans 
reinforces the essential functions banks play in the economy, which means 
that fear of banking crises leads to extraordinary policy action to mitigate such 
crises. 
Interestingly for the current work, Lonergan (2009, p.17) goes so far as to 
suggest, "money is a social contract and its value depends on the recognition 
of others".  Here Lonergan is discussing the interdependence of each member 
of society on the rest of society, specifically in the context of trade, hence 
money, as a medium of exchange, can only retain a stable value when a form 
of social cohesion exists.  In other words, a stable value of money is symbolic 
of a stable social contract.  Additionally we can note the need for agreement 
amongst people over what constitutes “money” which is an example of 
“[shared] principles of equivalence, which become tangibly manifest in 
measures and test, such that they can agree that certain things, people and 
actions carry value” (Davies, 2017, p.145).  Davies (2017) also notes the role 
of immanent sovereignty in giving meaning to concepts such as money 
“sovereignty […] is magically and swiftly rediscovered when other shared 
illusions – such as money – start to disintegrate” (p.157, edited for clarity).  
2.2.2 Regulation of Financial Services 
 
"If an event with widespread and severe economic and social consequences 
keeps on repeating itself, the onus is surely on the authorities to change 
something"  
(Brunnermeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud & Shin, 2009, p.xxi) 
Importance and connectivity are good reasons for regulation of an economic 
activity, however there are reasons beyond those two.  Campbell, Jackson, 
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Madrian & Tufano (2011) consider some of the “classic” reasons why 
governments may consider active involvement or ownership of financial 
regulation.  These are the possibility of “externalities” that impose costs on 
outsiders, which are not accounted for within the firm; information asymmetries 
(arising from product terms and conditions complexity, see also Howells & 
Bain, 2008); too-big-to-fail characteristics giving rise to moral hazard – more 
risk taking as there is a government “safety net” (see also Hellmann, Murdock 
& Stiglitz, 2000, Tett, 2012,).  Additionally, Campbell et al. (2011) note the 
presence of “price dispersion” (p.93) whereby firms charge a range of prices 
for the same services or product, which may arise as considerable knowledge 
is required regarding product features, terms, conditions and contingencies 
operant over a long time scale – such products form “credence services” 
(Hoepner & Wilson, 2012).  Campbell et al. (2011, p.93) consider “consumers’ 
biases and cognitive limitations” – the former relating to preferences for current 
consumption/pleasure over long term savings (hence restrictions on access to 
pensions savings ‘pots’) whilst the latter relates to a lack of financial literacy 
regarding, say, the effects of compound interest or benefits of diversification - 
see also Van Rooij, Lusardi & Alessie (2012). 
There are a number of regulators dealing with financial services firms and 
hence banks. Such institutions include The Bank of England through the 
Financial Policy Committee (FPC)4, the Prudential Regulatory Authority also 
embedded in the BoE and concerned with financial stability in the main, the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA: concerned with regulatory compliance and 
consumer protection), and the Payments System Regulator (PSR, 2019).  In 
addition, guidance and regulations are adapted from those developed by EU 
institutions such as European Banking Authority (EBA) and European 
Securities and Markets Authority (CMA, 2016). 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales evaluated key 
changes in response to the financial crisis: increase loss-absorbing capital 
relative to risk, reduction in balance sheets (reducing lending, in effect), lower 
                                            
4 This role is in addition to the role as a Central Bank (inter alia lender of last resort, banker to 
banks, central counterparty in payments, design and implementation of monetary policy) 
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leverage and a more cautious approach to asset portfolios (ICAEW, 2013).  
Additionally, there is increased focus on the possibility that lower margin 
product lines cause behaviours such as inappropriate cross selling of higher 
margin products to meet a net profitable position (see PPI scandals).  Broadly, 
there are three strands to the regulatory response to the crisis: increased 
capital, a more rigorous supervision reducing the chance of failure, and 
resolution regimes (e.g. “bail in” to crystallise losses for shareholders and other 
creditors ahead of the public purse) are designed to reduce the impact of bank 
failure (Chennells & Wingfield, 2015).  A more robust approach replaces the 
light-touch, principles based regulation from before the crisis and similar 
approaches were seen in the Eurozone, US, and China.  Wilson et al. (2012) 
see such a change as moving away from reliance on a “social contract” (for 
finance) to more explicit constraints through regulation.  
The role of regulation (in any industry not solely banking) may be to 
operationalise social control of the market, however it may also serve to 
protect incumbents or serve special (monied) interests (Glinavos, 2013, p.17, 
p.63).  Protection of incumbents is evident in Britain’s financial history whereby 
the number of banks and other actors in capital markets was restricted – for 
instance as early as 1697 per “An Act to restrain the numbers and ill-practices 
of stock-jobbers” (Smith, 1929, p.210).  Deregulation in contrast is the “main 
process of disembedding market processes from social controls" (Glinavos, 
2013, p.11).  Deregulation was seen as a factor in the financial crisis (Froud 
et al., 2010, Admati and Hellwig, 2014)5 and specifically for the UK context, 
the FSA approach was seen as “overtly” supportive of market mechanisms 
rather than regulatory intervention (Turner, 2009, p.87).  
The model of regulation in the UK is termed a “twin peaks” approach 
(prudential and conduct regulatory bodies) in contrast to an institutional 
                                            
5 Though for an alternative view see the two “Dissenting Views” chapters of National 
Commission On The Causes Of The Financial And Economic Crisis In The United States, 
2011 which in essence argue that heterogeneous national approaches to regulation prior to 
the financial crisis suggests that deregulation is not a common cause of the crisis.  The 
arguments elide the mimetic isomorphism around “principles based” rather than rules based 




approach (by firm type) or a “super regulator” (single regulator) model 
(Godwin, Howse, Ramsay, 2017, p.104).  Operationally in the UK prudential 
regulation is mostly the remit of the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) 
however the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) also has a powerful voice with 
regards to financial stability.  The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) regulates 
many more firms than the PRA and is the ‘prudential’ regulator for circa 18,000 
small firms (FCA, 2019a).   As prudential regulation is concerned with stability 
and continued operation of the financial system there is a bias with the 
regulatory paradigm toward continuity of firms to avoid breaks in market 
efficiency, albeit there is within the PRA remit the orderly dissolution of a firm 
(BoE, 2019c) – and secondarily within the FCA technical standards (the FCA 
is a post-hoc participant once the resolution and recovery process is 
underway, see FCA, 2019b).  
Glinavos (2013, pp.18-20) reviews perspectives such as Posner (1974) 
regarding state’s capacities to regulate firms and the tension between 
government regulation and market function.  Posner viewed regulatory 
functions as a product of Government, and as such, the desired form of 
product is only available to those who can pay the price.  The price in this case 
is time and energy spent coordinating responses to proposals and lobbying – 
and only the people most committed, that is the representatives of the 
regulated firms, will pay this price. The firms with most “skin in the game” 
capture government regulatory efforts (social interest theory).  To avoid 
regulatory capture there may be moves to promote a notionally independent, 
scientific rationale for rules and regulations administered by experts (elites).  
Technocratic governance is a move to disenchant politics via supposed 
rationality, an approach aligned with a neo-liberal project (Wacquant, 2010, 
Davies, 2017).  Despite the proposal of technocratic “epistocracy” (Brennan, 
2011, p.700) the suggested reliance on narrow expertise simply defers the 
question: how do experts themselves avoid capture? (social interest theory all 
the way down).  Additionally, Glinavos (2013, pp.52-53) considers how the 
narrative of objective administration elides the process that "cements a 




2.3 The Social Contract 
 
Given that regulation of banks is important and forms part of “the social 
contract for the banks”, the following section more broadly considers the 
development of the social contract by tracing some of the key elements of the 
concept, particularly as developed by “classical” theorists such as Rousseau.  
Subsequently two sections consider firstly, contemporary views, and then 
finally some of the critiques of the idea of a social contract.  
2.3.1 Development of the Social Contract from Rousseau  
 
The social contract as an idea has a rich and complex history and so a number 
of choices are needed to constrain, to sensible proportions, analysis of the 
development of the concept.  To give a flavour of the range of influences: Cole, 
in Rousseau (1973 [1762]), considers social contract ideas trace back to the 
Sophists of ancient Greece, albeit Boucher & Kelly (1994, p.2) see such 
connections as “tenuous”.  Kalpakian (2008) sees nascent shoots of similar 
ideas to the social contract in Ibn Khaldun’s thirteenth century analysis of the 
formation of large urban centres.  Riley (1973, p.543) sees the development 
of the social contract and increased focus on “voluntarism” (as opposed to 
coercion) as contemporaneous, such ideas being a development in Western 
thought from the sixteenth century Reformation (p.545).   Questions of moral, 
in contrast to political, philosophy are delineated by Aristole, Aquinas, 
Descartes, Hume, Smith, Diderot, Kant, Kierkegaard (MacIntyre, 2007).  
Questions of political philosophy may be characterised in two ways: as a 
“liberty” narrative from Locke, Smith, Madison, Mill, Friedman, Hayek, or an 
“equality” narrative from Rousseau, Owen, Marx, Rawls (Capaldi & Lloyd, 
2011).  The current study considers the social contract in the context of groups 
(banks and bankers, regulators, civic society) and is situated, post financial 
crisis, in a concern for equitability and justice with respect to the banking sector 
(such is the overall tenor of Tucker, 2009 for instance).  From this position, a 
suitable start point for examining the social contract is the “equality narrative”, 
beginning with Rousseau.  
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In an introductory analysis to Rousseau (1973 [1762]), Cole, similarly to Barker 
in Locke et al. (1960) considers two forms of the “Social Contract”: firstly, that 
of the “contract” between the governing and the governed; in particular the 
contract encourages the governing body or sovereign to take seriously their 
responsibilities to wider society; the contract (or breaches thereof) may also 
serve to justify resistance against an overbearing sovereign. Secondly, the 
norms of the social contract are between members of society in order to create 
and maintain that society.  The latter must be a priori as there needs to be 
some form of enduring society which may then undertake a social contract to 
be governed – (see also in Locke et al., 1960, p. xii., and Williams, 2003 re 
Kant’s support of this view).  
 
2.3.2 Contemporary perspectives on the “social contract” 
 
Given the above historical background to concepts of the social contract, this 
section set out some contemporary perspectives and leads to the following 
section on critique of the social contract concept. 
A “strong” social contract (Shklar, 1966, Vauleon, 2014) wherein social and 
economic decision making is tightly constrained by being embedded in social 
relations, a “substantivist” position, has been challenged (Granovetter, 1985, 
p.482), by the possibility of multiple justifications of a social contract inter- and 
intra-  society.  Granovetter (1985) also notes the similar challenge to a 
“formalist” approach wherein there is no social contract as economic decisions 
are made by self-interested utility maximising individuals.  Granovetter (1985) 
takes a position between these “over socialized” (sic) and “under socialized” 
(sic) positions, and also puts forward a useful argument, that implicit norms of 
relations are applied differentially depending on relational distance and 
historical interactions. Differential application means that across a society we 
cannot refer to a single homogenous social contract with predictive power for 
individual interactions.   
A common trope or paradigm is that of the rational human actor (homo 
economicus); a focus on methodological individualism denies the influence of 
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institutions or social structures on individual behaviour. In defence of the social 
contract, using game theory scenarios Gauthier (2013) demonstrates that 
individual utility maximisation may be less effective than co-operation 
strategies out with a postulated “perfectly competitive market” (p.203).  In 
complex decision-making an agent’s response does not have to be utility or 
even resource maximising if the response is “best” for the group in the 
situation.  Gauthier describes the “social contract” as the ex-ante 
determination of “rules of interaction” in order to meet a “P-optimal” outcome. 
In the claim that in competitive markets the best solution is to compete so the 
“invisible hand” secures an optimal outcome, Gauthier ignores the level of a 
priori cooperation required to bring about “free” markets (Glinavos, 2031, 
Davies, 2017).   
2.3.3 Critique of “the social contract” positions 
 
The concept of the social contract, as a social construct is vulnerable to 
challenge (Boltanski, 2011).  This section considers two lines of critique.  
2.3.3.1 Challenges of a-historicism and the problem of violence 
 
Berry (1977) adumbrates two critical positions in opposition to the social 
contract.  Firstly, from Hegel, that the state is not a mere averaging of individual 
wills, that the state (and culture) is inseparable from the realisation of individual 
freedom – to conceive otherwise is “ahistorical abstract individualism” (p. 701).  
The critique is in response to Rousseau’s conception of a “general will”: “the 
general will must remain dominant as the sole rule of all the rest” (Rousseau, 
1762, in Locke et al., 1960, p.325). In the current research, the critique from 
Hegel is addressed by consideration of social contracts as justifications rather 
than constraints on freedom – agents can exit the “test” situation and indeed 
have agency to agree compromise.  The second critical position, from Hume, 
is that a peaceful contracting of society is not represented in history: that 
violence, even war and appropriation have preceded formation of societies 
and nations (and continue thereafter).  Berry (1977) also notes Hume’s 
concern with the artificial history ascribed to the development of society (not 
explicitly referenced, but presumably referring, at least in part, to Rousseau) 
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for which there was no archaeological or historical record.  Similarly for 
Carneiro (1970, p.733), “voluntarist” theory exemplified by Rousseau can be 
discarded as the “Social Contract theory is today nothing more than a historical 
curiosity”.  Carneiro sees “no evidence” for voluntary abrogation of sovereignty 
absent exogenous pressures and that war under necessary conditions 
(circumscribed agricultural or other – aquatic food – resources) provides the 
drive for state formation in numerous historical examples.  However, for the 
current research yes, Rousseau’s conception of spontaneous order is 
metaphysical.  And yes, a social construct, however in practice the concept of 
a social contract is commonplace and so there is continued utility in 
considering a, or actually many, forms of social contract (albeit subject to 
caveats below re the metaphysicality of the construct) regardless of putative 
evolutionary development histories.  That is the narrative constructs around a 
fall from grace from utopian, natural societies may be ahistorical however are 
not in and of themselves sufficient cause to abandon the metaphor of a social 
contract as an analytical frame. In an analysis supportive of such a stance, 
Shklar (1966) considers Rousseau as “uninterested” in history per se as a 
“Utopian” thinker. In this view, Rousseau was a critic of the state of commercial 
society at the time - the social contract being a “yardstick, not a program [sic]” 
(p.37): taking such a view lessens the importance of Rousseau’s construct of 
a prelapsarian history, and is similar to the Kantian perspective described in 
Williams (2003, p.139).  
2.3.3.2 Challenge from Frederick: Impossibility, redundancy and anti-
parsimony 
 
Frederick (2013) considers - strangely, without reference to Rawls: 
“[S]ocial-contract theories require that a proposition of the following 
form is non-vacuously true:  
(SC) necessarily, all reasonable persons under condition C will agree 
that p.  
The condition represented by ‘C’ is some favoured condition, such as 
being behind a veil of ignorance or being impartial. The proposition 
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represented by ‘p’ is a complex proposition affirming that everyone in 
the society should comply with a specific form of government or a 
particular system of moral rules” (p.179).  
Throughout, Frederick (2013) tests a “hard” version of the concept of the social 
contract, not unreasonably given the conceptions of Rousseau re the general 
will, lack of dissent and the formation of a civil religion.  However Frederick 
makes untenable demands when discussing individual agents’ knowledge 
required for rational decision-making such that “evaluation of a proposition 
must survive the severest criticism of her intellectual adversaries before it can 
count as knowledge” (p.184).  Practically, this is simply not the case (a more 
full discussion of the nature of knowledge is out with the scope of the current 
research, for an accessible example consider the warrant of telling the time 
from a clock, which under severe tests one could not say was accurate).  
Frederick is usefully challenging the concept of a hegemonic social contract 
with absolute adherence (and hence potentially totalitarian enforcement).  The 
demands for adherence are replaced with contested attempts (tests) of 
justification in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) across multiple competing 
and compromising “orders of worth”.  Coherence rather than truth may be a 
more appropriate criterion for social construction (there is no attempt here to 
break Humean restrictions on “ought” from “is”6).  There is a sense that a 
“strong” conception of a singular concept of the social contract is worthy of 
critique per Frederick, however that critique would lack the same force when 
directed at multiple contingent social contracts in extant society.  The 
argument from Frederick is somewhat semantic rather than substantial as all 
social contracts require a social anchor (Offe, 2012) (similar to MacIntyre, 
2007, that all moral philosophies require a sociology).  Frederick fails to show 
why, if the concept of social contracts is logically impossible, unnecessary and 
easily replaced with evolutionary developments in society, actually existing 
societies operate on co-operative norms and “habits” that rely on a form of 
“social contract”.  
                                            
6 Which, interestingly is dispensed with in “After Virtue” (MacIntyre, 2007) 
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2.4 “The Social Contract” and UK Banks 
 
“The social contract that underlies the principal of trust and ethical behaviour 
can and has added value beyond expectations. It can also reduce 
compliance costs. But, a regulatory system based on trust, ethical behaviour 
and transparency will have few oversight mechanisms in place to regulate 
behaviour” (Wilson et al., 2012, cited in McGeever, 2015, unpaged) 
Considering the social contract specifically in relation to the banking sector, 
this section considers how banking may be viewed as a “public good”, and 
then considers the relationship of the State to the banks, financially and with 
respect to regulation.  The possibility of a broader perspective is considered 
before the section concludes there is an inherent tension between the needs 
of the “market” and “civic society”. 
It is worth considering if and how banking is a “public good”. There is a 
distinction between “the public good” and “public goods”.  The latter are 
resources, services, capabilities, institutionally situated or not, which are 
“positive externalities”.  Such services or capabilities must be non-excludable 
in supply (supplier cannot control who is the consumer) and exhibit “non-rivalry 
in consumption” whereby there is zero marginal cost to serve the next 
consumer (Schinasi, 2005, pp.50-51). Whilst public goods may be produced 
by private or state actors, the former often under produce public goods in that 
private incentives encourage production until marginal cost equals marginal 
benefit for the producer rather than the public. Schinasi (2005, p.56) identifies 
the “efficiency-enhancing pool of transactors and liquidity that develops 
because of the existence of fiat money7 and its characteristics and services”.  
Given that in a credit based economy most “fiat money” is actually bank credit 
(Keen, 2010) the dominant factor behind the “public good” of liquidity pools is 
bank credit and therefore banks themselves.  The apparent fundamental 
importance of banks has led to calls for banking to be operationalised as a 
                                            
7 Smit, Buekens & du Plessis (2011) describe fiat money as government issued money such 
as Sterling or $US, not backed by an asset such as gold.  Referring to the gold standard in 
the first half of 20th century, they rightly note that gold itself does not have intrinsic value, only 
value from our preferences and desires (p.14) 
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utility rather than for profit maximisation (Mullineux, 2011, Jenkins, 2016).  
That said, there are limits to banking as a true public good – financial exclusion 
demonstrates the limits of non-excludability (Leyshon, et al., 2008) – a limit 
that is ignored by Schinasi (2005, particularly p.58).  Finance itself may be an 
imperfect public good, however financial stability appears to be a more “pure” 
public good – it is desirable by all due to the risks of negative externalities, is 
non-excludable and non-rivalous in consumption (Schinasi, 2005, p.58).  The 
marginal costs of financial stability are indeterminate however, in that there 
are costs for banks in foregone profits by holding safer, lower returning assets 
such as Gilts. There may be unintended consequences following from the 
suppression of banks’ returns in order to increase stability:  
“capital requirements may not always be as powerful as previously 
thought. This is because, in addition to a one-period capital-at-risk 
effect that reduces the incentive to gamble, there is a future-franchise 
value effect that increases the incentive to gamble.” (Hellmann, 
Murdock & Stiglitz, 2000, p. 162)  
That is, Hellmann et al. are suggesting that the tensions between civic 
justifications of financial stability and market returns could result in banking 
strategies that initially seem compliant however over the longer term may 
increase risk.  If financial stability is a public good, and if the more public goods 
a society provides the more capable the society is of providing for the public 
good, then regulation toward financial stability is supportive of the “social 
contract for the banks”.  
Mullineux (2011) argued that a social “compact” existed between the 
Government and the banking sector up until the mid-1980s whereby a narrow 
cartel of retail banks controlled (profited from8) the payments system and in 
return banks supported an extensive branch network to give access to 
payments9.  More recently, Mullineux (2014, p.90) argues that the payments 
                                            
8 To the extent that Mullineux (2011, p.449) viewed monopoly profits as part of a “Faustian 
bargain” 
9 This argument may be correct, however does seem to elide the role of bank branches as 




system, and more generally, financial stability are “public goods” and as such 
more needs to be done to ensure, through regulation and governance, that the 
banks support the public good.  Financial stability is in effect threatened by the 
“moral hazard” created as, especially in such a concentrated banking market 
as the UK, the largest banks are viewed as “too big [to be allowed to] fail” 
(Mullineux, 2014, p. 88): this means shareholders may demand a more 
aggressive approach to risk for higher anticipated return, knowing there is 
implicit government support for the banks.   
Mullineux (2014) alludes to calls from religious authorities for better 
performance from the banks with regard to the “social contract”: to quote in 
more length here: 
“Benedict XVI in his encyclical Caritas in Veritate two or three years ago 
said this: ‘Development is impossible without upright men and women, 
without financiers and politicians…’ – there have got to be some around 
somewhere – ‘whose consciences are finely attuned to the requirements 
of the common good.’ In other words, to move from dystopia to utopia – 
though we won’t get there – this means that good banks must have values 
of integration into society, mutual service to all other parts of society, 
reasonable but not excessive profitability, and the effective but measured 
distribution of wealth, to ensure high levels of investment in sustainable 
products and things that are good.” (Welby, 2013). 
In a speech such as above it is inevitable that a number of terms are under-
specified, the thrust of the message however is to position the banks in a utility 
frame, of service within society more generally.  Mullineux (2014) however 
argues that in contrast to such desires, the banks have been lobbying hard to 
resist further taxation and constraints that would restrict how they operate 
(unfortunately Mullineux does not provide sources for such assertions).  
In considering banks as utilities Mullineux (2009) foreshadowed some of the 
changes that would occur in the sector over the next few years, such as the 
splitting of retail and investment banking activities into separately capitalised 
entities (Mullineux, 2009, p. 463) or more focussed regulatory structures than 
under the FSA.  Mullineux (2009) suggests that high value, low activity and 
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low interest bearing current accounts are often held by elderly and less able 
customers. Less able, that is to manage their accounts to move money to 
accounts with a better rate of return, and hence these customers could be 
seen to be (in part) subsidising “free banking” for typically younger customers.  
These younger customers tend to be more active users of accounts with lower 
average balances (hence costing the bank more to service the accounts).  
Mullineux’s suggestion (p.462) of “sweeper accounts” to automatically move 
excess funds to better paying accounts is a good one though it is difficult to 
envisage banks following Mullineux’s suggestion that they provide 
individualised advice during home visits.  Here Mullineux is moving beyond 
banking as a utility per se to consider social goals (protection of elderly 
people’s wealth) with banks taking on a socially proactive role: which may be 
acceptable and/or desirable but is dependent on shareholder approval in 
shareholder-controlled firms.  Mullineux (2011, 2014) is concerned with 
shaping a new social contract for the banks, in contrast to the current study 
Mullineux considers a functionalist analysis of the banks and how the narrow 
range of functions may or may not impact society (e.g. through financial 
inclusion): by analysing existing functions though the analysis is limited in 
considering a broader range of societal demands.  
Alessandri & Haldane (2009) chart the evolution of the financial relationship 
between the banking sector and the State: the latter was dependent on the 
former to raise funds (at often-high rates of interest due to the risk of capricious 
or defeated sovereigns); however, the State now tends to be the “lender of last 
resort” to the banks.  This role has most dramatically been evidenced by UK 
and US government support of financial institutions to the tune of 74% and 
73% of GDP respectively after the financial crisis (p. 23).  Alessandri & 
Haldane (p.2) echo Tucker (2009) in stating that such support is ‘one side of 
the “social contract” between banks and the state’: another being regulation. 
Alessandri & Haldane (2009, p.2) note that the social contract, like all 
contracts, is “incomplete”.  The social contract is necessarily an incomplete 
contract due to immanent social construction: Wilkinson (1997) notes those 
conventions, rules, regulations and other “heuristics” in testing or justificatory 
situations are due to “incomplete contracts” (for all commodities including the 
particular case of labour).   Such incompleteness is describing two aspects of 
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contracts.  One is that there will be varying commitment to the contract over 
time, giving rise to a “time consistency problem for the authorities when dealing 
with crisis” Alessandri & Haldane (2009, p.2).  Secondly, incompleteness 
arises from being unable to determine all actions to maintain the contract, all 
determinations of meaning of the contract and the viability of maintaining the 
contract, at the time of creating the contract (Aghion and Bolton, 1992, Tirole, 
199910).  For social contracts, these issues are more complex given the 
socially constructed nature and inherent vagueness of social contracts that are 
not anchored to physical contract terms and conditions in written form: also, 
as social contracts are continually contested and “renewed” the 
incompleteness of the contract is simultaneously renewed. Regarding the 
banking sector, the problems of incompleteness and time inconsistency are 
worsened by risk dynamics, whereby limited liability, and Too-Big-To-Fail 
externalities mean the state has little choice but to “socialise losses” – losses 
that are all the greater due to bank leverage (UK, EU) or risk profiles such as 
“sub-prime” in the US (Alessandri & Haldane, 2009).  Even within the technical 
discussions regarding how to ameliorate the effects of financial crises on the 
public purse, such as increased reserve ratios, capital requirements and 
contingent capital arrangements for debt to equity conversions in stressed 
conditions, the fundamental dynamics remain: limited liability for shareholders 
mean the burden of losses can only ever be partly absorbed by falls in equity.  
Externalities are therefore inevitable and moral hazard has not been removed.   
For the social contract of the banks then, the construct is necessarily 
incomplete and contingent on the particular circumstances of time and place, 
which means that any analysis of constructions of social contracts is also 
anchored in the specificities of the particular situation and there is limited 
expectation of “generalisability” of results of such analysis.  
Baradaran (2013, p.1284) notes that given the need for an efficient banking 
sector in a modern complex economy, banks are necessary: however, 
extending the discussion of Alessandri & Haldane (2009), banks “need 
                                            
10 Tirole (1999) usefully notes the lack of precision in the remit of the State or agents of the 
State: “No mention is made of the many contingencies that may determine the ministry’s 
desirable choices and of how decisions are to [be made to] react to these contingencies” 
[edited for clarity] 
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government support, without which their customers would lack sufficient trust 
to permit them to function properly”.  Baradaran is referring here to the inherent 
fragility of deposit taking institutions that in effect borrow short term, lend long 
term, and are hence vulnerable to collapse in confidence leading to a run on 
the bank.  There have been few bank runs in Britain although the early phase 
of the financial crisis did see the collapse of Northern Rock, with queues of 
customers clamouring for the return of their deposits (The Economist, 2007).  
Baradaran (2013) emphasises Government support: “it will protect banks from 
runs, liquidity shortages, and investor irrationality” (p.1284) rather than the 
regulatory side of the social contract as emphasised by Alessandri & Haldane 
(2009), and Tucker (2009).  Baradaran is focussed on developments in the 
US. Banking, although in private hands, was seen as being in no small 
measure a “public good” which in turn influenced views as to the necessity of 
a public mission for banks – a view codified in a legal case in Kansas (p.1293).  
Earlier Thomas Jefferson had expressed doubts about, in modern 
terminology, rent seeking and predatory lending: “And I sincerely believe with 
you, that banking establishments are more dangerous than standing armies; 
& that the principle of spending money to be paid by posterity, under the name 
of funding, is but swindling futurity on a large scale” (Jefferson, 2016 [1816]).    
Baradaran (2013) considers that “policymakers lost their way because they 
lost sight of the special social contract that must exist with banks” (p.1311), 
that is, the social utility of banks and the fragile nature of deposit taking 
institutions (Howells & Bain, 2008) was de-emphasised; in contrast, “In 
reviving the social contract, the government needs to be clear that of 
paramount importance in banking are safety and soundness, consumer 
protection, and access to credit” (p.1330). With respect to safety and 
soundness, the technical policy prescriptions are very similar to Alessandri & 
Haldane (2009), however there is less focus in Baradaran (2013) on the 
potential implications of a more homogenous sector wherein idiosyncratic risk 
is reduced whilst systemic or market risk increases 
Tucker (2009) considers the social contract between banks and regulators.  
Here he is using the social contract in the sense of the contract between the 
governing and governed parties in society.  Tucker states: 
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“Traditionally, there have been three elements to the Social Contract 
for banking. In exchange for being allowed to profit from taking the risks 
inherent in providing liquidity, or monetary and credit, services to the 
economy, banks have been subject to prudential regulation; given 
access to liquidity insurance at the central bank; and required to finance 
industry-wide insurance schemes to protect depositors” (p. 2). 
There are no (legal) industry sectors exempt from all regulation (e.g. health & 
safety).  Tucker’s “prudential regulation” signifies a qualitative difference to 
conduct regulation of, for instance, manufacturing operations.  The key 
difference between regulations regarding product manufacturing, say, and 
“prudential” regulation is that regulation of manufacturing processes is 
indifferent to the continued operation of the firm.  However prudential 
regulations are focussed on ensuring the “safety and soundness” of financial 
institutions by assessing, monitoring and reducing risks, such as by improving 
capital structure (BoE, 2012).  “Prudential” regulation, which could require 
banks to change inter alia their capital structure to deal with risk rather than 
current issues and is more intrusive than other regulatory regimes, reflecting 
the systemic importance of the financial sector.  Regulation of capital structure 
(when combined with other institutional factors) adversely affects credit supply 
(Godlewski, 2005) which means that one public good (financial stability) is in 
tension with another public good (access to credit).  Such tension also 
illustrates the difficulty in discerning “the” abstract and generalisable “common 
good”.   
The above discussions are largely concerned with the narrow functions of 
banks: secure deposit taking, assessing credit risk, not taking advantages of 
information asymmetry to prey on customers, avoiding socialisation of losses 
in contrast to privatised gains.  A secondary role of banks, in allocating credit 
in a welfare enhancing way, is not really discussed out with concerns of 
financial exclusion/inclusion.  A rare (somewhat dated) analysis of US banking 
and the social contract with a wider perspective is found in Dymski (1993) 
wherein there is a call for banks to support the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) in order to mandate support for local communities.  Whilst the aim is 
laudable for the largest banks, the CRA ignores corporate registrations in one 
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(low tax) state whilst most operations are executed in another (higher tax) state 
(e.g. Barclays US registered in Delaware yet operates mostly in New York), 
which means a more holistic perspective is required.  
A narrow form of social optimality from bank lending, hence “social contract” 
between regulators and banks and taxpayers, is considered by Kocherlakota 
& Shim (2007).  In a dynamic model of borrowers, lenders, and 
taxpayers/consumers11 the authors consider the “social contract” in terms of 
utility for taxpayers when there is a fall in the value of collateral pledged against 
loans.  The assumption is that falls in collateral are independent of project 
utility but that regulations may mean that the bank, on behalf of depositors, 
may liquidate the loan with value from the borrowers’ projects only partially 
realised (hence taxpayers utility as consumers of the project goods only partly 
fulfilled).  The banks are assumed to be risk neutral, though it could be argued 
the effects modelled in the research would not have been altered much by an 
assumption of risk weighting of assets which more closely matches reality.  A 
fall in collateral would mean higher risk weightings and a fall in the risk 
weighted value of the asset.  If, as in the financial crisis, there is insufficient 
equity on the liability side of the balance sheet to absorb the fall in value of risk 
weighted assets then the bank may be balance sheet (not cash flow) insolvent 
and would need to dispose of assets (a dynamic well represented by Royal 
Bank of Scotland). The simpler model in Kocherlakota & Shim (2007) gives a 
formal confirmation of an intuitive result: if the environment is risky when an 
asset value shock decreases the value of collateral then “prompt corrective 
action” to liquidate bank assets is the optimum regulatory response.  In 
contrast, in a relatively low risk environment a collateral value shock should be 
met with forbearance and the taxpayer should bail out the depositors of the 
bank.  One limitation in application of the result not discussed by the authors 
is the reliability of risk assessment of the financial system, especially so in light 
of the criticism of complacency amongst regulators ahead of the financial crisis 
(Engelen, 2011).  
                                            
11 The authors use the term “outsiders” however taxpayers, as “outsiders” are both consumers 
of consumption goods from borrowers’ projects and potential funders of bailouts of depositors 
due to collateral/asset value falls.   
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Glinavos (2013, p.61) contends that regulations and law focussed on 
protecting the economy (e.g. in Kocherlakota & Shim, 2007, discussed above) 
ignores law as an instrument of social justice. There are two aspects to discuss 
here. Without economic stability, social harmony and social justice is 
constrained or unlikely (this is not to say the current economic relations should 
be protected, simply that there may be an argument for economic primacy).  
Secondly, it is instructive to revisit the "textbook" rationale for regulations: in 
finance these include but are not restricted to active interventions to prevent 
or recover from “market failures” such as externalities (effects on other 
businesses from banks’ collapse) or rent-seeking “usurious” loans, or financial 
exclusion (Barth et al. 2008, pp.18-19).  Glinavos (2013) is supportive of 
government intervention through regulation albeit does not address Hayek’s 
(2013 [1973]) concern that government is vulnerable to capture by special 
interest groups.  Support for a strong role for the state this cannot be without 
consideration of the risks, especially of regulatory capture (Kwak, 2013). 
Glinavos (2013, p.95) contends that if an inflexible response to financial crises 
does not meet the (undefined) "social contract" then there is the possibility of 
political and economic difficulties. Further Glinavos argues (in one of the key 
themes) that market oriented law does not allow for flexible policy response to 
crises with a wider scope than the (sole) agency of markets.  
Glinavos (2013, pp.153-154) follows McBarnet (2009) in considering the limits 
of accountability of firms – in this case with respect to Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) – and thence the importance of embedding 
accountability in law - law which is more amenable to shaping via democratic 
will rather than the involvement of stakeholders of firms/sectors. For Glinavos 
the priority is democratic control of the financial system. Glinavos (2013) 
addresses the lack of political engagement and the effectiveness therefore of 
democratic solutions proposed and whilst this section of Glinavos (2013) 
raises more questions than answers, overall Glinavos (2013) usefully 
highlights the shortfall in the current transmission mechanisms from 
democratic will, through law, to a social contract for finance that is broadly 
welfare enhancing rather than accreting inequalities and distancing national 
governments from control of their own fate. 
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2.5 Summary  
 
Embedded in socially constructed markets more or less subject to democratic 
oversight, banks are subject to the demands of forms of social contract.  Banks 
provide public goods and play a role in welfare enhancing distribution of credit.  
One of the fundamental features of banks functions is to borrow short term 
and lend long term, which means that deposit-taking banks are inherently 
fragile. Banks then rely on the implicit or explicit lender of last resort, the central 
bank and in effect the state to underwrite their balance sheets.  The complexity 
of banking and finance means that delegated regulatory authority may be 
narrowly technocratic and may be at risk of “regulatory capture”.  As introduced 
above, regulation for financial firms extends beyond conduct regulation to 
“prudential” regulation. Glinavos (2013) is concerned that greater democratic 
oversight is required (a civic approach); Baradaran (2013) calls for consumer 
protection (again a civic perspective) as well access to freely circulating goods 
and services (particularly credit), which is a call for civic and market 
considerations for banks to compromise.  The social contract for the banks 
then is, in theory, a construct that recognises the need for civic trust and 





3 Public Justification 
 
“The idea of a shared willingness to modify our private demands in order to 
find a basis of justification that others also have reasons to accept is a 
central element of the social contract tradition going back to Rousseau” 
(Scanlon, 1998, p.5, emphasis added) 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In considering how justifications are created, ordered and contested, the 
framework used below is that of “orders of worth” or “sociology of worth” 
(SOW) most notably developed by Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]).  This 
framework is valuable in that “its fundamental assumption that pluralism and 
complexity are the norm and, in order to avoid violence, social actors face an 
imperative to justify and legitimate themselves in moments of uncertainty or 
dispute” (van Bommel, 2014, p.1162). 
The following section treats justification as important and as amenable to 
analysis.  As shall be seen, public justifications may be treated as expressions 
of a “social contract”.  
3.1.1 Contribution 
 
In the context of the current research, the following section makes an important 
theoretical connection between conceptions of public justifications and social 
contract(s).  The chapter extends the current literature regarding the social 
contract by showing in more depth how social contracts may be viewed, and 
analysed, as public justifications or “orders of worth”.  
3.2 Pragmatic Sociology of Critique or “Orders of Worth”  
 
“Justifications” have been a perennial concern through history (at least post 
200 BCE) and “broadly understood, are answers to why-questions given and 
debated by social actors” (Abulof & Kornprobst, 2017, p.1).  Abulof & 
Kornprobst conceptualise “public justifications as reason giving and contesting 
in public communicative encounters that are made possible and impossible by 
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social context, and (re-)produce policies and even political orders” (p.2) and 
“as a form of intersubjective reasoning, thus becomes a key piece in the 
explanatory puzzle of our socio-political universe” (p.4).  Opportunity for public 
justifications and disputation depends on some form of social contract as an a 
priori condition.  
Boltanski & Thévenot (and Chiapello), through several publications discussed 
below, developed what has been termed a “sociology of judgement” or “French 
pragmatic sociology” (Lehoux, Daudelin, Hivon, Miller & Denis, 2014)12.  
Susen (2014, p.56) gives a concise overview of Boltanski & Thévenot 
(2006[1991]):- 
“[they] make a case for a multidimensional framework founded on 
several ‘orders of worth’ or ‘polities’13, in which actors employ their day-
to-day sense of justice. Owing to the interactional centrality of people’s 
quotidian immersion in multiple regimes of engagement and 
justification, one of the key characteristics of differentiated societies is 
normative pluralism: the diversity of opinions, belief systems, and life 
styles is a precondition for the consolidation of discursively rich and 
democratically organized societies”. 
Multiple regimes of justification point to concurrent constructs of more than a 
single “social contract”, in contrast to Rousseau who focussed on “the” social 
contract between the citizenry and the state.  In Boltanksi and Thévenot’s own 
words, they attempt:- 
“to build a framework within which a single set of theoretical instruments 
and methods can be used to analyse the critical operations that people 
carry out when they want to show their disagreement without resorting 
to violence, and the ways they construct, display, and conclude more 
or less lasting agreements” (2006 [1991], p.25) 
                                            
12 Ponte (2016) considers the “orders of worth” discussed in this section as a subset of French 
pragmatic sociology, specifically “Convention Theory” 
13 Annisette & Richardson (2011, p.234) also use the term “commonwealth” 
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The concept of “the” social contract in, inter alia Rousseau or Hobbes can be 
likened to “the political-philosophical endeavour to come up with a singular or 
reduced set of principles for a society to be just” (Blokker, 2011, p.252). In 
contrast for Blokker (2011) the pragmatic sociology of critique “presumes a 
plurality of criteria of justification, related to a plurality of views of the common 
good, which are understood as in principle irreducible and between which no 
ultimate hierarchy can be identified” (p.252).  A “single” framework is then a 
generalizable approach and the heterogeneous situations of prior research 
analysed below bear testimony to the adaptability of the framework of “orders 
of worth”.    
The pragmatic sociology of critique is then a potentially useful tool to examine 
arguments, ideas and justifications – of the sort that appear in, say, speeches 
by regulators, or annual reports and accounts of firms. The framework is not a 
sociology of “everything” (Conley, 2015) as contexts for disputes must be non-
violent, albeit Boltanski attempts to expand the scope of the discussion 
subsequently: “pragmatic sociology is expanded into a wider theory of society 
and social action” (Blokker, 2011, p.254).  Neither is the framework dependent, 
in contrast to a Marxist/Hegelian approach, on historically situated norms: 
“Boltanski & Thévenot do not posit the issue of the historic consequences of 
social conflicts in terms of development and moral learning” (Basaure, 2011, 
p.266).  The lack of historical anchoring (or periodisation) is a strength of the 
approach as the analyses are not dependent on a priori analyses of, say, 
labour/capital relations and therefore can be applied in a broad range of 
situations. 
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], pp.74 onward) set out a “grammar” of the 
polity, or “justificatory regime” created within political economies.  As a 
“grammar” the framework is descriptive rather than normative, (though see 
later developments below with regard to shareholders).  Boltanski & Thévenot 
frame polities as ways of offering perspectives that can ultimately be used to 
solve disputes (by consideration of a higher logical conception of common 
humanity): disputes or moments of “questioning and criticism” (p.17) can be 
viewed as sites for “discerning qualification” (p.12).  Such a frame is pertinent 
in the current research, as there will always be a tension or dispute between 
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regulators and regulated firms or NGOs and firms due to conflicting interests 
or values.  Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) are less concerned with critique 
of the underlying philosophies of the polity as they are focused on the 
grammar, the constructive aspects of the texts that reify the polity.    
An acknowledged limit to the scope of Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) 
polities is the focus on “equilibrium” polities wherein a “common humanity” has 
some meaning, currency and agency as a structuring component.  Such 
structures break down in, say, civil war or armed occupation, states that would 
be the sine qua non of the authors’ rejected polities based on violence.  
Further, Boltanski & Thévenot (2000) note that the orders of worth approach 
“does not purport to account for all the facts and gestures that are habitually 
called ‘social’ and “The model does not aspire to an exhaustive 
comprehension, and one will vainly search here for a matrix that allows social 
reality to be described in all its aspects. Persons are not constantly focused 
on justice, and the demand of justice is far from necessarily present in all the 
situations in which they interact” (p.209).   
As a “grammar”, it is possible to consider the orders of worth as analytical 
categories that can be used in the analysis of text14, wherein the 
polity/justificatory regime is composed of common categories. The categories 
the authors use are: 
 Common Superior Principle – Criteria or “maxims” for Success 
o Whilst this may be difficult to sum up “in a single term” (Boltanski 
& Thévenot (2006 [1991], p.141) this is the foundational criteria 
such as “renown” in the world of fame/reputation, or “position 
within the domestic – family – world”.  
 Common Good 
 Common Humanity  
 Natural Relationship between Beings 
 Common dignity 
                                            
14 In the broad meaning of text including speech (Fairclough, 2010) 
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o There must be a way of bringing individual physical capacities to 
bear in order to develop a shared or comparable criteria.  There 
is a transformation from some aspect of human nature that is 
transformed into a comparable capability (p.142) 
 Principle of differentiation 
 Repertoire of Objects and Mechanisms; the latter would include, for 
instance “rules” (p.142) 
 Repertoire of Subjects 
 Priority of Worth 
 Condition of Great Person15 - embodies values of the polity 
 Condition of Little Person – absence of the values of the polity 
 Status Relation (especially of Great Person to Little Person) 
 Decline of the polity – instances where the polity is not supported 
o Notably a concern for such aspects has deep historical roots 
including Ibn Khaldun’s work in the 1380’s that “greed and 
selfishness that came with power, at the expense of the common 
good” (Butzer, 2012, p.3632); additionally “decline” may simply 
be “characterized as self-satisfaction” (Boltanski & Thévenot 
(2006 [1991], p.144). 
 Investment formula (or cost implications) 
o Model Tests: the outcome of which is uncertain, such tests (to 
the validity of the justificatory regime) are focused on a set of 
people solely from one polity. 
o Ways of expressing judgement: such methods will be coherent 
with the way the superior principle is expressed (e.g. fame) 
 Forms of self-evaluation 
By including a “repertoire” of objects – that is, tangible expressions of the polity 
such as prizes, shared resources (parks, hospitals), measurement equipment, 
etc., Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) “link macro-level conceptions of the 
‘good’ and the ‘just’ to their actual instantiations in the real life of the social 
                                            
15 In Boltanski & Chiapello (2007, p.109 & elsewhere) this is referred to as “Condition of Great 
Man” however a less gendered term is used here 
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world” (Reinecke, van Bommel & Spicer, 2017).  The reification of objects 
within polities may also aid empirical analysis of orders of worth by 
categorisation of observations.  A representation of the dimensions above and 




































































Table 1 Summary of Orders of Worth: Adapted from Thévenot et al. (2000), Annisette & Richardson (2011, p.233), Patriotta et al. (2011, p.1810) 
                                            
16 It is out with the scope of the current study to consider the human/nature divide, however from an eco-centric perspective there is no difference 
between nature and “humans”.  The artifice of the divide is considered, for example by Morton in inter alia McIntyre & Medoro (2016) to be at the root 
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Table 1 Summary of Orders of Worth: Adapted from Thévenot et al. (2000), Annisette & Richardson (2011, p.233), Patriotta et al. (2011, p.1810) 
 
                                            
17 Note the ecosystem level echoes concerns of Gray (2010) regarding the viability of the concept of “sustainability” at firm level 
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Table 1 Summary of Orders of Worth: Adapted from Thévenot et al. (2000), Annisette & Richardson (2011, p.233), Patriotta et al. (2011, p.1810) 
 
Notes: Common Good, Common Humanity are contingent and constructed in specific texts rather than having universal 
characteristics per instance of a polity. The “Projective” order of worth from Boltanksi & Chiapello (2007) excluded as not 
relevant to the current research. Some of the more detailed category examples in Annisette & Richardson (2011, p.233) have 
been excluded as they are context specific and constraining, particularly lists of objects, subjects.
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A noteworthy contrast between the dimensions of orders of worth and prior 
conceptions of justice is the inclusion above of the condition of great person 
or “little” person.  Such a conception alludes to the principle of “desert”19.  As 
such a concept of desert in a scheme of justice contrasts with McIntyre’s 
(2007, pp.246-251) analysis of Rawls’ and Nozick’s alternative approaches to 
justice, which although antithetical toward each other in many respects share 
a disavowal of desert – Rawls by disregarding the past, Novick by focus on 
(fair) entitlement.  MacIntyre (p.251) is sharply critical that disallowing 
concepts of desert necessarily disallows notions of human community and 
contributions to develop of the common good as desert-generating actions by 
which morality may be judged.   The inclusion condition of great person or 
“little” person is of note within a framework toward “justice”.  Hence, whilst 
Boltanski, Thévenot, and Chiapello variously use the metaphor(s) of justice 
within the cité (city), or “polity”, the authors do not preclude inequality (similar 
to the difference principle in Rawls, 1971).   Justice in this sense is with respect 
to status or position within the polity, rather than justice in a 
legalistic/punitive/retributive sense.  The above analysis positions “orders of 
worth” as somewhat distinct from some other conceptions of social contracts 
by allowing for “desert”, and illustrates further the complex history of the 
concept of the social contract.  
Based on analysis of canonical philosophical texts and management 
instruction text, Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) set out a number orders 
of worth or “polity” as listed below.  
Thévenot et al. (2000) developed a justificatory regime or “grammar” for a 
“Green” Polity.  This latter conception is subtly different to the other Polities in 
                                            
19 There is insufficient scope to consider in detail the principle of desert, which has roots in at 
least biblical times (see Jeremiah 17:10).  In suggesting desert as a moral principle, Dwyer 
(2019) contends inequality is a topic often addressed in economics, ethics, politics and 
proposes “that desert via a merit-based view of responsibility is a normative ideal that hinges 
upon a fundamental moral intuition” (p.4) and contends that “allocations of Just Deserts realize 
to a greater extent than that exhibited in our current economy, and may even maximize, the 
fundamental values of equal opportunity, economic efficiency, and individual liberty” (p.5, 
emphasis in original). Whilst Rowlingson & Connor (2011) are reticent about promoting the 
principle of desert, their contribution is to highlight current practice wherein the desert principle 
is applied asymmetrically toward rich (less blamed for rule/law breaches) or poor (more 
blamed).   
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that the “common humanity” is superseded by an interdependence between 
humanity and the natural world that extends through time (hence considers 
future generations). 
The polities all conform to the “grammar” of elements or dimensions listed 
above. The individual polities are described below. Boltanski & Thévenot 
(2006 [1991]) consider the incompatibility of the polities – they are individually 
“ideal types” - and how such conflict or tests may be resolved.  Resolution 
comes about through either agreeing the dominant polity that is used to 
evaluate critique and justify the situation, or through compromise wherein an 
equivalence is constructed between concepts of, for example, the superior 
principle or the tests for worth.  Equivalence is contingent on continued 
agreement to the equivalence, and similarly agreement on the dominant polity 
is contingent on acceptance of goals, outcomes, and tests.   Boltanski & 
Thévenot (2006 [1991], pp.343-346) further comment that conflict may be 
resolved, or rather, completed, through the use of power and in particular 
violence.  At this point justification is moot, and the social contract abandoned.    
3.2.1 Inspirational Polity20  
 
Participants in the inspired polity welcome “passion”, the “mysterious, 
imaginative, original, unspeakable, unnameable, ethereal” and are “at ease in 
informal situations” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991], p.160, emphasis in 
original).  Inspiration is available to anyone regardless of material wealth and 
in this sense, the inspired polity has fewer “qualified objects” to tie justifications 
to the corporeal world, instead access to inspired worth “calls for sacrificing 
forms of stabilization” (p.161).  The latter may be a reason why there is little 
evidence found of the inspirational polity in the analysis below, given 
businesses rely on at least some form of stability without which they could not 
operate.  
                                            
20 In considering this polity based on “The City of God” by St Augustine (Augustine, 2012 [early 
C5th]) any critical analysis of foundational concepts of “God” and “Saint” is absent from 




The inspirational polity also stands in contrast to concerns of fame: the 
religious (specifically Christian) conception of the good life concerns “self-
abnegation in favor [sic] of others” Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], p.88). 
The inspirational perspective eschews personal reward and competition in 
favour of co-operation and contains within the polity all elements including non-
human animals.     
3.2.2 Domestic Polity 
 
The Domestic Polity is a hierarchical conservative vision of an “ordered” 
society wherein social rank is important and endowed through position within 
a family or, by analogy, to the person’s position within a firm.  As such, the 
domestic polity is a somewhat patriarchal reactionary vision of society. The 
domestic polity has roots in monarchical absolutism per Hobbes and in 
particular Bossuet (1999 [1709]) who sees the state and the monarch as 
unitary: the success of the state depends on the sacrifice to the state by the 
King. Within such a polity agreements are enforced by superiors in the 
hierarchy, however such superiors exist (ostensibly) as “champions of the 
weak” Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], p.95).  The authors contend that 
cohesion of the domestic polity relies on nationwide ritual.  Discussions of 
centuries-old conceptions of the polity including the elision of public and 
private space, and moral judgements, foreshadow current “neo-liberal” 
encroachments between the public and private, for example with respect to 
work/home balance (inter alia Dixon, 2009): the domestic (small “d”) space 
has been under siege for quite some time.   
3.2.3 Reputational Polity or “Fame” 
 
Originally conceived as the world of “fame” Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) 
within this polity “the construction of worth is tied to the constitution of 
conventional signs that condense and display the power generated by the 
esteem people have for one another” (p.99).  The authors Analyse works from 
the 17th Century by Hobbes in developing the conception that reputation 
(fame) depends on possessing the most number possible of positive attributes 
(opinions) from the most people (especially elites, who favour their own in-
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group opinions): hence reputation is an external judgement independent of 
self-esteem. 
In contrast to the Domestic Polity, the Reputational Polity stands on 
foundations that are contingent on the value judgements of others and hence 
reputation, hard fought for, may be lost with ease. 
The analysis by Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) leading to the 
Reputational Polity contains a significant omission.  The development of 
reputation(s) is not a level epistemological playing field due to, inter alia, 
control of the media (Herman & Chomsky, 2010) - despite social media/blog 
encroachment (Meraz, 2009), framing effects (Habermas, 2006), and the 
power to develop “the production and reproduction of elite expertise and world 
views” (Zald & Lounsbury, 2010).  
3.2.4 Civic Polity 
 
In terms of construction and foundations at least, the Civic polity is of particular 
interest as, similar to the discussion of the “Social Contract” above, the Civic 
polity is founded on an analysis of the work of Rousseau (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006 [1991], p.107).  The notion of worth within the Civic polity is 
dependent on the extent to which the person being judged is deemed to be 
acting in accordance, and supporting, the General Will.  The decline of the 
polity is when legitimate disagreement is suppressed in order to enforce 
conformity to the general will (Vauleon, 2014). 
An important aspect of the Civic Polity is worth quoting: 
“Legality defines a form of worth that is particularly appreciated within 
this world.  It belongs to texts when they are regulatory or legislative” 
(p.186, emphasis in original) 
From this description of the Civic Polity, it could be expected that the texts 
from regulators and government and the responses from Banks would contain 
many examples of the dimensions of this polity, albeit the polity itself is 
applicable in a wider range of test situations out with banking and finance.   
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3.2.5 Industrial Polity 
 
In stark contrast to the inspirational polity, the industrial polity is grounded in 
“technological objects and scientific methods” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 
[1991], p.203).  The industrial polity is concerned with the satisfaction of 
“needs” in a productive and efficient manner.  
The Industrial Polity is constructed from Boltanski & Thévenot’s (2006 [1991]) 
analysis of the work of Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon, particularly his 
“L’Industrie” from 1817.  Saint-Simon conceived of organisation of society, or 
Government particularly, as narrowly bound to “the management of work and 
production” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991], p.120) which is a stark 
contrast to the society wide, general-will implementing view of jurisprudence 
or Government from Rousseau.  Hence the scope of government is limited to 
creation of fair markets (in particular for agriculture, manufacturers, trade) – a 
view preceding the ordo-liberalism which was dominant in German economic 
thought - “social policy to secure the sociological and ethical preconditions of 
free markets” (Bonefeld, 2012)21.  The consequences of a narrow focus on 
efficiency and cost with disregard of societal impacts can be seen in the 
positive reaction of share prices to news of redundancies with attendant if 
implicit hardship for employees – “mean announcement period returns are 
positive”22 (Collett, 2002). 
3.2.6 Commercial or Market Polity  
 
The market polity is constructed from an analysis of the work of the early 
economist Adam Smith (Smith, 2010 [1759], Smith, 2005 [1776]).  Competition 
to service wants and needs (more the former in Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 
[1991], p.196) forms the superior principle of the polity which is characterised 
                                            
21 Bonefeld (2012) traces ordo-liberalism to the Weimar republic, late 1920’s. 
22 It would appear the context is important. The sample in Collett (2002) is UK specific and 
stands in contrast to previous studies in US and Japan -  the difficulty arising in the literature 
appears to be in separating capital investment that is employment reducing (automation) from 
that which is employment enhancing (simple expansion)  
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“salable [sic] goods”, which may be “rare” or at least have a “strong position in 
a market” (p.196, emphasis in original).  
Boltanski & Thévenot were aided by the systematic nature of “Wealth of 
Nations” and “Theory of Moral Sentiments”: the authors’ analysis treats both 
as part of singular project.  Before this, the authors consider Hume’s (1739-
1740) “Treatise on Human Nature” which has a somewhat pessimistic view of 
the motives within society (such as selfishness).  Such motives are 
ameliorated by exchange of external goods rather than direct competition 
whereby “individuals redirect their vanity toward goods, and the constraint of 
scarcity that presides over the distribution of these goods is the basis for a 
new type of worth” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991], p.51).   
An assumption made in constructing the market polity is that market relations 
are “atemporal” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991], p.194).  The authors 
make this claim for two reasons.  One is to distinguish the market polity from 
the planned, time dependent industrial polity. The other is to justify the 
“ambiguous objects” (p.195) that disturb models of market coordination23, 
without over-claiming a new general equilibrium model of markets.  However 
in the latter desire to avoid venturing into dynamic equilibrium views of the 
economy an essential aspect of market relations – repeat transactions – is by 
definition excluded.  Whilst the discussion of the market polity is extended 
somewhat to consider utility (p.283) the atemporal construct not only appears 
to exclude repeated transactions (wherein the price may change) but also 
transactions that are complex, opaque and hard to value: very much like the 
credence services provided by banks (Hoepner & Wilson, 2012).   
  
                                            
23 Picasso’s scribble on a napkin, p.282 is an interesting example of different polities in play 




3.2.7 Green Polity  
 
This polity was added by Thévenot, et al., 2000, though with roots in Lafaye & 
Thévenot, 199324.  
The green polity has a longer period than other polities, is multi-generational 
and the qualified subjects and objects encompass everything natural, human 
and non-human alike.  The overall conception of “space” in the polity is that of 
the planetary ecosystem. 
In developing the green polity, Thévenot, et al. (2000) considered particular 
test situations where ecological harm was contrasted with economic benefit in 
two projects (road through a remote French valley, dam in “wilderness” area 
in the US).  Building on the orders of worth or justificatory regime approach of 
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), Thévenot et al. (2000) consider 
justifications are attempts to construct arguments beyond the particular, to 
claim a generalisability and hence legitimation, by appeal to a “common good”.  
In adumbrating their theoretical position, of considering constraints on 
repertoires of argumentation (p.238) and of the “pragmatics of public space 
and discourse” the authors note “the configuration of public space and the 
dynamics of discourse depend heavily on the mode of acting privileged in a 
political culture” (p.239).   It is interesting albeit out with the scope of the current 
research to consider how the political culture around banking and finance 
(Gordon Brown as PM favoured the tax revenue from The City) configures the 
construction, the Overton Window25, of the social contract for the banks.  
3.2.8 Project Oriented Polity 
 
In an increasingly networked employment landscape, the superior principle of 
the projective or project oriented polity is that of “activity” Boltanski & Chiapello 
(2007, p.109, emphasis in original), to extend networks through participation 
                                            
24 This source is in French, the author’s limited facility with that language suggests Lafaye & 
Thévenot consider the Green Polity as an addition to the schema of Boltanski & Thévenot due 
to incompatibilities between ecology focused justifications and the other orders of worth (the 
Civic Polity is specifically discussed) 
25 The “acceptable” topics of political discourse, see Beck (2010) 
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in projects: it is important to insinuate oneself into the next project, the next 
network, as the current project finishes. To be inflexible, “immobile” (p.119), to 
be unemployed, shows the decline of the polity.  
Boltanski & Chiapello (2007, p.106) draw the distinction between networks and 
projects (which may be embedded in wider networks).  For the authors the 
persons and relations in a network are “indeterminate” as new parts of the 
network may form at any time.  Hence the “very notion of the common good is 
problematic” as the constituents of the “common” here are also indeterminate 
and temporary.  Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) consider in some detail the 
fragmentation of and removal of protections within work and the working class 
in the late twentieth century (it could be argued that “The New Spirit of 
Capitalism” is actually two books, one developing the projective polity, the 
other analysing a more wide ranging critique of the development of capitalism).  
Patriotta, Gond & Schultz (2011, p.1833) removed this particular polity from 
their research due to concerns that it was less well rooted in empirical 
research, had been subject to little testing, and could be made to operate 
within other polities.  Additionally the project-oriented polity is constructed on 
an individual rather than firm/corporate level, which means that this particular 
polity is not included in the scope of the analysis below (nor in Table 1 above). 
3.3 Public Justifications as social contracts 
 
Vallier (1996) considers, “The great social contract theorists – Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau and Kant – all held that for a political order to be legitimate it had to 
be agreed upon by or justified for each person” – albeit the particular forms of 
social contract differ.  For Kant the social contract was always an idea or ideal 
with which to compare the current state (Riley, 1982, p.125, Williams, 2003, 
p.139).  Hence, the concept of social contracts and in particular agreement to 
a particular form of contract are closely tied to concepts of public justification. 
Gaus (2013) considers that if sufficient members of a community consider a 
convention moral, this convention “is not only a positive convention, but one 
that really is moral” (p.81).  This is similar to the discussion of Frederick (2013) 
above wherein social contracts are legitimate if members of a 
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community/society agree they are (there is no absolute determination of truth 
of a convention).  For Gaus (2013, p.81) “The social contract is best 
understood as way to model public justification” which means the reverse 
construction is true: public justifications relate to social contract(s).  Public 
justifications (and contentions and developments) allow the set of acceding 
publics to approach the total set of the public or community, wherein a social 
contract is formed as that in which there is no deep disagreement regarding 
the individual utility of the social contract.  The movement to broad agreement 
is important for Gaus in that the social contract is “not maintained simply by 
free action, exchange and common interest, but also by internalization, guilt 
and punishment” (p.83) – hence limited agreement suggests increased 
enforcement (echoes of being “forced to be free”) and hence not a legitimate 
convention.    
D'Agostino (1996) whilst linking social contracts and public justification order 
to achieve consent, considers the difficulty in truly assigning legitimacy to (say) 
an institution given the lack of outside, objective perspective – which Rawls 
(1971) constructs as thought experiment – from which to make a judgement.  
D'Agostino (1996), d'Agostino, Gaus & Thrasher (1996) support the need for 
public justification (“publicity” conditions in Rawls, 1971).  Lacey & Lamont 
(2014) similarly make the distinction between the consent-oriented 
approaches to the social contract of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, in contrast to 
the justice orientation of Rawls (1971).  A justice orientation is more processual 
and dependent on public justifications (Lacey & Lamont, 2014, p.834) however 
practically for a consent based approach to be operationalised the volunteers 
need to be able to evaluate and negotiate competing visions of society so 
public justification plays a role also, in that citizens need to obtain the 
necessary information in order to consent. 
Gaus (2013) notes that the processes to resolve conflicts to agree on contracts 
are “indeterminate” (p.85) and that disagreement over justification may extend 
to disagreements over procedure to resolve disagreements.  Referring to 
Hume, Gaus notes a presumption toward convention or a commitment to some 
form of common good: albeit moral codes form through “a matter of 
contingency and happenstance, not the unique dictates of an impartial 
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procedure” (p.86).  Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991] usefully demarcate 
instances where contingent moral codes do not form, thwarted by instances of 
violence.  As a unified theory of society conventions theory or orders of worth, 
and public justification principles espoused by Gaus, are necessarily limited in 
that they cannot be a positive theory of unresolved disagreement through 
violence.   
From the above discussion accepting Gaus’ proposition, that public 
justifications are the foundation of social contract(s), a framework for analysing 
the construction of public justifications aids in understanding heterogeneous 
social contracts.  Given the bounded understanding of the requirements of 
knowledge and justice qua Sachs (2015), the positive (descriptive) nature of a 
framework to analyse justifications through orders of worth is worthwhile, 
despite discussions of implicit normative aspects of the framework re investors 
(see Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007, pp.365-366 and discussion of findings 
below). See Boltanski & Thévenot (2000, p.210) re the normativity implicit in 
the need to develop a grammar toward a shared humanity. Usefully, orders of 
worth allow for hierarchy in relations between agents – there is no a priori 
assumption of egalitarian relations (the “conditions of great/little person” 
distinction allow inequality to remain just), which better matches actually 
existing conditions than an assumption of egalitarianism.   
A framework (such as represented in Table 1) can be seen as more 
ontologically closed and definite than was intended by Boltanski & Thévenot, 
2006 [1991]:  
“with nearly twenty years hindsight […] these pluralist positions were 
not expressed with sufficient force […] to prevent the framework 
presented in On Justification giving rise to re-appropriations which tend 
to employ it as if it made possible to effect a closure on reality and hence 
render it in some way calculable” (Boltanski, 2011, p.56).   
Subsequently Boltanksi affirms that ontological openness is endogenous: “It 
is precisely because dispute and critique occupy a central role in the course 
of social life that normativity can never be completely absorbed into regularity” 
(2011, p.85).  There are two implications for the current work: firstly, that 
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ontological closure should not be assumed and this may mean holding the 
tension or unease around definitive categorisation, and secondly, that the 
meaning of texts is paramount rather than a reliance on quantification.  
 
3.4 Prior research using “orders of worth”  
 
Whilst pragmatic sociology of critique or “orders of worth” was initially of note 
only in France and subsequently in Germany, there is increasing awareness 
in Anglophone countries – for instance a special issue devoted to the topic in 
the European Journal of Social Theory (2011, 14:3).  The initial obscurity 
outside of France means there are relatively few prior researches to consider 
that are available in English: the following section considers the prior research 
available and the implications for the current research.  
Boisvert & Vivien (2012) use the “orders of worth” framework discussed above 
to some extent in considering the “construction” of the “Convention on 
Biological Diversity”.  The authors set out ways in which biodiversity may be 
represented in the Convention text using the Market, Industrial, Civic, Renown 
(Reputational/Fame), Inspirational, and Domestic Polities.  Subsequently it is 
noted there are examples within the Convention of the Market, Industrial, Civic, 
Domestic and Renown polities.  The authors did not consider the “green” or 
“portfolio/connexionist” polities discussed above.  More pertinently for this 
section, Boisvert & Vivien (2012) contains no explication of methods, of what 
phrases, themes or sections of discourse led to the identification of these 
polities in the text26.  Boisvert & Vivien’s (2012) discussion of Godard (2005) 
is suggestive of the need for a common ground for true compromise rather 
than fragile acceptance of alternate tests, objects pertaining to conflicting 
orders of worth, echoing Boltanksi and Thévenot ([2006] 1991, p.278), and 
Mesny & Mailhot (2007, discussed below).   
                                            
26 Unfortunately, one of the key sources used in Boisvert & Vivien (2012) was Godard’s (2005) 
“Les conditions d’une gestion économique de la biodiversité - Un parallèl avec le changement 
climatique” which as the title implies is in French. 
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Kietäväinen & Tuulentie (2013) consider rhetoric around climate change in 
tourism texts.  They use the six polities of Market, Industrial, Civic, Renown 
(Reputational), Inspirational, and Domestic as well as the “green” – they term 
“ecological” - polity.   The authors employed a mixed methods approach 
comprising:  
“qualitative content analysis with a specific emphasis on the rhetoric 
and the features of the arguments used. The data were coded 
according to which context was used when speaking of climate change, 
and how climate change was understood in a continuum from active 
and concrete to passive and abstract phenomenon. Quantification was 
used to illustrate the prevalence of the arguments” (p.850).  
Additionally the results show that quantification was categorised by valence – 
positive, negative, or neutral (p.851, Table 1).  The authors, in contrast to 
Boisvert & Vivien (2012) above, do give some indications of text or figuration 
examples pertaining to, e.g. “market worth” (Kietäväinen & Tuulentie, 2013, 
p.851).  Much of the discussion is “content based” as in, discussion of where 
and how “climate change” is discussed or framed, with no attempt to 
consistently or frequently address the links to the polity/orders of worth 
framework. That said, there is analysis showing how texts may proclaim one 
main justification (environmental reasons) whilst substantively focussing on 
justifications “from the worlds of fame and markets” (p.852).  Whilst noting that 
quantification would show the prevalence of themes, quantification was only 
applied to “climate change”, and to factors influencing tourism in the analysis 
of interviews (p.853) or putative actions to respond to such change (p.855).  
Although the authors identify the civic world, the industrial world, and market 
world as predominant (with climate change as a topic linking to the “green” 
world), the research is not transparent with respect to the relative 
predominance of such themes. The research shows how more than one 
justificatory regime may be operant at the same time without explicit resort to 
compromise.   
For the current research, the implications of Kietäväinen & Tuulentie (2013) 
are that the research demonstrates the viability of an additional, quantitative 
step to a qualitative approach in order to determine which themes are 
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foregrounded or de-emphasised.  Within the space constraints of a research 
paper some of the detailed connections and quantifications between texts and 
polity are obscured.  The research also lends support to Boltanski & Thévenot, 
(2006 [1991]) in their contention that multiple views of justification may be 
present in a social situation concurrently. 
Miranda, Kim & Summers (2015) frame their grounded theory analysis of 
visions/understandings of social media with respect to schema theory and 
organising vision theory (p.592).  This enables an approach to consider levels 
of understanding around an organising vision/perspective.  The use of 
grounded theory is justified by a “paucity of theories to inform what constitutes 
an organizing vision and how it is constituted”: such a perspective echoes the 
current exploratory approach to the Social Contract, as a social construction 
rather than a simple noun.  The use of grounded theory by Miranda, Kim & 
Summers (2015) is constrained by use of a priori frameworks.  The authors 
used an iterative coding technique to group items of text under the Civic, 
Domestic, Industrial, Inspirational, Market and Renown [Reputational or Fame] 
“principles” as they label the polity.  Following a content analysis approach 
they coded for terms from Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991] with additions 
from research group discussion/coding iterations.  With respect to inter-coder 
reliability, this was high through all six “principles” however the industrial polity 
was notably weakest, though why this might be the case was not discussed 
by the authors. The content analysis was constructed around 
presence/absence of words relating to the polity overall, that is, the constitutive 
components of the polity were not analysed.   Such an approach is well suited 
to a larger cohort of texts for analysis - the research sample comprised 2,414 
texts (7,500 pages).  As such, this stands in contrast to the more fine-grained 
approach in the current work with a much smaller sample.  The authors do not 
discuss compromise constructs at all.  The lack of discussion of compromise 
is an artefact of a quantitative approach considering the characteristics of 
terms: “coding each text for presence of the principles. To enhance coding 
validity, we began with keywords culled from the margin notes provided in 
Boltanski & Thévenot’s (2006)” (p.595).  The coding then was presence or 
absence of polities rather than the simultaneous presence of multiple polities, 
or the relations between polities described in the text, or composite 
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constructions.  It is not clear how composite constructions (if observed) were 
coded. 
A narrower focus within the “orders of worth” framework is taken by Ramirez 
(2013), who focusses on the situational “tests” of the polity(s).  Ramirez (2013) 
is focused on criticism and justification in the audit sector in the context of 
institutional change and challenges to legitimacy. Ramirez (2013, p.854) notes 
the difficulty in applying an a priori framework to a real situation.  In contrast to 
other research in this area Ramirez (2013, p.855) is simultaneously using the 
framework of orders of worth and challenging “the very process of attribution”, 
hence allowing an openness to new information out with the a priori framework 
of orders of worth.  The sampled texts included secondary written material e.g. 
articles in professional journals and interviews with auditors.  There is little 
direct attribution of texts (or units of texts) to polities.  The author notes some 
of the features of justification – what constitutes a “great auditor” echoes the 
“great person” test discussed above.  Beyond justification, Ramirez (2013) 
notes the need for “institutional work” by the auditing profession (ICAEW) in 
order to restore equity between members.  Ramirez discusses limited 
examples of compromise in their analysis.  The move to compromise between 
the audit profession and small firms was to bring new evaluative objects 
(assessments of audits) into play.  Whilst Ramirez is not explicit this seems to 
compromise between the industrial (efficiency) and domestic (hierarchy, own 
control) polities.  The implication for the current research is to be open to new 
forms of justification or, similar to Ramirez (2013), new structural 
arrangements enabling the agency of individuals that are not represented in 
the overall framework of Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991]. 
Patriotta, Gond & Schultz (2011) use a quantitative content analysis method 
to examine the use of orders of worth present in public communications and 
debate in the aftermath of a Swedish company’s “near miss” regarding a 
potential nuclear core meltdown at a power plant. The sample period for texts 
was the year following the event.   As a quantitative method, NVivo was used 
on a large corpus of text (over 800 items – some of which would presumably, 
as press releases, be brief). Similar to Miranda et al. (2015) the coding was 
derived from Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) for the most part, with 
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additions (such as synonyms) derived from texts and subject to inter-testing 
review (all the “green” polity terms were from the project team as Thévenot et 
al. (1993) did not set out key terms in the same way as Boltanski & Thévenot 
(2006 [1991]). The means that each code was viewed as a synecdoche for the 
polity.  The current research is concerned with the construction of the polity 
however and therefore is concerned with evidence of the attributes of the polity 
with respect to constructing a “social contract”, which means that the current 
research uses the constitutive dimensions (such as decline of the polity) as 
the analytic or coding framework.   
Patriotta, Gond & Schultz (2011) used mostly public, newspaper/online media 
sources as texts for analysis as they saw these as sites of controversy and 
justification.  As coding was computer assisted (NVivo) a large cohort of text 
could be analysed (circa 800 texts covering a twelve-month period).  The 
authors used “utterances” as the unit of analysis: an utterance is “a phrase 
bound by a clear ending and that expressed at least one clear idea” (p.1816). 
Such an approach allows for more than one utterance per sentence and 
multiple utterances per paragraph: a similar approach is taken in the current 
research.  Perhaps unsurprisingly in the context of an industrial issue, the 
“Industrial” order of worth tended to be prevalent at the start of the discourse 
around the situation; this reduced over time with other justifications such as 
the Civic order of worth becoming noteworthy.  The Inspirational order of worth 
was almost entirely absent.  In contrast to inter alia Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 
[1991]), Patriotta et al. (2011) do not initially find compromise constructions of 
justifications as the analysis is at the singular level of order of worth rather than 
dimensions that construct the polities.  
Jagd (2011) comprises a literature review of circa 30 studies utilising the 
orders of worth framework.  Jagd considers that early work mostly emerged 
from the research programme directly associated with Boltanski & Thévenot, 
diffusing into the Anglosphere after the translation of “On Justification” 
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991]).  Jagd (2011, p.355) concludes: “The 
orders of worth framework seems a very effective framework for categorizing 
empirical data presenting relevant categories of worth” – in this the framework 
is an “ontological schema”. 
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It is not necessary nor practicable to analyse all thirty prior studies covered by 
Jagd (2011): the nature of some of the studies is quite different to the current 
research, and some studies are older and not notably influential.  However, to 
cherry pick from the studies in Jagd (2011) would beg the question of how 
such a selection was made, and which studies were omitted. Appendix B 
comprises an analysis of the discussion in Jagd (2011) and therefore allows 
for a rationale for selection of studies for further analysis.  Some studies were 
rejected immediately (e.g. not in English), some studies were briefly analysed 
for key characteristics of (e.g.) methods to give an indication of further 
suitability, subsequently a small number of studies are analysed more fully to 
understand the implications for the current research.   
Jagd (2011) notes the relative lack of focus in the above studies on processes 
of justification and of compromise, which may reflect the relative ease of 
access to secondary data, which can be used to illustrate the presence and 
change over time of presence of orders of worth in public justifications.  Public 
justifications reveal some aspects of organisational justifications however 
further detail may be uncovered from primary data from actors – the 
equivocation here relating to possible limitations through post hoc 
rationalisations and justifications from those actors as well as limits to 
openness and transparency due to boundaries of company confidentiality.  
The studies in Appendix B show some situations wherein differing orders of 
worth are negotiated for example through sequencing in the study by Gagnon 
& Séguin (2010) as well as contrasting situations wherein a compromise was 
not reached, e.g. Mesny & Mailhot (2007).  The presence of examples of 
compromise supports the discussion in Boltanksi and Thévenot (2006 [1991]): 
that compromise may be possible between orders of worth. 
From the literature review performed by Jagd (2011) three studies in the Table 
14 in Appendix B appear to have particular relevance for the current research 
and these are analysed below: Rousseliére & Vézina (2009), McInerney 
(2008), and Mesny & Mailhot (2007). 
Rousseliére & Vézina (2009) is of interest methodologically in order to 
understand how “units of analysis” are constructed. The authors use the 
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“Alceste” software27 to conduct their analysis.  Alceste software categorises 
the corpus of texts, grouping related and oppositional terms to develop a count 
and visualisation of key themes.  The authors emphasise the importance of 
objects in the construction of the polities.  Hence, mission statements, 
regulations themselves, acts of Parliament may be objects from which actors 
draw justifications.  Public texts themselves become objects that may be 
adduced in support or contention with orders of worth.   
The approach of the current research also sees texts of speeches, annual 
reports, proclamations or campaign statements, as claims to legitimation 
which conflict – to varying degrees – between stakeholders depending on the 
polity used as justification.  Rousselière & Vézina (2009) consider that the 
orders of worth framework has no predictive power in that meaning is 
constructed in tests of justification and these cannot be predicted, nor can 
responses to tests.  Meaning then is only available ex post and as such, what 
people say about what they did, and why they did it, becomes meaningful data 
for analysis.  
The Alceste software works with “chunks” of text within pragmatic semantics.  
This vague term is a result of processes at the word level of analysis 
(lemmatization to reduce variances on words to a base form, exclusion of rare 
words) and sentence level (‘elementary context units’ or “Unités de contexte 
élémentaire, UCE”). Hierarchical clustering of related themes follows.   A result 
of such an approach is, per Rousseliére & Vézina (2009), the potential to link 
themes or concepts with actions.  The authors suggest that the approach 
allows for discourse and hence meaning to develop even within short texts, 
and that as such this validates their approach against criticism that a 
reductionist, atomistic analysis for meaning within texts misrepresents 
meanings developed by readers.  A pragmatic consideration re Alceste and 
similar approaches arises in that the understanding of the corpus of texts for 
the current research is informed by an understanding of business, economic, 
strategy formation and regulatory contexts in the banking sector – that is, the 
                                            




analysis herein is informed by the field of study, rather than studying words or 
phrases in the abstract.  Overall, the review of Rousseliére & Vézina (2009) 
suggests that whilst there are alternate, detailed semantic approaches and 
software that may be applied in the analysis of text, the current research is 
justified in utilising a manual approach given the reliance on field (banking) 
specific analysis of texts.  
McInerney (2008) is located within an analysis of “fields” – particularly “an 
ethnographic history of the field of non-profit technology assistance providers 
(NTAPs)” (p.1090).  A “field” is considered as a bounded set of activities within 
which power relations, power distribution, common practices and justifications 
define legitimacy.  It is interesting to note the overlap between “markets” and 
“fields”, considering the discussion in Davies (2017) of how markets are 
defined and regulated (markets are seldom “free” – for instance there are 
usually anti-trust or competition supporting agencies to avoid monopoly or 
oligarchy).  In this vein, McInerney (2008) considers: 
“how institutional entrepreneurs spawned a new social movement by 
promoting accounts, narratives about the way the work in the field ought 
to be done, and anchoring them to moral ideologies, encapsulated in 
orders of worth. I argue that institutional entrepreneurs shape fields by 
attempting to conventionalize accounts, i.e. by convincing powerful 
actors in the field to accept those accounts as taken-for-granted” 
(p.1091, emphasis added) 
The emphasis added to the above quote shows the link to the discussion in 
Davies (2017) of the effects of Schumpeter’s view of economies, that 
capitalism’s vitality relies on entrepreneurs who are disruptive toward rules and 
current practice such that they change the “rules of the game” allied to a longer 
term aim toward monopoly.  McInerney (2009) analyses an extensive corpus 
of “text” comprising ethnographic field notes, interview transcripts and 
organisational communication documents. McInerney considers these “Texts 
do not merely represent, they reproduce social life” (p.1098), which means 
that, as forms of public justifications they are used to justify the continuation 
or change of corporate behaviours, with consequent effects on society.   The 
analysis in McInerney (2009) clearly articulates competing orders of worth and 
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demonstrates how these were associated with key actors and rhetorical 
categories though there is scant detail regarding the specific textual 
components that lead to such categorisations.  That said the study is an 
interesting advance in the conventions/pragmatic sociology and orders of 
worth theories, demonstrating not only the presence of orders of worth but also 
key moments of conflict or, though not described as such in McInerney (2009), 
testing per Boltanksi and Thévenot (2006 [1991]):  which resulted in a change 
to the dominant justification.  This newly dominant justification then led to 
reorganisations and repurposing within the field.  The study more generally 
lends support for an analysis of texts as demonstrating meaningful support for 
public justifications.  Notably absent from the analysis of conflict situations was 
evidence of compromise constructions.  The absence of compromise is in 
stark contrast to the construction of orders of worth by (Boltanski & Thévenot, 
2006 [1991]).   
Mesny & Mailhot (2007) use the orders of worth or "polity" model to analyse 
the "logics" of interests in a research collaboration between a university and a 
commercial firm.  Logics here is synonymous with "justification" and may be 
"coexisting" (p.204).  The authors use the same polities as above in their 
analysis, excepting the green polity that is not considered. The qualitative 
method employed relied solely on researchers interpretation of texts with 
respect to the polity or polities.  To improve trustworthiness, external reviewers 
familiar with the research context, though not the orders of worth framework, 
reviewed the categorisation of texts to polities (the textual unit of analysis is 
not stated).  Reviewers’ lack of awareness of the orders of worth framework is 
a noteworthy limitation of the research. A further limitation is the symbolic 
representation or mapping created by the authors to represent usage of 
different polities by the observed actors (Figure 2, p.217).  This purports to 
show the “vast extent” that the inspired polity was used by the academic 
community: however there is no quantification of “vast” and it is not clear how 
size differences in the graphic representation of polities should be interpreted, 
nor why some polities overlap, whilst others do not.  The authors analyse the 
lack of sustained compromise in the academic/industry partnership and 
conclude a key factor was the lack of time for, or at least success in defining 
a common goal.  Hence in terms of orders of worth and compromise there was 
72 
 
less likelihood of success given the two options available to agents: to work 
around conflict without explicit compromise per se, or to agree a compromise 
justification with aligned tests, modes of evaluation, compromise qualified or 
legitimate objects.  In the former case, working with objects and relations from 
two polities with only a general appeal to “the common good” (there was some 
evidence of this as discussed by Mesny & Mailhot, 2007), leads to a “fragile” 
compromise as it is vulnerable to reassertion of tests and legitimacy from a 
single polity (Boltanksi and Thévenot, [2006] 1991, p.278).  That said, two 
particular types of compromise were apparent: compromise between inspired, 
market, and industrial polities, and compromise between civic and 
REPUTATIONAL polities. 
In the first case the authors see the academic parties in the situation as rooted 
in “Mertonian”28 views of science and discovery – relying on creativity, 
inspiration, innovation and being inherently non-linear so not susceptible to 
scheduling. That said the analysis considers the scientists open to issues of 
efficiency and commercial profitability.  No compromise was found – the 
authors considered this failure related on the structural features of contracts 
for the academic/commercial joint venture.  
In the second case, echoing Boltanksi and Thévenot ([2006] 1991) the 
analysis starkly illustrates the search for objects of compromise to instantiate 
the compromise between polities.  In this case, the lacking objects, and 
qualified processes and persons relate to a coherent PR message from both 
parties regarding the nature and importance of the joint venture.  Mere desire 
on the part of the actors was necessary but not sufficient to bring the qualified 
objects into being.  
Noting that many studies of commensuration and compromise are based on 
successful tests, Huault & Rainelli-Weiss (2011) consider the case when the 
transparency of “manoeuvres” appeared manipulative, and attempts to find 
“common interest” failed.  Using Boltanksi and Thévenot’s (2006 [1991]) 
framework they note that one of the reasons for the failure was the lack of 
                                            
28 See Sztompka (1986) biography of Merton and the latter’s contribution to understanding 
“science as a social phenomenon, and scientific cognition as a social process” (p.3).  
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shared ambiguity from actors – necessary to allow time to develop new 
approaches to fulfil the common interest – “clarification is the enemy of 
compromise” (Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011, p.1413). This finding is echoed 
by van Bommel (2014).  The study by Huault & Rainelli-Weiss was qualitative 
with a range of primary (interview) and archival sources, the span of which 
covered nine years (fieldwork was conducted over two). Whilst the steps in 
attribution to orders of worth were not explicitly stated, the authors found 
evidence for market and industrial justifications.  They also demonstrated 
moves to make private arrangements (small scale offers) that were less 
generalisable across markets. The failure to agree compromises on weather 
risk derivatives is seen as a sign of incommensurability hence a challenge to 
financial firms that contend any form of risk is quantifiable as financial risk.   
Drawing on Stark (2011) – itself by influenced by, and somewhat contrasted 
to, Boltanski & Thévenot’s (2006 [1991]) framework, Chenhall, Hall & Smith 
(2013) construct a narrowly defined matrix to analyse interviewee accounts of 
developments (hence challenges, tests) of developing performance measures 
within the Voluntary Overseas Organisation (VSO).  The context specific 
framework comprises dimensions of Purpose of evaluation, Attributes of ‘good’ 
evaluation, Attributes of ‘good’ accounts, and “modes of evaluation”, either 
Learning and Uniqueness, or Consistency and Competition’ (p.274) (hence a 
2 x 3 grid). Whilst there are some direct mappings to Boltanksi and Thévenot’s 
(2006 [1991]) framework such as “uniqueness” to the inspired polity, verbs 
such as “learning” are not easy to place as within the orders of worth 
framework tests are largely outcome oriented.  This means that “learning” 
could be harnessed to develop outcomes for any and all polities – for example 
in “learning… to improve profitability”.  Chenhall, Hall & Smith (2013) use a 
different framework to the current research and as such, the process and 
outcomes are not directly comparable, however the authors demonstrate the 
success of an iterative, immersed approach to data analysis.   
Both Stark (2011) and Chenhall et al. (2013) consider extended dissonance 
(similar to friction) as generative and contrast this with the tendency toward 
closure found in the compromises within the orders of worth framework.  There 
are two criticisms of this approach that are worth considering, however.  Firstly, 
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that dissonance, if it is to be sustained and not collapse into conflict must allow 
for some shared conception of the common good and a tacit agreement to 
keep dissonant elements “in play”. This, contra Stark (2011) is similar to the 
fragile compromise constructions of Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]).  
Secondly, by operating at a more abstract level of analysis such as “learning” 
the approach lacks the analytic categories, such as objects used in comprises 
and used signal coherent orders of worth.  This means that the analysis 
especially in Stark (2011) is less categorical than the orders of worth 
framework and in its insistence on contingency limits capacity for critique.  
The articulation of irreducible dimensions of morality is a departure from 
dominant sociological paradigms of rational choice theory and critical theory 
(Dromi & Illouz, 2010) – though only the former enjoys significant policy 
influence (Davies, 2017).  Dromi & Illouz (2010) support the turn in sociology 
and literature studies toward “moral dimensions of texts, what texts say about 
what we owe to each other” (p.352) whilst being concerned with simplistic 
approaches to power/oppression.   The authors (p.353) describe the 
justifications framework of (inter alia) Boltanski & Thévenot as leading to moral 
justifications that are “multivocal and conflictual” which corresponds with the 
current research perspective on multiple, contingent views of “social 
contracts”.  The current research has a critical stance. An epistemic 
assumption of the current research is that communications from firms or civic 
institutions are meaningful with respect to intentions (Milne & Adler, 1999.  This 
approach avoids the limitations of a “hermeneutics [or epistemology] of 
suspicion” (Dromi & Illouz, 2010, p.353, edited for clarity) which “cannot take 
seriously the explicit moral claims of texts”.  This is not an argument for naivety 
– “Not all statements are transparent; deceit is always a possibility, as are 
hidden interests and motivations” (p.367).  The authors correctly note that 
although Boltanski & Thévenot “do not make explicit methodological 
formulations, we can generalize their methodology to suggest that texts can 
serve as platforms which formulate cités [polities] and moral critiques” (p.357, 
[edited for clarity]).  As seen below, this latter statement supports the use of 
texts as public justifications amenable to analysis.  The (generally) descriptive 
nature of the orders of worth framework is exemplified in the “symmetry” of 
analysis, that is, no polity is seen as a priori possessing greater normative or 
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injunctive force – this is in sharp contrast to conceptions of power in, say, 
Critical Theory.    
Having said that the orders of worth framework enables the articulation of 
irreducible dimensions of morality above, it is noteworthy that Henson & 
Wasserman (2011) in applying the framework to religious texts avoid 
engagement with substantive moral and ethical engagements on their own 
terms.  Instead, the authors look for the “logics” or the polity present 
underneath seemingly disparate paradigms regarding the common good: they 
find an underlying logic or polity of the market.  The specifics of the market 
(the goods and services) are by definition contested through competitive and 
destructive/generative entrepreneurial acts qua Schumpeter.  This echoes a 
wider contestation of the “common good” per Laclau (1996) around an always-
empty ground of the common good, which resists universalism in the face of 
anti-foundationalist (post-modern) critique. Permanent contestation resists 
reification and as such goes some way to explain the open or at least indefinite 
approach found in the discussion of the results below.  
For van Bommel (2014), an initial evaluation of integrated reporting in a Dutch 
context had revealed a complex and conflicting set of demands for legitimacy 
which was not amendable to analysis through “established theoretical lenses” 
(p.1167).  The author found in “sociology of worth” (SOW) or orders of worth 
from Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991) a suitable analytical framework.  
Similar to other authors above van Bommel (2014) employs a “qualitative 
content analysis”, which in this case is described as being an inductive and 
interpretative approach in contrast to the more mechanical, counting based 
approach above of Patriotta et al. (2011). The analysis is qualitative as the 
attribution of terms (from interviews or texts in this case) to a specific order of 
worth rely on the judgement of the researcher.  
Nyberg & Wright (2012) attempt to explore discursive justifications for 
business activity beyond a dichotomy wherein reports are either fully authentic 
or entirely “greenwash”.  Through interviews with CSR participants from firms, 
the authors considered the various “common goods” - anathema to Bouillon 
(2013) - such as profit, welfare, inspiration, and the environment; and 
problematic strategies of “equivalence and difference” (Nyberg & Wright, 
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2012, p. 5) used to justify corporate activity.  These strategies are problematic 
in the sense that by aiming for equivalence this may appear imperialistic from 
one domain to another (economic rationale versus duty arguments, for 
instance).  The authors found a complex set of interactions of justifications: an 
example of “combining justifications in practice” (p. 16) showed how a bank 
loan for a “green” project in turn also satisfied market imperatives, since 30% 
of such loans went to new clients (p.17).    
Nyberg & Wright (2012) consider their discourse analysis of interviews in the 
light of the “orders of worth”.  Whilst finding examples of discourse supporting 
the polity listed above, Nyberg & Wright found evidence of attempts to 
reconcile disparate orders of worth.  The authors categorised the moves to 
reconcile polities (they use the term, “worlds”) as Combining, Collapsing, 
Coupling, Connecting (p.1830).  The moves can be summarised as: 
Combining – two justifications in a single practice evaluated under more than 
one order of worth simultaneously; Collapsing – two justifications evaluated 
under one order of worth; Coupling – two justifications in two practices 
evaluated under two orders of worth simultaneously; Connecting – two or more 
justifications connected but evaluated asynchronously. “Collapsing” here is 
analogous to compromise in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]). Whilst it is 
arguable that the use of two orders of worth simultaneously (coupling) is 
explicitly disallowed in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) the argument in 
Nyberg & Wright (2012) uses empirical evidence to develop the theory of 
public justifications further: the extended range of “compromise” constructions 
is reconsidered further in the light of empirical evidence in the current 
research.  
A benefit of the orders of worth framework when analysing constructs such as 
the social contract is the explicit inclusion of moral dimensions that therefore 
necessarily constrains and makes explicit the qualified objects, subjects and 
particularly the judgements within orders of worth (Reinecke, van Bommel & 
Spicer, 2017).  Moral judgements are implicit in the common good, and 
common humanity – in contrast, a value neutral institutional logics approach 
could legitimate descriptions of, say, slavery.  Another alternative approach 
with similarities to the orders of worth framework is the ascription of moral 
77 
 
character to (qualified) objects as in Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Annisette & 
Richardson, 2011), however this perspective is not considered further in the 
current research as the orders of worth framework is a good “fit” with a social 
contract as discussed below.  
As a body of research, the varied subjects of analysis and results above 
support the methodological appropriateness of textual analysis when 
considering public justifications through the presence, absence, conflicts and 
compromises of and between orders of worth.  There is scant detail in the 
above research projects regarding the mapping of specific textual elements to 
specific polity.  Where more detailed methods are presented these are 
sometimes too fine grained (lexical) for the current research (Rousselière & 
Vézina, 2009) or at a higher level of abstraction (Patriotta, Gond & Schultz, 
2011). Software enabled analysis is somewhat limited in that terms are 
analysed in the abstract. In contrast the manual approach in the current 
research utilises domain specific knowledge to make connections between 
elements of text to better understand the characteristics of polities, and the 
nature of compromise between polities, within the text.  
The expressions of justifications considered above feature the co-existence of 
multiple concurrent justifications endangered by fragility of compromise, and 
the importance of shared conceptions of the common good: all the above 
research lends support to the framework in Boltanksi and Thévenot (2006 
[1991]), however it is noted the critique of attribution per se in Ramirez (2013). 
3.4.1 Compromise in prior research 
 
Orders of Worth describe ways of valuing people, objects and outcomes in 
particular ways – the polities as described above.  Polities are brought to bear 
as a grammar of justification in test situations.  Such situations may result in 
disagreement and a breakdown in the situation, meaning that actors no longer 
work toward a truly “common good”.  Alternatively, tests may be resolved by 
recourse to compromise constructions.  Boisvert & Vivien’s (2012) discussion 
of Godard (2005) is suggestive of the need for a common ground for true 
compromise rather than fragile acceptance of alternate tests or objects 
78 
 
pertaining to conflicting orders of worth, echoing Boltanski & Thévenot ([2006] 
1991, p.278).  The following section considers how compromise has been 
analysed in prior research.  
Kietäväinen & Tuulentie (2013) find examples of domestic and market, and 
also civic, market, and green compromise.  Whilst all industry sectors have 
consequences beyond their own boundaries – “externalities” – the tourism 
industry by definition is reliant on the attractiveness of the ecology within which 
it operates29.  The direct, explicit reliance on ecologies means there is more 
salience to the green polity and hence more likelihood of compromise between 
the green polity and others such as the market profit motive.  
Further in considering compromise Ramirez (2013) considers that a 
compromise polity cannot emerge from within the situation as a common 
good/organising principle is required and as such “institutional work is 
necessary to avoid recurrence of such situations” which also requires “material 
changes that allow for equitable distribution of worth” (p.850).  Ramirez 
discusses limited examples of compromise in their analysis.  Following from 
above the move to compromise between the audit profession and small firms 
was to bring new evaluative objects (assessments of audits) into play.  Whilst 
Ramirez is not explicit this seems to compromise between the industrial 
(efficiency) and domestic (hierarchy, own control) polities.  
Thévenot et al. (2000) provide examples where compromise was represented 
by qualified objects: restricted number of lanes on a proposed road to mediate 
between market (tourism, commerce) concerns and domestic (village life) 
concerns.  Similarly adaptation of the infrastructure (industrial) to the needs of 
wildlife (bears and nesting birds in this case) – a green justification.   The 
authors trace the industrial and civic compromise to France’s historical 
acceptance of governmental industrial strategy.   
                                            
29 Or not, in the exceptional circumstances of “dark tourism”, see inter alia Hartmann (2014) 
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Business reports such as the texts analysed in the current research as sites 
of tension and hence potential compromise.  Given that, it is worth quoting 
Rousselière & Vézina (2009, p.246) at length:  
“We can clearly see that policy and business reports are objects of 
compromise, which, in turn, are footholds for actions by the 
cooperative’s various stakeholders. They ground arguments in the 
event of disagreement. They also have another function. Each year, 
they ground the explanation of why the cooperative acted in a particular 
way and why it is legitimate to continue doing so. This claim is intended 
not only for members but also for the collectivity when the activity 
reports are made public. In this approach, cooperative identity is not 
monolithic. Rather, it is complex since it is the expression of a plurality 
of values the coexistence of which is not obvious but must be 
constructed. The expression of this compromise can be understood in 
a given context, and there is thus no a priori reason why it should be 
identical for all cooperative organizations” (emphasis added) 
The quote above also illustrates that the situation of a test contains 
idiosyncratic objects, persons, investment criteria, meaning that there is 
limited “generalisability” of content of justifications, however widespread 
applicability of the grammar of justifications, of the orders of worth framework.  
A notable difference between Ramirez (2013) and the current research is the 
former’s reliance on software.  The lexical construction of compromise in 
particular is an illustration of how the methodological approach can restrict or 
expand the potential set of results.  A large corpus analysis may be more 
amenable to software than manual analysis however the nature of the results 
will be different.  The value in the concept of a social contract is the possibility 
of understanding the grammar, the expected elements of a social contract as 
public justification rather than simply affirmation of a priori deontological 
commitments.  A shared grammar of justification allows for understanding and 
analysis of the elements of antagonism and moves beyond rhetorical desire 
for compromise to ask the question, what are the objects in the compromise 
world? What instantiates compromise? For the FCA and PRA one object that 
instantiates civic compromise with market considerations is the language of 
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the Financial Markets Act (2000) wherein the “investment criteria” concerns 
functioning markets.  To avoid all harm from (say) capital markets by closing 
such markets would be to frustrate firm’s (customers) desires to bring forward 
consumption ahead of saving.   
3.5 Critique 
 
The sections above have considered how the orders of worth framework has 
been operationalised in prior research.  Before considering how the framework 
will be used in the current research it is worthwhile considering some of the 
critique aimed at the theory of orders of worth developed by Boltanski, 
Thévenot, and Chiapello. 
Parker’s (2013) critique is less concerned with the contents of the polities 
described and is more concerned with the totalising effects of the sociology of 
critique (see also Boltanski, 2011).  Parker considers that Boltanski & 
Thévenot (2006 [1991]), and Boltanksi & Chiapello (2007) are rooted in French 
experience and take insufficient account of, say, critical management theory, 
critical accounting amongst others which means that their approach is one 
among many.  The key criticism from Parker is that in attempting to construct 
a unified theory for sociology there are two consequences.  One is that any 
prior or current resistance to current issues in society are enfolded into the 
orders of worth framework, the other is that the largely descriptive framework 
lacks a normative, appealing vision of future possibilities.  
There are aspects of the orders of worth framework that Parker does not 
consider.  Firstly, violent acts (defined as a lack of commitment to a common 
good) are explicitly excluded from the framework.  In this case then Parker is 
correct to say that Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), and Boltanksi and 
Chiapello (2007) are reformist rather than revolutionary – however they are 
not, per Parker’s reading, excluding the possibility of forms of revolution, rather 
their framework is bounded and cannot be used to analyse all forms of social 
relation.  Secondly whilst Parker claims that all relations are enfolded under 
the scope of the orders of worth framework, one of the most important of 
contemporary capitalist relations is considered and then explicitly excluded 
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from the framework by Boltanksi and Chiapello (2007), namely that of 
shareholders (discussed further below).     
A further weakness of Parker’s analysis of Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), 
and Boltanksi and Chiapello (2007) is the reading of orders of worth as “ideal 
types”.  The dimensions of orders of worth are empty of content, whereas an 
ideal type would say more about what (crudely) “fills the boxes” of Table 1.  
For Parker, using ideal types with inductive analyses means “No inductive 
generalizations will allow you to claim, from a desk in Paris, that you 
understand the logics of justification that pertain in a village in Bali” (Parker, 
2013, p.136).  However the orders of worth framework is not intended to 
achieve a content filled description in the abstract as the grammar leads to a 
structuring of questions about the justifications in the “village in Bali”: what are 
the qualified objects, what are the qualified subjects, what are the modes of 
evaluation, and so on.  The orders of worth framework is not a predictive tool 
nor claimed to be so and is not tied to a notion of socio-economic development 
whereby expectations of justifications can be derived from economic or other 
indicators.  The claim for orders of worth is that for a particular form of 
justification there is coherence between the elements of the justification.  The 
further claim is that tests occur between orders of worth and compromises or 
conflicts ensue.  Overall, whilst Parker (2013) is concerned that orders of worth 
over-reach in terms of scope, Boltanski & Thévenot and subsequent authors 
do not make such a claim to universality.  
Callinicos (2006, p.54) claims that Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) do not 
overcome the problem that ‘there are no context-transcendent principles of 
justice common to different ways of life’ (cf Rawls and the external position 
behind a “veil of ignorance”).  The issue is if a normative basis is present for 
all socially constructed conceptions of the common good or indeed moral 
philosophies (see also MacIntyre, 2007 for an exposition of advantages of 
virtue ethics in this regard).  In a largely positive rather than normative 
framework, there is no claim the OOW framework is intended to provide an 
etic moral perspective even if one could exist.   
A final critique of conceptions of justice is that they are incomplete if the 
viability and potential difficulties in implementation are not considered: “Liberal 
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theories of justice similarly elaborate the principles that should be embodied 
in the institutions of a just society without systematically exploring whether 
sustainable, robust structures could actually be designed to carry out those 
principles in the pure form in which they are expressed” (Wright, 2006, 
pp.96:97).  The orders of worth framework attempts a generalisation of the 
conventions, the grammar, of agreement (of social contracts) that are used to 
solve agreements in the presence of a test of justice.   As such, the orders of 
worth framework are only a part of an emancipatory project.  The orders of 
worth framework is largely descriptive as opposed to morally normative 
(though normativity is present with respect to investors, particularly in 
Boltanski & Chiapello, p.129, pp.365-366).  The critique of Wright has some 
applicability only if the orders of worth are taken as an end, rather than an 
analytic tool, the output from which deepens understanding about the 
conventions in play in a particular situation.  
For Honneth (2010, p.376) Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) represents “the 
most interesting attempt of the more recent past to give sociology a basis in 
moral philosophy” – in contrast to biological or economic models of society.  
For Honneth (2010, p.379) a concern re the constructions of orders of worth 
is the valorisation of the “desert principle” as the “determining norm in the 
justification of social orders”.  However, an alternate reading of “On 
Justification” is that the determining norm is that orders of worth are subject to 
tests, that the criteria for these tests are specific to each polity, and that these 
criteria may conflict, leading to disagreement and the possibility of compromise 
through appeal to higher values around common humanity. The most salient 
difference between each polity may well be the superior principle, and the 
investment formulae.  Different concepts of the superior principle are tested in 
public justifications.  On this reading then the position of the greater/lesser 
person is an outcome of tests rather than prior to tests and cannot therefore 
be the determining principle.  Such an argument is also found in Boltanski & 
Thévenot (2006, p.222) when discussing Rawls’ (1974) moves away from the 
“desert principle”.  Additionally Honneth (2010) appears to focus solely on 
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) and hence ignores the Green polity which 
is not determined by principles of desert, which further refutes the criticism.   
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Honneth (2010) is correct to say there is limited attention in Boltanski & 
Thévenot (2006 [1991]) to how canonical works from, for example St 
Augustine or Rousseau influence modern conceptions of justice, or the 
historical receptions and conditions of the analysed texts.  A different set of 
base texts would produce somewhat different polities however as the polities 
are anchored in real lifeworlds and to real, qualified objects the range of 
alternative polities is limited. Indeed by anchoring polities to qualified objects 
the orders of worth framework fulfils MacIntyre’s (2007, p.23) injunction that 
moral [or political] philosophies, to be taken seriously, must be grounded in its 
“social embodiment”.  Similarly the OOW framework supports Tyler’s (2016, 
p.10) view that “justice, rights and all other such concepts [cannot] be 
understood in abstraction from particular worlds of meanings, values, 
practices and guiding ideals” [edited for clarity].  Had Boltanski & Thévenot, 
and Chiapello analysed alternate sources such as Kant with a focus on 
universalism, such analysis would alter the Civic investment criteria but would 
be unlikely to add or remove the polities as described.   
The challenges Honneth (2010) presents are of under-theorisation (lack of 
structural influences and constraints), and of over-theorisation (by extending 
to consider “qualified” objects, ontology is reduced to moral justifications).  By 
considering orders of worth as tendencies and dominant tests of circumstance, 
entangled, in interplay and potential conflict, the latter critique is somewhat 
ameliorated as polities combine ontologically  to comprise the (possibilities of) 
all the objects in the world.  Objects are valorised from a number of value 
perspectives (hence depending on an epistemological level playing field, a 
dependence that may be hard to justify, per Dotson, 2011). The omission of 
structures is of note however.  A defence could be that structural influence is 
implicit in tests: a commercial firm will be subject to market, and industrial 
tests; a community project to predominantly civic tests.  The argument 
depends on views of structure versus individual agency, a long-standing 
debate in the social sciences (Coburn, 2016).   Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 
[1991]) demonstrate awareness of structures and structural theories (pp.158 
& 178 respectively) however choose not to engage substantially with this 
literature, which Honneth (2010, p.385) decries as inadequate given the “great 
confusion as to the question of whether such orders refer merely to mental 
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conceptions and convictions or do, in fact, denote actual structural constructs”.  
Here Honneth is not allowing for the contingent nature of orders of worth 
expressed in tests, as Honneth had earlier stated, objects can be ascribed 
different meanings in different polities.  Further, by definition, though it is 
clearer in Table 1, the dimensions of orders of worth are both metaphysical 
and real: the orders of worth are not constructed as one or the other.  When 
Honneth criticises the orders of worth framework for not considering the 
reification of justifications in institutional contexts the criticism lacks force given 
that any institutional test can be described in orders of worth terms, the 
institutional aspect will affect the depth of attachment and willingness or 
otherwise to compromise.  The criticism from Honneth (2010, p. 388) of the 
“dissolution of the moral structures of the social” has worth from one 
perspective and less so from another.  The lack of institutional perspectives is 
not overly problematic empirically: two people can hold the different 
perspectives on the value (and values) of an organisation for which they both 
work.  Where this particular critique does possess force is in the contingent or 
at least unspecified nature of the common good that may allow a tautological 
justification that the market polity is itself justified in market terms.  The 
tautology does appear to be present in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], 
p.44) wherein market actors are, in and of themselves, defined as part of the 
common good.  
Honneth ends with a forceful critique that Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) 
have “immoderately gone past the mark” (Honneth, 2010, p.388) by ignoring 
the “normative pre-structuration of the societies under examination” however 
with a largely descriptive frame, such structures can be described when tests 
of legitimation or justification arise.  Honneth is considering Boltanski & 
Thévenot (2006 [1991]) as building more of a whole sociology, rather than a 
sociology of political agreement and justification, contrary to that claimed.  
Honneth (2010) would benefit from considering the implications of a 
nonanthroprocentric polity (Green), and the explicit exclusion of violence and 
exploitation from orders of worth qua a framework of justice.  More broad 
considerations of social life and specifically of critique are found subsequent 
to Honneth (2010), in for example Boltanski (2012).  
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In challenging and extending the conception of a singular Green polity, Blok 
(2013) contends that a better conception of ecological orders of worth is that 
the plurality seen above in the range of polity also extends to the green polity: 
“In short, there is not one, but several, common ecological worlds” (Blok, 2013, 
p.494).  The implication for the current research is to be alert to the potential 
for multiple constructions of green or ecological justifications.  Further Blok 
(2013, p.496) alerts the researcher to the possibility or indeed probability that 
ecological or green orders of worth are “entangled” with other orders of worth 
– such as the domestic polity valorisation of “tradition” or “heritage”.   
Subsequently Blok expands further on entanglement wherein the green polity, 
or value, appears as “a ‘natural resource’ to be rationally exploited (industrial); 
as a ‘collective good’ of equal citizens (civic); […] as experiences of ‘sublime 
grace’ (inspired); and as communicative signs of ‘trendy popularity’ (fame)” 
(p.506). The implication for the current research is to be alert to multiple 
synchronous constructions of the Green polity and the possibility of developing 
another polity.   
Alternative approaches with some similarities and differences to the above 
scheme include an institutional logics approach.  For instance Soin & Huber 
(2013, p.262) evaluate regulatory change in the UK since the mid-1980s under 
logics of “profession-based, state-based, market-based, as well as market-
based and risk-based logics”.  These logics could been seen to have some 
analogues as Domestic (qualification based on hierarchy and licensing), Civic, 
Market, and a combination of Market and Inspired Polity (if in the latter there 
is recognition of the limits to quantification of risk, see inter alia Taleb, 2012).  
Institutional logics echo some of the structures of “orders of worth” however 
are locally situated whereas orders of worth are intended as a general 
framework for test situations (within which there is a commitment to some form 
of “common good”). 
A notable omission from Boltanski & Thévenot (2006, [1991]) is the role of 
shareholders or investors with respect to the orders of worth framework. 
Shareholders influence firms’ purpose and strategies by supporting or 
opposing management direction at Annual General Meetings, and proposing 
executive appointees whose aims are aligned to those of shareholders.  
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Boltanski & Chiapello (2007), in the context of the networked or projective 
polity do consider the role of shareholders/investors.  For the authors the 
projective world relies on personal contacts and relations and hence relatively 
private information (p.130): “Information is not available to everyone 
simultaneously in its entirety, as in the ideal of pure and perfect information 
allowing all the participants in a market an equal footing”.  As such the 
projective polity, reliant on the networked diffusion of information, contacts and 
reputation, stands  opposed to the idealised markets of the “efficient markets 
hypothesis” and hence excludes many models of investor behaviour (inter alia 
Malkiel, 2003)30.   For Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) market interactions are 
synchronous, exchange is immediate: hence ruling out long term investors 
from the market polity.  Such an approach is also unduly limited when 
considering the full range of goods and services that can be traded freely: 
within financial services such as banking, savings (such as pensions) the 
outcome of purchase or use of a product is uncertain at the initial transaction.  
Further, technical skills and experience may be required to ascertain if a 
product had actually delivered as intended.   For these reasons banking and 
other financial services are termed “credence services” (Hoepner & Wilson, 
2012).  The argument in Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) excludes a range of 
extant services.   The implication of the gap between theory and practice is to 
problematize theoretical boundaries (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007) and as 
such, the relationship between theory of orders of worth and shareholders, 
and the construction of the “time” dimension in the market polity is returned to 
in the discussion section below.  
3.6 Summary 
 
For Eulriet (2008, p.137) the concepts of pragmatic sociology set out in “On 
Justification” are “a significant contribution to specific discussions in social and 
political theory around the ‘dynamics of ideas’, ‘political rhetorics’ and ‘public 
arguments’. More precisely, it is suggested that the model elaborated by the 
two French theorists is best understood and put to use as a specific tool for 
                                            
30 There are many critiques of the EMH not least from the field of behavioural finance however 
a consideration of such literature is out of scope for the current research 
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the “study of public rhetorics and their effects on social actors’ positions and 
identities in the polity” (p.137)31.  The importance of this stream of literature is 
emphasised by Rendtorff (2014): “essential as a theoretical framework for 
business ethics and philosophy of management” (p.252). 
This chapter has introduced a framework, “orders of worth”, with which public 
justifications may be analysed.  Public justifications are seen to be a way of 
expressing a “social contract” as each particular order of worth or justificatory 
regime is constructed of “a set of material, cognitive and symbolic elements” 
(van Bommel, 2014, p.1162).  Importantly the material elements include the 
qualified actors that are parties to the “contract” implied by the orders of worth.  
The chapter evaluated a number of prior research projects utilising orders of 
worth.  The current research will employ a human researcher (as opposed to 
software oriented) approach; further, such an approach is appropriate given 
the current research is situated in a specific business sector, knowledge of 
which will be used to inform the attribution of textual elements of public 
justifications to the constructs of orders of worth. Further, from the prior studies 
a framework is expressed in tabular form, which will be used as the guide to 
analysis of texts as below (Table 1).  
Having considered the characteristics of, and previous in, public justifications 
and the orders of worth framework, the following chapter considers the 
methodological approach to using the orders of worth framework to analysis 
constructions of the social contract for the UK banking sector.  
  
                                            
31 Eulriet was writing as member of GSPM: “Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale” 
founded by Boltanksi and Thévenot hence is writing as an insider to the pragmatic sociology 
research programme rather than a distant observer/reviewer 
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This chapter analyses the research methodology, and is structured per Denzin 
& Lincoln (2011, p.12, Table 1.1), namely: the personal biography of the 
researcher, theoretical paradigms and perspectives, the research strategy, 
data collection and methods of analysis, interpretation and evaluation.  
Additionally, this chapter considers research quality and research ethics.   
4.1.1 Contribution 
 
This chapter extends the public justifications research literature by setting out 
a more detailed approach to analysing texts than observed in prior researches 
using the orders of worth framework, and extends the method to the banking 
sector for the first time.  The research study is a partial response to the call by 
Tregidga et al. (2012) in a similar field of enquiry:  
“[Social Environmental Reporting] research could benefit from utilizing 
the insights from interpretive and qualitative methodologies. These 
methodologies provide theoretical structures to further analyze [sic] the 
quality, meaning and accountability implicit in organizational reporting 
and communication. We argue for a move away from the ‘safety’ of 
quantitative based content analysis toward the more unfamiliar territory 
of interpretive and qualitative methodologies” (p. 2012). 
As discussed above, qualitative, interpretive research is under represented in 
journals such as the Journal of Banking & Finance, which means that the 
current study contributes to methodological diversity.  
In the narrow context of the current research, the following chapter justifies the 
research approach in the light of prior research and the aims of the current 




4.2 Motivation for the Research or “The Social Wrong” 
 
The banking sector can, and has, externalised losses (Wolf, 2009) – a “social 
wrong” (Fairclough, 2010, p.226) as the sector and many individual institutions 
are “too big to fail” (Tett, 2012).  Banks have been found to ignore or fail to 
comply fully with regulations regarding interest rate setting and foreign 
exchange rates amongst others – approaches and activities imposing public 
costs for private gain. Further, regulatory bodies, as an agent of government, 
have narrowly defined the social contract for banks as complying with 
prudential regulation (Tucker, 2009) in return for the legitimation of rent 
extracting activities: such a scope fails to address the full range of “social 
wrongs” above. Additionally, there are concerns that banks are “too big to jail” 
– then Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osbourne used economic 
arguments to influence (reduce) regulatory enforcement action regarding 
HSBC and money laundering in Mexico (Neate, 2016). 
4.3 The Personal Biography of the researcher 
 
Denzin & Lincoln (2011, p.11) consider that researchers speak from “a 
particular class, gendered, racial, cultural and ethnic community perspective” 
and that this “leads the researcher to adopt a particular view of the ‘other’ who 
is studied”.  Similarly, Reiter (2017, p.132) convincingly states: “Who we are, 
our interests, backgrounds, training, and culture all influence what questions 
we ask, how we ask them, and even what we accept as confirming evidence”.  
It is however difficult to simply state the “particular view” as the above ignores 
the amount of change in a lifetime: the researcher was born to a nurse and 
electrician, who both retired from management roles – their life histories 
encompassed a transition from “working class” to “[some micro distinction of] 
middle class”. The researcher has only worked in “professional” and 
managerial roles.  The researcher has worked mostly in the Financial Services 
sector in the UK: critical concepts such as a rentier sector (Epstein, 2002, 
Dünhaupt, 2012) are relatively novel to the researcher which means the 
researcher needs to move from an emic (insider) to an etic (outsider) 
perspective to gain “critical distance” Boltanski (2011).  The researcher 
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acknowledges a priori acceptance of the worth (to some degree) of the 
financial system within a state enabled or state protected market economy 
(Davies, 2017) such as the UK.  The implications of the researcher’s biography 
are that the current research is concerned with critique and development in 
contrast to the radical transformation associated with, for example, Critical 
Theory (inter alia Landmann, 2011).   
4.4 Research Paradigms and Conceptual Model 
 
Philosophy (herein synonymous with “paradigm”) is “a form of understanding” 
in the “broadest sense” of “how things hang together”, and the subject-matter 
of philosophy, however broad, can be defined through “its range of questions, 
problems and theories embodied in the texts of the tradition” (Crane, 2015, 
following Sellars, 1963). Following this line of thought, this section explains 
how the current research paradigm “hangs together”.  The choice of theory 
has been developed above in considering the usefulness and appropriateness 
of extant theory with respect to the “research object”. The following section 
positions the chosen research paradigm and then the conceptual model for 
the research is considered. 
4.4.1 Research Paradigm 
 
Issues of knowledge and reality underpin all approaches to research; there is 
no single “correct” approach applicable in all circumstances.  A daunting range 
of perspectives and paradigmatic approaches has developed over time to 
create a “challenging philosophical terrain” when attempting to justify one 
approach compared with many potential alternatives (Pernecky, 2016, p.3).  
Addressing such issues is important: for Herrera & Braumoeller (2004, p.16) 
understanding the relationship between ontology, epistemology and 
methodology is to ask, “what are the connections among the nature of reality, 
the ways in which we come to know it, and the tools we use to do so?”. 
Research context, motivations, and research questions drive the choice of 
research methods (inter alia Sobh & Perry, 2006, Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, 
Pernecky, 2016).   
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Ontologically the current research accepts banking as a “real” activity despite 
contrary views re. “fictitious capital” (Hudson, 2010).  Banks and economic 
activity exist and have done so over time.  Banking’s effects are tangible, the 
tap of a card can be accepted as payment and we use mobile apps for banking.  
Indeed, the economic effects of banking as discussed above are profound, 
albeit often misunderstood.  A realist ontological perspective, or more formally 
“the terms [...] accept[ed] as ultimate in the order of explanation” (Taylor, 2003, 
p.195, [edited for clarity]) is compatible with orders of worth, all of which are, 
in part, characterised by “real” qualified objects.    
How banks present themselves to stakeholders is variable and the reception 
of that presentation is partial and subjective (indeed, “intersubjective” per 
Herrera & Braumoeller, 2004).  In one sense then, similar to Hajer & 
Versteeg’s (2005) analysis of environmental discourses, the technical aspects 
of what and how banks operate are of secondary importance to how 
stakeholders such as regulators, government, and NGO’s make sense of the 
purposes, communications and effects of banking.   
A realist ontological perspective combined with a subjective epistemological 
perspective is appropriate when considering the types of institutions in the 
current research.  Such an approach is consistent with Searle’s (2010) concept 
of “institutional reality”.  That is, speech acts (“status function declarations” in 
this case – or public justifications specifically in the current research) are used 
to create the “reality” that whilst banks may be “real” objects, banking is 
ontologically and epistemologically subjective and would not exist without the 
continued declarative acts that confirm its institutional reality.  
The following table (Table 2, below) illustrates the paradigm for the current 
research, using a descriptive framework derived from Guba & Lincoln (2005, 
pp.103-115).  Note: the “positivist” and “participatory” paradigms have been 
excluded, as neither are at all suitable for the current research.   Positivist 
approaches are excluded by the subjective epistemology (see also Davies, 
2017, p.17, who considers positivist approaches at least to some extent as 
“parasitical” on interpretive conceptions of value), and the participatory 
approach is not appropriate for the use of secondary data described below. 
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Bryman (2007) considers the commonality of interpretivism and related 
approaches to be antipathetic to a positivist approach to social studies. Whilst 
noting the influence of symbolic interactionism, and the hermeneutic-
phenomenological tradition on interpretivism, Bryman considers “particular 
epistemological principles and research practices do not necessarily go hand 
in hand in a neat unambiguous manner” (p.16).  For Bryman (2007) 
interpretivism is concerned with construction of meaning by research 
participants who may be subject to a triple interpretation: the participants own, 
the researchers analysis, and the researchers further positioning of the 
findings with respect to prior knowledge or research.   Bryman (2007) sets out 
two ontological positions: objectivism (external reality of social phenomenon), 
and constructionism (“social phenomena and categories are not only produced 
through social interaction but are in a constant state of revision”, p.18).  
Guba & Lincoln (2008) set out four paradigms in research: positivism 
(attempting to prove), post positivism (attempting to falsify), critical theory and 
related ideologies, and constructivism.  As above, given the current research 
is concerned with interpretation of texts that are themselves socially 
constructed, a naïve realism in a positivist sense would be in appropriate and 
is not considered further.  Whilst acknowledging Pernecky’s (2016) concern 
that increasing methodological plurality means that tightly defined categories 
are less useful than thinking “in terms of flows and continua as opposed to 
rigid frameworks” the longstanding mapping from Guba & Lincoln (2008) is 
useful to assess the current study’s ontological and epistemological positions.  
The colour scheme in the Table below represents the degree of affinity in the 
current research with the associated paradigm.  Deeper green is more affinity, 
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Table 2 Assessment of Paradigms.  Derived from Guba & Lincoln (2005, pp.103-115), additional 




The analysis in Table 2 does not, unsurprisingly, give a neat “fit” to a paradigm 
– an outcome which is coherent with Bryman (2007) and Pernecky (2016) 
regarding blurring of labels.  The approach taken in the current research leans 
toward a (weakly) constructionist perspective – the qualifier “weakly” alluding 
to the distinction in Pernecky (2016, Ch. 8) between realist ontological and 
subjective epistemology (the current research) compared to a subjective 
ontology and epistemology, a “strong” position that is perilously close to a 
solipsist approach denying the likelihood of agents beyond the self.  
In the current research, the method used, attribution from texts to 
characteristics in the orders of worth framework may be used within a range 
of research paradigms. For instance in a positivistic manner (to develop 
generalisable theory), in a post-positivistic way (to test hypotheses), 
phenomenologically (to “describe the essence of a phenomenon”), 
hermeneutically (to analyse emergent meaning in context), and in a 
constructionist manner “as a way of expounding the plurality of meanings” 
(Pernecky, 2016, p.22).  The understanding of the paradigm used in the 
current research then is driven by the research aim (exploration of a social 
construction) rather than by the data collection and analysis methods 
employed. 
In short, from the above discussion the research paradigm is based on a realist 
ontology and a constructionist epistemology, both of which are coherent with 
the overall approach of using an empirical framework (orders of worth) to 
investigate a social construct such as “the social contract”.  
4.4.2 Conceptual Model 
 
The purpose of a conceptual model is to communicate the salient actors, 
institutions and objects in the field under analysis and to illustrate the relations 
and interpretive process that combine to create a dynamic social situation.  
A stylised representation of the processes considered in the current research 
is presented below as Figure 2.  In this model, private firms (banks) consume 
factors of production (Barney, 2001) such as commodities (electricity, 
credit/money and labour, for example) which results in changes in those 
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factors of production as they are exhausted, altered, increased to produce final 
products and through sales, profits.  Firms also consume public goods as they 
rely on, inter alia, public transport networks, clean air, and a secure society.  
They produce changes in those public goods through “externalities” which are 
most likely to reduce the utility of public goods through, for example, pollution 
or exhaustion of non-renewable inputs.  
Additionally, firms require a “licence to operate” – a social contract for the 
banks – as the banks’ existence and operations ought be seen as socially 
beneficial by society (inter alia Ramathanan, 1976).  In the current research, 
public justification of the “social contract” of/with banks is comprised of tests 
of the polities or orders of worth discussed above.   
Both the “social contract” and “orders of worth” discussed below are social 
“constructs”. Such constructs are the “metaphysics” criticised from an 
empirical economic (neo-liberal) perspective (Davies, 2017).  An underlying 
epistemological postulate of the current research is that the empirical 
observation of constructs such as the social contract is necessarily indirect; 
however, there is useful information to be gathered and interpreted through 
the public manifestations or expressions of justifications in texts, which are 
meaningful (Milne & Adler, 1999).  Boltanski (2011, pp.2-3) cautions that 
conceptual constructions however are readily subject to criticism of 
inapplicability to “reality” and to normative biases in construction. 
In the discussion above of prior research, business reporting such as annual 
reports and accounts, to adapt Rousselière & Vézina (2009) from the specifics 
of “cooperatives” to general “firms”, are “objects of compromise, which, in turn, 
are footholds for actions by the [firm’s] various stakeholders. They ground 
arguments in the event of disagreement […] Each year, they ground the 
explanation of why the [firm] acted in a particular way and why it is legitimate 
to continue doing so” (p.246, [edited for clarity]).  Annual reports are forms of 




Other actors in the sector engage in discourse regarding performance of banks 
or expectations of future behaviour.  Such actors include NGOs such as “Move 
Your Money”, Government, and Regulators such as the FCA and PRA.  
Justifications are most obviously present in conflict or “tests” between different 
ways of looking at the world, different criteria of worthy objects, subjects, 
evidence and relations.  In the case of the texts analysed below there may not 
be explicit conflict; that is, “no conflict has been declared” (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006 [1991], pp.348, emphasis added).  Texts of speeches, 
reviews, reporting have expectations of judgment from the audience. As such 
they are “Moments of testing and explicitation [sic] [which] are particularly 
opportune” (p.356, [edited for clarity]) – echoing the sentiment in Chenhall, 
Hall & Smith (2013, p.270) that “the production of accounts can serve to 
‘crystallize’ the compromise in a material form [making visible] different values 
and principles”.  Similarly, “Accounts are particularly important in settings of 
conflicting values because they are sites where multiple modes of evaluation 
all potentially operate at once” (p.281) – which supports the contention above 
that polities as social contracts are various and contingent.  
 
 
Figure 2 Conceptual Model (Source: author’s own) 
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The encircled areas of Figure 2 comprise the scope of the current research: 
that is, exploring the social construction of the justification of social contracts 
for the UK banks through texts produced by banks, NGOs and Government 
representatives (Regulators).  
Figure 2 above includes, for completeness, aspects beyond the current 
research.  The study considers the researcher’s interpretation of the texts 
produced by the actors above: it does not consider the reception of such texts 
by recipients, nor the influence of direct experience through brand touchpoints 
such as branch, mobile app or advertising interactions.  There is justification 
for such an approach to scope given prior research into public justification, that 
is justifications in the public domain (see inter alia McInerney, 2008, 
Rousseliére & Vézina, 2009, Patriotta et al., 2011) wherein the reception of 
texts by audiences such as the public at large was not considered.  
Secondly, the “media” influences above are not explored further.  If the final 
reception by recipients was being considered it is likely an analysis of media 
influence or media agenda setting  would be required to understand the 
influence of the external environment on recipients (per Thomson, 2013) – 
literally a “mediating factor”. However, as the final reception of texts is not 
explored it is legitimate to exclude ‘media agenda setting’.33  Further whilst 
there is value from including the “voices” of the public more generally, doing 
so in the current study would be to combine two different types of “voice.”  The 
current samples include what may be termed “strategic” communications from 
individual/corporates whereas surveys of public perceptions would likely be 
constructed from aggregation and analysis of central tendencies.  One of the 
                                            
33 Whilst resource constraints are again important in the decision to exclude this aspect there 
is another characteristic of the media data analysis that raises questions.  In particular, the 
number of media texts would be large – initial assessments showed the population of articles 
in the Financial Times for the sample banks in 2015 would be circa 500 and a similar, if slightly 
smaller population for The Sun (England). These two newspapers were considered, as they 
could be representative of the financial press and the mass newspaper circulation 
respectively.  However, newspaper dominance in setting news agenda is being challenged by 
social media (Meraz, 2009): this raises questions regarding the population and sampling 
approach.  However, given the significant resource demands occasioned by including a media 
agenda setting aspect to the research, at this stage, such deliberations are not examined 




findings below, that social contracts may be limited as contracts due to 
ontological diffusion (wide variety of subjects and objects) also supports the 
narrow sampling approach.  A representative sampling of the “public” would 
then be large scale, aggregated and to some extent incommensurable with the 
data analysed in the current study.  
A critique of the above conceptual model includes issues of power and access 
(Abulof & Kornprobst, 2017, p.6), agency and voice of disenfranchised 
stakeholders such as the “unbanked”: ontologically invisible in the above 
conceptualisation and hence to an extent subject to “epistemological violence” 
(Dotson, 2011, p.236) that the inclusion of NGOs as representatives of societal 
issues can only partly assuage. Awareness of an issue does not mean the 
resources are available to resolve the problem at this stage of the research 
process: exploration and analysis of further aspects such as 
unbanked/financially excluded members of society could form part of a future 
research programme.  
The conceptual model (Figure 2) shows the specific areas of analysis within a 
broader context.  Texts associated with the highlighted areas are evaluated 
through the lens of the “orders of worth”.  
4.5 Research Strategy 
 
Research strategy is a “general orientation toward the conduct of business 
research” (Bryman & Bell, 2011, p.25).  Such orientations may be mixed 
methods, predominantly quantitative, or qualitative, though neither will be 
entirely “pure” in practice (pp.619-625).   There are arguments that 
positivist/quantitative and interpretivist/qualitative approaches “construe the 
social world differently— just as Newtonian mechanics and quantum 
mechanics do in the physical world” Ruggie (1998, p. 86).  However, as 
Bryman & Bell (2011, p.619) note there is “no perfect correspondence between 
research strategy and matters of epistemology and ontology” hence such a 




The research paradigm discussed above is weakly constructivist (a realist 
ontology and subjective epistemology).  A subjective epistemology means a 
qualitative strategy is appropriate as adopted below - though with some 
analysis of the dominance (or otherwise) of particular orders of worth. 
4.6 Qualitative Content Analysis   
 
Content analysis can be used with both quantitative and qualitative data (Elo 
& Kyngäs, 2008).   Elo & Kyngäs (2008, p.108) consider that “concepts and 
categories” are analysed in order to construct a system model or conceptual 
map that will inform, or be useful in constructing actions to solve research 
problems. The authors consider that content analysis can be (dependent on 
application), more than a naïve counting of words and that the method “is as 
easy or difficult as the researcher determines it to be” (p.108).   The approach 
may be inductive (when exploratory work is undertaken in a little understood 
area) or deductive (when prior expectations or frameworks shape the 
approach) the latter being the case in the current research.  That said the 
researcher is alert, per Jagd (2011, p.355) that “the strength of this framework 
[may] lead to a relative blindness towards forms of justification that do not fit 
into these categories” ([edited for clarity]) and hence is open to the discovery 
of new or amended “polity”.   
For van Bommel (2014) the orders of worth framework “provides a set of 
conceptual tools that allows researchers to achieve a better understanding of 
how this process [in integrated reporting] of gaining, maintaining or repairing 
legitimacy works” (p.1180, edited for clarity).  A priori dimensions for attribution 
from texts echoes that in Henson & Wasserman (2011, p.55)  
The framework: “while clearly reliant on empirical observation at some 
level […] provides a more rigorous system that makes comparison of 
qualitative observations possible, but does so with an ontological 
system general enough to avoid the rigidity of traditional 
operationalisation, something which tends to be focused on content, not 
on form”.    
102 
 
In a similar vein, Eulriet’s (2008) review of Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) 
concludes, “the conceptual matrix […] makes it possible to investigate in great 
detail the way in which arguments are mobilized [sic]” (p.144).     
The essence of the analysis is to categorise textual elements with respect to 
orders of worth – a “raw coding of interpreted narrative data” (Henson & 
Wasserman, 2011, p.45) – similar to the “prespecified [sic] format” of a 
checklist matrix in Miles, Huberman & Saldana (2014, pp.142-144). The initial 
phase for content analysis is to determine the “unit of analysis” (Milne & Adler, 
1999, Elo & Kyngäs, 2008).  Following previous research such as Patriotta et 
al. (2011), the unit of analysis for the qualitative content analysis is the 
“utterance” or bounded concept.  This is justified, as the nature of the analysis 
is to map the concepts in the texts to existing categories found within a social 
contract/orders of worth framework: single words will not convey enough 
information in order to map across.  Similarly it is unlikely that discrete 
sentences will map neatly, however to go to the far extreme and consider 
“texts” as the unit of analysis would lose the granularity required.    
Elo & Kyngäs (2008) describe a second stage: organizing the data from texts.  
The second phase could also be described as the analytic phase of the work 
as the activities include coding, grouping, categorisation, abstraction, and (in 
more positivist work) hypothesis testing (p.110).  The authors describe 
“deductive” analysis as working with existing “theories, models, mind maps 
and literature reviews” (p.111) and this is the approach taken in the current 
work.  Texts are assessed against the extant orders of worth framework 
situated within the banking sector, that is, analysis is concerned for 
implications for understanding the sector, the relationships, the objects and 
the justifications used in the sector.  A “categorization matrix” (Elo & Kyngäs, 
2008, p.111) set out in Table 1 is derived from prior work by Patriotta et al. 
(2011), building on Boltanski & Thévenot (1991), Boltanski & Thévenot (1999), 
Boltanski & Thévenot (2000), Thévenot et al. (2000), and Boltanski & Chiapello 
(2007) with adaptations as discussed previously: all categories and sub-
categories are “conceptually and empirically grounded” (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, 
p.112).  Henson & Wasserman (2011) in applying the orders of worth schema 
included a prior stage of analysis in characterising texts using Multilevel 
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Integrative Cognition (MIC) wherein levels are Static, Dynamic, Evaluative and 
Self-Identity.  This additional step was not found to be necessary in the current 
research and in particular the “self-identity” construct did not map well to the 
aspects of orders of worth set out in Table 1.   
The operations on the text were twofold.  Initially, a first order analysis relating 
relevant text elements (utterances) to the dimensions of the orders of worth. 
For instance, mention of “bank branches” meant that bank branches were 
listed as a qualified object.  Discussion of goals and targets would be listed 
under investment criteria. The word “relevant” here is doing a lot of heavy lifting 
as the amount of text allocated to orders of worth attributes was much less 
that the total text, the judgement on which text to capture being based on the 
researcher’s experience in the sector and understanding of the constructs of 
orders of worth. The second level of analysis was to attribute the listed 
elements to a specific polity or order of worth. As discussed in the analysis 
below, sometimes this was a simple attribution such as “cost to serve” 
reductions relating to industrial efficiency, however on occasion attribution was 
ambiguous and a judgement required based on the context of the textual 
element/utterance.  The context could be the surrounding themes in nearby 
paragraphs or more generally, the dominant tenor or theme associated with a 
polity running through the text.  A good example of the latter would be the 
“Barclay’s approach” text wherein most terms associated with polities appear 
instrumentally, subordinate to the market justification. The iterative nature of a 
cycle of considering utterances with respect to categorisation against 
elements of orders of worth is the first stage of “aggregation dialectics” (Jonsen 
Fendt & Point, 2018), a process to build a picture of the construction of the 
orders of worth present in the text.  As the number of utterances categorised 
against elements of orders of worth increases it is possible to re-categorise 
previously ambiguous utterances, or to defer categorisation until a more 
immersive understanding of the text is achieved.  The categories more 
ontologically described as presence versus absence (e.g. bank branches as a 
qualified object) are unlikely to be re-categorised as anything other than an 
object. In contrast to van Bommel (2014) the current analysis does not “zoom 
in” to a restricted set of polities, rather the analysis is open to attribution of 
utterances to any order of worth.     
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In considering the third stage of content analysis – reporting - Elo & Kyngäs 
(2008) consider the subjectivity in drawing inferences and conclusions from 
the data.  In addition to improving trustworthiness through the use of citations 
to data and quotations where feasible34, an approach which the current work 
follows, the limitations of single researcher subjectivity are acknowledged 
below.  The process of reporting findings is similar to the sequencing around 
critical discourse analysis (Richardson, 2007).  Textual analysis (p. 38) means 
identifying and recording representations of the common good, social 
relations, and other attributes from Table 1.  “Repeated reading” of the text 
follows the Braun & Clarke (2006, p.86) approach toward “immersion” (see 
also Altheide, Coyle, DeVriese & Schneider, 2008).  The researcher records 
“utterances” and commentary associated with them in the Microsoft Access 
database form – each “field” corresponds to the left-most column in Table 1.  
All textual elements regarding “tests” or investment formula, flaws revealed by 
evidence, are gathered together in a single field.  There may be some 
immediate analysis in response to the phrases or sections of text considered.  
There are additional fields captured on the MS Access database compared to 
Table 1 and these are Common Good – in the second sense used in Boltanski 
& Thévenot (2006 [1991]) – see next paragraph, Assumptions re Natural 
Relationships, Social or National Grouping, Status Relations, Condition of 
Great/Little Persons, Decline (of the polity), Criticisms.  By extending the 
number of dimensions of orders of worth for which data was captured a richer 
set of terms was built per polity. It is likely that the additional terms were not 
included in the original listing in Patriotta et al. (2011, p.1810), Annisette & 
Richardson (2011, p.233) as a number of the terms are contingent on the 
specificities of the local context rather than common terms.   
It is worth considering the common good as a dimension of the polities further.  
The common good is used in two substantial ways in Boltanski & Thévenot 
(2006 [1991]).  Firstly, the authors use the common good as the defining 
“superior principle” for each polity.  For instance in the market polity, free 
market agents not only make judgements toward the common good, they are 
                                            
34 The authors needed to maintain participant anonymity 
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a component part of that common good (p.44).  In line with the discussion in 
Offe (2012) the usage here could more usefully be “a” common good rather 
than “the”, which “suggests a definitive clarity that brooks no dissent” (p.665). 
Subsequently Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) relies heavily on a higher 
principle such as “the” common good in order to provide a measure of stability 
for compromise (p.278).  Without justification to a higher principle, compromise 
is mere forbearance even more fragile than true compromise constructions. It 
is useful to extend Table 1 in the data capture (MS Access database) to allow 
for both usages of the common good.  In the analysis below then “superior 
principle” is the first form of common good from Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 
[1991]) – this is polity specific.  Data characterised under the label “common 
good” is defined as the second usage in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), 
a more general (truly “common”) use of the term.  
Using more terms for each polity increases the confidence in attribution from 
texts to polities. Additionally, a comments field is available to capture other 
more general analysis of the texts.  Figure 3 also contains a field for analysis 
of imagery – such a field was used in an early iteration of analysis influenced 
by semiotic/discourse analysis literature, however does not have a direct 
analogue in orders of worth and has not been used in the final analysis. An 
example of analysis of a PRA authored text as “work in progress” is shown 









Figure 4 Initial analysis of HSBC text - example process. Source: Authors own.  
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From the initial gathering of elements, the text is compared to the descriptions 
associated with the particular polities or orders of worth.  There are two 
characteristic ways that elements of orders of worth are included in texts.  
Firstly where the elements comprise a justification of social relations or a social 
contract.  This may include a single, coherent set of elements from a particular 
polity however, as will be seen below this is rarely the case.  Texts appear to 
contain a number of justificatory regimes with degrees of emphasis.  Secondly, 
orders of worth may be present but elements appear as objects or relations of 
critique.  In both cases, tensions and oppositions, and compromises or 
composite structures may be discerned in the text.   
When reporting findings a limited quantification is used (similar to Milne & 
Adler, 1999, Kietäväinen & Tuulentie, 2013) to illustrate which is the most 
frequent polity being brought to bear as form of public justification.  The 
limitation of this approach is that the salience of the polity may be interpreted 
from context and specific framing through textual elements in the text rather 
than mere frequency. That said, there is value from visualising incidence of 
polities across a range of texts (Table 10), as the visualisation allows an 
accessible overview of emphasis and in graphically illustrates differences 
between different author groups.   The use of some quantification is a 
distinction of the current approach in contrast to thematic analysis which, per 
Vaismoradi et al. (2013, p.400) would be “purely qualitative”.  
As discussed below the first text analysed was in effect a pilot test.  Whilst the 
pilot showed the viability of the analytical approach, the first analysis was 
found to be initially too high level and was revised to be structured more 
around the database fields (characteristics of orders of worth). 
4.7 Populations and Samples 
 
“to make such [qualitative] analysis effective it is imperative that you have a 
limited body of data with which to work” (Silverman, 2000, p.828, [edited for 
clarity]) 
The conceptual model above (Figure 2) shows a number of types of actor 
(Banks, Regulators, NGOs); these actors produce multiple genres of “texts” in 
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the broadest sense.  To evaluate all forms of text from all actors in the banking 
sector is not feasible; a sampling approach is required.  Per the above quote 
from Silverman (2000), constrained sample sizes are important in qualitative 
research.  The following discussion explains the (necessarily) emergent 
process of deciding on the final sample of actors and texts: the overriding 
principle for which has been to allow the development of “depth” rather than 
“breadth” of analysis (Guetterman, 2015).  
 
4.7.1 Boundary Timeframe 
 
This section sketches the process for deciding on a timeframe and approach 
to the data population boundaries.  Two potential approaches are considered: 
longitudinal (through time) and cross sectional (analysing data from a single 
time period).  
Longitudinal studies analyse data from more than one time period, either 
through trend analysis (different samples from the population at different times, 
e.g. opinion polls), panel studies (sample data analysed repeatedly e.g. British 
Household Panel Survey) or cohort studies (sample cohort with specified 
characteristics e.g. health conditions compared to control samples) (Hua & 
David, 2008).  The numerous potential issues concerning longitudinal data 
analysis are out of scope; see inter alia Grittner et al. (2011), and Galbraith, 
Bowden & Mander (2014). 
Cross-sectional research considers data at a defined point or small period and 
may show relationships between variables (Hua & David, 2008) however 
cannot show causality.  A cross-sectional design is likely to be achievable in a 
short time span when compared to longitudinal studies.   The current research 
attempts to open up, to uncover the forms of justification of the social contract 
with the UK banks, rather than develop causal hypotheses, hence a cross-
sectional study is appropriate for this purpose.  
With respect to sampling, 2015 (the most recent year for which full data was 
available at the time of writing) was chosen as the data is most complete 
(contra, say, 2006).  This year is also not a transitional year for regulation from 
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the FSA to FCA and PRA, and is not in the immediate aftermath of the financial 
crisis.  The most “stable” years to choose from could be said to be 2014 or 
2015, with little to choose between them. 
The following section considers further how sampling is undertaken within the 
universe of potential populations for that year.  
4.7.2 Sampling – Overall Approach 
 
A range of sampling approaches are available: convenience (or opportunistic) 
sampling (first-come, first-served); purposeful (purposive) sampling (explicit 
and intentional selection); snowballing (word-of-mouth); quota sampling 
(similar to purposeful sampling) and case study (Luborsky & Rubinstein, 
1995).  Koerber & McMichael (2008, p.465) add “theoretical sampling” – 
similar to purposeful sampling albeit emergent in the process of grounded 
theory studies.  Within “purposive” sampling Patton (2002) identifies a range 
of variants: extreme case, intensity (information-rich cases), maximum 
variation (diverse characteristics), homogeneous (small sample in depth), 
typical case, critical case (if here, then everywhere as logical generalisation), 
snowball, criterion (e.g. all patients with > 2 hour wait time), theory based 
(exemplars of theoretical or operational constructs), confirming/disconfirming, 
stratified, opportunistic, purposeful random (for credible, rather than 
representative, selection, outcomes not known in advance), politically 
important cases (relevance to policy, similar to critical cases), convenience 
sampling (neither “purposeful nor strategic” hence “the least desirable”, 
p.242), and combination of above (e.g. if initial selection too time-
consuming/costly, a random sample from within the initial selection).   There 
are overlaps in the above typology, the range of which, and lack of firm “rules” 
for sample selection, illustrates that the sampling approach needs to be 
aligned to specific research purposes rather than follow a generic 
recommendation (Patton, 2002, Charmaz, 2014).  
Samples need to be sufficient for the research questions/epistemological aims 
and coherence or credibility, given the nature of truth claims or implications 
derived from analysis (Charmaz, 2014, p.215).  As Charmaz notes, a small 
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sample size is incongruent with, say claims that are generalised to all of 
society.  Further, a small sample size may be appropriate if the data (and by 
implication analysis) is sufficiently “rich”, meaning “many layered, intricate, 
detailed, nuanced” (Fusch & Ness, 2015, p.1409). By way of example, in 
choosing their sample size, Henson & Wasserman (2011) eschewed large 
samples that could be used to indicate salience through word frequency, 
instead focussing deeply on the logics (justifications) within seminal/exemplar 
texts (to represent radical Islam, and radical Christianity).   
There are five “lingering” sampling controversies described by Trotter II (2012): 
lack of consistent terminology; clarity/acceptance of criteria for 
quantitative/qualitative sample sizes; differences in approach between 
emergent theory versus theoretically based qualitative research design; 
understanding that qualitative measures of “reliability, replicability, and 
validity” are required, and accepting the lack of generalisability from small 
sample analyses of heterogeneous populations.   Embedded as the current 
research is, in the orders of worth framework as representations of social 
contracts, this comprises a “theoretically based qualitative research design” 
(Trotter II, 2012, p.399). As such the research is less reliant on an open, 
undetermined sample size approach dependent on some (to whatever degree 
convincing) articulation of saturation or redundancy: the sample size may be 
articulated to some degree in advance of the data analysis process, for 
instance by focussing on the most significant banks in the UK.  Such a priori 
sketching of the bounds of the population and sample echoes Trotter II’s 
(2012, p.399) discussion regarding “special populations that need exploration 
in terms of specific beliefs, behaviour”.  The research objective driven 
approach leads to a “purposeful recruitment frame” (p.399-400).  
From the above: sample size, in itself, provides relatively little information 
regarding qualitative research quality.  Samples may be very small, but with 
rich data and analysis, as long as claims to objective truth and to 
generalisability are treated appropriately.  The current research explores a 
narrow sector of the economy using an a priori theoretical frame; hence the 
sampling approach is purposive and adapted to each actor related population 
of texts. By taking a pragmatic but purposive approach in the context of a 
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single researcher project, the approach avoids the potential for bias and 
“anecdotalism” (Silverman, 2010, p.276).  
For some texts a further sampling process is required as they are too large to 
be analysed in depth as a single text, hence judgement sampling is required 
(Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p.109).  This judgement comprises an attempt to ensure 
a similar, strategic nature of texts as representative of organisations by 
extracting, for example, the CEO strategic statements or similar from the larger 
texts such as the banks’ annual report and accounts.   An “institutional” voice 
is anticipated in the selection of texts35.  For the current research, the text 
samples within documents (such as annual report and accounts) are selected 
in order to represent the “head” of the organisation.  
The following sections describe firstly the sampling approach for the actors in 
the sector as described above, then the approach to text sampling within actor 
populations is considered. 
4.7.3 Sample of Banks 
 
The scope of the current study is the UK banking sector.  The conceptual 
model discussed above (Figure 2) illustrates Banks using channels such as 
annual reports and accounts and social environmental reporting (SER) in order 
                                            
35 To explore the significance of the institutional voice it is worth considering 
the bodied/bodiless distinction in Boltanski (2011).  Drawing on the work of 
Cayla (1993), Boltanski shows that, as the intent of personal communication 
cannot be understood directly (only inferred), then in conflict neither personal 
party can bridge the gap between them simply through personal 
communication.  Hence an interpreter (or, arbiter) is required (Cayla is 
discussing the role of a judge).  The interpreter is necessarily not seen as 
embodied, located in idiosyncratic time and space – to very much not embody 
yet another “point of view”.  Sociologically, Boltanski assigns such a role to 
institutions as they are by definition bodiless and not directly locatable; further, 
although the agents in the current research are not in conflict they are in “test” 
situations.  For Boltanski (2011, p.75) the semantic functions of institutions are 
paramount: “to institutions falls the task of saying and confirming what 
matters”.  The implication for the current research is that the “voice” of the CEO 
or director is not simply another view; the samples in effect represent the views 




to communicate public justifications.  For the banks, these are the analysed 
channels or sources of texts.  In particular the Chairman and Chief Executive 
statement of the annual report or SER texts as the authoritative 
representatives, or “the organisational actor primarily in charge of legitimacy 
construction” (Beelitz & Merkl-Davies, 2012, p.109).  
The population of UK based banks is a heterogeneous group of commercial, 
retail and wholesale, national and regional, headquartered and subsidiary 
firms in the UK with widely differing scales of balance sheets (BoE, 2017).  
There is an argument that, since the Building Societies Act of 1987 (and 
subsequent amendments in 1997, 2000 and 2012), Building Societies may 
operate in a manner much more akin to Banks than they had been allowed 
previously.  However, none of the building societies has taken on the universal 
range of services seen in banks and none provides SER texts: building 
societies have been excluded from this analysis. 
Regarding the Banks to analyse, the population of potential banks has been 
taken from the quarterly listing provided by the Bank of England in October 
(BoE, 2015).  This list comprises 166 Banks.  These can be split further into 
two types of entity, Firstly, where the bank is the parent company.  For parent 
companies, it can be considered that corporate communications, statements 
and accounts represent the views of the company.  The other category is 
subsidiary companies.  For subsidiary companies, it is less clear to what extent 
the corporate communication is independent of the parent company, to what 
extent key messages and ways of communicating are inherited from, or are 
mandated explicitly by, the parent entity.   
Additionally, there are number of Banks that appear rather like subsidiaries of 
State Operated Enterprises in that their capital structure is such that they are 
owned by only a small number of shareholders. For instance, Jordan 
International Bank plc is owned by The Housing Bank for Trade and Finance 
and the Arab Jordan Investment Bank, so this bank is classed for the purposes 
here as a subsidiary (the only other banks similarly categorised are Persia 
International Bank plc and Cambridge & Counties Bank Limited).  For the 
purposes of this research, the population is reduced by excluding subsidiary 
banks leaving the population shown below.    
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Per Table 13, highlighted below: only six of the population of regulated banks 
with Head Offices in the UK produce a form of social environmental 
accounting.  These banks are Barclays Bank Plc, HSBC Bank Plc, Royal Bank 
of Scotland Plc, Standard Chartered Bank, The Co-operative Bank Plc, and 
Lloyds Bank Plc.  The sample then is the entire set of banks that are 
headquartered in the UK and have some form of social and environmental 
reporting (SER).  
4.7.4 Sample - Regulatory Actors 
 
The central theme of regulation, as the formal expression of a social contract 
with financial firms, as described in, for example Tucker (2009) has taken on 
renewed import following the financial crisis.  Since then there have been a 
number of new regulatory bodies accountable for financial regulation. 
The population of bodies affecting banks’ regulation in the UK since the 
financial crisis comprises: 
 The Banking Code Standards Board (until 2009)  
 The Lending Standards Board (from 2009, partial remit of the 
Banking Code Standards Board) 
 The Financial Services Authority (assumed much of the remit 
of the Banking Code Standards Board in 2009.  Replaced in 
2012 by the FCA and PRA)  
 The Financial Conduct Authority 
 The Prudential Regulatory Authority 
 The Bank of England 
 The Treasury (as part of HM Government) 
 EU Commission (Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive (AIFMD), UCITS V (Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities), Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD), the Markets in Financial Instruments 




 European Central Bank (ECB), for example through the 
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) 
introducing additional capital requirements (Arnold & 
Noonan, 2015) 
 Competition and Markets Authority 
 Parliamentary Commission for Standards in Banking 
 International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
 The London Stock Exchange (listing rules for banks, and 
trading regulations) 
 The Health and Safety Executive 
 Trading Standards Institute 
 Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) (a trade 
association rather than a formal regulator) 
Additionally it may be noted that a number of professional bodies could 
influence behaviours within banks such as CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst) 
Society of the UK, The Chartered Institute for Securities and Investment (CISI), 
and The Chartered Institute of Bankers.  These bodies operate at the individual 
level rather than the firm level and are excluded from the current research.  
Per Jaworski & Coupland (2014, p. 413) there is an argument for considering 
a “polycentric” approach to the power of international/global regulatory bodies.  
These would include the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and the 
reporting Financial Stability Board (FSB).  These bodies have indirect 
influence as their guidelines are operationalised through multinational and 
national regulatory authorities such as the EU Commission, Prudential 
Regulatory Authority and Financial Conduct Authority and as indirect agents 
are excluded from further consideration. 
Taking a “relevance sampling” (Krippendorf, 2009) approach to regulators 
seems appropriate as they are not equally influential on banks especially with 
regard to wider systemic (hence social contract) issues.  If this study were 
focussed on the building industry sector, for example, then the Health and 
Safety Executive would be more relevant.   
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For the current work, the “relevant sample” of regulators is those organisations 
directly involved in regulating the banks:- 
 The Financial Conduct Authority 
 The Prudential Regulatory Authority 
In addition, a single significant text is joint authored by the Bank of England, 
the FCA and the Treasury.  As such, the Bank of England has been included 
as a regulatory actor.  This means that all publications from the Bank of 
England during 2015 have been reviewed.  The only relevant BoE source text 
is the co-authored Fair and Effective Markets Review – relevance here means 
to be concerned with the role, conduct or purpose of the banking sector.  
4.7.5 Sample - Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) 
 
A “relevant” NGO is concerned with improving the outcomes of the UK, or 
international finance sector (which generally but far from exclusively means 
banking) with respect to Environmental Social & Governance (ESG) issues. 
Hence, whilst there are many thousands of NGOs worldwide, where they are 
not concerned with the interaction of finance with society they are excluded.  
The geographical scope, at least initially, is broad enough to consider 
international finance in that the UK banks are (generally) systemically 
important actors within global finance (BIS, 2015), however texts that are only 
concerned with global, international issues with limited direct reference to the 
UK are excluded. 
The initial populations of NGOs are derived from: 
 Signatories to the Collevechio Declaration (BANKTrak, 2003) 
 Wango (World Association of NGOs) website 
 Search on fossil fuel disinvestment campaigns 
 Author’s experience to generate initial listing followed by snowball 
technique (Bryman & Bell, 2011) utilising links, 
sponsorship/partnerships to generate new NGO possibilities 
The set of NGOs considered comprises: 
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 Association for Accountancy and Business Affairs (AABA, 2019) 
 The ‘Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financière et l'Aide 
aux Citoyens’ (Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions 
and Aid to Citizens) (ATTAC, 2019) 
 The Corner House (The Corner House, 2019) 
 Move Your Money (Move Your Money, 2019) 
 BankTrack (BankTrack, 2019) 
 Centre for Responsible Credit (Centre for Responsible Credit, 2019) 
In the sampling process it was found that only two NGOs – BankTrack, and 
“Move Your Money” had texts focussed on concerned with the role, conduct 
or purpose of the banking sector in the sample period, so both NGOs have 
been included.  
4.7.6 Description of Institutions 
 
It is worthwhile describing the institutions whose texts are analysed in the 
current research, however a note of caution is required.  Any description is 
necessarily incomplete and the gap between description and reality is 
particularly acute for complex, large-scale organisations.  To illustrate: RBS 
described below had over 90,000 employees, multiple brands in a range of 
countries, had met regulatory stress tests in 2015, promoted LGBT 
awareness, human rights, and reported in some detail the intensity of climate 
change related emissions (RBS, 2015).  The group had also reported pre-tax 
losses of circa £3bn and had not been able to return any of government 
(societal) bailout funding of over £40bn and experienced operational 
difficulties: “600,000 payments and direct debits went missing” (Financial 
Times, 2015). The firm was fined circa $679 million over rigging forex markets 
(Chon, Binham & Noonan, 2015). To sum up such a complex set of 
circumstances depends on the relative salience of factors, so in the current 
context the descriptions below have a narrow purpose: solely to give some 






Barclays has a long history, starting with two Quaker merchants in 1690, 
although the Barclays company name dates from 1736 (Barclays plc, 2019).  
Barclays has also been transformed over the years through growth, mergers, 
and acquisitions.  Barclays employed over 129,000 staff, income was over 
£25bn, made a profit after tax nearly £4bn (Barclays, 2015) and was valued at 
circa £37.2bn36 despite being fined $2.4bn for forex rigging (Arnold, 2015a). 
4.7.6.2 Co-operative Bank 
 
For most of its history since 1872 the Cooperative Bank has been part of the 
cooperative movement in the UK, and as a cooperative was owned by 
members.  In 2013 however a restructuring necessitated by financial 
mismanagement meant the Cooperative Group lost financial control of the 
bank (Harvey, 2017) and the bank is now owned by private equity (Treanor, 
2017a), albeit with a continuing commitment to “cooperative” values.   
Much smaller than RBS or Barclays, though still one of the main high street 
banks in the UK, in 2015 the bank lost £622m on income of £299m and 
employed circa 5,700 staff (The Co-operative Bank, 2016). 
4.7.6.3 HSBC 
 
HSBC – “Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation” opened in Hong Kong 
in March 1865 and a month later in Shanghai.  The “centre of gravity” of the 
firm has always been Asia, however when the firm bought Midlands Bank in 
the UK the then regulators insisted on the firm’s HQ moving to London.  
One of the largest companies on the FTSE by market cap (£105.5bn37), HSBC 
employed > 250,000 staff and served over 41m customers, resulting in profit 
before tax of £18.9bn (HSBC, 2016a).  HSBC threatened to move HQ back to 
                                            
36 Author’s calculation of Weighted average number of ordinary shares outstanding during the 
year from annual report multiplied by year end share price on LSE 
37 Author’s calculation of Weighted average number of ordinary shares outstanding during the 
year from annual report multiplied by year end share price on LSE 
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HK in the face of bank taxation in the UK (Arnold & Oakley, 2015) - and 
appeared to win the day against Chancellor Osborne (Parker, 2016) 
4.7.6.4 Lloyds 
 
The Bank of Scotland, formed in 1695 is the oldest component of Lloyds 
banking group – Lloyds bank itself formed in 1765.  The Bank of Scotland had 
joined forces with Halifax Building Society to form in HBOS in 2001.  HBOS 
suffered in the financial crisis and Lloyds was given a competition waiver in 
order to facilitate their rescue/takeover (Croft & Felsted, 2008). 
Lloyds share price was relatively high in 2015 resulting in a market cap of 




The Royal Bank of Scotland has a long heritage, founded in Edinburgh in 1727 
(RBS, 2019) shortly after its long-term rival, The Bank of Scotland opened for 
business in 1695 (Lloyds Banking Group, 2019).  Like many corporations, 
there have been myriad changes, mergers, acquisitions, disposals in RBS’s 
history to the point where claims to heritage are best seen as branding and 
employee engagement devices rather than being particularly meaningful in 
terms of practice.    
In 2015 the bank was transitioning from one of the largest banking groups in 
the world following what would prove to be the disastrous takeover of ABN 
Amro (Croft & Bolger, 2009), toward a reduced balanced sheet with a focus 
on the British Isles (RBS, 2015a).  With income of nearly £13bn and a market 
capitalisation of nearly £35bn38 RBS was one of the largest (and least 
profitable) firms in the UK. 
                                            
38 Author’s calculation of Weighted average number of ordinary shares outstanding during the 
year from annual report multiplied by year end share price on LSE 
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4.7.6.6 Standard Chartered  
 
Similar to HSBC, Standard Chartered has roots in Shanghai and Mumbai in 
1853 (Chartered Bank), and also the British firm ‘Standard Bank’ focused on 
S.Africa from 1862, however only took its current form in 1969 through the 
merger of the two banks.  
Standard Chartered had a market cap of £14.45bn in 201539.  Whilst 
headquartered in the UK it had no retail presence here and over 60% of 
operating income was from Asia in 2015 (Standard Chartered, 2016).  Profit 
for the year was a loss of £1.5bn and the firm employed just over 84,000 staff.  
Despite the bank’s “centre of gravity” being in Asia, it is worthy of inclusion in 
the banking sample as a bank which is regulated by the BoE/FPC/PRA and 
FCA, and is a significant employer and taxpayer in the UK.  
4.7.6.7 Bank of England 
 
Within a broad remit, from monetary policy, to payments systems and currency 
issuance (via third parties such as De La Rue and the Royal Mint), the Bank 
of England has some specific regulatory functions. The Bank of England 
contains two regulatory bodies: at a whole-economy level the Financial Policy 
Committee scans for threats to financial stability (BoE, 2019a) and at a firm-
level the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) monitors  and supervises 
banks and insurance institutions to ensure they are well capitalised and well 
governed (BoE, 2019b).  
The Bank of England supervises “financial market infrastructures” such as 
payments systems (though the “economic regulation” of the payments 
systems more generally fall in the bailiwick of the Payments Systems 
Regulator, which is part of the FCA).  
 
                                            
39 Author’s calculation of Weighted average number of ordinary shares outstanding during the 
year from annual report multiplied by year end share price on LSE 
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4.7.6.8 Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
Reporting to HM Treasury, the FCA is funded via levies on regulated firms 
(FCA, 2018b).  Similarly created as a response to the financial crisis, the FCA 
supervises the conduct of 58,000 financial firms – from the largest banks to 
single trader advisory firms.  The FCA works closely with the PRA – a director 
of the latter is also a board director of the FCA.  
Neither the FCA nor PRA operate a tabula rasa when deciding on regulatory 
policy, rules or guidelines.  The main criteria and operation of regulations have 
their genesis with international bodies such as Bank of International 
Settlements, the Financial Stability Board, and the EU Commission (Armour, 
2017). 
4.7.6.9 Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) 
 
A wholly owned subsidiary of the Bank of England, the PRA was part of the 
regulatory response (discussed above) to the financial crisis: twin peaks of 
prudential and conduct regulation. The PRA supervises “around 1,500 




A relatively recent activist organisation formed in 2004 (BankTrack, 2019) the 
scope of which is global, with a particular emphasis on global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs).  The organisation is small (staff of eight) hence 
relies on social media for audience reach.  Recent campaign focus has been 
on lending to the fossil fuel sector.   
 
4.7.6.11 Move Your Money (MYM)  
 
The MYM campaign developed in response to the conduct scandals 
subsequent to the financial crisis (Move Your Money, 2019).  The organisation 
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aimed to encourage switching from less ethical banks to more – where ethics 
are ranked using criteria concerning fossil fuel finance amongst others (Move 
Your Money, 2014).  The final blog posts from the organisation were in early 
2017.  The US version of the campaign would now appear to be a campaign 
run on behalf of Amalgamated Bank.  The size of the organisation at the time 
is unknown. 
4.7.7 Sampling of Texts 
 
This section considers the process and outcomes from sampling texts.  
4.7.7.1 Texts produced by banks 
 
In keeping with the discussion above regarding timeframes, bank reporting will 
concern 2015 (this means that a report may actually be published in 2016). 
The total population of texts produced by banks could include statutory 
reporting in Annual report and accounts, quarterly and half year results 
announcements, product announcements, company websites, press releases, 
advertising in print, online, on TV and Radio, and Social Environmental 
Reporting (often termed CSR, Sustainability or Citizenship reports).   
From this long list of potential sources, some, such as advertising, websites at 
a particular point in time, are “perishable” and if they still exist will be only 
accessible with access to bank archives.  Consideration has been given to 
seeking access to bank archive material, however this would likely increase 
the population and sample sizes under consideration by an impractical extent.  
Whilst Annual Report and Accounts comprise external/public reporting and 
may not accurately reflect the circumstances “inside” the firm, insider data is 
not available (and not relevant for public justifications).  Additionally for such 
socially constructed data (see, inter alia, Gray, 2002, Collison, 2003, Davison 
& Skerratt, 2007, Beattie, Dhanani & Jones, 2008, Davison, 2011, Wu 2012), 




Per the discussion of Unerman (2010), the earliest SER/SEA research 
focussed on Annual Reports.  Since then, despite the requirements of the 
Companies Act (2006), SER has tended to be published mainly as a 
standalone report, often split into sections on a website.  The source for SER 
texts is banks’ websites (the firms in the current sample tend to be well 
structured and include archival data).  Additionally, the strategic report element 
(typically authored, or by-lined, under the Chairman or CEO) will be analysed 
as this comprises a key text for how the bank presents itself to stakeholders, 
predominantly shareholders, but these are public documents and have a wider 
potential audience. 
Following the discussions above and in Unerman (2000) regarding over-
reliance on annual reporting, the following document sources have been 
chosen to attempt to balance completeness, availability and ensure the 
dataset is bounded: 
1. CSR/Sustainability/Citizenship reports 
2. Annual Reports and Accounts 
3. Any documents published by the firm that are cited in (1) or (2) above 
and which are made available by the firm 
Within a “relevance sampling” frame, a difficulty arises when banks produce a 
heterogeneous range of documents, making certain information on different 
timescales such as half yearly interim statements in addition to the full year 
annual report and accounts.  An initial review of the documents produced by 
banks shows a wide variance in documentation available publicly and hence 
an approach is needed to decide on the population and sample of texts to be 
analysed.   
When gathering data a difference in approach was noted for some banks, 
wherein data is available at different levels of the group or holding company: 
specifically banking groups such as Barclays produce reports for Barclays 
group, and for Barclays Bank, though the differences between the two reports 
are not superficially obvious as they only diverge after nearly 30 pages of the 
annual review.  Again with a relevance frame, the question arises: is the 
Barclays Bank report more relevant or is the Group report more relevant to the 
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UK and the social contract? Due to London’s influence as a financial centre 
(Wolf, 2009) many capital markets staff (with global reach) in banks (such as 
Barclays and HSBC) are based in London.   
At the time of sampling texts, “ring fencing” (PRA, 2015) was yet to be 
implemented.  The concept of “too big to fail” applies to the banking group 
companies rather than bank brands themselves.  Firms such as RBS only 
produce group level reporting.  From this then: to ensure a degree of similarity 
of approach across the banks, and to consider the entities for which the 
taxpayer may be ‘on the hook’ to bailout, Group level reports will be analysed 
in the current research.  It is noteworthy that of the banks, Standard Chartered 
replicate much of their strategic positioning and review text from the Annual 
Report and Accounts to the Sustainability review text.  In order to be able to 
compare strategic “voices” e.g. from the CEO or similar across texts only one 
text (AR&A) has been analysed for Standard Chartered as there is no 
difference between the selected sample text in the AR& and Sustainability 
texts.  
4.7.7.2 Texts produced by regulatory actors 
 
Texts from regulators can be classified in a number of ways: as speeches 
(typically by senior managers, directors), the transcripts of speeches, reviews 
– interim and final reports, including for thematic reviews, technical notices, 
administrative notes, consultation papers (CP), feedback statements (FS), 
submissions to third party institution reviews, discussion papers (DP), 
guidance consultations, handbooks, market studies, occasional papers, press 
releases, newsletters, statements, and press releases (FCA, 2015). 
The sample of regulators was discussed above, hence the population of 
regulatory texts is made up of all texts listed on the websites of the Financial 
Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Bank of 
England for 2015.  
Texts were selected by a three-stage process.  Firstly, searches for suitable 
items were made on the regulators websites (e.g. speeches, or simply the 
publications archive).  Secondly, a review of the search results title was used 
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to exclude items (e.g. a technical notice re product lists) which left a number 
of texts for further consideration.  Finally, for the remaining items a read 
through of the contents of the text was used to decide on inclusions for further 
analysis.  “Suitability” here implies a judgement by the researcher given the 
particular “social contract” frame in connection with the role, conduct or 
purpose of the banking sector, also utilising the researcher’s experience and 
immersion in the field qua Altheide et al. (2008).   
For the sample year there were 248 links to texts reviewed, from these the 
following texts were included in the final sample:- 
Date Title Include? (Comment) 
14/07/2015 Fair and effective markets review (speech) 
Tracey McDermott, director of supervision, 
investment, wholesale and specialists 
Yes (contains strong 
statements re prior conduct of 
banks) 
20/10/15 Chairman's speech to the Trust in Banking 
Conference  
John Griffiths-Jones, Chairman 
Yes (contains themes such as 
“the linkage of trust to business 
purpose” 
22/10/15 The rapidity of change 
Tracey McDermott, Acting Chief Executive 
at the Financial Conduct Authority 
Yes (Contains themes on 
banks behaviours, cyclical 
regulatory change and the 
“unsustainable” level of 
regulatory change) 
02/06/15 “Regulation - supporting vibrant markets” 
– speech (Wheatley, 2015) 
Yes, includes relations 
between regulators and 




Second Annual Public Meeting: 
Transcripts - John Griffiths Jones speech 
Yes (themes include culture 




Second Annual Public Meeting: 
Transcripts - Martin Wheatley speech 
Yes (themes include culture 
change in financial institutions) 
Table 3 Sampled texts for FCA 
As of May 2017 the PRA section of the Bank of England’s website was 
organised in sections:  
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Website section Assessment 
Banking policy 85 titles, 19 assessed further, 1 selected for 
sample 
Supervisory statements 65 titles, 3 assessed further and none 
selected for sample 
Letters  33 titles, 1 assessed further and none 
selected for sample 
Annual Report & Accounts Selected for the sample (specifically the 
statement pp6-8 from Andrew Bailey BoE 
Deputy Governor, Prudential Regulation 
and Chief Executive of the PRA.  Exclude 
Chairman (Mark Carney) statement as this 
is internally focussed on the "how" whereas 
AB focussed more on the "why"; exclude 
remaining sections of document as more 
focussed on strategy and 
operationalisation) 
Insurance policy This section of briefly assessed and 
excluded as irrelevant 
Consultation papers This section duplicates the Banking Policy 
texts (and includes insurance texts) hence 
is excluded 
Policy statements This section duplicates the Banking Policy 
texts (and includes insurance texts) hence 
is excluded 
Statements of policy This section duplicates the Banking Policy 
texts (and includes insurance texts) hence 
is excluded 
Regulatory Digest Excluded as an initial assessment showed 
they duplicate, or rather are mostly links to, 
texts assessed under previous headings 
Approach documents There are none for the sample year 




The 333 analysed document headings/links for the PRA resulted in two 
documents sampled for the PRA:- 
Date Title 
15 June 2015 Annual Report & Accounts 2015 (specifically the statement pp6-8 
from Andrew Bailey BoE Deputy Governor, Prudential Regulation 
and Chief Executive of the PRA) 
21 May 2015 Corporate governance: Board responsibilities - CP18/15 
(Consultation Paper) – considers the rationale for corporate 
governance hence of interest with respect to how firms ought 
operate with respect to societal stakeholders 
Table 5 PRA Texts sample 
4.7.7.3 Texts produce by NGOs 
 
The websites for the above NGOs were examined for relevant publications.  
The examination of the NGO websites led to the following sampling: 
 Association for Accountancy and Business Affairs (AABA) - 54 search 
results, 15 assessed further; 1 text suitable however out with sample 
year – 0 sampled 
 The ‘Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financière et l'Aide 
aux Citoyens’ (Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions 
and Aid to Citizens) (ATTAC) – 13 titles, 4 assessed further of which 2 
would be of interest however are not in the sample year – 0 sampled 
 The Corner House – 87 titles – 20 assessed further, 2 of interest 
however are not in the sample year – 0 sampled 
 Move Your Money – 80 titles – 20 assessed further, 2 of interest (an 
additional eight out with the sample year) 
 BankTrack – of the 25 texts for 2015, 2 were assessed further and 1 
included for sample 
 Centre for Responsible Credit – out of 7 texts 3 were assessed further 





From the 336 total texts the sample comprises: 
Date/Partner if applicable 
 
NGO Title 
September 16, 2015 
 
Move Your Money 
In the age of digitalisation, 
do we really need branches 
anymore? 
January 9, 2015 
 
Move Your Money 
How we can transform 
finance 
Dec 07, 2015 | BankTrack, 
Les Amis de la Terre and 
Rainforest Action Network 
 
BankTrack 
Civil society statement in 
response to the launch of 
financial sector voluntary 
climate principles 
Table 6 Sampled NGO Texts 
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4.7.7.4 List of all sampled texts 
 
This section lists all the sampled texts from the above analysis:- 
Text # Date/Partner if 
applicable 
 





September 16, 2015 
Move Your Money In the age of digitalisation, do we really need branches 
anymore? 
6 6 
2 January 9, 2015 Move Your Money How we can transform finance 2 2 
3 Dec 07, 2015 
BankTrack, Les Amis 
de la Terre and 
Rainforest Action 
Network 
BankTrack Civil society statement in response to the launch of financial 
sector voluntary climate principles 
1 1 
4 15 June 2015 PRA Annual Report & Accounts 2015 (specifically the statement 
pp6-8 from Andrew Bailey BoE Deputy Governor, 
Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive of the PRA) 
3 94 
5 21 May 2015 PRA Corporate governance: Board responsibilities - CP18/15 
(Consultation Paper) – considers the rationale for corporate 
governance hence of interest with respect to how firms 




Text # Date/Partner if 
applicable 
 




6 14/07/2015 FCA Fair and effective markets review 
Tracey McDermott, director of supervision, investment, 
wholesale and specialists 
4 4 
7 20/10/15 FCA Chairman's speech to the Trust in Banking Conference  
John Griffiths-Jones, Chairman 
3 3 
8 22/10/15 FCA The rapidity of change 
Tracey McDermott, Acting Chief Executive at the Financial 
Conduct Authority 
3 3 
9 21/07/15 (modified 
14/09/15) 
FCA Second Annual Public Meeting: Transcripts - John Griffiths 
Jones speech 
3 3 
10 21/07/15 (modified 
14/09/15) 
FCA Second Annual Public Meeting: Transcripts - Martin 
Wheatley speech 
5.5 6 
11 02/06/15 FCA “Regulation - supporting vibrant markets” – speech 
(Wheatley, 2015 
4 4 
12 Fair and Effective 
Markets Review  





Text # Date/Partner if 
applicable 
 




13 2015 Barclays CEO review 4 356 
14 “Our Approach” (equivalent to SER) 10 356 
15 2015 Cooperative AR&A 3.5 294 
16 SER (Values & Ethics report) 3 59 
17 2015 RBS AR&A CEO Q&A 2 2 
18 SER 2 59 
19 2015 HSBC  
  
AR&A 2 54 
20 2015 SER (Approach) 3 54 
21 2015 Lloyds  
 
AR&A 3 311 
22 2015 SEA 5 10 
23 2015 Std Chartered  AR&A 3 360 
 Page Count Totals 87 2177 
Table 7 List of all sampled texts 
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4.8 Data collection and storage 
 
Copies of all relevant reports and web pages were made as soon as sources 
were identified.   
The limitations of software NVivo 10 in supporting the analysis of comprise 
constructions in the current research necessitated an alternative data capture 
software.  Whilst a spreadsheet format could be a workable solution, there was 
the possibility that analysis would extend to querying relationships between 
words, phrases and types of institutions. To support relationship based query 
and display of data a Microsoft Access database was constructed by the 
author.      
4.9 Research Quality 
 
The following section analyses issues of “quality” and “trustworthiness” of the 
method employed in the current study.  First it is worth considering approaches 
to what we mean by “quality” in the context of research.  
4.9.1 Dimensions of Quality 
 
The particular criteria for assessing quality of research are contingent on the 
methodological approach undertaken.  In a statistical analysis of a large 
sample intended to develop generalizable findings, facets of validity and 
reliability are foremost considerations. Validity ensures the analysis is actually 
of the purported concepts, objects or processes under examination.  Reliability 
helps ensure the replicability of findings.   
In contrast to large-scale quantitative and confirmatory analysis, there are 
different and various criteria regarding the “quality” of interpretive, small scale, 
exploratory analyses.  Discussion of quality or trustworthiness of qualitative 
research may focus on the coherence of concepts, contribution, defensibility 
of research design, and transparency/rigour of reporting, whilst considering 
issues of ethics and diversity (Spencer, Ritchie, Lewis & Dillon, 2003, p.716).   
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Similarly an implication from Davies (2006) is that exploratory research should 
be credible, plausible, and trustworthy.  
Research ontologies foreground and privilege objects and relations, and 
enable or constrain epistemological approaches.  Following Potter (1996), this 
section excludes considerations of the nature of “reality” as the abstract 
ontological debate does not sufficiently advance understanding of the entities 
and agents and relationships between them with which this work is concerned. 
More broadly Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p.13) summarise criteria for a number 
of interpretative paradigms (Table 1, below) which means that no singular 
quality framework is universally applicable, quality assessments are 
necessarily “context dependent” (Welch & Piekkari, 2017) giving rise to 
“contingent criteriology” (Johnson, Buehring, Cassell & Symon, 2006, cited in 
Welch & Piekkari, 2017, p.719).   
 Paradigm Criteria 
Positivist/Post-
positivist 
Internal and external validity [could usefully add 
reliability of measures and generalisability of results] 
Constructivist Trustworthiness, Creditability, Transferability, 
Confirmability 
Feminist  Afrocentric [could be challenged: “global” more 
appropriate, or “Global South”], lived, dialogic, 
concerning, race, class, gender, reflexive [though 
see Lynch (2000) for an interesting critique], 
grounded, embodied 
Ethnic  Afrocentric [as above], lived, dialogic, 
accountability, race, class, gender  
Marxist Emancipatory, falsifiability, dialogic, race, class, 
gender [historically situated may be a useful 
addition here] 
Cultural studies Cultural practice, praxis, social texts, subjectivities 
Queer Theory Reflexivity [see above], deconstruction 
Table 8 Research Criteria adapted from Denzin & Lincoln (2011, p.13)) [additions, authors own] 
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Given the closest paradigm from Table 8 to the current research is 
“Constructivist”, the rest of the section below considers the criteria as above, 
of Trustworthiness, Creditability, Transferability, and Confirmability. 
4.9.2 Trustworthiness  
 
Common discussions of validity and reliability for quantitative analyses are 
contrasted with calls for trustworthiness and credibility in the qualitative world.   
Torrance (2008) suggests that the terminology is instructive and that trust and 
“warrant” are terms that tend not to be applied to quantitative research, that 
there is a lack of critique of such issues in quantitative approaches.   
In positivist/quantitative research, there is considerable emphasis on validity 
of constructs, models, and analysis wherein validity is concerned with the 
“integrity” (in the sense of coherence) of the analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2011, 
p.42).  Whilst much of the discussion of validity in Bryman & Bell concerns 
quantitative methods (measurement, internal, external), and “validity” is more 
generally a term associated with positivist/realist approaches, Bryman & Bell 
further consider qualitative aspects (ecological validity) and trustworthiness 
(creditability, transferability, dependability, confirmability) (p.43) which parallel 
quantitative research concerns.  For Altheide & Johnson (2011, p.585) there 
may be additional validity concerns for qualitative research such as: validity-
as-culture (validity is defined as reflecting researchers’ culture), validity-as-
ideology, validity-as-gender, validity-as-language/text (discourse), validity-as-
relevance/advocacy, validity-as-standards, and validity-as-marketable-
legitimacy (socially acceptable research), all of which similarly impose a priori 
epistemological constraints on frames, data, and analysis.   In addition to these 
aspects of trustworthiness above, Seale (1999, p.468) notes that 
trustworthiness is “always negotiable and open-ended, not being a matter of 
final proof whereby readers are compelled to accept an account”.  
The immersive approach per Altheide et al. (2008) challenges the realist 
concept of reliability in that the depth of understanding is particular to the 
researcher, and therefore the analysis is dependent on this particular 
understanding.  That said, some indicators above are notably straightforward 
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(e.g. time orientation).  A mixed picture of trustworthiness emerges: some of 
the analysis does depend on the researcher’s understanding of the field and 
hence results may not easily be reproduced by other researchers with less 
subject matter expertise: for other aspects, a high level of “reliability” (a realist 
term) would be expected. 
Other potential issues identified in Welch & Piekkari (2017) include descriptive 
errors such as not quoting texts correctly, interpretive errors due to lack of 
understanding of meaning of texts, and theoretical issues of incoherence or 
lack of links between texts and claimed meanings.  In addressing the first of 
these errors, the current research uses publicly available texts hence quotes 
and attributions may be checked by third parties; as a single researcher project 
there is a reliance on the accuracy of the researcher.  The issue of attribution 
of meaning echoes concerns in Ramirez (2013), that a priori meanings are 
forced onto texts in ways that may be inappropriate, without challenge to the 
theoretical framework.  To address such concerns, for the current research, 
instances of ambiguities in attribution are discussed explicitly and the 
reasoning for attribution given.  There is still a reliance on domain expertise to 
some extent (a researcher not familiar with the banking sector may make 
different attributions in some cases). Finally in terms of alignment to theory: 
the use of an explicit a priori framework helps constrain the analysis within a 
public justification theoretical field, which means that links to theory are 
reasonably clear, even if the specific attributions and constructs may require 
some explanation.   
All data used is viewable in the public domain which means that there is the 
opportunity for others to challenge the analysis herein, and most importantly 
to see that samples are what they purport to be.  
A characteristic of the foregoing discussion is the contingent nature of quality 
criteria. In contrast, Tracy (2010, p.839) adumbrates eight “universal” criteria 
for qualitative research: “(a) worthy topic, (b) rich rigor [sic], (c) sincerity, (d) 
credibility, (e) resonance, (f) significant contribution, (g) ethics, and (h) 
meaningful coherence”.  A critique of all these characteristics is out with the 
scope of the current research, suffice to say there are a number of issues of 
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particular note, not least that a “criteriological” approach necessarily relies on 
socially constructed criteria (Smith & McGannon, 2017) - implying infinite 
regress or, more commonly, “turtles all the way down”40.  Further, naïve 
application of criteria may privilege a narrow approach to the exclusion of novel 
ways of producing knowledge; to apply strict quality criteria may be 
undesirable, unsustainable and unlikely to be achieved in practice.  
4.9.3 Creditability 
 
Following Potter (1996), the current research excludes considerations of the 
nature of “reality” as the abstract ontological debate does not sufficiently 
advance understanding of the entities and agents and relationships between 
them with which this work is concerned41.  A singular ontology has been 
chosen, per Rousselière & Vézina (2009). The ex post texts from social actors 
as objects in themselves, however per Jagd (2011) these represent outcomes 
rather than processes (epistemologically and practically, the latter are difficult 
to discern and analyse). Whilst in contrast, Saunders et al. (2009) suggest 
multiple approaches to ontology are usable in one project, this would appear 
problematic given the arguments for incommensurability between ontologies 
highlighted by Guba & Lincoln (2005, p.198, Table 8.5).  As discussed above, 
the current research is ontologically objective whilst epistemologically relative, 
which is appropriate when considering the interpretation of real objects (texts) 
from real institutions.  
Altheide et al. (2008) emphasise the need for a familiarity with the field of 
discourse before analysing text samples in detail.  Research familiarity 
(comfort, even) with textual material raises a question of how the researcher 
avoids sample selection that supports a particular a priori notion of the 
concepts to be examined.  Altheide et al. do not address this issue.  To address 
                                            
40 A saying regarding infinite regress, attributed to Barker & Berg discussion & Four sermons 
by T. Parker: A collection of 12 pieces (1854): “My opponent’s reasoning reminds me of the 
heathen, who, being asked on what the world stood, replied, “On a tortoise” But on what does 
the tortoise stand? “On another tortoise.” With Mr Barker, too, there are tortoises all the way 
down” (p.48)  
41 Potter (1996): “reality (or ‘reality’) cannot enter this debate except as another description, 
which would beg the question of whether this new description is itself descriptive or 
constructive” (p.2, emphasis in original).   
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the issue of potential bias in the current work a heuristic to select samples has 
been developed: to sample texts associated with the head of organisations 
such as banks and regulators, this means there is consistency in the type of 
texts analysed.  NGO texts are more challenging in this regard: sample 
selection relies on the researcher’s familiarity with key topics in the sector and 
hence the most salient and general texts have been selected.  Transparency 
with respect to the population and sample for NGO texts helps reduce the risk 
of bias.  
One consideration from a cross-sectional design is to understand how typical 
of organisations texts are the particular sample set.  For instance, “Materially 
improved [financial] returns” and “deliver good returns” (p.4) (Standard 
Chartered, 2016) raise questions around “good compared to what?”  Given 
Standard Chartered is in a “turnaround” process then the emphasis in 
constructs could be different in other than in texts prior, and subsequent to, 
the sample period.  Herein there is a reliance on the researcher's familiarity 
with the sector to be alert to this risk.  The texts in the sample do appear to be 
broadly similar to texts out of sample.  Further, the sample year 2015 was 
chosen in part as not being particularly notable with respect to crises, major 
geo-political changes, or legislative/structural changes within the regulatory 
space. In short, 2015 is as near as possible to a “typical” year.  
4.9.3.1 Warranted belief in the trustworthiness of texts 
 
The analysed texts transmit beliefs from an institution to an audience: they are 
the “testimony” of the institution (Lackey, 2006).  Testimony ranges from the 
mundane to political or legal declarations with profound consequences. 
Publications from NGOs, Speeches from Regulators, and Strategic 
statements from banks’ executive are testimonies on behalf of the institution 
and may be said to represent the firms’ beliefs regarding their activities, 
values, motivations (see also consideration of “institutional voice” above). In 
the Belief View of Testimony (BVT), for knowledge to be passed via testimony, 
a necessary (though not sufficient) condition is that the speaker needs to be 
sincere (Lackey, 2006, p. 78). What is important in the BVT is that the 
speaker’s beliefs are warranted, and that there are known epistemic 
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characteristics of the statements made.  However, the most important aspect 
is the speaker’s warranted belief.  It is worth considering the approach to trust 
in institutional communication in the content of the analysed texts in the current 
research.  Each type of author or institution can be considered in turn.  
The production of banks’ texts is set in a long history of business deception – 
indeed Adam Smith (2005 [1776]) took a dim view: 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment 
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” 
RBS were sued for £4bn after allegedly overstating the prospects of the bank 
whilst raising fresh capital (Binham & Thompson, 2013) and settled for £200m 
(Dunkley, 2017b); RBS CEO was accused of “misleading parliament” 
(Binham, 2018); the CEO of Barclays called for reduction in “bank bashing” 
just before the LIBOR scandal broke (Goff, Jenkins & Jones, 2012); HSBC 
were fined for enabling tax evasion (Keohane & Arnold, 2017), and the 
Cooperative Bank chief exec was filmed buying drugs (Guthrie & Bounds, 
2013).  The scale of such misconduct is such to raise doubt over the 
trustworthiness of banks’ reporting. Banks are no exception in attempting to 
construct brand image for differing stakeholder groups (Beelitz & Merkl-
Davies, 2012, Solomon, Solomon, Joseph & O'Doherty, 2013).  However 
investors who bear risk dependant on their analysis of firms’ prospects, seem 
to give (some) credence to strategic statements conveyed from firms, e.g. in 
annual report and accounts (Barker, 1998).  
Considering source data in more detail, all of the banking Annual Report and 
Accounts/Strategic reports and SER texts are assured by third parties, and 
this may confer some legitimacy42 on the documents as a valid and reliable 
source of information.  A number of initiatives purport to improve the quality 
and standardisation of assurance. The International Auditing and Assurance 
                                            
42 Indeed a specific award category within the Corporate Register Reporting Awards is “for 




Standards Board (IAASB) introduced the ISAE 3000 (Revised) standard 
“Assurance Engagements Other Than Audits or Reviews of Historical 
Financial Information” which may be applied to social and environmental 
matters (there is also a specific standard for assurance of GHG emission 
statements).   AccountAbility introduced the AA1000 standard for assurance 
of compliance with AccountAbility reporting guidance (ACCA, 2014). 
That said, concerns regarding assurance have been raised, such as 
management involvement in, and control over, assurance processes and a 
lack of external stakeholder involvement (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005); 
assumptions of uniform levels of assurance and inconsistencies between 
national approaches (Manetti & Becatti, 2008); and concerns over the diversity 
of approaches and actors “promoting their own commercial, professional and 
ideological agendas” (Smith, Haniffa & Fairbrass, 2011). On balance, it would 
appear appropriate to (cautiously) warrant that the constructions of the 
strategic statements in banking texts represent the constructions of the social 
contract as intended by banks. 
NGOs demonstrate heterogeneous ideologies (Fisher, 1997) and these 
ideologies will inform, guide and constrain texts (Richardson, 2007).  For NGO 
texts, warrant for belief in the sincerity of the beliefs in testimony may be 
derived from the very fact that the institution exists as an NGO in order to 
create positive social change.  That is, unless there is suspicion that the NGO 
is falsely representing itself and may actually be an agent for (say) the banking 
industry, it seems reasonable to say that the beliefs expressed in testimony 
are likely to be sincere at that time – otherwise the NGO would be a different 
organisation with a different purpose.  
For regulators the determination of sincerity is difficult, not least due to 
concerns over “regulatory capture” (Kwak, 2013).  Regulators are to some 
extent held to account for public strategy or public justifications and financial 
sector outcomes (particularly customer outcomes).  There are three processes 
by which regulators are accountable. The first is by publishing texts of 
speeches, regulations, guidance and so on, there is the possibility of public 
scrutiny, however there is a lack of engagement of the public in such topics 
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(and in politics in general, see inter alia Marsh, O’Toole & Jones, 2006). 
Limited public oversight weakens reasons to consider regulatory texts 
warranted knowledge.  Secondly, part of the public scrutiny is by the press and 
broader media sector.  It is noteworthy that parts of the UK media landscape 
are focussed on topics of finance, the economy, and regulation (The Financial 
Times, The Economist in particular) – such focus may allow for more skilled 
analysis and reporting of financial news.  However media institutions do not 
really hold institutions to account unless it serves their interests (Carrington & 
Nelson, 2002) and if such institutions are to truly to act as the “fourth estate” 
watchdog (Besley, Burgess & Prat, 2002) they should be (impossibly) 
independent “of other institutions, especially government, business and 
industry” (Newman, et al., 2012, p.7, emphasis added).  This second, media-
led form of accountability may then also be weak. Finally, regulators may be 
subject to parliamentary scrutiny through management accountability and 
more publicly through select committees.  At the time of writing, the work of 
the FCA is under review (Treasury Committee, 2019).  Such public scrutiny 
provides stronger warrant for believing in the sincerity of the regulatory texts 
especially in the atmosphere of heightened scrutiny following apportionment 
of (some) of the blame for the financial crisis on regulators and subsequent 
changes in regulatory structures in the UK.  
The considerations above consider empirical evidence, for example if we have 
seen evidence of wrongdoing in the past we are less likely to assume good 
faith in the future.  Relatedly Boltanski (2011) addresses tensions in societal 
relations toward institutions.  As disembodied entities, institutions have the 
possibility of taking and speaking to a general position or “sub specie 
aeternitatis” (p.84).  Disembodied entities cannot speak for themselves, so rely 
on spokespersons to do that on behalf of the institution. For Boltanski (2011, 
pp.84-87) the audience knows that the spokesperson is not fully identifiable 
with the institutions as the spokesperson has their own agendas, desires, 
failings and so on and so forth.  As a result, a “dress code” such as a uniform 
or priest’s attire for instance may be used to frame the spokesperson’s speech 
as “official” or institutional rather than personal.  The tension between relying 
on institutions to declare “what is”, and being aware of the fallibility of the 
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people within institutions Boltanski refers to as “hermeneutic contradiction”.  
For the current research the warrantedness in believing in the good faith at 
least, or the truthiness of texts, depends on resolving the hermeneutic 
contradiction, or at least holding this in abeyance.  As discussed above the 
varied stakeholders of regulatory institutions and of corporations act (with 
some potential delays) as governing mechanisms in order to increase the 
warrantedness of the belief in the truth of texts from the perspective of the 
institution. For NGOs it is less clear that such governing mechanisms pertain 
excepting that, were texts to depart too far from institutional mission then 
support for the NGO would be withdrawn.  
From the above then it seems reasonable that there is sufficient public 
scrutiny, or alignment to institutional aims and purpose, to warrant that text 
contents do reflect the views of the institutions “owning” those texts – albeit 
cautiously in the case of the banks.  
4.9.4 Transferability 
 
Sobh & Perry (2006) consider generalisability for a realism paradigm in 
contrast to positivist (generalisation of results to wider populations) and in 
contrast to critical theory and constructionist paradigms wherein results 
(constructed, by definition), cannot be generalised. For the current study, 
generalisability or rather transferability to wider populations is constrained in 
two ways: firstly, banks are “special” due to credit creating capabilities and 
hence banking relations with the economy and society are not easily 
generalizable to non-financial firms (or indeed many other types of financial 
firms, such as insurers)  (Ashcraft, 2003).  An additional constraint on 
transferability is that, despite increasing influence of global institutions such as 
the Bank of International Settlements, “all banking is local” due to the influence 
of regional and national legislators.  This discussion echoes Trotter II’s (2012, 
p.400) concern that qualitative research “has more epistemological difficulty 
with generalizability to large populations, especially highly diverse populations 
which are multi-modal on beliefs, values, knowledge, processes”.  Whilst the 
choice of the UK banking sector is defensible solely on pragmatic grounds, it 
is possible that UK banks, regulators and NGOs are idiosyncratic, which 
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means that further research to contrast UK construction of the social contract 
with other jurisdictions would be desirable.  More pointedly, in the earlier 
discussion of the social contract for the banking sector it was noted that all 
social contracts are necessarily incomplete and contingent on local 
specificities.  In short, the results of the current research are not intended to 
be transferable albeit there are methodological implications from the current 
research which are of a more general nature.  
Further, Lewis & Ritchie (2003) consider representational generalisation as 
not dissimilar to the positivist generalisation above to wider populations from 
which samples are constructed – the limits here are per the above discussion.  
The authors also consider inferential generalisation, to other contexts that are 
“similar”: however a similar constraint applies for the current research as 
discussed above.  Finally the authors consider theoretical generalisation 
(enhancing theoretical perspectives), and this is the type of generalisability 
pertinent to the current research, as an example of a construction of the Social 
Contract and empirical use of the orders of worth schema of justifications.   
4.9.5 Confirmability 
 
Rousseliére & Vézina (2009) note in the construction of orders of worth that 
justifications are not simply obvious. Hence they consider that justifications 
and perceptions of co-operative organisations’ identities are constructed in 
each organisation - such contingency then could be said to limit 
generalisations of the specific constructions of polities, however this does not 
challenge the general applicability of the grammar  of conventions, of 
justifications and hence the social contract.  The occasional difficultly in 
attribution of utterances to polities highlights the tension between empirical 
data and theoretical frameworks (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007, Ramirez, 
2013). 
4.10 Research Ethics 
 
The secondary data analysis herein uses publicly available information.  The 
ethical considerations regarding handling secondary data in a qualitative 
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approach are concerned with understanding the context of primary data (text) 
production and in sensitivity in handling data not intended for the analysis 
undergone in the current research (Irwin, 2013, Morrow, Boddy & Lamb, 
2014).  The processes by which judgements are made in the current work are 
spelled out in the process discussions above and in the analytical and 
concluding sections below and the researcher is sensitive to ambiguities and 
the possibilities of misinterpretation.  There are no ethical issues in the current 
research that required consideration by the research ethics committee in the 
Business School. 
4.11 Research Methods Summary 
 
The above chapter has considered the justifications of the approach with 
respect to prior research and the aims and objectives to be attained.  A 
conceptual model has been developed and used to delineate the boundaries 
of the research.  The methods employed – qualitative content analysis within 
a framework of orders of worth – has been set out.  The pilot study showed 
the viability of the research and is written up as text #1 below (further 
reflections on the pilot study are included at the end of the discussion chapter 
below).  There is transparency regarding populations and samples. Limitations 









This chapter explores the characteristics of orders of worth present in the 
sample of texts examined through a qualitative content analysis method.  For 
each text the characteristics uncovered by the repeated re-reading and 
analysis of the text are discussed, including where appropriate discussion of 
decision making in the presence of ambiguous utterances.  A summary of each 
analysis includes a discussion of the most prevalent of the polities.  The 
analysis of Text #1 formed the pilot study above and the change in approach 
can be seen between this analysis and the remaining texts: rather than discuss 
the text in the order as written, subsequent narratives are more directly 
structured around the characteristics of the polities. 
Following the discussion of the texts, two further analyses are presented.  
Firstly an overall pictorial representation of the presence/absence of polities in 
the texts.  Rather than a detailed quantitative analysis this representation is 
intended to develop an easy to access overview indicating the dominance and 
absence of polities in the texts.  
Finally, there is consideration of the most prevalent and absent characteristics 
of the polities in the texts.  The analysis raises interesting questions about the 
relative presence and absence of elements of polities as some texts have a 




This chapter explores the presence, absence and construction of justifications 
of social contracts in texts.  Given an a priori framework, this chapter illustrates 
the range of polities utilised and the relative predominance of each (taken to 
be meaningful, similar to Milne & Adler, 1999, re the prevalence of terms in 
content analysis). This initial analysis describes “who said what” in terms of 
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dimensions of orders of worth: the following chapter analyses patterns of 
justifications across the whole dataset. 
Methodologically this chapter illustrates the use of orders of worth in a novel 
area (the banking sector), and finds there are limits to the use of the 
framework.  One limitation is in attribution, similar to concerns of Gale, Heath, 
Cameron, Rashid & Redwood, (2013) who note the difficulty in analytic 
choices regarding attribution, and Ramirez (2013) who uses difficulty or 
tension in attribution to problematize limits of extant theory (see also Alvesson 
& Kärreman, 2007). The other is that a normative element to what may 
superficially be considered a positive framework is present: Boltanski & 
Chiapello (2007, pp.365-366) explicitly exclude shareholders as “qualified 
subjects” which is problematic when addressing the construction of the banks’ 
social contract by the shareholder “owned” banks.  Similarly shareholders are 
problematised by the criticism in van Bommell (2014, p.1160) wherein the 
authors finds it “difficult to position integrated reporting as a durable legitimate 
compromise since it violates the principle mechanisms of finding a common 
interest, avoiding clarification and maintaining ambiguity. In particular, 
accountants and investors are often accused of capturing the dialogue and 
pursuing private interest rather than searching for a common interest” 
(emphasis added).  
5.2 Texts Analysis 
 
In each of the following analyses, the justifications found within the text are 
considered using the “qualitative content analysis” approach described above.  
After the analysis for each of the texts, a summary of the main “polities” found 
is presented including a summary count of polities found.  
5.2.1 #1 “In the age of digitalisation, do we really need branches 
anymore?” (Move Your Money, 2015a) 
5.2.1.1 Justifications within the text 
 
There are few direct indicators of the “common superior principle” in the text, 
which may be because the text is an even-handed critique of market 
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justifications from civic demands.  Ontological and epistemological 
assumptions that underlie a common capacity to hold banks “accountable” are 
present through the text – that bank branches enable tangible evidence of 
bank behaviours and hence critique and accountability.  
The concept of common dignity appears through the article in the form of de 
minimus expectations of what should be expected from banks and banking 
services (a market justification).  That a wide range of face-to-face and 
bespoke services are available to all (and even that all should have internet 
access): “you can’t get bespoke advice from a FAQ page”.  Further interactions 
with banks should be “meaningful” – as opposed to automated, homogenised: 
the appeal to “all”, or equality, is a civic justification. 
The “common good” is not explicit in the text.  The article, in allowing space 
for both market and civic orders of worth, appears to be based on a conception 
of taming and mediating financialised capitalism rather than a more radical 
approach.    
The initial focus of the article concerns “mis-selling, criminal behaviour”.  The 
focus on breaches of law and regulation is a focus on the non-justifiable, out 
with the polity, an act of violence out with the orders of worth (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006 [1991], pp.37-38, Shafik, 2006).  The focus in the Move your 
Money article on public and private debt suggests concerns of a civic and 
market nature respectively however the concerns regarding retail credit (PRA, 
2017) have recently been more acute than those for public debt.  Some of the 
key subjects within the text are Banks, Regulators, Government (Politicians), 
and Debtors.  
There is substantial criticism of regulatory change since the crisis (“watered 
down”, “practically worthless”, “in tatters”) that is suggestive of a test that 
shows decline within the civic polity.  In the “capitulation to HSBC lobbying” 
the co-existence of civic and market justifications is seen to resolve to a 
‘victory’ for market justifications. As part of this critique, regulatory capture is 
said to have occurred.  This echoes the discussion of Glinavos (2013) and 




In two paragraphs discussing change in the banks there seems to be a 
recognition and acceptance that market justifications (ways of expressing 
judgement, investment formulae) are to be expected from a commercial firm.  
There is also a sense that the banks in aiming to be seen as an “ultimately 
benevolent institution” is placed hierarchically superior to customers within the 
domestic polity demonstrating assumptions regarding natural relations.  
However this is something of a strawman in the article given the lack of 
evidence – surely all firms wish to appear benevolent toward customers. 
Placed in the third page of text there is a large graphic representation of a 
Royal Bank of Scotland credit card, with the long card number replaced with 
£15,530,000,000 to signify the amount of investment by banks (or just RBS? 
This is not made clear though the scale of number is most likely to be for a 
single bank).  This graphic, which calls for divestment from fossil fuels is 
placed within the green polity, though strangely is rather free floating and not 
directly connected to the narrative of the surrounding text.  
There follows a discussion of the market world of the banks such as “cross-
selling and customer profiling” which is followed by criticism of “abuse, with 
near-complete legal impunity, over and over and over again”.  The impunity 
here is suggestive either of corruption, which lies out with the orders of worth, 
or of market justificatory hegemony meaning that it is difficult in practice to 
challenge the “dominant market position”.  As discussed above one of the 
(deliberate) limits to the orders of worth framework is the exclusion of violent 
acts (exploitation of customers is a form of financial violence, see Marazzi, 
2011).  The charge in the article is (in part) that banks’ behaviour is not always 
oriented toward justice, toward a common good.  
The article challenges the “inevitable” move to a cashless society (industrial 
and market justifications) on civic grounds – a “threat to civil liberties”, showing 
again the tension between justificatory regimes indeed hinting at 
incommensurability between the justifications even at a higher level of “the 
common good”. 
“Disempowerment” of staff is a representation of the status of the “little person” 
within a market justification – there is no discussion of the condition of the 
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“great person” because this article comes to bury that justificatory regime, not 
to praise it.  Such disempowerment is seen to constrain “holding bad bank 
behaviour to account” which is another way of saying that the tests of a non-
market justification cannot readily be applied. Interesting to reflect that “little” 
person in one polity may be a “great person” as judged under the criteria of an 
alternate polity.  Ultimately, by focussing on industrial justifications and actions 
(such as making it difficult to find helpline phone numbers) there is a sense 
that ultimately the consumer loses out: one justificatory regime is employed 
excessively in circumstances where a range of stakeholders have a range of 
demands for services, prices, and relationships. 
Efficiency through digitalisation leads to the claim by RBS that their busiest 
branch is “the Reading to London” train.  The authors find this claim “as risible 
as it is ridiculous”.  The strength of critique is an indicator of the gap perceived 
here between civic and market/industrial justifications.  Some of this antipathy 
must surely be rooted in the discussion above, that within a civic order of worth, 
the bank branch is reified as a bearer of social cohesion effects, conferring an 
element of fixity to the nominalisation of complex, interacting social processes.  
As such, there is a reactionary critique lurking here, whilst there is a trend 
elsewhere (e.g. fintech) wherein banking is becoming less “somewhere you 
go and more something you do” (King, 2012, emphasis added), for instance 
via mobile phone.  A similarly reactionary tone is prevalent discussing the 
tangible barrier e-commerce places between customer and bank engagement 
– this elides the problems of prejudice as face to face bank managers were 
more prone to bias against minorities than is likely in an “app” environment – 
for instance with respect to gender see Fay & Williams (1993), Bellucci, 
Borisov & Zazzaro (2010).  From the above the principle of differentiation is 
apparent: within the market justification. Consumer choice has axiological 
drivers hence is somewhat independent of form (as long as choice is provided) 
whereas within the civic polity the ontological fixity of a branch is freighted with 
expectations of broader social functions producing a normative demand that 
form follows function, and that functions of social cohesion are attached to 
banks and banking.  
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When discussing the geography of banking and internet access the authors 
are illustrating areas of decline of the market polity wherein customers are not, 
and cannot be served effectively.  The test here appears to be “services”.  This 
test could be rooted in a market justification, however given the focus on “the 
public” desire for a full branch network the conflation of civic provision and 
market services suggests that certain functions of banking are best seen as a 
utility (see also Mullineux, 2011).  Such a view reduces risk (possibly) and de-
emphasises margin per se albeit aiming to be profitable– a view also 
expressed in Wolf (2007) and Milne (2013), though countered by the CEO of 
JP Morgan as unrealistic with respect to risk operations in Jenkins (2016).    
There is a normative judgement hidden behind critique of market norms 
(“money-making machines”, “short-term profits”) leading to “significant 
personal reward”.  The judgement is coherent with the condition of the “great 
person” – differences in criteria for this aspect of the market polity.  There is 
however no outside framework to judge the rightness of income distribution. 
This example shows that the tension between different stakeholder 
justifications is not always inter-polity as is most often discussed by Boltanski 
& Thévenot (2006 [1991]), but also intra-polity wherein test criteria differ. 
In Table 1 above the approach to time was noted for each order of worth.  In 
particular the market polity: “short term, flexible”, civic: “perennial”, industrial: 
“long term planning”, and green: “future generations”.  It is interesting to note 
the several criticisms in the text of the banking sector’s short termism 
especially with respect to short-term profits.  This is implicitly a critique of 
market justifications from either a civic, industrial, or green order of worth 
(though in the current context civic seems most likely).  
When discussing the “monoculture” of banking, this suggest that market tests 
have resulted in mimetic isomorphism. This section of text is suggestive of 
differing views of the market justification – that a test associated with market 
competitiveness within the market polity should be a risk-weighted calculation 




The discussion of the need for local banks is a call to the domestic justifications 
of local geography or a call to refocus the “detached” civic and globalised 
market geographies.  Altering the tests, altering the focus of time or 
geographies could give rise to hybrid polities, objects and tests of justification.  
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], p.285) are concerned that the proliferation 
of objects and tests accompanies an “indeterminacy” of the common good 
around which the order of worth is created which leads further to fragility and 
repeated tests of justification. The article provides an example here, containing 
calls for local focus linked to “investment in renewable energy”.  So far so local 
on the face of it, a bucolic image of a local wind farm.  However, renewable 
energy technologies depend on imports such as cheap solar panels and rare 
earth metals from China.  Hence, a call to invest in renewables in a local 
context elides the efficient interconnected global supply chains (industrial) this 
implies, and the associated management of forex risk and price volatility 
through derivatives (complex products decried earlier in the article) (market).  
The implication here is that for relations and justice to work well in a domestic 
order of worth there needs to be sufficient underpinning from efficiency 
(industrial justification) and depth of liquidity (market making and price 
dynamics within a market justification).   
Given this complex interdependence and tensions between orders of worth 
per Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), resolution in a sustained manner can 
only occur through shared conceptions of the common good, in which case 
excesses of the markets may be tamed.  Indeed, in the final page the article 
criticises the “weighting” in terms of commercial (market) interests as opposed 
to “maintenance of essential social functions”  (civic), further the article calls 
for “different types of banks that perform different types of functions — including 
the maintenance of branches, and the stable provision of banking services to 
the public”. It seems reasonable from the wording to see such a call as civic 
rather than using, or compromising with market justifications to achieve civic 
ends.  This accords with Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], p.325) who state 
that amongst many compromises between polities in their analysis they “did 
not come across any compromise” between market and civic orders of worth.   
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The final call to action in the article is for HM Government to use what is in 
essence a state-owned bank (RBS Group) to fulfil the civic mission discussed 
above.  This could be interpreted as an injunction to act within a Rousseau 
inspired social contract between the people and the state,  illustrating the 
multiple logical levels at which the social contract is conceived in the article: 
between local communities and local branches as part of larger banks, of 
society with respect to banks, and of society with respect to government.  
5.2.1.2 Summary of analysis of text #1 
 
The article comprises two main themes: one is that too much, too often, the 
behaviours of the banking sector are illegitimate – that is, it stands as a form 
of financial violence (Marazzi, 2011) out with the orders of worth framework of 
justification.  The second theme is the contrast and comparison, a near attempt 
at compromise, between the market and civic justificatory regimes – 
discussion of the dimensions of these polities far outweigh other mentions of 
industrial, domestic or green polities.  The near constant difficulty and tension 
in the attempt to gain compromise is unsurprising on two counts. Firstly, that 
Boltanski & Thévenot ([2006] 1991, p.325) themselves found no compromise 
in their data between these worlds.  Secondly there is little explication of 
concepts of common good and common humanity in the text, and in any case 
compromise would be dynamically created with other market participants such 
as banks and regulators.  Compromise, per Boltanski & Thévenot always 
fragile, relies on a commitment to common causes.  
In considering the presence of market justifications in particular the above text 
often features market polity characteristics within criticism therefore these 
instances are not “counted” when considering the relative dominance of 
polities.  Overall, there are eight market and civic justifications, two industrial 




5.2.2 #2 “How we can transform finance” (Move Your Money, 2015b) 
 
5.2.2.1 Justifications within the text 
 
In considering the Common Superior Principle, "people and planet first" and 
"long term interests of society" and the idea that the Green Investment Bank 
could "invest in our society's future" is appealing, however ignores wider 
sustainability issues such as perpetual growth; the concern for societal and 
ecological sustainability is a combination of a civic justification with a green 
perspective. Such combinations elide the possibility of conflict: if the 
trajectories of "people" and "planet" were incommensurable, there would need 
to be "Restrictions […] on population growth and the scale of human activity" 
(Spash, 2012, p.34, edited for clarity).  
Further support for a civic justification is demonstrated in the discussion of 
decline of this polity.  In describing the "decimation of the welfare state and the 
savage and unnecessary period of austerity" this alerts the reader to what is 
unacceptable within this order of worth echoing concerns in, inter alia, Mishra 
(2014), and the concerns over the role of government in supporting the social 
contract in Esping-Andersen (2002, p.11-12). 
Whilst the Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives overlaps substantially 
with other texts analysed above, there is emphasis on failed banks (a market 
failure), community banks, stakeholder banks (neither if which are delineated), 
"values based principles" for investment, and "mutuals". All are suggestive of, 
at least a civic justification (though the ‘values’ aspects are left vague of 
uncertain attribution to an order of worth. 
The “great person” power of state bodies to influence the market - the 
reference to the CMA "investigation into retail banking" as a "great opportunity" 
suggests the state/regulators are seen as having power to shape the financial 
system supports a civic justification. 
In discussing “natural relationships” the "Standard plc model of banking 
institutions" - elides the market and institutional processes that produced this 
"standard" and also ignores for example the largest building society 
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(Nationwide) which is a co-operative, and other less “standard” business 
models such as Triodos Bank (albeit the latter’s market share is admittedly 
small).  The statement that "the taxpayer was left picking up the pieces" can 
be read two ways: that the taxpayers collectively have sufficient agency, 
sufficient resources, to be able to rescue some of the largest financial 
institutions in the world (supporting a civic interpretation). However, the 
alternative reading is that taxpayers lack agency: Too-Big-To—Fail (TBTF) 
banks leave taxpayers no choice but to "pick up the pieces" (see Oxera, 2011, 
Tett, 2012) – a dominance of the market perspective. In a similar way, the 
agency of individual investors in (say) pensions is both present, and weak. 
Present, as investors may be able to choose responsible investment funds. 
Weak, due to collective action problems (inter alia Ostrom, 2014, Gavrilets, 
2015) and as the text notes, a lack of transparency that a "Responsible 
Investment Bill" could address - a civic justification.  Another aspect of agency 
of concern, critically showing a market over a civic order of worth is the 
discussion of the "important function" of the broad money supply (M4), which 
is in the hands to the private banks and as such out with the direct control of 
the BoE (McLeay, Radia & Thomas, 2014). 
The critique of a market perspective "Risky, speculative lending and ever-more 
complicated financial products got us into the financial crisis" and there is an 
implicit rejection of profit (market) motives in the mention of "unaccountable 
private profiteers" (to whom they should be accountable is unstated here but 
the general sense is that a civic duty is lacking).   
5.2.2.2 Summary of analysis of text #2 
 
Overall, the above text is dominated by civic justifications (7 instances) in 
contrast to a single green justification.  The market order of worth is invoked 
only in a critical manner to illustrate decline of the civic polity.  There are no 




5.2.3 #3 Civil society statement in response to the launch of financial 
sector voluntary climate principles (BankTrack, 2015) 
5.2.3.1 Justifications within the text 
 
There is no specific mention of the common good, common superior principle 
or common human dignity.  
The title contains the phrase "Civic society statement" suggesting the NGOs 
see themselves as both within, and speaking for, civil society.  As such, this 
suggests a position within a civic order of worth, and that NGOs are “qualified 
subjects” within this.   
It is noteworthy that when mentioning objects e.g. banking sector or 
mechanisms e.g. Paris COP Summit they are not always explicitly qualified (or 
disqualified) and therefore may be difficult to assign to a polity.  However 
contextually, as "coal mining and coal power" are within a paragraph 
discussing drivers of climate change, it is reasonable to assess these as not 
qualified objects and processes within a green order of worth. 
In considering status relations between qualified/unqualified subjects or 
persons, global banks are seen as instrumental and important in "financing of 
fossil fuels".  Hence, the banks are seen as having an enabling role with 
respect to business or economic relations toward climate change activities – 
a critique from a green justification.  
Within a green polity the flaws revealed by evidence concern lack of 
leadership, lack of urgency in addressing "the biggest drivers of climate 
change".  Further criticisms include "These new principles still focus on the 
risks posed by climate change for the business activities of banks. What we 
urgently need is for banks to focus on the risks their business is posing to the 
climate" - this statement shows a critique of market orders of worth from the 
green order of worth. There is disqualification of the market justifications; 
though how far this should go in negating market justifications in total is 
unclear (should the firms/banks simply cease to operate?) 
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An indicator of decline of the green polity is the lack of financing for renewable 
power generation, as the report notes there is less than half the financing of 
renewables than coal alone (i.e. excluding oil, gas).   
5.2.3.2 Summary of analysis of text #3 
 
This relatively short text is unsurprisingly limited in the range of polity on which 
judgements are based, with a strong emphasis on the green (4) justificatory 
regime with just one other polity – civic – used once.  Whilst the market polity 
is present it is only as a subject of criticism.  
Unsurprisingly the global scope of the document aligns with the planetary 
scope of the green polity.  A notable contrast to the framework in Table 1 is 
that rather than taking an inter-generational or future generations-long 
timescale to frame arguments the text throughout calls for a sense of urgency. 
5.2.4 #4 PRA Annual Report (PRA, 2016a) 
5.2.4.1 Justification within the text 
 
It is clear the PRA prioritises it's framework of rules - hence Government, 
statutory objectives are a priori to the existence and functioning of the PRA.  
The PRA is not assuming agency for objectives, but for fulfilling objectives 
which it receives. The common principle herein is respect for the rule of law, 
which is a civic justification.  
There is a sense of compromise around the common good, in that the PRA 
needs to, in addition to fulfilling regulatory powers, do this whilst being 
"consistent with the overall health of industries whose firms we supervise" 
(p.6).  If the PRA can only supervise in a manner that fulfils market norms (e.g. 
"health" of industries) market outcomes may be considered as synonymous 
with the common good and in effect a priori to the rules of supervision – such 
a view is consistent with the first form of the common good discussed in 
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]).  Similarly the PRA states, "statutory 
objectives shape our judgements": statutory is a priori to operational 
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judgement.  Additionally it would appear to be accepted as a norm that 
international regulations drive the domestic agenda to a large degree. 
There is a notably large number of “objects and mechanisms” mentioned in 
the text (see Appendix C for detail). There is a bias toward rules and regulatory 
processes that is indicative of a civic polity.  The breadth and complexity of 
qualified objects and mechanisms may suggest a less concrete anchoring in 
a specific polity, at the level of the market sector the diversity of objects and 
mechanisms may work in various ways to construct justifications for contingent 
operations and relations. The diversity of objects and mechanisms also 
undermines singular conceptions of a “social contract”.   
In that "Natural habitat" of prudential supervisors is early intervention to head 
off risk (p.7), hierarchically the supervisor is seen as more powerful - able to 
"intervene", to change the course of events in the sector. The presuppositions 
here share some of Boltanski's (2011) requirements for critique.  These 
include a certain critical distance from the milieu being critiqued - critique is a 
forerunner to effective supervision.  This is still critique rather than Critical - the 
nature of the system per se is not under analysis, simply the behaviours, 
incentives, outcomes within the system. PRA is “interested” and takes a close 
look but firms are accountable for their behaviour.  There is an emergent 
recognition here that although the PRA is hierarchically dominant in a civic 
polity sense, in tests the firms may well pursue other justifications such as the 
market and hence the PRA does not justify its approach with respect to a 
singular justificatory regime.  
Largest and most complex firms bear/cause the greatest risk hence should 
carry a larger buffer of capital.  This is illustrated in contrast to prior regimes.  
"London is a major international centre for insurers and banks" illustrates the 
status of London within a financialised globalization – an element of the market 
polity, The inequalities (albeit implicit in the text) between London and the rest 
of the UK can be seen as a result of free markets (market), that is there is no 
a priori concept of a normative vision of a “fair” distribution.  
When considering "the competition was fragile, built on unsustainable 
business models" (p.7) the usage of sustainability is ambiguous, however in 
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context it is a reasonable assumption to consider this relates to the sustained 
operation of the firm rather than ecology.  The focus on competition, albeit as 
a secondary objective, is notable and concomitant with a market polity.  Whilst 
competition may be associated with the market polity, the call for continued 
operations, a sense of stability over time, seems to draw more on the planned 
future of the industrial polity, which unwittingly expresses a frustration at the 
lack of state control over contingent market outcomes.  This is echoed on p.8 
with respect to a wish to control "excessively high household debt through 
mortgage borrowing”.  
Focus on staff as "judgement at the heart of everything we do" is suggestive 
of a domestic polity (per Table 1).   
"The rising prominence of cyber risk" (p.8) is interesting when considering 
which polity is at risk.  The main reasons for regulation discussed above are 
information asymmetry, externalities, principal-agent problem, and moral 
hazard.  Cyber risk means either accessing private information, loss or 
corruption of private information extortion over access to information or 
extortion over the dissemination of sensitive private information.  The two 
polities most affected by such operations are the market polity, and the 
industrial polity.  The market polity depends on price and demand as indicators 
of the validity of the product or service.  Being unable to price (say, stocks and 
shares) would disrupt the market world.  Relatedly, being unable to complete 
activities/production efficiently disrupts the industrial world.  The domestic 
world is less susceptible to such challenge, however information may come to 
light to challenge the legitimacy of hierarchy or other social relations. The 
inspired polity is relatively immune, though incentives for innovations may be 
reduced if property rights are insecure.  The green polity would not be 
challenged in the financial sense (apocalyptic scenarios of nuclear plants held 
to ransom are certainly possible if fantastical, however such scenarios are not 
rooted in the financial sector). 
The focus on a stable institutional structure of supervision, something which 
has been “elusive" is redolent of a call toward a domestic justification: where 
relations are fairly fixed between institutions.   
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Transparency and public accountability of the PRA are seen as aims and the 
annual report is an improvement in this regard.  This suggests a lack of 
transparency in the past. The interesting discussion (p.7) of accountability 
focusses on "senior" roles.  In this, there is an element of the domestic polity, 
in that respect, reward and in this case accountability are functions of position 
in a hierarchy, potentially regardless of direct attribution, of actions taken, 
toward an unwelcome outcome.  An explanation of the "depressing" lack of 
clarity during the financial crisis is seen in the market and other justifications 
that allocate responsibilities and accountabilities more dynamically than within 
the paradigm of the domestic space.  There is not strong evidence for this 
though the contrast is striking.  Prudential regulation is "forward 
looking…prioritise prevention over after-the-event enforcement" (p.7) which as 
a construct regarding time is suggestive of the detached abstraction from 
immediate crisis aligned to the civic polity. 
Note the new supervision approach appears to be "a work in progress", which 
can be interpreted as supportive of a market polity wherein the outcome is 
flexible and will be adapted to external drivers, or the industrial polity wherein 
the changes form part of a rational calculative planning approach.  Given the 
phrase "work in progress" tends to imply uncertainty over the outcomes, and 
the PRA are "working through the implications" this tends to support a market 
orientation. 
Absences from analysis of text include “common dignity” and “condition of little 
person”.  To some extent, the latter is implied as the obverse of the hierarchical 
positioning of the PRA as being a priori to the firms it regulates.  
5.2.4.2 Summary of analysis text #4 
 
There is a wide range of objects and mechanisms in the text.  Whilst these are 
biased towards rules and regulatory processes indicative of the civic polity, 
many of the qualified objects are market agents.  As such, this particular 
aspect may illustrate the essential tension or compromise facing the regulator 
in applying civic justifications within a market polity.  This finding is in contrast 
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to Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], p.325) wherein compromises from the 
civic world with the market were absent from their analysis.   
In considering the presence of orders of worth in the text there are five 
discussions relating to market worth, four relating to a civic polity, three for 
domestic and two for industrial.  There was no evidence of inspired or green 
polity.    
5.2.5 #5 CP18/15 Corporate governance: Board responsibilities. (PRA, 
2015a) 
 
5.2.5.1 Justification within the text 
 
The “common superior principle” appears to be implied by the focus on “the 
continuing stability of the financial system” (p.2).  The concern here is implicitly 
with collective welfare, a civic concern, as one of the raison d’etre of regulation 
is the impact of externalities (Campbell et al. 2011).  These impacts are on the 
wider economy and society, occasioned by banks’ collapse, or in other words, 
financial instability.  
The discussion (Appendix, p.2) of relationships between key actors includes 
consideration of the “collective responsibilities” of the board (a civic 
justification) however that the Chairman and Chief Executive have "leading 
individual roles to play in the board’s development and maintenance of the 
firm’s business model", the latter being either an industrial or a domestic 
perspective.  The first of these suggests authority through competence, 
however given the travails of various senior bank position holders (e.g. at the 
Cooperative Bank, see BBC News, 2013) competence cannot be taken as a 
given.  The domestic perspective, which qualifies persons through position in 
a hierarchy, aligns well with the way the PRA is discussing this matter.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly in the context of this particular text, the qualified 
objects and mechanisms relate very much to the civic polity with rules and 
regulations paramount. These include Senior Managers and Senior Insurance 
Managers regimes, risk control framework (though see discussion of risk 
below) (see more detail in Appendix C).    
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The repertoire of subjects and agents and includes the formal hierarchy 
characterised as domestic polity including boards, sub-committees including 
dedicated “risk committee”.  From a rules-oriented civic perspective, the 
Financial Reporting Council is included (see more detail in Appendix C).  
In considering success or “Condition of Great Person” the PRA text (p.2) 
states:- 
"an effective board, which is one that: 
 establishes a sustainable business model and a clear strategy 
consistent with that model;  
 articulates and oversees a clear and measurable statement of 
risk appetite against which major business options are actively 
assessed; and  
 meets its regulatory obligations, is open with the regulators and 
sets a culture that supports prudent management."    
Whilst the meaning of “sustainable” business model is not explicated in context 
this appears (again) to refer to the continued operations of the firm hence from 
a market competitiveness perspective rather than an ecological viewpoint.  
The use of a risk framework is suggestive of a planned, industrial approach, 
however risk appetite overall is more suggestive of the self-interested desire 
for success attributable to a market polity.   It is noteworthy that Table 1 does 
not include approaches to risk.  Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) do not 
address risk taking behaviours, although the term “risk” is used often, in 
connection with processes of conflict and the possibilities of compromise.  The 
discussion with the PRA text which accepts and aims to aid the management 
of risk has no counterpart in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) wherein the 
only discussion of risk is in connection with the risk of misunderstanding or the 
risk of not reaching agreement.  
With regard to status relations, repeatedly the PRA text holds that non-
executive directors hold the board “to account” and whilst being “cooperative 
and collegiate” this should not “inhibit the non-executive directors from 
challenging executive management and holding them to account effectively” 
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whilst “The PRA expects the chairman to play a pivotal role in facilitating this 
culture” (Appendix, p.3).   Such constructs, of collective working however 
within a defined and bounded hierarchy are suggestive of a domestic polity.  
The focus on formality of relations, of evidence that boards should not be 
“stage managed” (Appendix, p.4) is suggestive of a civic justification.  The use 
of domestic and civic justifications forms a compromise justification that enable 
aims of hierarchy to be met within a broader set of societal aims. Consider the 
methods of evaluation for the polities: civic: Collective welfare, civic duty; 
domestic: Esteem, reputation, position in hierarchy. The former are broadly 
constructed with respect to society and it is clear that the latter, domestic forms 
of evaluations could be used within a number of different operational contexts.  
The difference in scope of the evaluator criteria may imply that domestic 
justifications can readily be invoked to support other polities, that the domestic 
polity could be yoked more readily than others to support the aims of a range 
of polities.  However this does not apply to all polities - situations that may 
appear hierarchical but are justified by the market polity use hierarchy as a 
means to an end – sales people are only as good as last week’s/month’s sales 
Figures, no matter the position in the hierarchy.  
Omissions from the text include constructs of “the common good”, “common 
dignity”, and “condition of the little person”.  Whilst there is no discussion of 
social or national groupings, this may be implicit in that the role of the PRA in 
this context is geographically constrained to the UK.   As time construction of 
the text is future oriented around stability (the former suggestive of an 
industrial justification whereas the latter “perennial” approach is suggestive of 
the civic polity) there is no review of past performance and so little 
consideration of “flaws revealed by evidence”.  
5.2.5.2 Summary of analysis text #5 
 
The PRA text is narrowly conceived regarding specific expectations from the 
PRA regarding governance of banks.  The dominant polity is civic (six 
constructs) with relatively few other justificatory perspectives used – domestic 
(focused on hierarchical relations) (three) and the market polity features once.  
The compromises between the domestic and civic world described by 
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Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], p.306+) have echoes in the PRA text, of 
formality, politesse and respectful operations allowing effective (hierarchal) 
working relations that create a space for “judgement” and pragmatism in 
following rules.   
5.2.6 #6 FCA Speech re Fair and Effective Markets Review (FEMR) 
(FCA, BoE & HM Treasury, 2015) 
 
5.2.6.1 Justification within the text 
 
Similar to other texts analysed the “common superior principle” appears 
assumed re the positive function of the specific markets under discussion (see 
also #18) – suggesting a market polity. 
There is little explicit discussion of the “Common Good” in texts analysed so 
far.  In the particular text it is stated that markets are for "delivering for the 
good of society" - though what that "good" comprises is unclear, albeit the 
societal focus suggests a civic justification. 
Notably despite being one of the economies most badly affected by the 
financial crisis, there appears to be a positive view of the potential role of the 
country: “The UK, by virtue of its prominent role in these markets and its long 
and hard-won reputation for innovation, fair dealing and consistency".  In one 
sense, this is an appeal to the REPUTATIONAL polity however, the emphasis 
on creating markets is more suggestive of a market polity.  
Within the description of the market, there is little elucidation of success or 
failure, however tentatively the importance of the actors (many in the 
audience) is emphasised as a "critical group of users within the vast complexity 
of today's wholesale securities markets".  Such a position is dangerously 
reminiscent of “too big to fail” that may give rise to moral hazard as extra risk 
is taken due to asymmetric risk sharing.  Risk may be somewhat diffused by 
the heterogeneous nature of firms and nationalities as risk is spread across a 
number of jurisdictions.  That said the “decline” of the polity is sketched as a 
"culture where there was complete disregard for the integrity of the markets 
and fair play".  This forms a market justification – the overriding principle again 
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being the continued functioning of the Fixed Income, Currencies and 
Commodities (FICC) markets.  The invocation of “fair play” relates to a civic 
justification, showing an attempt at compromise between market competition 
and a broader sense of justice.  By using “fair play” rather than, say “fairness”, 
the author invokes a metaphor of sport, and in particular of an “honourable” 
commitment to justice within sport, that to be otherwise is “simply not cricket”, 
a mythologisation of a Britain of stiff upper lips and “gentlemanly” conduct (see 
for an example par excellence  Cavallini, 2007).  Such a metaphor undermines 
the seriousness of impacts of market abuse and places market activities in a 
separate “gaming” sphere separate to the rest of society: in games after all, 
“gamesmanship” and “gaming the system” are not explicitly disavowed.  Such 
attitudes are though condemned further in the text “Announcements of huge 
penalties for the manipulation of the foreign exchange market were 
accompanied by those dismayingly familiar trader messages"…”we saw 
participants in an unregulated yet hugely important market demonstrating a 
cavalier disregard for the interests of their clients, their employers and the 
wider market".  Terms such as “clients” and “employers” need qualification in 
order to be anchored to a specific polity and as such, the (again) overriding 
need for success of the “wider market” positions this sentiment within a market 
polity.   
With respect to the “Investment formula” the focus is on a civic justification with 
“a massive policy, legislative and regulatory response aimed at ensuring that 
never again could banks benefit from the implicit taxpayer subsidy”.  This is 
accompanied by support from a market perspective: "the importance of 
transparency, open access, competition and choice".  Using the example of 
RBS the tension between market and industrial justifications are revealed, as 
there are “trade-offs here between cost, efficiency and choice  This is 
illustrated with an example of RBS with approximately 1,000 bonds trading on 
a wide range of arrangements, giving huge variety; however complexity 
adversely affects secondary market price discovery and hence affects primary 
market prices.  
With respect to “flaws revealed by evidence” the text sets out six forms of root 
cause: market structures, lack of use/salience of extant guidance in 
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unregulated markets, organisational structures (controls too far from "front 
line"), weak competitive forces (reduced market discipline), short-term 
remuneration incentives, and “culture of impunity" in some areas of the market.  
These criticisms are really of one type, in that the market polity is failing on its 
own terms rather than being a critique of the market justifications per se.  
The underlying principle of market effectiveness or market justification is 
apparent when considering “ways of expressing judgement”.  The markets are 
seen to “broadly work and fulfil their function. They allow you to sell your 
sovereign and municipal securities to investors. And elsewhere they allow 
investors, borrowers and those wishing to mitigate their financial risks to have 
their needs met in most circumstances”.    
5.2.6.2 Summary of analysis text #6 
 
The superior, or underlying, principle of the text – that FICC markets are a 
social good, which therefore are required to work “well” may well be inherited 
– intertextually – from the FEMR itself.  The dominant justificatory perspective 
is market, with some consideration of civic and, in a minor way, industrial 
polities.  At first sight the focus on markets (rather than, say, consumers, or 
society more generally) appears unexpected.  However considering the roots 
of the objectives of the FCA which lie in the Financial Services and Markets 
Act (2000, p.2), the main objectives of the FCA are: “Market confidence, Public 
awareness, The protection of consumers, The reduction of financial crime”.  
There is no explicit prioritisation in this list of objectives however the ordering 
can be inferred as prioritisation.  In part, this is supported by the general 
guidance for achieving objectives which includes “the need to minimise the 
adverse effects on competition that may arise from anything done in the 
discharge of those functions” (emphasis added).  The underlying principle here 
is of predominantly private market provision.  National Savings and 
Investments (NS&I) is one exception to this.  The Green Investment Bank was 
another – now sold, and the temporary public ownership of (all of) Northern 
Rock and (most of) RBS are others, however the latter was not seen as a 
desirable relationship between State and private sectors (Treanor, 2015).  
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Through the broad range of stakeholders in the sector (see Appendix C), and 
of the variety of financial instruments or financial products, the tests for 
success within the sector become obscured.  The nature of the justification, or 
in Boltanski & Thévenot’s (2006 [1991]) term, the nature of the dispute are less 
clear in an arena with so many potential “qualified” persons.  For customers 
the risk adjusted return may be predominant in assessing a firm, whereas a 
provider of nominee services may be more concerned with efficiency and the 
reduction of operational risk.  
5.2.7 #7 Chairman’s speech to the Trust in Banking Conference) (FCA, 
2015j) 
 
5.2.7.1 Justification within the text 
 
In a similar manner to other texts the Common Superior Principle concerns 
market functioning: "our overriding objective is to ensure that markets work 
well".  This indicates the fundamental market polity is used to frame the text.   
Also in common with a number of other texts, there is no explicit consideration 
of the “Common Good”. 
Following from the general discussion above, the Assumptions re Natural 
Relationships reinforces the mutual dependence of regulator and regulated 
actors: “both need to succeed for trust in banking to be rebuilt” and there needs 
to be a "relationship of trust between regulator and regulate”.  However, trust 
in banking more generally has always been hard won (Hoepner & Wilson, 
2012).  The overarching principle is present again, in that both parties 
(regulators and industry) are subject to the demands of effective markets.  
Following discussion of increased penalties such as bonus clawbacks for staff, 
there is comment that “as the chairman of one large bank commented, leaving 
the shareholders alone to bear the brunt of penalties is not a desirable or 
sustainable model."  This elides other important stakeholders that also “bear 
the brunt” – in particular increased costs of penalties may affect customer 
value (rates) and also the public has borne the brunt of bailouts (inter alia 
Treanor, 2017).  The interdependence of regulator and regulatee is indicative 
of the presence of both civic and market polities.  
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There is no discussion in the text aligned to “Social or National grouping” or 
“Common Dignity” (though see below). 
Empowering the “customer” through increasing choice is a focus of the FCA 
allied with "rapid advances in technology" which should result in lower barriers 
to entry into the sector.  Reliance on technology suggests the reification of 
connected customers and implicitly reinforces issues of financial exclusion of 
the less affluent communities (Leyshon et al., 2008) and less technology 
“savvy” consumers.  Customer empowerment is important in 
maintaining/increasing competitive pressures within the market polity.  
In unpicking the discussion of Status Relations, the importance for the FCA of 
the banking sector is clear: “The banking industry is too important to the 
prosperity of the country, too essential a utility for its citizens, to be run other 
than for mutual benefit”.  Again mutuality is stressed, a conflation of differing 
polities.  The utility of banks is perennial: a civic perspective.  “Prosperity” in 
this context could be seen as an expression of “common dignity” however 
given the overall market framing of the text this seems more likely an 
expression of prosperity as in wealth, an indication of the market polity.  
When considering the “Investment formula” it is noted the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer “wants the UK financial services to be the best regulated in the 
world with markets of unquestioned integrity and the highest standards of 
conduct”.  “Best” regulation is somewhat underspecified here and is part of the 
compromise between civic and market polities.  “Best” leaves open questions 
of “prudential”, “light touch” or other variants of regulatory framework.  
“Unquestioned integrity” maps well onto the “fairness” criteria of the civic polity 
as does “highest standards” to the basis of the civic polity in rules and 
regulations.  
It is noted that "Complaints to FOS [Financial Ombudsman Service]” are 
reducing.  Complaints are tangible evidence of flaws in the operationalisation 
of the polity and as such, in being complaints against equitable or fair 
treatment are indicative of the civic polity.  Another tangible form of evidence 
could be “Knee jerk responses” leading to many new rules however whilst ‘The 
size of the rule book is testament to this pattern, but it has not, to date, 
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prevented the next “bad thing”’. Claims of over use of regulations and rules 
(qualified mechanisms in the civic polity) is a critique from the market polity 
(more freely circulating goods and services), in addition a critique could also 
be sited in the industrial polity wherein the concern is that over regulation 
becomes over complex and costly and hence inefficient.  The inefficiency is in 
two senses: one is that undesirable cost is allocated to compliance, control 
and reporting functions:  Binham (2016) shows increasing concentration of 
responsibilities and hence pay inflation due to senior manager responsibility 
regime. Secondly, that costs of entry (the “c” in Blanchard & Giavazzi, 2001) 
are raised (Dunkley, 2017c). Additionally a caveat in discussion of the 
expected Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) comes from Coates IV (2014) who 
considers such analyses to be (at best) “guesstimates” given the difficulty of 
modelling and assigning costs.  
One the concerns about the financial sector is that “too big to fail” firms induce 
“moral hazard” as bailouts are guaranteed and hence losses may be 
socialised, at least to some extent (Mullineux, 2014).  This is addressed in the 
text:  “From the prudential angle, 'too big to fail' is being tackled by more 
capital, measures around ring fencing and resolution regimes” (FCA. 2015j).  
This shows that there is a judgement that competition should apply to all 
market participants: alternate approaches (from a civic) perspective could 
include nationalising more of the “utility” elements of the banking sector.  
Conduct criteria includes senior managers regime. There is an element of the 
domestic justification here: that within a hierarchy certain responsibilities are 
attached to roles.  The conflict with the market perspective is that hierarchical 
fixity contends with flexibility of roles, functions and structures.  This may be 
why relatively few individuals are registered under the regime than expected - 
the more senior roles are more stable compared to "middle" management.   
Other performance indicators from the market perspective include 
competitiveness with respect to customer loyalty: “customers remember tone 
at the till long after they have forgotten tone from the top".  The assumption is 
that in a competitive environment customers would switch provider however 
this is low "when you might expect otherwise".  Reasons given include inertia, 
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lack of choice, fear of worsening situation, information asymmetry and difficult 
to change debt contracts.  Additionally "In order for it to become a commercial 
imperative for banks to treat their customers well, and for this to sit at the heart 
of their business model, there must be the ability, willingness and motive for 
the customer to move supplier".  This has been a concern of the Competition 
and Markets Authority (CMA, 2016) and customer inertia is a particular 
concern: “We are more likely to get divorced than change bank account” 
(Rovnick & Cook, 2016).   
The few discussions relating to “time construction” in the text are difficult to 
assign with confidence to a particular polity.  The text contains a sense of an 
“inflection point” (emphasis added) - of "opportunity" given some issues 
(LIBOR for example) have been addressed and that forward-looking 
approaches are required. The text does not appear to be referring to green 
(future generations), domestic (customary, cyclical) or civic (perennial) 
timescale constructions. An inflection point alludes to an inspired 
(revolutionary, visionary moment) however, this is not a good fit in context.  
Hence construction could be pointing to either a market (short-term) or 
industrial (planned, long-term) polity construction.  
5.2.7.2 Summary of analysis text #7 
 
Given prior discussion regarding the roots of the FCA’s remit in the FSMA 
(2000) legislation, which prioritises market concerns, it is no surprise to find 
market perspectives used more frequently (8) than civic justifications (6).  
There is the possibility of a critique form the industrial polity of over-regulation, 
however this is the only industrial construct in the text (1).  The accountability 
justifications include the tests and compromises between market and domestic 
polity (1).  There are no justifications based on inspired, green or 




5.2.8 #8 The Rapidity of Change (FCA, 2015h)  
 
5.2.8.1 Justification within the text 
 
Whilst not explicit the “general superior principle” could be considered as the 
effective functioning of competitive markets as this is a theme returned to 
repeatedly in the text – a market polity.  There is no clear explication of “the 
common good”.  
The market polity is present in the assumption throughout that customers 
naturally appreciate markets – and this would be hard to gainsay in the sense 
that customers seek novelty and choice, both of which may be delivered 
through market mechanisms.  However, this elides market failures such as 
information asymmetries (Barth et al., 2004, Brunnermeier et al., 2009).  
In noting that “The FCA is currently one of only two regulators in the world to 
have both competition and more traditional regulatory powers” this alludes to 
other “usual" or natural relations of regulation (the specifics are not detailed). 
However, discussions of the purposes of regulation generally include 
promotion of competition (Armour, Awrey, Davies, Enriques, Gordon, Mayer & 
Payne, 2016).  Additionally, regulators have been criticised for slowing 
recovery from financial crises by suppressing competition in order to “prop up” 
banks (Phillips & Heriard-Dubreuil, 2009).  The FCA needs to work with the 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), another example of compromise 
between market and civic polities not found in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 
[1991]).  
There is some focus on the City of London as a financial centre, which could 
be interpreted as calling on justifications of the domestic polity with local, 
proximal anchoring of activities and justifications.  Given the only other 
reference to domestic polity is through a call to “restore the trust and 
confidence, of this those [firms] are here to serve” care should be taken not to 
make too much of this.   
Given LIBOR, PPI, Swaps, and Forex scandals it is a remarkable statement 
that "[London's rise in importance] was driven by professional excellence, 
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creativity and integrity. And I cannot imagine a future under which that will be 
any different".  In addition to the commonly known scandals, there are many 
critiques of London (the City of) as a tax haven for instance (Gravelle, 2009, 
Christensen, 2011). Professional excellence may be attributed to the industrial 
polity (technical efficiency, performance), creativity to the inspired polity, and 
“integrity” to the civic polity.  This type of construct, bringing together multiple 
criteria is another example illustrating that a single polity as representative of 
a social contract singular is untenable.  
The regulator is portrayed metaphorically as referee "Constantly on the pitch, 
keeping up with what is going on, respected, fair and consistent. Tough where 
required. At the centre of the action without being the centre of attention" - 
which requires rules (civic polity) - however note these are apparently only 
worthwhile if there is "competition between the players in the first place" 
(market justification).  This though is clearly nonsense. A state monopoly 
would still require standards of governance, communication, and risk 
assessments and so on.  Competition is not a precondition for regulation 
(consider State monopoly of highly regulated Armed Forces). 
The text contains an interesting characterisation of the market as 
"characterized by complexity, customer biases, potential conflicts of interest 
and information asymmetries. The demand side is, therefore, less likely, or 
less able, to correct market excesses" which is a justification for exogenous 
agency to correct market failure: a civic justification.  
Whilst there is evidence of investment of time and money, this is seen as 
problematic - "the intensity and volume of regulatory activity over recent years 
is not sustainable – for regulators or for the industry" - however it is unclear 
what the appropriate criteria are here.  A focus on cost is suggestive of a 
market polity, though similar to ambiguities discussed with respect to other 
texts, there is an alternate justification around efficiency or an industrial polity.  
The latter though seems less likely when the range of indicators for such a 
justification are considered (see Table 1). 
A similar discussion follows: “We are often told that boards are now spending 
the majority of their time on regulatory matters. This cannot be in anyone’s 
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interests.  If that continues indefinitely we will crowd out the creativity, 
innovation and competition which should present the opportunities for growth 
in the future".  The focus on innovation and creativity may be seen as an 
inspired justification, and labelling this as such highlights the contrast to what 
may be considered the key role of boards, which is governance.  Interestingly 
“governance” is a civic term regarding the rules, regulations and formality with 
which the board approaches these duties.  Governance (civic polity) may 
always be in tension then with inspired or market justifications. The focus on 
competition suggests the inspired creativity is subordinate to a market polity.   
"Crowding out" is term reminiscent of criticisms of public debt "crowding out" 
the private sector (see Blyth, 2013 with roots in Hume, 1907 [1758]).  The use 
of such a term may be suggestive of an alignment of the regulator with the 
private sector, by definition not aligning with the State. 
The outcome of regulatory development should be "if regulation achieves its 
aim – of changing behaviour – the result should be a need for less, or at least 
differently focused, regulation".  Hence the status quo is insufficient, and 
simply "more" regulation in inadvisable.  The latter interpretation supports the 
market polity however there is ambiguity in the use of "differently focused" 
regulation. 
Again, there is an attempt to combine the market and civic polities: "We want 
to create the best environment we can to allow competition to take place. To 
have a level playing field which does not advantage one participant over 
another".  The emphasis on competition (market) and fairness (civic) does not 
have a direct analogue in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) however the 
market polity to some degree rests on the notion of “fair prices" (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006 [1991], p.44), a notion resting on the writings of Adam Smith 
(2005 [1776]). 
Flaws revealed by evidence: the financial crisis and “conduct failures” are 
evidence leading to “a deep, and critical, re-examination of the cultures, 
behaviours and incentives - of regulated and regulator - that created the 
conditions which allowed this to happen”.  This is interesting in framing the 
responsibility jointly and again alludes to a compromise between market and 
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civic polities.  Perhaps this tension causes uncertainty and hence agility in 
response: “Regulators have too often allowed issues to grow in size and 
importance when rapid action may, although unpopular, have prevented much 
larger problem".  
Whilst the financial crisis and subsequent conduct behaviours are criticised, 
more fundamental issues concern “Complacency and lack of historical 
awareness [which] can result in believing 'three lies of finance': this time is 
different - markets always clear - markets are moral”. These “lies” or 
propositions are of note with respect to: 
a) time construction - that “now” is ahistorical 
b) markets always clearing is an idealisation of the “market” polity 
(“market efficiency” is not to be confused with efficiency in common 
usage). Markets always clearing is contra to the views of Minsky and 
others who consider market equilibrium may include slump (non-
clearing) conditions (Keen, 2011).   
c) the most interesting proposition concerns “moral markets” which 
brings together two justifications: market and civic. Such a compromise 
is not found in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) and is discussed 
further below.  
There is an unqualified judgement in the text: “our major financial institutions 
are now safer and stronger”, which could be interpreted in either of two ways. 
Firstly, this is a civic concern with the reduction in externalities from market 
failure being passed onto society, violating the “fairness” criterion. Secondly, 
this can be seen as risk reduction in market operations, a market justification, 
as for instance market “credit crunches” disrupt the free flow of products and 
services.  This is another example of the ambiguity associated with assigning 
specific phrases to justificatory regimes (cf Ramirez, 2013). The 
methodological implication, tentatively at this stage, may be that the ambiguity 
may be resolved by reference to the trend of assignments to justifications in 
the text overall.  Such an approach however is open to critique as something 
of a tautology (ambiguities resolve in the way that ambiguities resolve), or that 
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such an approach is unduly influenced by early decisions which in effect create 
a bias toward initial attributions. 
It would appear that the implicit prioritisation is, similar to other texts, focussed 
on the market polity: “How do we work together to create a sustainable model 
that works for markets, consumer and industry?” The “industry” comprises 
market actors, and consumers are only consumers when active in a market.  
There is no consideration of non-market actors, financial inclusion, or wider 
externalities.  
It is notable that in the text there is significantly more focus on constructing, 
framing the current moment in historical terms (and in looking forward).  Whilst 
the discussion of cyclical relations of regulation chime with the “perennial” 
construct of the civic polity, this is not an entirely good fit.  A cyclical construct 
does not have a direct analogue in Table 1 which suggests that the short-term 
variability of the market polity may usefully be expanded to include 
considerations of “the business cycle”.  
5.2.8.2 Summary of analysis text #8 
 
Throughout the emphasis remains on market (9) justifications and to some 
extent on compromise between market and civic (7) polities, which as 
discussed below, is not found in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]).  There 
are two domestic justifications and one each for industrial and inspired polities. 
 
5.2.9 #9 “Opening Remarks” FCA Second Annual Public Meeting (FCA, 
2015f) 
 
5.2.9.1 Justification within the text 
 
As seen in other regulatory texts, the Common Superior Principle is expressed 
as “our overriding objective of ensuring that financial markets work well."  This 
ambiguous, market oriented phrase is doing a "lot of heavy lifting". It is not 
clear for whom the market functions: consumers, firms, bystanders, or the 
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ecological systems on which society and hence the markets themselves 
depend.  
A relatively rare mention of “Condition of Great Person” is shown in 
considering recruitment and training approach: "For all the strategies and 
structure, policies and procedures, we […] can only ever be as good as the 
people who work on a daily basis in our organisation to achieve what we are 
setting out to do.  Recognising this, we have taken further steps during the 
year […] to develop long-term strategies to attract and retain the very best 
people we possibly can”. However, this statement is not anchored in any 
specific justificatory regime, and therefore forms another example of the 
difficulty in assignment of all textual elements to a polity, an issue raised in a 
different context by Ramirez (2013). 
The text claims an inclusionary policy "proud that we have, for the first time, 
joined the top 100 employers on the Stonewall Workplace Index".  The 
immediate analytic move is to assign such proud boasts to the free, equal, 
solidarity promoting civic polity.  However, there are no good grounds 
(considering Table 1) why such a boast could not be attributed to any of the 
other polities, which appear agnostic in this regard (and to gender, ethnicity).  
The civic is the only polity with a non-instrumental approach to qualified 
persons. For instance, the market polity concerns either end (buyer, seller) of 
trades – without trade, no polity. Similarly, the industrial polity is agnostic 
around most personal characteristics and yet demands expertise.   The civic 
polity is the only such that proclaims the value of the person qua citizen and is 
the only polity for which a statement regarding approaches to equal citizens, 
employees and so on with respect to personal characteristics is coherent.   In 
addition the “pride” taken in inclusion in a public ranking is associated with a 
fame/renown justification that relies on development of reputation.  
In evaluating performance, a leading indicator is used “emphasis [of CEOs] 
during the year has remained firmly on good conduct” – good conduct being 
related to regulations and rules (and other normative expectations) suggests 
a civic polity.  Similarly the lagging indicator that “Complaints to FSO is down 
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rather than up” as a proxy of “Another year of solid progress” is associated 
with the civic justification. 
Looking to the future the FCA “evolution will see us take a more markets-based 
approach, conducting fewer but more focused pieces of work. Underpinning 
this structure is a coherent strategy based on even stronger commercial 
awareness than we have historically had” which is suggestive of moving 
toward a market polity or at least a compromise (in some way) between market 
and civic justifications.  
In expressing judgement of the FCA as an organisation, there is discussion of 
the evaluation of the regulator by the regulatees: “satisfaction of the firms with 
their regulator – always, I have to admit, a bit of a two-edged sword as a metric 
– nevertheless has shown a further improvement”.  This shows the balancing 
act required of a regulator – that some degree of cooperation, as mentioned 
in the “social contract” discussion of Tucker (2009) , is required to be able for 
regulators to function effectively, as otherwise the cost of reducing information 
asymmetries between regulators and firms could prove disproportionate. The 
balancing act can be seen as a compromise between the civic (regulatory), 
market (cost, attention) and industrial (efficiency) justifications.  
5.2.9.2 Summary of analysis text #9 
 
The relatively short text contains a balanced mix of market (3) and civic (5) 
justifications, with the latter subordinate to the former.  The focus on equality 
shows how the inclusion, potentially, of personal characteristics in the civic 
justification means that such characteristics may form a mode of evaluation 
under other justificatory regimes.  There is a risk that legitimation or reification 
of the superior principles of the market, industrial and other polities allows 
discrimination to enter the polity “under the radar”.   There is also present in 




5.2.10 #10 “Outstanding Achievements” FCA Second Annual Public 
Meeting (FCA, 2015f) 
 
5.2.10.1 Justification within the text 
 
Regarding an overall superior principle, a civic perspective is observed: "Since 
the FCA was created, there has been no doubt that the issue of conduct has 
gone from being an optional extra to being top of the agenda for CEOs and 
chairmen across the financial sector” (emphasis added). The author notes, 
"We are not in regulation to regulate for the sake of it. We are here to help 
firms raise their standards, to ensure that markets work well for firms, for 
consumers and for the UK economy" (emphasis added) which can be 
interpreted as a market perspective.  The statement is interesting in the way 
that civic regulations (which are also for the benefit of non-consumers) are in 
effect subordinate to market justifications and the implications of this are 
considered below.  
There is no evidence of a “common good” through the text.  
The text contains emphasis on common human conditions hence “common 
dignity”: 1 in 60 over 80s with dementia. As such a need for regulators and 
firms to work together to ensure inclusion and (not their word) care for 
vulnerable groups. This is an example of market participants working with the 
regulator toward a civic justification.    
Again a comment on the broad range of regulatory mechanisms such as the 
"Senior Managers Regime” (see Appendix C) suggests a high level of 
complexity within the sector.  The more complex the sector in terms of 
products, stakeholders, regulators and regulatory processes, the more 
heterogeneous the range of justifications are likely to be and hence the less 
likely to characterise texts as employing a singular or limited set of justificatory 
regimes or polities.  
In terms of hierarchical relations, the “great person” is represented "at the top" 
- "senior persons" – “are held accountable for the decisions and behaviour 
carried out by themselves and the people that they are managing".  In contrast, 
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the “Little Person” is indicated by “Culture change and consumer vulnerability" 
which suggests a power imbalance, that the interests of a consumer may be 
thwarted.  This is suggestive of either an example of the “decline” of the market 
polity, or further, implicitly a possibility of "financial violence" (see Marazzi, 
2011). As described above, violence, by not cohering with a concept of or 
commitment to the common good, is external to the orders of worth framework.  
When considering success and hence investment criteria the focus on “trust 
of consumers, they [firms] need to demonstrate that they get the need for good 
conduct to be at the heart of everything that they do” suggests that qualification 
is dependent in trustworthiness which in Table 1 is associated with the 
domestic polity.  This is an attempt to combine market (firms’ success) values 
of the domestic polity however elides the lack of profit motive in a domestic 
situation.  Trust by consumers toward profit making firms will always be partial, 
always approached rather than realised given the multiple and potentially 
contradictory aims and strategies of the firm.  Relatedly, a rare example of 
consumers placed ahead of markets – “protect consumers and markets in the 
UK” is suggestive (mostly) of a collective duty, or more specifically a collective 
of firms having a duty to an even broader collective qua society.  “Competition 
in the interests of consumers” echoes earlier aspects of bridging market needs 
toward a collective civic need, however also noting the limited application of a 
civic justification here, which is broader than solely consumers within the 
market.  
Another bridging construct is found in “giving consumers clear targeted 
information so that they are able to quickly compare their accounts and that 
providers should be more transparent when reducing interest rates on variable 
rate savings” Here the competition (market) through information availability 
also supports a focus on fairness (civic).  Similarly this tension is found when 
discussing credit markets where “the challenge for us is clear: to ensure that 
this market works well and that consumers can have confidence in the 
products that they use” and “However, it is not about closing down the market. 
We want credit firms to respond positively to our rules and guidance”.   
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The FCA, through supporting “100” start-up firms (20 through to authorisation 
process) in developing innovations and working with PRA to introduce more 
competition for banks – suggests a market polity perspective.    
In working toward successful implementation of “Pensions Freedoms”43, the 
FCA support for removing restrictions on consumers reduces the influence of 
civic justifications in that the common dignity of the consumer, the ability to 
access funds, is foremost, in contrast to (say) long term societal concerns re 
the risks of funding pensions individually versus collectively (Berry, 2016).  
However the focus in reducing complexities of “at retirement” options and 
information sits well with welfare promotion policies from the civic justificatory 
regime. However "unauthorised business [increased] which coincided with the 
increase in pension freedoms”: this shows the tension between unfettered 
markets (market) versus concern for exploitation of the vulnerable (civic).  
When criticising, the flaws as related to polities seem to be around the market 
concern with competitiveness, such as in insurance markets: "lack of 
competition, a lack of information at point of sale, all  of this preventing 
consumers from making comparisons and informed decisions about products. 
That led to a low level of claims and consumers potentially being overcharged 
by up to £200 million each year for products that they may not need or even 
use”.  However some criticisms are more oriented to fairness or the civic polity: 
“evidence in the market that some brokers were taking fees without informed 
consent or explaining what the fees were for, and were then passing on 
customers’ bank details to other firms who could also charge fees".  
The critique of LIBOR and Forex market issues emphasises that this 
“undermined confidence in the UK financial system and put its integrity at risk. 
The FX issue was disappointing; disappointing because it arose after LIBOR”.  
The former criticism appears to be concerned from a market perspective with 
                                            
43 Pensions Freedom, introduced in 2015 allows savers in “defined contribution” schemes 
more options than simply waiting to buy an annuity at normal retirement age.  The Government 
supports information sharing on this and other pensions topics by funding The Pensions 




interruptions to the “flow” within the financial market.   The latter criticism is 
from the civic perspective – that rules and regulations were repeatedly ignored.  
5.2.10.2 Summary of analysis text #10 
 
There is a relatively even split in the main polities present in the text (9 market, 
7 civic, 1 domestic).  In the analysis above it is notable how often the 
discussions in the text form compromising or bridging constructs between 
market and civic polities, suggestive again of the tension in the construct of 
the market regulators.  
 
5.2.11 #11 “Regulation - supporting vibrant markets” – speech (FCA, 
2015i) 
 
5.2.11.1 Justification within the text 
 
In considering the Common Superior Principle then throughout – including the 
title – the emphasis is on a market orientation rather than state (civic) 
alternatives.  The title "Regulation - supporting vibrant markets" naturalises 
markets: markets are supported, as if they exist a priori to regulation, and are 
not co-constructed by economic agents and the act(s) of regulation. The 
market perspective is echoed in considering “assumptions regarding natural 
relationships”: Credit from markets rather than the State - no mention of the 
Green Investment Bank (a market justification); regulation should be a “friend” 
to business and consumer – which is an extraordinary term given the criticism 
of the FSA with respect to RBS (FSA, 2011) and while the term friend hints at 
a more domestic justification, that latter polity is less predicated on friendliness 
than hierarchical relations hence this term is more rooted in a market 
justification.   Throughout, whilst there is mention of shadow banking, and of 
alternative methods of finance such as P2P (Peer-to-Peer), the heterogeneity 
of banking (Luyendijk, 2015) is underplayed, the simplified view of “modern” 




Per Patriotta et al. (2011, p.1810) a “globalised” view of space/place can be 
interpreted as aligned to a market justification.  So whilst the UK is mentioned 
(as a place to do business, implicitly in competition with other nations), the 
FCA is described as “leading global work” amongst “global regulators”.  
Further, digital currency is mentioned in an uncertain context not rooted in a 
particular nation state, further reinforcing the market perspective (Sterling can 
largely be viewed as a digital currency as less than 3% of the money supply is 
notes and coins, however these do not have transactional value outside the 
UK).   In terms of spatial constructions, digital currencies can be said to occupy 
two types of space.  One is the Cartesian special context of the moment an 
agency reifies digital currency in some form: on an app, conversion to 
currency, on a computer screen.  Secondly is in the virtual or conceptual realm 
not rooted in national borders (especially with respect to so-called crypto 
currencies such as bitcoin, ripple).  The freely circulating nature of digital 
currencies aligns with the market justification and hence this finding can be 
used to extend Patriotta et al. (2011, p.1810) to include a “virtual” or “cyber” 
construction of space as well as the globalised view already present. 
When considering the Condition of Great Person the Business leader is 
promoted and is seen as concerned about constraints (on business activity).  
Perhaps surprisingly there is a hint that certain consumers could be seen in 
the “little person” role: in the discussion of PPI consumers were seen as not 
making rational decisions because PPI was costly (circa 20% increases in 
costs of loans). However, as McConnel and Blacker (2012) point out, some 
claimants were at risk of losing their homes due to non-payment, so such 
insurance was rational. Further, the "irrationality" of the purchase only became 
obvious when considering ex-post claims ratios (for every £100 in premiums 
only £14 was paid out for PPI claims, compared to circa £55 for general 
insurance claims). There is a hint of victim blaming here.  In order of worth 
terms the consumers were not supported by a market justification here but 
were expected to play their “rational utility maximising” role (Rabin, 1998, p.11) 
as a cog in the industrial machine.  
The “decline” of the polity is considered in two ways: "You want profit [market] 
for good firms without the envy and unrest [civic decline] that's created in the 
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past" - clearly showing there have been periods of "decline" however, how was 
this envy and unrest manifest? This is left open for the reader. "The wrong 
approach […] is for firms to unpick principles [civic] in the pursuit of profit 
[market] with no apparent social utility [civic]" echoes concerns by Turner 
(2009) regarding "socially useless" financial innovation.  There is a 
compromise here across polities of a “If…then…” construct showing a 
boundary to a market justification, which cannot be allowed to impinge too far 
on the civic world (to become a “monstrous construct” in Boltanski & 
Thévenot’s (2006 [1991]) terms) 
In considering how the sector is evaluated there is a hint, in framing this topic 
as “complex” and the future as “uncertain” that evaluation of outcomes is to 
some extent dependent on factors out with the regulators, and indeed the 
sector's control.  The lack of long-term vision, the sense of reactivity, lends 
further support per Patriotta et al. (2011, p.1810) of a market perspective on 
the finance sector. 
Wheatley constructs a narrative of "existential crisis" which is now past, 
moving to a "new growth imperative". However, for firms such as RBS, 
"existential crisis" seems to sum up the current performance of the firm 
(although payments to HM Government obscure an improving underlying 
picture - see RBS, 2016b). The narrative of a turn toward growth ignores debt 
levels (both post crisis deleveraging and more recent debt increases) and 
ignores ongoing conduct costs for banks: hence elides “decline” from three 
perspectives: civic, market, and industrial.  Further Wheatley sees an 
"optimistic" reading of deregulation in 1986 that created efficiencies – linking 
regulation to an industrial justification. However there are views that the 1986 
deregulation was a partial cause of the crisis of 2008 (inter alia Crotty, 2009, 
Ertürk et al., 2011) so this is not especially even handed.  The turn to growth 
and the importance of the FCA and regulation more generally within that 
movement are taken as uncontroversial within Wheatley's narrative, however 
this is in contrast to critical perspectives such as Engelen et al. (2012), and 
Bowman et al. (2012b). Wheatley notes the "frustration" for retail banking in 
particular such that concentration in the market increased during the crisis - 
though elides policy decisions regarding the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds 
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(Froud et al., 2010, p.28) that supported the market at the potential cost to the 
taxpayer (contra a civic justification).  
A modernist view of time, of progress (Calinescu, 1987), is evident in two 
aspects of the text: "the value of looking forward has only ever magnified over 
time" (emphasis added) suggests an unbroken unrepeatable time period - 
though this is unbounded and there is a focus on the future – the value will 
only increase. Similarly, the use of the term "sustainable growth" and "long 
run, sustainable prosperity" ignores limits (Meadows et al., 2004). This is an 
example of the regulator not considering a holistic approach to the sector 
within a wider set of ecological constraints.  “Sustainable” prosperity may hint 
at a green justification; however the focus is on sustainable success for today’s 
generation rather than explicitly concerning (say) conservation in order to 
enable the success of future generations.  Both of the above ways of handling 
“time” are more suggestive, per Patriotta et al. (2011, p.1810), of an industrial 
justification. 
5.2.11.2 Summary of analysis text #11  
 
Overall the text, not surprisingly given the title, has a notably market 
justification orientation – 10 market, 4 industrial, 2 civic and no 
INSPIRATIONAL, domestic or green constructs of orders of worth.  This bias 
toward the market raises questions about the critical distance between the 
regulator and the regulated, questions that are also raised by Levi-Faur (2005). 
 
5.2.12 #12 Barclays AR&A: Chief Executive’s Review (Barclays, 2016a) 
5.2.12.1 Justification within the text 
 
In setting out the overall goal for Barclays, Staley (CEO) states the goal is to 
be "the bank of choice for our stakeholders” via a strategy that is "commercially 
successful” generating "long-term sustainable returns".  This “superior 
principle” then is rooted in a market polity.  The use of "sustainable" is 
ambiguous, however given the lack of attention to green polity perspectives 
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through the text it is reasonable to interpret this as sustainability in terms of 
the firm's place in the market per, say, Porter (2008) rather than broader 
ecological concerns per, say, Glavič & Lukman (2007).  This – potentially 
strategic - ambiguity has analogues in the pragmatic usage of the term 
(Dunne, 2008, albeit in the context of CSR). 
Barclays is positioned as transnational, based on capital centres of London 
and New York indicating a market polity.  The international reach of regulations 
is noted, including the UK bank levy which applies as Barclays is domiciled in 
the UK (Meeks & Meeks, 2015).  Rules and Regulations are indicative of a 
civic polity albeit in this case not tied to a particular location.    
In considering the “Condition of Great Person”, there is an interesting 
discussion of the status of bankers in the past (which is returned to near the 
end of the text):   
“in 1979, because I was excited to be a part of a respected profession 
[a domestic polity wherein deference is a prior conferred on position in 
hierarchy] […] The practitioners of the profession of banking were 
skilled [industrial polity] at understanding the complex topics of capital, 
credit, savings and investor returns; and they were highly regarded 
[REPUTATIONAL polity which generally has been excluded from the 
analysis up to this point] […] It was a profession because it was moored 
to a commitment for integrity [civic polity]” (Barclays, 2015, p.6, [edited 
for commentary and for brevity]).   
The use of “moored” above denotes a connection between market 
justifications and civic polity. The identity of bankers in society is 
presented as a multi-faceted construct incorporating domestic and industrial 
justifications with a hint of the REPUTATIONAL polity which may be seen here 
as subordinate.  When discussing how the bank performed its business 
function in the past as “principled” (p.6), there is reference to the “300 year” 
history of the Bank.  This is suggestive of a civic or “perennial” nature of the 
firm however the implications are ambiguous.  Stressing history is suggestive 
of path-dependency, which may constrain, or enable, future successes: a form 
of “survivor bias” – that by definition, having survived 300 or so years, the 
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culture and processes and assets that make up the firm must be justified 
otherwise through market mechanisms the firm would no longer exist.  Such 
an approach elides the “grandfather’s axe” problem: “I have my grandfather’s 
axe, my father replaced the shaft and I replaced the blade”.  A focus on 
continued existence obscures the dynamic composition of the firm through 
time. 
Investment formulae include measures of success appearing repeatedly in the 
text such as “attractive earnings” and “return on tangible equity above ‘cost of 
equity’”.  The bank should be “well capitalised with a balanced funding profile, 
supporting solid investment grade credit ratings” (p.6).  Throughout, market 
outcomes such as accounting ratios, market indicators such as dividends are 
used to express judgement.  Whilst broadly such evaluations are of the market 
polity, when attempting to assign seemingly technocratic narratives of financial 
outcomes to polities it is worth considering each in detail, below. 
The importance of shareholder returns in clear: “All of this has been done to 
move us towards becoming a Group which can generate the returns our 
shareholders deserve” (p.4, emphasis added). The discussion of forthcoming 
dividend policy: Staley recognises “the importance of paying a meaningful 
dividend as part of total shareholder returns and am committed to doing so in 
the future.  But for now, the reduction of the dividend is the right choice. These 
are hard decisions, but we believe the shareholder value created by getting 
Non-Core closed will greatly exceed the downside of cutting the dividend for 
the next two years."(p.5, emphasis added).  The “hard decisions” relate to 
restriction in dividend not the associated loss of employment as the bank’s 
balance sheet is reduced.   Given the discussion of the role of investors within 
the orders of worth framework below, the discussion regarding dividend policy 
is not allocated to a specific polity. 
Return on Tangible Equity is a measure of profit from the shareholders 
perspective, comprising Return on Assets, and a leverage ratio (Equity 
Multiplier) (Sinkey, 1998, p.87).  Return on Assets gives a measure of 
efficiency - how effectively were assets (such as loans to customers) utilised? 
This relates in part to price (market) justifications and efficiency (industrial), 
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and indeed, with respect to the latter, the text refers to reducing the cost of 
new business to less than 60%.  
Being well capitalised, with a “balanced funding profile” concerns risk.  Risk of 
a decline in assets (loans not being paid back) and risks of funding - run on 
deposits, frozen wholesale money markets - see Northern Rock for example 
(The Economist, 2007).  In one sense risk reductions increase reliability, which 
is an industrial justification.  However, this is also related to market continuity, 
the free flow of goods and services. Industrial justification could be interpreted 
here as subordinate to a market justification.  This can be seen as an 
interdependence between polities.  Such interdependence is not discussed in 
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), excepting brief mention (p.175) of the 
interdependence between professional and family (domestic) life: the authors 
do not explore the implications of interdependence between polities. 
A similar construct arises when common equity tier 1 capital is discussed: “We 
will run the Group’s CET 1 ratio at 100-150 basis points above our regulatory 
minimum level”.  To go beyond a regulatory minimum seems on the surface to 
be a strong endorsement of a civic position, and indeed reference to Barclays 
“Quaker” heritage and proclamation of the bank’s “intrinsically valuable role in 
society” again “moors” the commercial entity in civic justification.   However 
the move to over-perform against regulatory metric also supports a market 
focus in two ways: falling below regulatory minima may result in withdrawal of 
the “license to operate” by the regulator, so keeping a cushion above the 
minimum is prudent, and similar to above, a higher equity cushion, whilst 
reducing RoE for the same asset utilisation, reduces the risk of breakdown in 
freely circulating goods and services.   The instrumentalism with regard to civic 
measures rather than as intrinsically valuable outcomes, as supportive of 
market measures demonstrates the fundamentally entwined nature of civic 
and market polities in the banking sector and is in somewhat stark contrasts 
to the original constructions of the polities in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 
[1991]).   
Despite the attempts to link or moor the organization in civic justifications, past 
conduct and "culture", which over previous years has been noteworthy (Baker, 
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2012, Goff et al., 2012, Binham & Jenkins, 2013, Confino, 2013) is criticised 
in the text.  Rather than a normative, prescriptive (civic) justification, it is the 
cost to the bank, or market implications that are highlighted, which is 
suggestive, per the discussion of the superior principle above of the 
dominance of the market polity for the firm.  This is not to suggest that finding 
a market justification as a fundamental principle for a commercial firm is at all 
revelatory, what is noteworthy is the extent of such prioritisation, when 
considering the bank’s (and banks’) egregious breaches of regulations.  
5.2.12.2 Summary of analysis of text #12 
 
From the above analysis it is clear that the market polity is dominant within the 
text (8), with the civic polity used half as frequently (4) as is the industrial polity.  
The domestic and reputation justifications are present once each.  
Similar to other texts there are composite constructions such as professional 
(competence – industrial) integrity (civic) and attempts to moor, or anchor, 
market justifications with respect to a civic polity.  Financial metrics such as 
RoE are found to elide, under ontologically positive constructs, justifications 
based on composite qualifications from market and industrial polities.   
The text is notably narrow in scope, addressed primarily to investors, which is 
problematic given the discussion in Boltanski & Chiapello (2007, pp.365-366) 
regarding shareholders.  This narrow approach may due to a structural 
approach to reporting or “genre” of text (Fairclough, 2010). 
 
5.2.13 #13 Barclays “Our Approach” (Barclays, 2016b) 
 
5.2.13.1 Justification within the text 
 
This text does not specifically state an overriding goal or “Common Superior 
Principle”, however as will be seen below there is instrumental use of orders 
of worth subordinated to the market polity.  For example, within the text a 
lengthy discussion of risk approaches and focus is framed with respect to 
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adverse impact on “long term goals”.  Risk management per se is not the goal; 
risk management, described in dry technical terms (which can be placed in the 
industrial polity), is subordinate here to market success (see below for how 
risk management is a useful addition to the orders of worth framework). .  
There is no articulation of a “common good”.  
Barclays is placed in an international context as a Global Systemically 
Important Bank (FSB, 2014).  Barclays states this means they "have the 
responsibility – indeed the obligation – following our designation as a GSIB, to 
work together with our regulators to help reduce risk in the industry and provide 
a more sustainable banking landscape over the long term".  This shows that 
the bank is subject in part to "social contracts" out with the UK.   A global 
outlook is aligned with the market polity. 
When considering technology as part of the “investment formula”, the text 
states “It has also reduced the cost-to-serve through automation, process 
improvement and  innovation, while making customer experiences faster, 
more personalised and lower risk”.  This presents efficiencies (industrial) as 
instrumentally in the service of competitiveness (market).  This discussion is 
repeated in somewhat expanded form later in the text (p.10).  The discussion 
ends in stating this is “the way Barclays adds value and provides benefit to all 
of our customers and clients through our approach to banking” (p.10).  “Value” 
is in this case a nominalisation of process to create benefit for the consumer 
(Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004) that elides the capture of surplus value 
creation inherent in wage labour (Wolff, 2013) and the focus on shareholder 
value (defined and defended in Jensen, 2001) as noted in the Barclays CEO 
text.  
The market polity focus on customers appears subordinate to investors as the 
bank seeks to “deliver a diversified income stream and long-term sustainable 
returns”.  Investors are not present in prior analysis leading to the framework 
of Table 1 and are not present at all in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]).    
There is concern that "Conduct issues have hurt Barclays, causing loss of trust 
among stakeholders" (p.7) which suggests the civic rule-breaking is not judged 
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in and of itself, but on the impacts this has on relationships with market 
qualified stakeholders.  Civic concerns are subordinate in this case to market 
justifications. 
As above there is considerable focus in this text on “ways of expressing 
judgement”.  A variant of a “Balanced Scorecard” is presented on p.11 - albeit 
no overarching goal presented.  Approaches such as balanced scorecard are 
criticised by Jensen (2001) as not enabling managers to make purposeful 
decisions and progress.  The lack of an explicit goal means that an overriding 
“superior principle” is obscured, however noted above the instrumental use of 
orders of worth toward a market justification.  That said one of the elements of 
the BSC (the Barclays version has five “C”s rather than four quadrants) is 
Company, so this may be viewed as the overriding metric for the firm - herein 
comprising RoE (Return on Equity) and CRD IV CET1 (Capital Requirements 
Directive IV Common Equity Tier 1) which are market (profitability) and civic 
(compliance with regulations) priorities.  Again per Jensen (2001) it is not clear 
which of these measures takes precedence, however earlier discussions 
favour CET1 compliance.  The other metrics can be assigned orders of worth 
also: Customer and Client - two metrics market oriented; Colleagues: two 
metrics, the percentage of women in senior leadership roles is a civic fairness 
polity, however there is some ambiguity around “Sustained engagement of 
colleagues score”.  Engagement could refer to the “emotional involvement” of 
the Inspired polity, however in context is more likely to refer to “work energy” 
of the industrial world.  The “Citizenship” score appears solely as a civic polity 
metric, however this elides underlying factors.  There is little detail in further 
discussion (p.14) however notably there is reference to a green measure of 
reduced CO2 emissions.  The discussion of this metric is interesting as the 
drivers of the success of the measure are industrial measures - energy 
efficiency and travel management.  As discussed in Jeucken & Bouma (2001) 
the direct environmental footprint of banking could be viewed as less 
significant than the indirect effect through financing polluters.  The metrics here 
only consider direct impacts rather than lending criteria (there is discussion of 
environmental impacts and Equator Principles in the “data supplement”). 
There is a form of “double counting” here - energy efficiency is also captured 
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in cost and hence profit metrics44.  Under “conduct”, the remaining “C”, there 
is a composite construct of “Conduct reputation” as administered by a third 
party (YouGov).  Further explanation of some of indicators behind the conduct 
measurement (p.14) reveal an ambiguity, the construct, Conduct (a civic 
measure) includes a measure: “Delivers value for money for customers and 
clients”.  The focus here on what is in effect ensuring a competitive offering for 
customers is oriented to a market polity however is embedded in an civic term, 
which suggests an instrumentally with respect to civic justifications in the 
service of market outcomes.   Additionally, “value for money” is in the eye of 
the beholder, the customer, and yet such an evaluation is hampered by 
information asymmetries and the nature of banking “credence services” 
(Hoepner & Wilson, 2012).   
A good example of the indirect effects (positive or negative) from a financial 
intermediary is the investment into Green Bonds (a green polity supporting 
initiative).  The bank has invested £2bn over two years in its "liquidity pool" 
function (p.14).  Whilst this is claimed as "one of the largest investments into 
this sector to date", this represents only 1.4% of total liquidity pool funding and 
2% of non-cash/central bank deposit liquidity pool funding (authors derivation 
based on p.191). 
In another example of the dynamic between two orders of worth, Conduct civic 
justifications allow an industrial object to be qualified: surveillance technology 
in monitoring Investment Bank positions.   
In considering “time construction”: "long term goals" are mentioned (p.7) 
though not explicated at that point: long term goals are associated with 
industrial, civic and green polities however in context it is appropriate to 
allocate this to the industrial polity.  
                                            
44 For further detail, readers are directed to the Citizenship Data Supplement 2015.  Within 
this document the initial introduction concerns reporting, not the approach of the firm to 
meeting citizenship (CSR) metrics (this is one reason why the Citizenship Data Supplement 
2015 has not been selected as a text for further analysis).  Within the report there are 
measures which would support a “green” polity, such as Carbon Dioxide emissions reductions.    
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Whilst there is little explicit “space construction” within the text, there is a 
delineation of key activities “Particularly our UK and US home markets”.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly as a global business post crisis the geographical 
changes (shrinkages) appear to be underway including US Wealth (which in 
itself is a little surprising), Spanish and UK Secured Lending businesses, and 
Portuguese and Italian retail businesses.  Spain and Portugal as “periphery” 
countries of the EU have suffered significant economic distress after the 
financial crisis.   
5.2.13.2 Summary of analysis of text #13 
 
In quantifying the different orders of worth, these are market 9, civic 6, 
industrial 5, green 2, and zero for domestic, REPUTATIONAL or inspired 
polities.  
 
5.2.14 #14 Co-operative Bank CEO Review (Co-operative Bank, 2016a) 
5.2.14.1 Justification within the text 
 
In the initial paragraphs, rather than state an overriding aim or superior 
principle for the bank, there is a focus on 'resilience' and on cost cutting - both 
are industrial polity criteria.  Similarly, there seems to be external validation of 
the overall goal “As agreed with the PRA in December 2014, the focus for 2015 
was to derisk the Bank and increase its capital resilience” - an industrial polity 
focus. There is some mention of performance – related to market polity, 
however the initial paragraphs seem to indicate that survival of the bank is 
dependent on technical competences and efficiency.  Prioritisation seems 
evident when considering "We remain positive that we are developing a more 
resilient bank, underpinned and differentiated by values and ethics, and that a 
profitable Core Bank will emerge from the turnaround creating further value for 
all our stakeholders” - that is market tests underpinned by civic values - not 
the other way round. 
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There is an instrumental use of civic polity values: “We are engaging with 
customers who, like us, believe values and ethics have an important role to 
play in banking. Our current account Net Promoter Score (NPS) increased 
from 15 to 24 and we were recognised as the most improved brand of the year 
by YouGov” in that the civic justifications are “part of” rather than “the essence 
of” banking and are yoked to the service of market justifications. Similarly, “in 
an effort to sustain our differentiation from others in the marketplace, in 2015 
we took some key steps towards demonstrating our values and ethics in 
action” the market justification appears ahead of the civic polity. 
The above prioritisation of orders of worth ahead of civic concerns is seen in 
the final “outlook” paragraphs which do not return explicitly to values and 
ethics, only “differentiation” (market), meeting regulatory requirements (civic) 
and returning to profit (market)".   
There is more explicit evidence of “the common good” as seen in a number of 
examples: 
"the focus on our donation on behalf of our customers to one of seven 
charities enabled us to reinforce our status as the ethical alternative to 
other high street banks”.   
“In October 2015 we announced a £1m investment and partnership with 
Co-operatives UK to support the development of the UK Co-operative 
and social enterprise sector” 
“heartening to see the Bank returning to its campaigning heritage by 
working with Refuge to reveal the scale of financial abuse in the UK 
where, unfortunately, a particularly high number of victims are women. 
Since the launch, we have been working with the British Bankers’ 
Association and Citizens Advice Bureau to drive real, valuable change” 
[emphasis added] 
The above examples rely mostly on charity (civic justification) – albeit again 
yoked to market justifications by alluding to competitive differentiation. The use 
of “campaigning heritage” highlighted above is an example of a compromise 
object Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], p.279), between the civic 
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(campaigning for rights, for equality) and domestic worlds (customary: 
“heritage”).  Such a compromise, Boltanski & Thévenot note, can be inherently 
fragile. In this particular case, tensions may exist between the “campaign” and 
the traditional (patriarchal, patronising) “heritage” of social relations.  The 
choice of campaign may signal prioritisation of scarce (attentional, financial) 
resources and as such is essentially political.  
In considering how “natural relationships” are evidenced in the text, there are 
some interesting developments in the structure of the firm - outsourcing IT to 
IBM and mortgage processing to Capita (as well as securitising mortgages 
which not only take risk of the balance sheet, this also moves accountability 
for processing activities out with the firm).  The focus here is on industrial 
efficiency however is also notable in echoing approaches to the firm as a 
“nexus of contracts” (Thompson & Valentinov, 2017). By outsourcing functions 
this means that the employees performing those functions are no longer 
necessarily engaged with a firm explicitly constructed as an “ethical 
alternative”. Increased outsourcing can be seen as dominant industrial logic, 
as opposed to civic or even domestic wherein the latter justifies long term 
relations with staff as more important than efficiency.  Perhaps the test here 
has been “won” by industrial justification, as the bank may simply not have 
existed at all due to prior mismanagement (Guthrie & Bounds, 2013). In a 
similar vein “At times, this means we have had to make difficult people-related 
decisions but this is critical to delivering a cost base which supports a 
sustainable Core Bank” is again an industrial justification whereby “people” are 
reduced to costs or at least the industrial justification is more salient.  
There is a notably dynamic relation with customers: “Over time it seems 
customers increasingly want frictionless transaction services from the Bank. 
These are best delivered digitally and using straight through processing. This 
has benefits for both the Bank and the customer. In almost direct contradiction 
to this, however, when something goes wrong, customers want a real person 
to talk to”. The latter point suggests an industrial strategy needs to be allied 
with the domestic polity - the qualified industrial object (mobile app, PC screen) 
elides a “subject” from the firm, however under duress the justification shifts to 
a (different) qualified subject.  This is a good example of the use of qualified 
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objects in orders of worth. There exists a tension as industrial priorities inhibit 
the “generation” of worth, of customer value, by eliding the personal subject.  
Here the order of worth could be said to fail the industrial (ease of use, 
reliability) test and then be subject to a domestic test (comfort, support, 
trustworthiness).  There may still be a further test for the competence of the 
employee serving the customer (this reintroduces the industrial polity through 
consideration of credentials, qualifications).  Further, the mix of technical and 
personal capabilities is deployed toward market justifications (e.g. mobile 
banking is the “price to play”).   
With respect to “Condition of Great Person” the importance of customers is 
emphasised:  
“In line with the commitments of our expanded Ethical Policy, we have 
taken steps to involve customers and incorporate their views in 
developing other products. Our revised overdraft policy, launched in 
April 2015, was the first of our products to be created together with 
customers. The consumer group Which? were also engaged 
throughout the proposition development and have provided positive 
feedback around the Bank’s approach of listening to customers and 
making products that work for them. The Bank also received praise for 
making a ‘positive move’ towards transparency, living up to its values 
and ethics and delivering a much fairer overdraft tariff. Perhaps the 
most significant indication of the increased transparency was a 77% 
reduction in complaints related to overdrafts comparing the three 
months before and after the changes were made” (emphasis added) 
The involvement of customers through a co-creation process (Cambra-Fierro, 
Pérez & Grott, 2017) here is indicative of a market polity wherein “customers” 
are automatically “qualified” within the polity simply by being customers.  There 
is also, in the above quote, evidence of a compromise between market polity 
and an ethical stance (civic) however this very much seems to label a standard 
marketing approach as somehow worthy of an “ethical” label: this is a form of 




In considering success, or investment formulae, this text refers to actual 
“tests”, stress tests from the Bank of England (BoE, 2017) and the response 
to such tests explicitly, in addition to obliquely relating “tests” of orders of 
worth.  Within this discussion, the reduction in risk-weighted assets makes the 
bank more resilient and hence reliable.  Discussion features competence as a 
qualification: “The Non-core and Treasury team, in conjunction with other 
colleagues across the Bank, have deployed their considerable experience and 
skill to manage the deleveraging activity effectively, securitising £3.1bn of the 
Optimum [mortgage book] portfolio” [edited for clarity].  As discussed above 
risk (of failing stress tests, or failing due to market conditions) can be seen as 
a risk to free flow of goods and services (market) or from the reliability criteria 
of the industrial polity. Perhaps, given there is relatively little upside to meeting 
capital requirements (this can be viewed as a hygiene factor, the risk is all on 
the downside) the focus on meeting regulatory (civic) requirements is best 
viewed through the industrial polity, though there is some ambiguity here.  In 
contrast, if there had been a focus on upside this would tend to be in market 
terms.  This shows that caution is required in analyst assignment of texts to 
polities (cf Ferguson, 2007).  
Again, multiple orders of worth are present within the same text and it could 
be argued in the “stress test” itself. The process of stress testing can be seen 
as civic polity (follow rules to avoid externalities), industrial response (reduce 
RWA rather than increase capital), civic validation (“we have met our CET1 
ratio and RWA commitments to the Regulator”).  Customer numbers (“prime 
current accounts”), customer satisfaction, and brand metrics are suggestive of 
a market polity investment formula. 
Whilst there is a notable focus on costs (industrial) there is significant 
discussion of market indicators (e.g. net outflow of current account holders, 
mortgage lending increases, and net promoter score). As discussed above 
there is instrumental use of civic justifications: “We are proud to be the only 
high street bank with a customer-led Ethical Policy and in January 2015, we 
relaunched our expanded Ethical Policy which was well received by 
customers, colleagues and stakeholders. We kept all of the existing policy 
commitments and expanded the policy in new areas voted for by customers".  
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As heterogeneous customer perspectives are used (at least in part) to the 
development of the firm’s “ethical” stance, there is no singular normative basis 
for the ethical policy. The “qualified subjects” are the customers – the 
importance of whom would support a market polity.  The question arises, if this 
were truly a civic justification without compromise, would the same ethical 
stance be taken, by whom using what justifications? Could an uncompromised 
entity actually exist? Is it possible to conceive of texts and hence firms 
perspectives on the social contract to be constructed on a single order of 
worth? A religious order could be constructed around an inspired order of 
worth.  However operating in world as it is means dealing with, inter alia social 
externalities from own operations and obligations (such as regulatory 
demands, taxation of income, wealth) (civic concerns), attracting new 
customers/adherents (market concerns, albeit unduly forcing market 
metaphors onto a non-profit organization), waste (industrial) and impact on the 
wider ecosystems (green).  Additionally per Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 
[1991], p.143) the sociological construction of “reality” the construct of the 
leader for example, leads to the REPUTATIONAL polity.  Perhaps an idealised 
construct of a singular order of worth is an abstraction never present in reality 
and indeed in discussing the construct of the inspired word (p.162) qualified 
worth can only be present when detached from “demoralizing [sic] reality”.  
In addition to the discussion above of the focus on survival, there are other 
“flaws revealed by evidence”.  The text notes “the increase in conduct charges 
has to some extent been driven by factors impacting all banks, in particular 
PPI”. Such a statement is a way to imply the PPI scandal is an exogenous 
event affecting “all” banks rather than an endogenous calamity of their own 
making.  Further, the following sentences seems to distance the bank from 
accountability and consequence:  
“They do not reflect the considerable progress in the Bank, on which I will 
elaborate below, and importantly have no major impact on the Core Bank 
which produced a close to break even [sic] result”.   
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An interpretation of this construction could be “yes, we violated civic 
justifications however don't worry, in market terms we're fine” – a similar 
prioritisation seen in text #12 Barclays AR&A CEO review.  
External validation (fame/reputation) is noted and focused on customer 
measures:  
“It is particularly pleasing to note that the Bank received a number of awards 
for customer service in 2015, which is welcome recognition of the excellent 
service being delivered by colleagues in our contact centres and branches […] 
we remain one of the top 3 banks for customer satisfaction and current account 
NPS45” [edited for brevity] and similarly “We have made significant strides in 
dealing with complaints with the overall level of complaints falling by 19%. 
Based on industry data provided by GfK FRS, we are one of the leading banks 
for resolving complaints to customers’ satisfaction."  
The use of measurable non-monetary standards supports an industrial polity.  
The qualified subjects include “industry” bodies – these are not competitors in 
this particular market, they stand outside the market, which reinforces the 
sense in which the usage here of consumer metrics can be interpreted as 
supporting and industrial polity.   
5.2.14.2 Summary of analysis of text #14 
 
In a similar fashion to the analysis of the Barclays CEO text above there is little 
surprise in the predominance of market justifications (14) in a commercial 
firm’s text.  However, the Co-operative Bank brands itself as an “ethical 
alternative” and this is reflected in greater use of civic justifications (12) – which 
were only just behind market in frequency.  The greater frequency of market 
justifications is also reflected in framing wherein civic and industrial 
justifications are instrumentally harnessed toward market justifications.  
Although the frequency of market and civic justifications was similar, the 
framing emphasised the market.  Additionally a theme through the text was 
                                            
45 NPS = Net Promoter Score 
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“survival”: this is a bank that needed special dispensation regarding resolution 
regulations in order to avoid more pressure on capital reserves.  The survival 
mechanisms are couched in industrial terms (9) as they rely on competence, 
planning and efficiency.  Further there were 2 instances of domestic 
justifications and none for REPUTATION or green (the latter result somewhat 
surprising for a self-styled “ethical” bank).   
 
5.2.15 #15 Co-operative Bank Values and Ethics report 2015 (Co-
operative Bank, 2016b) 
 
5.2.15.1 Justification in text 
 
An overriding (superior) principle appears to be ethicality within the bounds of 
an “Ethical Policy” (Co-operative Bank, 2016), which is reasonable to attribute 
to a civic polity.  The Ethical Policy is discussed rather than restated and this 
means that the terms for ethics, values are ambiguous and not anchored in 
concretely visible aims, objectives or principles.   The common superior 
principle is however enacted through assessments for credit decisions 
(extending loans).  This is explained further in the report when the referrals 
and declines of business are set out by business area and by topic.  Two 
referrals out of 304 were declined (compared to 4 out of 290 in the previous 
year).  It is noteworthy that the Cooperative bank is the only bank in the 
sample46 to set out this level of detail regarding operationalisation of the credit 
risk/screening policy. 
Whilst much of the discussion on p.5 is oriented to a civic justification (e.g. 
ethics, values, customer consultations, fairness, transparency) these are in the 
end harnessed to "stability of our franchise" - in other words, stability of market 
position. The use of stability in the text is another example of the instrumental 
use of one polity in furthering the aims of the market polity.    
                                            
46 And, to the author’s knowledge, such information is vanishingly rare out with the sample 
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As with most of the texts analysed, there is no explicit adumbration of the 
“Common Good”.  
There is a clear example of “assumptions re natural relationships” in that 
ethical campaigning "Represents an exciting return to our campaigning roots".  
This is an interesting statement in effect of "intertextuality" broadly understood, 
to encompass the founding ideals of the organization (albeit without explicit 
referent).  The ethical emphasis places this in the civic polity. 
Whilst not defining a social grouping per se, the text shows an engagement 
with “financial inclusion” - p.4 - “we ensure access to banking in socially 
deprived areas”.  There appears to be a broad construction of the scope of 
social groupings through which the bank, including customers, is formed, and 
the focus on reducing deprivation/exclusion forms a civic justification.  That 
said, as a fairly small organisation, it is difficult to consider suitable criteria for 
such an unbounded aim of providing banking in deprived areas - there is only 
one “Co-op” branch in the whole of Scotland which has many more deprived 
areas than that.   
A unique social grouping relating to the Cooperative Bank is the relation 
between the bank and Cooperatives UK (p.6).  This comes about as the 
Cooperative bank is no longer member owned and therefore not a cooperative, 
however in order to retain its current name, has formed an agreement to 
commit to and engage with Co-operatives UK.  This is an interesting example 
of how the signifier relates to the signified (see Frawley, 2013).  Here the 
signifier, “Co-operative”, means shared civic values.  This example also shows 
how a civic body or association (Co-operatives UK), has resisted a break 
between signifier and signified by insisting on a set of relations that keep the 
signifying relations intact – at least to some degree (Murray, 2014).  An object 
(and process) supporting these civic relations was in the launch on October 
2015 of the Hive which is a business support programme for people keen to 
start or grow a co-operative or community enterprise 
There is a notable ambiguity in the construction of the Common Dignity aspect: 
“Help our colleagues be the best they can be” – begs the question, be the best 
at what? Unadorned however there may be justification in attributing this 
199 
 
description to the “Oral, exemplary, personally warranted” judgements of the 
domestic polity (aided also by the construction of “our colleagues” which may 
be – linguistically at least – a more inclusive mode than, say, “the firm’s 
employees”).   
In the text there is one main “Mechanism” which relate to polities: as previously 
mentioned, the Ethical Policy is central to the construction of the text: the 
Ethical Policy as mechanism for referral, consultation albeit not spelled out in 
the text.  It is now apparently “embedded […] into our Articles of Association” 
(edited for clarity).  This is an example of using institutional processes to 
produce a law-like (rather than individual-dependent) constitution or culture to 
the firm.  This could in a sense be seen as anti-democratic (current generation 
attempts to bind future generation), and has echoes in the constitutional 
liberalism present in the founding of the United States (Capaldi & Lloyd, 2011).  
Again, the emphasis is on a civic polity.  
In support of a strong presence of the civic polity throughout the text, the 
“Condition of Great Person” is illustrated in the statement that the "Values and 
Ethics committee is a relatively new innovation (2014) but already its influence 
is being felt across the Bank, and it has become a key committee of the Board” 
(p.5).   
In contrast, though still relying on civic justification, the “Condition of Little 
Person” could be seen as a rejected customer, excluded through the ethical 
policy screening.  Notably the Bank expects to engage with fewer such cases 
as it focusses on smaller businesses and charities, implying that, in the firm’s 
view, larger business are more likely to be problematic from an ethical lending 
policy perspective.  
In deciding strategic investment or nature of the firm, there is a strong 
statement: "Without our Values and Ethics we might be just like any other 
bank. Our customers have repeatedly told us that these values are a key 
reason for banking with us”: the test here interestingly is a market validation 
(through gaining and retaining banking customers) based on broadly civic 
ideals.  This is an illustration of the subordination of one polity (civic in this 
case) to an overriding or superior polity (market) which may be viewed as 
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surprising in context, however may also reflect realpolitik: within a commercial 
firm, insufficient earnings will result in crisis.      
In contrast to the previous instrumentalism, considering the ways of 
expressing judgement, market justifications are sometimes subordinate to 
civic: "Organisations that conflict “with our ethical policy” will not be customers.  
As this stance “guides our activities”, this means in effect this prioritises civic 
values explicitly over market justifications.  In this the Co-operative bank is 
notably different to, say, RBS and Barclays in construct of the firms “social 
contract”.  
Running the business in an “environmentally friendly” manner shows a green 
justification, albeit the environment “friendliness” – an unfortunate term – of 
any business is open to question.  If all customers left the Cooperative bank 
and were spread across extant banks in the UK it appears plausible there 
would be no marginal increase in the requirement for branches at the other 
firms.  It is tentatively suggested then that “the” most environmental “friendly” 
strategy for the Cooperative bank would be to cease operations, at least in the 
short term.  There is a more positive argument that by growing market share 
at the expense of less environmentally “friendly” banks, the net impact on the 
environment is reduced.  Though even in the latter case total harm may 
increase despite a fall in harm/sales or other normalised metric.   
The use of “transparent and open manner” for the running of the firm is 
interesting as there are always information asymmetries between firms and 
stakeholders in finance, see inter alia Kodres & Pritsker (2002), Roberts (2015) 
or more generally, Bosse et al., (2008). The text itself may be one way of 
reducing that asymmetry.  This is an example of ambiguous attribution to the 
orders of worth framework as these terms may be “industrial” if the terms mean 
publication of measurable variables for comparison, or “civic” in terms of 
formal, welfare enhancing policy.  Given the context of the text overall it seems 
reasonable to assign this to the civic polity.  
In considering how “time” is constructed in the text, some of the discussion is 
recent (2014 - ethics and values committee), 2015 - extended ethical policy.  
Notably however the Chairman (p.5) constructs an open-ended perspective 
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"[we have] built on this during the year and will continue to do so in future years 
through everything that we do" (emphasis added).  An open ended time 
construction is analogous, and can be attributed to, the “perennial” construct 
of the civic polity.   
5.2.15.2 Summary of analysis of text #15 
 
In terms of justificatory regimes observed in the texts, the Co-operative Bank 
has, as it suggested in the text, discursively as well as materially constructed 
the firm in a differentiated manner to rivals RBS and Barclays.  There are 12 
civic justifications, 3 market, 1 domestic and 1 green (no industrial or inspired 
polity constructs were observed).  
 
5.2.16 #16 RBS annual report and accounts 2015 (RBS, 2016a) 
 
5.2.16.1 Justification in text 
 
With respect to the “Common superior principle”: Economic growth seems to 
be the superior principle alluded to (p.10): financial success could be 
interpreted as a market order of worth justification.  Similarly, The EU 
referendum is mostly framed with respect to customers “unfettered access to 
the European Single Market" (p12). Explicitly however "our primary 
responsibility is to serve and support our customers" (p12) which is 
undoubtedly a market perspective.  
There is no consideration of the common good per se, social activities of the 
bank are mostly expressed in terms aligned with the bank itself (not entirely 
inappropriately, see for instance the discussion of alignment in Brammer et al., 
2007, or Porter & Kramer, 2011). Utilising this alignment there is emphasis on 
financial literacy education ("Moneysense" p12) - despite there being little 
evidence more generally of the efficacy of such initiatives and the concern that 
such activity is substantively a defensive ploy to forestall more onerous 
product regulation (see Willis, 2009). The development of entrepreneur "hubs" 
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including at the Gogarburn HQ, is aligned through a market perspective with 
growing "the economy and creating jobs" (this from a firm that has lost in 
excess of 90,000 jobs through intrinsic and extrinsic reasons - see Treanor, 
2017).  The Chairman notes the "zeal" (suggesting an INPSIRATIONAL 
justification) with which staff supported Comic Relief (civic) in the "the largest 
corporate fundraising event in Sport Relief’s history" which is a success 
indicator – size - more suited to a market justification; this shows the 
instrumental use of one justificatory perspective (civic) in the service of a 
market justification. 
When considering the “assumptions regarding natural relationships” (p.11) 
contains a hint at push back on complexity of regulatory regime in noting 
"many regulators" as stakeholders.  Hence, the natural relationship includes 
some tension between the firm and regulators.  In contrast, it was noted the 
FSA were rather too friendly with RBS ahead of the financial crisis (FSA, 
2011).   
"All our staff" suggests a patriarchal "ownership" or at least hierarchic domestic 
relation to employees (p.12).  Whilst the bank positions itself as "RBS is a core 
part of the communities it serves and undertakes a number of initiatives to 
support them and help them succeed" (p.12) which positions RBS in a 
domestic justification, this is an implicitly circular justification that it is in that 
position because it is core.  What a "core part" really means in this regard is 
unspecified, as is "community" - the term could be increasingly problematic 
given the rise of mobile/internet banking (Gupta, 2013): being a core part of 
the community harks back to the central role of a bank manager and bank 
branch in small communities (Collins, 2012). 
Whilst there was little direct read off regarding “common dignity”, the 
discussion of the "focus on culture and diversity" (p12) is noteworthy as the 
text then hints at a civic order of worth focussed on "integrity" which can be 
related to the common dignity attribute. However this is linked to a market 
perspective as the culture is harnessed to serving the needs of customers and 
shareholders; another example of one order of worth being compromised 
instrumentally in order to serve the needs of another order of worth. Similarly 
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mention of “Culture” and “Diversity” (which, standalone, could be symbolic of 
the "expression" and "expressiveness" of the activity in the firm (inspired polity) 
is again harnessed to "innovation" (market in this context) and improved 
"decision making" (industrial).  Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) discuss the 
processes of compromise (though they did not find any cases in their work of 
comprise between the civic and market worlds – see p.332).  The authors note 
(p.277) that the presence of objects appropriate to differing polities is not in 
and of itself to recognise a compromise.  Compromise is enabled by allowing 
the identities within each world to remain in the service a higher good (conflict 
rather depends on the asserted primacy of a particular polity). In the text 
analysed however the presence is not of incommensurate objects but “higher” 
(more abstract) concepts such as expressiveness which is associated in the 
polity with the level of common dignity or investment formula within the test 
situation.  A fragile compromise then is present in the text albeit the common 
good within which the validity of the compromise is endowed is not explicit.   
What is not readily apparent in the text is the linguistic composites signalling 
a compromise such as in Boltanski & Thévenot’s (2006 [1991], p.277) example 
of “worker’s rights” combining industrial and civic justifications.  
The “status relations” within the bank show a hierarchical perspective: the 
Board is the shareholders' representative, protecting their "long term interests" 
(p.11) though these are undefined (either capital growth, or dividends, could 
be considered). The board is "supportive" [of management] whilst "exercising 
strong oversight" (p12). The board is presented as important then in a 
structural sense through a domestic justification, though later (p12) retail 
financial expertise has been added to the board - an industrial order of worth 
in the expression of “competence”. 
The “decline” of the polity is largely expressed in market terms: Within a 
"market" order of worth the lack of profit, and return to shareholders would be 
seen as a serious issue. The Chairman acknowledges this (p12) - at the time 
of writing RBS had not made a profit for seven years.  The concerns expressed 
about the ongoing low interest rate environment are interesting in that there is 
a potential tension arising from a simplistic consideration of the market 
justification. Low interest rates support customer's borrowing and raise 
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expectations of economic growth - a market justification as has been used 
earlier in the text. However, the market decline is shown in reduced profits 
within the retail bank.  Further, flaws are revealed such as delays to separate 
Williams & Glyn (p11); “significant conduct issues which the banks has faced 
and continues to face" are discussed in terms of profitability hence a market 
order of worth, however what is notable in this description is the passive nature 
of "the bank": there is no sense that the bank created or allowed a culture to 
develop which allowed such conduct issues to develop. However, the further 
expression of regret can be viewed as decline of the civic order of worth 
wherein reputation rests on trustworthiness. Later (p12) there is determination 
to guard against "behaviour that held us back" - there is less distance in the 
statement and even a hint of the domestic perspective of "us". Essentially 
criticisms are muted: this is not an "easy" year for banks or its shareholders 
(p.10). 
As might be expected in an evaluative/summative report such as the Annual 
Reports and Accounts of a firm, there are many criteria for evaluation: A 
“simpler bank” with “low risk” (p10) - an industrial perspective; a fair bank (p10) 
suggests a civic motivation; Capital ratio (CET1) - it is unclear if this is driven 
by a civic justification or an industrial (de-risking) strategy.  The customer is 
present in terms of measures of “Advocacy”, “Service”, “Trust” (all p10) – 
suggesting a market perspective.  “Reduce costs and enhance IT capability” 
(p.11) (industrial). The (p11) "detailed oversight" of capital improvements 
suggests a focus on measurable criteria - per Patriotta et al. (2011, p.1810) 
suggestive of an industrial perspective. The (p11) desire for a period of 
"stability and reflection on the new rules, alongside an assessment of their 
overall impact" is from an industrial perspective as the justification for the 
approach depends on the management and deployment of technical 
expertise. This is followed by a market justification regarding financing "the 
rest of the economy" and supporting "growth".  The consideration (p11) of the 
ring-fencing regulation (HM Treasury, 2013) which alters the operational and 
capital structures of banks, ostensibly to reduce the risk of future taxpayer 
funded bailouts, is presented in market terms in that this "will have an 
important impact on the way we serve our customers" (p.11).  Following from 
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the discussion on diversity (p12) there is pleasure noted at the “emphasis on 
the business on ensuring women taking a significant number of roles 
throughout the bank and at all levels" (p12). Leaving aside the ambiguity of 
the term "significant" here what is more important is what is unsaid, but found 
elsewhere - that the gendered distribution of roles in the banks has not 
changed since 2011 (RBS, 2016d).  
There is further evidence of “self-evaluation” in that the bank is ahead of plan 
(downsizing investment bank, p.10) - note no mention of staff losses hence an 
industrial justification rather than a domestic or civic. P.11 notes "mixed 
feelings about a reduction of its activities on this scale" hinting at a number of 
conflicting orders of worth or justificatory perspectives. Other banks are noted 
to be similar however, this elides some notable exceptions to this (e.g. 
Barclay’s success in investment banking post crisis): the comparison with 
other banks is then superficial. 
5.2.16.2 Summary of analysis of text #16 
 
The above analysis found 15 instances of market justification, 7 industrial, 4 
civic, 4 domestic, a single (fairly weak) allusion to INSPIRATIONAL 
justification and no instances of green justifications. Hence the market and the 
somewhat related (through a common focus on business success) industrial 
justifications dominate the text though when the discourse touches more 
specifically on the relations between the bank and external agencies this tends 
to be couched in civic terms.  Perhaps given the nature of the report, which is 
to some extant an evaluation of the previous year’s performance, there was 
much more text dedicated to evaluative statements than more general framing 
(e.g. with respect to the common good). 
The key conclusion is that the narrative within the bank’s report is not 
surprisingly focussed on commercial success and efficiency, with Civic and 
Internal (staff) foci a distant second.  The absence of any consideration of 
climate change even from an instrumental (e.g. stranded asset value risk- 
Andersson, Bolton & Samama, 2016) perspective is notable.  Perhaps this is 
not too surprising as “Even sophisticated scholars well versed in social theory, 
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it seems, are nowadays at a loss when it comes to articulating nature’s worth 
beyond market grammars” (Blok, 2013, p.493).   
 
5.2.17 #17 RBS Sustainability report 2015 (RBS, 2016c) 
 
5.2.17.1 Justifications in text 
 
The superior principle is to support the economy through lending to SMEs and 
supporting financial literacy and development of capabilities.  A similar tone is 
evident regarding the “Common Good” (though relatively little direct evidence 
of this topic was observed):  Economic and customer focus values dominate 
e.g. p.3 "our commitment to the small businesses at the heart of our economy. 
If they grow, the UK’s economy will grow, and that is ultimately good for our 
business. That’s what we mean by ‘sustainable banking’, and we are 
committed to it now and in the future".  Similarly, an economic rationale is 
present in considering services to educate people about finances: "Being 
knowledgeable and confident with money can only be a good thing for 
customers and their families, the bank, and the UK economy" (p.3). The focus 
on customer again supports a market justification whilst the (planned) future 
betokens an industrial perspective 
Interestingly the relationship of RBS to the banking sector is framed in two 
ways: one is competitively, the other is somewhat of an “outsider” perspective 
challenging “some established industry practices" (p.3).  The former is a 
market perspective whilst the latter suggest a civic justification.  There are 
suggestions of a domestic order of worth regarding  the relationship between 
the CEO (Ross McEwen) and the rest of the bank employees as the language 
employed includes “my vision” (p.2, emphasis added) and “pride” (p.3): both 
are suggestive of a familial, or more critically, “patriarchal” relationship (a 
discussion of definitions is in Gneezy, Leonard & List, 2009).  There is support 
for the latter critique elsewhere in RBS (2015, p.51) wherein it is reported that 
73% of clerical (hence relatively low paid) employees are female whereas the 
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senior manager positions are distributed 73% male and executive positions 
80% male47.  
The “national grouping” is defined explicitly in the text as UK and Ireland, 
though there is no contrast to prior scope, hence is a context free statement 
of intent.  The repertoire of “objects” include organisations/brands such as 
Royal Bank of Scotland and Nat West however subsidiary organisations such 
as Coutts and Adam and Company are absent.  Citizens bank is mentioned 
only in connection with its recent sale – it is no longer a part of the RBS group.  
With respect to the orders of worth framework, it is noteworthy that the 
repertoire of objects does not support a specific polity.  Hence, this supports 
the Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) perspective that justificatory “worlds” 
can be used within the same “real world”.  The construction of space suggests 
an increasing focus of virtual space – through mobile banking apps for 
instance, less tied to a specific location which is in line with declining use of 
bank branches across the sector (French, Leyshon & Signoretta, 2008). With 
respect to assigning such a virtual space formation to a polity it is worth 
reconsidering the use of “globalised” space formation in the market polity in 
Table 1.  The globalised world reduces the importance of national borders, 
national governments and regulations and the salience of national identities.  
The use of apps and mobile/virtual space additionally elides the importance of 
borders and transitions between national spaces: Facebook is the same 
everywhere (or everywhere it is allowed, which is a separate discussion).  The 
use of mobile, “virtual” space as the “place” where market interactions occur 
(see also Jobber, 2013 for the “four P’s” of markets and marketing) suggests 
that Table 1 can usefully extend space constructions for the market polity to 
include virtual/mobile space.   
With respect to relations between subjects: service to customers 
predominates in a market justification; within the firm itself there appears to be 
the domestic concern between the CEO and “colleagues”.  Regulators as a 
stakeholder are implicit in the discussion of capital requirements however the 
                                            




importance (and agency?) of regulators is undermined by the framing of capital 
requirements making banks safer “theoretically” (p.2) – this is a (slight) 
undermining of civic justifications. 
Whilst customers are mentioned repeatedly (“complaints” in contrast could be 
viewed as the “decline” of the polity), the metric of concern here is “customer 
advocacy” (p.3) whereby customers promote the firm to others (Bendapudi & 
Berry, 1997, p.30), which reveals the instrumental underlying paradigm to 
customer’s welfare – rather than a good in and of itself the customer is 
employed to extend the bank’s marketing efforts which is indicative of a market 
order of worth.  Customers are also presented as homogenous in the 
discussion (p.3) of the move to fewer branches and greater utilisation of 
technology, which views customers through the industrial lens of efficiency and 
reduced costs.   
Removing £983m costs from the business is seen as positive: whilst the 
market justification is made: "the less we spend on running the bank the more 
we can spend on making it better for customers" (p.2) this construct 
simultaneously supports efficiency justifications through the industrial polity.  
This latter justification is the dominant perspective in the discussion of the 
"break" with "144 year old tradition" to open busiest branches on "bank 
holidays” as whilst this is market justification regarding customers, this could 
also be construed as a neo-liberal approach to employees as assets to be 
exploited (see inter alia Selwyn, 2013). 
There is critique of past performance from both a civic and market perspective.  
The former is illustrated by concerns over fines for “conduct” regulation and 
“legislative” breaches: the latter is then evidenced by concerns over the 
financial losses such breaches produced.   The construction of time as “now 
and into the future” is in keeping with a view of “sustainability” as the continuing 





5.2.17.2 Summary of analysis of text #17 
 
Overall this text predominantly constructs a market justification (with 6 
instances) with few alternatives (industrial 3, INSPIRATIONAL 1, domestic 2, 
civic 3).   
A priori expectations of a “sustainability” report would be that such reports 
might include presence of a “green” order of worth or justification: the most 
striking finding in this part of the analysis is the absence of a “green” order of 
worth in this particular text48.  Thus whilst “sustainable banking” is considered 
a number of times this is in the context of gaining the licence to operate, 
gaining positive customer advocacy.  Hence, the over-riding perspective 
regarding the “common good” appears narrowly constructed with respect to 
satisfying customer requirements rather than broader societal concerns (which 
by definition include non-customers).  This is in contrast to the discussion of 
Jagd (2011) and Daigle & Rouleau (2008) wherein the latter posited a 
constraint on genre, such that it could be anticipated that an ecological or 
green order of worth would be paramount, however this is not the case here.   
 
5.2.18 #18 Fair and Effective Markets Report (FCA, BoE, HM Treasury, 
2015) 
 
5.2.18.1 Justification within the text 
 
Similar to other texts analysed, the “common superior principle” is not 
addressed directly. However there are unstated assumptions or fundamentals 
that are not subject to critique that are suggestive.  That there should be a 
private market for Fixed Income (products), Currencies, and Commodities 
(collectively, FICC), is not examined.  That a fixed outcome (an interest rate) 
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can be constructed from myriad of variable fixed factors is not challenged (the 
challenge could be that such an outcome by necessity introduces complex 
mechanisms including hedging and contrarian trading which may increase 
systemic risk due to herding, per Beck, Coyle, Dewatripont, Freixas & 
Seabright, 2010).  If the end user does not bear risk in the normal course of 
events, some parties must take risk in order to produce an outcome 
independent of volatility amongst underlying assets.  “Capital liquidity” is the 
underlying principle behind markets and approaches to regulation: however, 
this is not stated. “Capital liquidity” allows for flexibility, for short-term changes 
in allocation: it is a market justification.   
It is worth examining how judgements are constructed in the text.  For fair 
markets, there are five particular components: 
i) “clear, proportionate and consistently applied standards of market 
practice” (emphasis added).  Here the focus on standards fits with 
objects and mechanisms of the civic polity.   
ii) “are transparent enough to allow users to verify that those standards 
are consistently applied”.  Similarly, another focus on standards fits 
with objects and mechanisms of the civic polity.   
iii) “provide open access (either directly or through an open, 
competitive and well-regulated system of intermediation)”. There 
are two conceptions of a market here: one, with low or no barriers 
to entry is aligned to the market polity whereas the latter conception 
is an interesting comprise construction in the same phrase.  Here 
“open” and “competitive” are from the market polity, however “well-
regulated system” is from the civic polity. In effect, the market is 
open to those who are willing to comply.  Such a construction avoids 
the loaded and misleading terminology of “free” markets (inter alia 
Glinavos, 2013).  
iv) “allow market participants to compete on the basis of merit”.  This 
construction is solely aligned to the market polity if “merit” is taken 
to be assessed by typical marketing indicators such as market 
share, profits.  
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v) “provide confidence that participants will behave with integrity”.  
Here “integrity” is used as an endogenous quality separate to 
exogenous regulations. However, integrity suggests an alignment 
within a polity albeit not which particular one.  This is an example of 
a construction of justification that says “this far and no further” 
regarding tests within a polity.  As such any order of worth may be 
followed “with integrity”: to go further than is allowed within the 
particular context is to commit a form of violence, such as the 
“financial violence” considered in Marazzi (2011).  The ontological 
fluidity of the noun “integrity” may be a reason why this term was not 
used in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]). As a noun “integrity” is 
a nominalisation of a host of actions toward coherence within a 
social contract or order of worth, and actions away from deficiencies 
in the social contract, away from violations of successful 
qualifications within the polity.   
In contrast to the market and civic justifications of fair markets, efficient 
markets (Paragraph 5, p.9) are constructed around industrial concerns: “a 
predictable way”, “underpinned by robust trading and post-trade 
infrastructures” (emphasis added). In addition, there is the presence of market 
justification through enabling participants to “discover and trade at competitive 
prices” (emphasis added). It is less obvious how to place phraseology such as 
“ensure proper allocation of capital and risk”.  There are a number of elements 
within this phrase that increase uncertainty for the reader.  “Risk” in Boltanski 
& Thévenot (2006 [1991], p.161) is associated with the inspired polity, however 
this is in connection with risks to beliefs, habits, identity and so on – rather 
than risks to value or money.  This suggests that the best placement for this 
phrase is within the market polity.  Yet the word “proper” is suggestive of a 
normative and even rules based framework with which proper and improper 
allocations of capital can be judged. Within the market for capital, 
Governments may or may not try to affect capital flows, by improving rates on 
its own liabilities for instance or by structural changes to capital markets. 
“Proper” here then is an “empty signifier” (Barthes, 1972) to be assigned by 
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those with power to enforce the signification.  Tests of im/propriety are 
dependent on access to salient data.  
Judgements are operationalised positively as:  
“tight pricing and deep liquidity for more actively traded instruments, 
including government bonds, standardised derivatives and major 
foreign currencies. And they have also facilitated trading in a wide range 
of less standardised assets, tailored to users’ needs. Commitment of 
capital by market makers, trading as principal, has helped sustain 
liquidity in a number of secondary FICC markets, particularly for more 
bespoke assets, larger trade sizes, and during periods of market-wide 
stress” (p.9). 
Several general remarks may be useful before considering the implications for 
orders of worth. “Tight pricing” here refers to narrow bid/ask spreads.  Broad 
spreads imply greater returns for market makers. Less standardised assets 
may include insurance products such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and 
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), and whilst these are liquidity 
enhancing in the market these are also relatively opaque leading to difficulties 
in assessing risk, especially systemic risks (Beck, Coyle, Dewatripont, Freixas 
& Seabright, 2010).   Normative judgements regarding the scale and social 
worth of capital markets are commonplace (inter alia Gray & Bebbington 2006, 
Bowman et al., 2012b). It is unclear where the normative judgements would 
take the markets: a lack of liquid secondary markets reduces or even halts 
issuance on the primary market. Less liquid markets imply higher risk for 
market makers and therefore increased cost for users of the capital markets.   
In analysing  the orders of worth in the statement it is clear that free circulation 
(liquidity) of the market goods (financial assets) are important and this is 
associated with a market polity. However to take more risk “as principal” to 
ensure liquidity to maintain the market is harder to align with the short termism 
of the market approach.  Market agents may have actually being planning for 
only short-term risk (in that a long-term crisis could not be forestalled by market 
actors).  Alternatively, they may have taken a “perennial” – civic justification.  
In this case that the existence of the market could in and of itself be justified 
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as a public good rather than solely a construction or forum for market 
making/commercial success. The current research is limited with respect to 
understanding agents’ motivations and hence this is suggestive of a possibility 
for future research.  
Further “flaws” shown by evidence include  
 “Market structures that presented opportunities for abuse, including: 
poor benchmark design; unmanaged conflicts of interest in 
intermediaries acting as both principal and agent, exacerbated by 
horizontal integration across diverse business lines; vulnerabilities to 
collusion; and thin markets for less liquid assets;  
 Standards of acceptable market practices, particularly in bilateral over-
the-counter (OTC) markets and less heavily (or un-) regulated 
instruments including spot FX, that were sometimes poorly understood 
or adhered to, short on detail or lacked teeth;  
 Systems of internal governance and control that placed greater reliance 
on second and third lines of defence than on trading or desk heads, 
proved incapable of asserting the interests of firms and the wider 
market over those of close-knit trading staff, and failed to identify 
emerging vulnerabilities or ensure that conduct lessons learned in one 
business line were fully applied elsewhere; 
 Limited reinforcement of standards through bilateral market discipline 
from sell-side and buy-side firms, or from end-users;  
 Remuneration and incentive schemes that stressed short-term returns 
over longer-term value enhancement and good conduct; and  
 A culture of impunity in parts of the market, coloured by a perception 
that misconduct would go either undetected or unpunished” (pp.8-9) 
There are a number of types of criticism in this quoted section above.  Firstly 
criticism that the market polity was not working on its own terms. That is, a 
market polity is in part justified by effective, competitive price discovery and 
rewards to best performers.  “Thin markets for less liquid assets” alludes to a 
lack of effective price discovery; “poor benchmark design” suggests a skewed 
approach that means that fund managers more easily reach or exceed 
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benchmark performance, increasing their rewards.  Secondly, criticism that 
where regulation (civic polity) was introduced this was ineffectively 
implemented, was unclear or “lacked teeth”.  Thirdly, that some participants 
looked out for each other’s interests as “close-knit trading staff” (a domestic 
justification) ahead of “true” market principles. Finally the fourth type of 
criticism is that market justifications of timescales (flexible, short term) are not 
appropriate compared to civic, industrial or green timescales (long term). More 
simply then, the criticisms are that the market polity was not effective on its 
own terms, or compromises with other justifications are not reached.  
5.2.18.2 Summary of analysis text #18 
  
The underlying principle adumbrated above is that liquid markets should exist 
for FICC.  Given this, critique from the authors of the text concerns where the 
market justification fails on its own terms, or where compromises with other 
polity such as civic (5) appear to be ineffective (that is, dominated by market 
(5) or occasionally domestic (1) concerns).   There is one justification around 
the industrial polity, none for inspired, REPUTATIION, or green. 
 
5.2.19 #19 HSBC Group Chief Executives review (HSBC, 2016a, pp10-
11) 
 
5.2.19.1 Justification within the text 
 
The “Common Superior Principle” in the text is oriented toward a market 
justification, "Revenue Growth", "Capitalise on higher return businesses" 
(p.10), "better return for shareholders (p.11) – though as discussed below the 
presence of shareholders as qualified subjects problematizes the orders of 
worth framework.  
There is no articulation of the “Common Good” in the text.  
When considering “Assumptions re Natural Relationships” it is noted the 
intertextual reference(s) to "Investor Update" suggests the current text can be 
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read as a continuation of the discourse with investors: the latter are the 
"natural" audience for the text.  Also noted are multiple references to the 
"network" of "collaborative" businesses and partners within the Group.  This is 
not the "networked" or individual project based polity of Boltanski & Chiapello 
(2007) but part of the "natural relationships" within, and external to, the firm.  
The discussion below of the role and positioning of investors with respect to 
the orders of worth framework means it is problematic to assign the 
relationship with investors to a specific polity, however in context it seems not 
unreasonable to see the focus on investors as relating to “bottom line” market 
justifications.  
Social or National grouping: There is a wide-ranging, almost global 
construction of the business: "Global Private Banking" for instance as a 
business unit.  There are mentions of the US, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, and Asia, 
in particular the Pearl River delta area in China (albeit Brazil particularly in 
respect of disinvestment from the country). The globalised aspect of the text 
is suggestive of a market justification.  
There is no articulation of “Common Dignity” in the text. 
Similar to other banking texts there is a wide range of qualified objects and 
mechanisms in the text:  "Development of Asia business”, “Higher return 
businesses”, “US Consumer Lending and Mortgage portfolio”, “Industrial 
Bank” (stake now sold, p.11), “Risk Weighted Assets [RWA]”.  The latter is a 
hybrid type of “object” in that the RWA are derived from underlying assets 
adjusted by risk weightings per asset type. The assets themselves may be 
derivatives sold on the basis of risk expectations: the “object” obscures the 
technical/social ontology of derivatives giving rise to possibilities of an 
ontological “spread” that depends on initial assumptions regarding the nature 
of assets and monetary values (Bryan & Rafferty, 2016).  Overall, the 
“qualified” objects are market oriented rather than, for example, civic or 
domestic – notably absent from the text are discussions of regulators, or 
employees.  
A similarly ontologically diffuse “Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives” is 
found in the text: "Investors”, departments or business units such as: “Global 
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Banking & Markets”, “Commercial Banking”, “Principal Retail Banking”, 
“Wealth Management”; Clients, and the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA), and by implication the agents within NAFTA markets.  Whilst the 
qualified subjects appear market oriented investors as a class are not 
discussed at all in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) and specifically 
excluded from orders of worth as not oriented toward common humanity or 
justice in Boltanski & Chiapello (2007, p.365) as “the premier exploiters […] in 
a long chain of sequential exploitation” ([edited for clarity]).   
There is no discussion in the text of “Condition of Great Person”, “Condition of 
Little Person”, “Status Relations” or “Decline”. 
The “Investment formula” appears to be oriented toward "Cost reduction 
programmes - "strict cost management" (p.10) which could be allocated to an 
industrial efficiency perspective however in context is supportive of results 
around “Revenue Growth” (p.10), “return on equity" (p.11), "increase the 
dividend" (p.10) and “Shareholder wealth" all of which are best allocated to the 
market justifications.  Similarly, when considering offers for a business "none 
of which were deemed to be in the best interests of our shareholders" (p.11) 
is again financially oriented and hence best suited to the market polity albeit 
further discussion of the role of shareholders is considered below.   
There is an indirect indication of “flaws revealed by evidence”: "we are 
committed to turning them around" [emphasis added] referring to US and 
Mexico businesses (p.11) suggests a failure to meet required goals in this year 
and recent past and in context is a failure associated with the market polity.  
There are no direct forms of (self) “criticisms” in the text.   
Most of the “Ways of expressing judgement” are concerned with managing or 
reducing risk, some of which are difficult to assign to a polity per se.  For 
instance: "targeted investment, "prudent lending", "diversified", "increase in 
provisions", "de-risking measures", "strengthen the common equity tier 1 ratio"  
(p.10), "reducing our risk weighted assets", "strength and resilience" (p.11).  It 
is not always immediately apparent to which polity these terms refer.  Some of 
the terms indicated increased compliance with civic regulations (increased 
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equity capital), some seem to be mostly concerned with efficiency in an 
industrial sense (“de-risking measures") and some see to support increased 
(risk adjusted) capital gains ("targeted investment") that could be evaluated 
under a market justification. 
5.2.19.2 Summary of analysis text #19 
 
There are nine examples of market justification within the text two industrial 
polity justifications and only one civic.  The neglect of civic justifications is 
somewhat surprising given recent conduct issues at the firm (Nasiripour & 
Scannell, 2012, Jenkins, 2013).  Notable absence from the text includes any 
reference to employees.  In common with other banks’ texts above, there were 
no green justifications observed.  
 
5.2.20 #20 HSBC Approach (HSBC, 2016a, pp36-39) 
 
5.2.20.1 Justification within the text 
 
Common Superior Principle: highlighted is “Fair outcomes for customers” 
(p.36) - the customer focus seems to suggest a market justification.  
Additionally "financial market integrity" is a civic justification of maintaining “a” 
public good (in contrast to "the" common good).  Overall a "sustainable" 
business model that means persistence and success of the firm rather than 
ecological sustainability.  
Common Good: “reducing global carbon dioxide emissions is a critical 
challenge for society” (p.36) is one of the few instances of a societal as 
opposed to firm-centric perspective. There is relatively weak ownership of 
HSBCs role in fossil fuel investment - HSBC “see the potential for financial 
services to facilitate investment that can help the world transition to a low-
carbon economy” (p.36, similarly on p.37) – a rare green justification.  Given 
the scale of challenge apparent even in 2015, this statement falls far short of 
a leadership role that could be expected of the most valuable company on the 
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FTSE 100.  There are further civic and green evocations of common goods: 
“education and environment are essential to resilient communities and thriving 
economies” (p.39). 
There are no statements pertaining to: Assumptions re Natural Relationships, 
Social or National grouping, Common Dignity. 
The Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms is extensive and heterogeneous, 
overall weighted toward market and civic polities with some green justifications 
also: 
Market: 
Product Governance Processes (p.36) 
Alert customers by text message p.36 
Customer complaints (and “tools for understanding their causes”) 
Seeking feedback from customers (p.36) 




RBWM (p.36 - Retail Banking & Wealth management) 
“350,000 customer surveys” 
Innovation and digital capabilities  
Financial Transactions 
Customer Data 
Apple Pay mobile payment 
Live-chat online customer service 






Flexible working programmes 
“agenda free exchange meetings” (p.38)  
Webcasts with senior executives 
Training programmes (including “values led leadership training for all 
employees” p.38) 
HSBC Confidential Whistleblowing platform 
Performance review processes  
Variable pay considerations 
At our best online recognition tool for all employees (p.38) 
Suppliers' code of conduct 
International Slavery Act  
International Bill of Human Rights 
UN declaration of human rights 
International Labour Organisations Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work 
Community Investment Activities 
UK Code of Practice for the taxation of banks 
US/Foreign Account Tax compliance act  
Green: 
Climate Change (note as “challenge” as risk) - also stated as 
“opportunity” for customers (presumably green technology providers) 
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Asset management business joined the Montreal Pledge49 to disclose 
the carbon intensity of its portfolio (p.36).    
Green bond issued 2015 for the first time 
Investment sectors: renewables, energy efficiency, sustainable waste 
and water management, sustainable land use, climate change 
adaptation, and clean buildings and transportation. 
Certified, sustainable palm oil 
Training on sustainability risk policies (2,300 attendees) 
Sustainability risk policies 
OECD Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account 
information 
CRD IV 
OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) Initiative 
The Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives is less extensive: 
Market 
Customers 




Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
                                            
49 https://montrealpledge.org/ states “investors commit to measure and publicly disclose the 
carbon footprint of their investment portfolios on an annual basis.  The Pledge […] is supported 
by the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) and the United Nations Environment 




United Nations Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport 
Civic 
Team dedicated to bus rapid transit systems 
Parents returning to work 
“International Labour Organisation" 
Condition of Great Person: "Our Global Research team was ranked number 
one for Integrated Climate Change…" (p.36) combines REPUTATIONAL as 
recognition- this time with respect to a green concern (albeit instrumentally in 
terms of portfolio values and risk). 
Condition of Little Person: Non-compliance with (green) forestry and 
agricultural policies meant that 160 customers were refused service and 
needed to find alternate banking providers.   
Status Relations: "Global Research team was ranked number one for 
integrated Climate Change" (p.36) is an instance of a REPUTATIONAL or 
“opinion” polity justification. 
Decline: "The firm is aware of “bias in hiring, promotion and talent 
identification” or at least the possibility thereof.  Such bias is a decline in the 
civic justifications toward equitability of employment.  The text alludes to past 
problems (p39), “our banking services are not associated with any 
arrangements known or suspected to be designed to facilitate tax evasion” 
Investment formula: Rather more literally than is intended by Boltanski & 
Thévenot (2006 [1991]), "HSBC also pledged to invest $1bn in a portfolio of 
green, social or sustainable bonds" (p.37).  Such investment forms a green 
justification, albeit as investment rather than donation or gift a market 
mechanism is also present.  There is a form of compromise here between 
green and market justifications; however as discussed below "investors" are 
not a legitimate stakeholder concerned with justice in Boltanski & Chiapello 
(2007, p129, pp.365-366).  Similar, if more indirect example on p.37 is in 
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helping ABC launch an international green bond and in facilitating rapid bus 
transit systems to "reduce pollution  and increase road safety" (green and civic 
justifications respectively).  Social or green investments may be viewed as 
instrumentally using green justifications or means to further market ends.  
There were no direct examples founds of “Flaws revealed by evidence” or 
“criticisms” though as seen below customers do complain. 
Ways of expressing judgement: "Customer complaints have reduced by 67%” 
(p.36) is a market (customer) oriented criteria.  With a similar market focus, 
'Customers have saved more than $129.9m, in fees' (p.36) is interesting, as 
this saving comprises fees foregone by HSBC.  Customer fee payments are 
reduced, which means HSBC income is reduced by the same amount.  
However, linking to “lasting” and hence retained relationships with customers 
the superior principle overrides the short-term fee income reduction.  As such 
this example illustrates the “time construction” of the banks is somewhat 
different to that found in prior literature and summarised in Table 1.  
Preservation or retention of client relations is especially important when there 
is use of capital upfront (annuities, life assurance reserves, loans).  Although 
Table 1 shows market constructions of time as “Short-term, Flexibility”, the 
construct in the text is longer term, which suggests that market justifications 
as actually constructed by banks are not constructed solely in terms of short-
term transactions.  This is an important distinction not made by prior research; 
such a lack problematises current theory.  
Similar to the discussion above, financing of renewable energy deals in the US 
and UK (p.37) is important.  Green justifications are present however again 
the financing is the dominant justification, the fulfilment of a service/product or 
a market justification. 
The text highlights “Diversity Team of the Year” and Top Global Employer (the 
latter from Stonewall, both p.38).  These are appeals to REPUTATION through 
global recognition.     
The company is “proud” to provide an “open, supportive and inclusive 
workplace” (p.37) which is a civic justification based on equitability and 
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highlights “our award winning Balance employee network”.  These 
justifications are linked to commercial performance by recruiting and retaining 
talent - a market justification and hence the civic justification in this reading is 
subordinate to the market imperatives. 
By “reducing environmental impact” - reducing energy usage and increased 
percentage from renewables the firm uses a green justification – albeit as 
discussed above, Jeucken & Bouma (2001) note direct environmental effects 
of banks are less significant than the indirect effect through financing polluters. 
Sustainability risk is mentioned (p.39), though the nature of the risk is 
somewhat vague: risk to the ecosystem/carrying capacity to the planet, risk of 
specific damage from HSBC operations, risk to reputation if the focus on 
behaviours do not change.  The ambiguity here means this particular phrase 
is not assigned to a specific polity.  
The firm is “recognised as a leader in the Forest 500 ranking of 150 investors' 
policies on the sustainability of forest commodity supply chains” which is a 
justification that combines of REPUTATIONAL and green polities. One of the 
difficulties for the text audience is in understanding the warrant of claims based 
on third party evaluations – how independent, valid, reliable, rigorous and 
trustworthy are the claims. 
From a civic perspective, the firm donated $205m to charitable programmes, 
an extra $150m over three years donation extra to mark their 150th year, and 
$62m to HK charities from sale of commemorative bank notes: all in some 
tension with financial, market outcomes.  Employees volunteered 304,555 
hours during the working day - the latter point illustrates a tension with 
industrial efficiency and productivity.  
The civic polity related, “We pay our fair share of tax in the countries in which 
we operate” seems like a low bar to meet, however several firms have been 
criticised in this regard (Gravelle, 2009) and indeed subsequent to the claim in 
the text HSBC was found to be supporting tax evasion by customers (Keohane 
& Arnold, 2017).  
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Time construction: the subheading (p.36) contains "building lasting business 
relationships".  This is of interest as the time construct of business 
relationships may be expected to be market oriented and short term (you are 
only as good as your last delivery/project etc.).  The use of "lasting" here then 
suggests either that the construct in the text problematises the theoretical 
approach to time construction in the market polity or that a different polity is a 
better fit.  None of the other polities seem a good fit however for customers as 
"qualified subjects", so in this case the use of "lasting" or long-term 
problematises the narrow expectations associated with the market polity of 
short term relations.   
Space construction: Global: India, UK, US, HK, France, Argentina, Philippines, 
Denmark, Ghana, S. Africa, Birmingham (UK), China, Asia, Europe, Middle 
East North Africa (MENA), N America , Latin America; “employees lead seven 
global employee networks to promote diversity” […] “in more than 30 offices 
around the world” (p.38) – per Table 1, this global construction supports a 
market polity.    
5.2.20.2 Summary of analysis of text #20 
 
Notably in the above text, there are as many green (10) justifications as market 
justifications (10) with almost as many civic justifications (8).  In contrast as 
above the green polity has been seldom called on in banks’ texts.  That said, 
some constructs of green justifications appear subordinate to market 
concerns. There is some appeal to reputation justification also (3). There are 
no constructs based on industrial, domestic or inspired polities.  
5.2.21 #21 Lloyds Annual Report and Accounts (Lloyds, 2016a) 
 
5.2.21.1 Justification within the text 
 
Common Superior Principle: Throughout shareholder and customer 
expectations are paramount and used to express judgement (see more 
examples below): a market justification. 
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Common Good: The links to a strong economy could be seen as a background 
level of economic welfare [notionally] shared across society.  Whilst some 
indicators (p.9) are genuinely “common”, such as “reduced household 
indebtedness”, others such as “increased house prices” are more narrowly 
positive for asset owners (and the lenders such as Lloyds bank who 
presumably have less leveraged customers).  If Lloyd's text is taken as a proxy 
for the voice of "capital" then the view of common dignity is partial and most 
notably does not include a broader view of societal and ecological capital, 
echoing Hickel (2018) "From the perspective of capital, what most of us see 
as tremendous ethical and even existential problems literally don’t count" 
(Hickel, 2018). Overall then whilst the common good sees some articulation in 
civic terms there are indications of a more narrow framing under the market 
polity.  
Assumptions re Natural Relationships: “the UK economy, to which we are 
inextricably linked” is suggestive of a more nationally bound business model 
(which is the case) than compared to other banks such as Barclays and HSBC 
that include a global perspective in their texts. A national focus can be read as 
a more domestic justification in contrast to the global/globalised justifications 
of the market polity. The bank is in part “owned” by the state: in discussing 
(pp9,11) the Government part “ownership” of the bank due to the bailout 
following the financial crisis (Nilsson, 2010), the assumption of natural 
relationships is that the firm ought to be entirely private, that is a market 
justification, rather than state-controlled (civic – wherein wider social goals 
may be prioritised).  
There are no constructs pertaining to “Social or National grouping”, or 
“Common Dignity”. 
In a similar finding to other banks, the “Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms” 
is diverse, albeit weighted toward market and civic polities.  The repertoire of 
Subjects Agents and Motives is similarly oriented toward civic entities (for 
detail see Appendix C).   
There are no constructs pertaining to “Condition of Great Person”, nor 
“Condition of Little Person”. 
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Status Relations: Following state aid concerns (Lodge, Warwick-Ching, 
Cumbo, Kelleher, 2009) there was a "commitment to the EU” to dispose of 
TSB bank.  The statements show a civic engagement with the EU albeit 
obscuring the reason for this - that the disposal plan was imposed on, rather 
than sought by, the bank. 
Decline: Complaints from customers are instances of flaws in the market polity. 
The bank claims that, excluding PPI, its reportable complaints are the lowest 
of its peers.  There is an attempt here to soften the "flaws revealed by 
evidence".  Lloyds is the bank most affected by PPI (Dunkley, 2017a) so 
excluding PPI claims as complaints distorts the picture.  In terms of total 
customers, Barclays and HSBC are much larger, so any comparison of 
complaints should be normalised (not that there is quantification in the text). 
Investment formula: "Cost leadership” and similar phrases, indicating an 
industrial polity, are mentioned repeatedly through the text, e.g. “lower 
operating costs” and ”cost to income ratio” and “£150m run rate savings” as 
success indicators (p.10).  Explicitly two polities are yoked together: “absolute 
focus on cost management [industrial] and the resilience of our income 
generation [market]” (p.10).  Risk is also present implicitly and explicitly in a 
number of places in the text.  Emphasised (p.9) is a “low risk approach”.  As 
discussed elsewhere, there is no immediate analogue in Table 1 for “risk”. 
With an aim for “c55 per cent of customer needs being met digitally” and 
“automated solutions for simpler customer transactions in nearly 70 per cent 
of branches” there is a focus on industrial efficiency.  Similarly, “halved the 
time to open a new bank account” is industrial in focus on efficiency (and has 
market customer benefits given that new banks such as Starling enable bank 
account opening in minutes remotely). 
Flaws revealed by evidence: "Increased PPI provisions (by £4.0 billion) (£2.1 
billion of which was in Q4 2015), “charges we have taken for PPI” are 
indicators of a lack of judgement: civic regulations were broken, yes, however 
even within a purely market polity PPI is invalid due to customer impairment 
and reputation damage.  Bland statements regarding “charges we have taken” 
elide the scale of costs to the bank and the censure of the (civic) regulator. 
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Impairment charges albeit decreasing (p.10) are an indicator of failures or 
shortfalls in credit risk assessment (though cannot be reduced to zero due to 
random life events affecting borrowers). Risk is characterised under the 
industrial polity.  
There are no explicit “Criticisms” constructs in the text. 
Ways of expressing judgement: "Increased net lending in key customer 
segments” (p.9) is a market justification. Similarly, “Our financial performance 
has continued to improve underlying profitability and returns” is a market 
justification 
Whilst as for other banks above, the focus on shareholders such as “increase 
the ordinary dividend and return surplus capital through a special dividend” 
can be seen as “bottom line” market polity criteria, the problematic of investors, 
particularly as found in Boltanski & Chiapello (2007), is discussed further 
below.  Relatedly civic compliance is seen as aligned to the market:  The 
directive regarding capital requirements by the FPC “supports the Group's 
expectation to be able to distribute a significant proportion of the capital it 
generates going forward”. 
“Our differentiated business model continues to provide competitive 
advantage” is a market justification. 
The deadline for PPI complains is presented as bringing “certainty” for 
customers and shareholders.  Given the extraordinary costs to Lloyds of the 
PPI debacle (Dunkley, 2017a) it is easy to see why shareholders would 
welcome certainty in an end to ever increasing liabilities.  However to bracket 
customers in the same way is puzzling - customers are either unaware of their 
potential to claim PPI (would welcome an open ended process), are aware 
and pursuing a claim (ditto), are aware and decided not to claim (agnostic), or 
have already claimed and are at the end of the claims process (no longer 
interested).  The use of customers in this construct then appears to add a 
market gloss (good for customers) to what is actually a costly process (decline 




Increasing CET1 ratio to 13% (p.10) meets civic regulatory requirements 
however also decreases risk (industrial).  
The liquidity position (risk criteria) is “strong” (p.10): £123bn liquid assets 
covers £120bn wholesale funding (borrowing). The low “credit default swap 
spread” is also a risk indicator, in this case an indicator constructed by market 
participants rather than the bank itself.  Risk indicators here (as for other texts) 
are categorised under the industrial polity.  
Delivering “sustainable growth” is an ambiguous term: in context, this is more 
likely to relate to market measures than green “sustainability” of the 
ecosystem. 
The UK's “no.1 rated banking app” (p.10) is an appeal to REPUTATIONAL 
justifications.  The net promoter score (amongst customers) has increased and 
can be seen as a compromise between market (customer satisfaction) and 
REPUTATIONAL polities. 
Credit card balances are growing at 4% compared to the market growth of 2%, 
a market justification (customers are using the service more).  The growth of 
4% in consumer debt (at high interest rates) is positive for the firm but 
somewhat at odds with “prosperous” Britain.  In 2015, wage inflation was only 
3.9% (ONS, 2016) and hence by definition for Lloyds credit card customers, 
payments on, and interest payments for, credit card purchases are higher as 
a percentage of income at the end of 2015 than they were at the start. 
Donated £17m to four charities, £1m funding for credit unions, 320,000 
colleague-volunteering hours – civic justifications.  
“Good progress on targets for gender diversity” - a civic polity focus on 
equitability.  However somewhat strangely the paragraph (p.11) turns to how 
the above equitability results in a customer-focused culture and on market 
outcomes.  This construction appears to position civic justifications as 
subordinate to market concerns. 
Time construction: The initial statements in the text celebrate the longevity of 
the firm (250 years old in that year).  It is not surprising that firms appeal to 
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longevity as symbolising success.  That longevity elides the differences in 
markets, activities, subsidiaries and personnel making up the bank. A 
perennial time construct is characterised under the domestic polity.  
Space construction; somewhat in contrast to global Barclays and HSBC the 
business model is focussed on the UK. The (relatively) local nature of this 
construct is more suggestive of a domestic polity.   
5.2.21.2 Summary of analysis of text #21 
 
As in most bank texts the justifications are weighted toward the market (16), 
followed by civic (10), industrial (6), domestic (3) and REPUTATIONAL (2), 
there are no constructs pertaining to inspired, or most notably in current 
circumstances, green polities.  
 
5.2.22 #22 Lloyds SEA “Making Britain Prosper” (Lloyds, 2016b) 
 
5.2.22.1 Justification within the text 
 
Common Superior Principle: "Prosperity" seems to be a key word (p.2).  
A somewhat ambiguous term, suggestive of wealth, however anyone could be 
viewed as "prosperous" if their needs were much less than their 
resources/capabilities.  The link between prosperity and commercial success 
is suggestive of market justifications wherein trade is not simply goods and 
services but also capital and labour.  
There are no constructs of “Common Good” in the text. 
Assumptions re Natural Relationships: "250 years’ banking experience has 
taught us that a successful society and successful banks go hand in hand – 
When Britain prospers so do we."  A construct linking the bank to the national 
(rather than global) economy is suggestive of a domestic (perennial, 
somewhat static in relations) polity.  Notably the construct of “Britain” is 
somewhat vague as Northern Ireland is encompassed within “UK”, or “Great 
Britain & Northern Ireland” but not “Britain”.  
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There are no constructs of “Social or National grouping” or “Common Dignity” 
in the text.  
In a similar finding to other banks, the “Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms” 
is diverse and somewhat weighted to civic criteria.  In contrast, the Repertoire 
of Subjects Agents and Motives is relatively limited (for detail see Appendix 
C). 
Condition of Great Person: SMEs are described as "the bedrock of the UK 
economy" (they are also an important market sector for the bank). As SMEs 
function by freely traded goods and services this is an appeal to market 
justification. 
There is no construct of “Condition of Little Person” or “Status Relations” in the 
text.  
Decline: “almost one in five people are saving nothing for their retirement. 
We’re helping by providing much needed financial education and advice” is a 
“decline” in the civic polity wherein financial security is unavailable to a 
substantial proportion of society. 
Investment formula: There is some ambiguity around aims "help 1 in 4 first-
time buyers" (p.3).  If "help" were replaced with "sell to" would practice really 
change?  A similar construct appears in "help 100,000 customers save through 
company pension schemes” (same page).  Presumably the bank's group 
pensions team already have sales targets which seem to be repurposed here 
as altruistic "helping". The discussion of "3.2 million people in the UK have low 
digital and financial capability" (p.2) is double-edged. There is the civic 
perspective wherein supporting people without such skills is empowering and 
builds agency and contribution within society, however more financially aware 
and literate people are more likely to become consumers of financial products, 
so a sceptical perspective may categorise the focus on such consumers to 
also rely on a market justification.  
There is no construct of “Flaws revealed by evidence” in the text.  
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Criticisms: "Net growth in [pensions] customers was only 6,000 [against a 
targeted 100,000]." The targets had been set on a gross rather than net basis 
and are to be adjusted. As the target was set from both a market and civic 
perspective the criticism is categorised under both polities also.  
Ways of expressing judgement: “rebuilding trust in -our Group and our sector” 
(p.2) is an appeal to civic justifications. £17m donations to charitable 
foundations similarly supports a civic polity.  
There is ambiguity (p.3) in the aim to help make “Britain’s economy more 
productive, agile and sustainable” - in particular it is far from clear that 
“sustainable” in this sense has any green connotations, the statement is better 
categorised under the industrial (efficiency) polity. 
The metrics used (p.3) to measure performance are vague - “help more 
customers get on the housing ladder” gives no sense of scale of challenge or 
scale of how many people “success” comprises.  Further, seven key areas of 
activity/aims are set out on page 3:-  
1) “We’ll help more customers get on the housing ladder – and more 
customers climb up it” – is a market polity aim 
2) “We’ll help our customers plan and save for later life”. Whilst this seems 
civic oriented in ensuring more people avoid poverty in later life there is a 
commercial market benefit also, suggesting this construct is a somewhat 
indirect compromise between civic and market polities 
3) “We’ll take a lead in financial inclusion to enable all individuals to access 
and benefit from the products and services they need to make the most of their 
money” is a similar combination of civic (developing skills to work, to make a 
living in this polity) and market polities - more financially aware customers are 
more likely to buy financial products such as pensions. 
4) “We’ll help UK business to start up, scale up, and trade internationally to 
support the long term strength of the UK economy” would appear to be a quid 
pro quo oriented to further market polity justifications. 
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5) “We’ll help businesses and individuals to succeed with expert mentoring 
and training” - it is not clear if these people being supported are existing 
customers, however existing relationships are the most likely route for such a 
process.  Oriented toward the “win-win” market polity. 
6) “We’ll be the banking Group that brings communities closer together to help 
them thrive” - this is almost impossible to understand.  Which communities, 
how? Ostensibly a civic focus on communities actually analytically opaque, 
indeed meaningless and hence not finally categorised under a specific polity.  
7) “We’ll better represent the diversity of our customer base and our 
communities at all levels of the Group” - to represent diversity is an aim 
towards equitability, a civic justification. However, the mention of “customers” 
(rather than “society”) is suggestive of a market polity also. 
Time construction: There is reference to 250 years of banking experience (p.2) 
since the bank's "foundation in the industrial revolution".  Such a call on 
“perennial” existence is suggestive of the domestic polity.  
5.2.22.2 Summary of analysis of text #22 
 
The overall justification of how the bank helps ‘prosperous’ society is 
dominated by market (9) and civic (6) concerns followed by domestic (2), 
industrial (1). There are no justifications bases on the inspired, 
REPUTATIONAL or green polities.  
 
5.2.23 #23 Standard Chartered Annual Report 2015 (Standard 
Chartered, 2016) 
 
5.2.23.1 Justification within the text 
 
Common Superior Principle: Whilst most bank texts above draw primarily 
on market justifications, this is less clear in the Standard Chartered text.  The 
bank is undergoing a “turnaround” strategy and hence whilst market 
justifications are littered throughout the text there is an almost equal focus on 
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efficiencies, cost reduction, reducing risk, and delivering to plan - industrial 
justifications.  To some extent, the tone of the text is oriented to survival, 
indeed the final sentence of the text is revealing: as “custodians of a fabulous 
franchise” [emphasis added] is suggestive that the over-riding principle is the 
continuation of the firm, beyond the tenure of the current staff/leadership team. 
Common Good: There is no construct in the text around the common good, 
the focus is largely internal or limited to the company and key stakeholders 
(subjects) such as investors, clients, and regulators (though the latter not 
notably prevalent). 
Assumptions re Natural Relationships: The use of a redundancy programme 
to reduce staff numbers is illustrative of a contingent and commodified 
approach to labour.  In this sense, labour is a freely marketed/traded/bought 
and sold commodity: the market logic applies not just externally, but also to 
the relationships between Management (as agents of Capital) and Labour. 
There is no construct of “Social or National grouping” or “Common Dignity” in 
the text.  
The Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms is varied, on balance weighted to 
market polity.  The repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives – mostly market 
oriented with some civic (regulators) (see detail in Appendix C). 
The “Condition of Great Person” seems to rest on knowledge and other market 
oriented attributes: “significant global experience and deep knowledge of our 
businesses” (new hires): “we have deep local-currency financial markets 
knowledge and capabilities”, and “strong cross border capabilities”. 
There is no construct of “The Condition of Little Person” or “Status Relations” 
in the text.  
The sole construct of “Decline” of a polity is market related: "low returning 
relationship RWAs [Risk Weighted Assets]".  
Investment formula: "There are two considerations of investment in the text.  
One is that the firm needs to create “capacity to invest” (p.3). The other is in 
the investment for the a priori “repositioning” (p.3) change programme to 
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become “leaner and more focussed” (similar themes are returned to on p.3) 
indeed the final cost is estimated as $3bn (p.4).  The focus on efficiency is an 
industrial justification.  In contrast a “comprehensive set of products which are 
directly relevant to the clients it serves” is a market construct.   A criteria of a 
“stronger and more diverse balance sheet” (p.3) relates to financial outcomes 
however the diversification is to provide for resilience and reduced risk over 
time. Hence, it appears this particular way of describing the balance sheet, 
which essentially relates to profits (market polity) is also compromising with 
the industrial polity regarding rebalancing balance sheet to reduce risk. 
Flaws revealed by evidence: “"we are not unwitting victims” and “the 
challenges we created for ourselves” (p.3) (are not specified, however later 
the possible effect of conduct fines is alluded to).  The ambiguity means that 
these phrases are not categorised to a specific polity.  
Separately it is stated that returns have been reduced by “loan impairments, 
income pressures and high expenses as a proportion of income” (p.4)" – which 
are flaws in risk (industrial), market, and efficiency (industrial) characteristics.  
Criticisms: There is an interesting construct (p.3) - "the weakness in our 
performance in 2015 is also partly the result of deliberate management 
actions", including by way of example, "up front charges of some $400million" 
(p.4).  The performance alluded to is financial, return on equity for instance. 
The problem then with market outcomes is that in some cases these need to 
be foregone, at least in part, in order to invest for the future.  Hence the concept 
in accounting and reporting of "underlying" performance which excludes one-
off items.  However, the text does not make a move to call on strong underlying 
performance hence suggests a weak performance made worse rather than an 
acceptable performance made to look weak, albeit temporarily.  The 
discussion of weak results is one of the few criticisms found in the banks' texts.  
Similar points made later on p.3 "reduced income", "upfront costs", "higher 
levels of impairment [of loans]"; also, "[CET1] suppressed by our restructuring 
initiatives" are market, market, industrial, and civic concerns respectively.  
Ways of expressing judgement: “focus on execution” concerns delivery 
against plans, which suggests an industrial polity.  The CEO (Bill Winters) 
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states he “admired Standard Chartered from the outside for years” which 
suggests he considers a strong reputation or opinion - A REPUTATIONAL 
polity criteria - to be an important criteria for the bank.  A “differentiated 
franchise” is discussed (p.3) similar to other banks - though it is not clear what 
this differentiation comprises, the differentiation would be in the ‘eye of the 
beholder’, that is, the customer so this construct is a market justification.   The 
phrase “committed to demonstrating real discipline…” (p.3, emphasis added) 
is another appeal to opinion (REPUTATIONAL).  
There are some key success measures: “8% ROE by 2018” is aimed at 
shareholders (the distinction of return on tangible equity is not made here) and 
despite the discussion below regarding investors, is allocated to a market 
justification given the “returns” aspect linking to profit.  In contrast, “CET1 of 
12.6%” (p.3) is aimed toward fulfilling civic obligations – as are “liquid asset 
ratio of 30.9% per cent and a leverage ratio of 5.5 per cent”.  Reducing risk 
features often in the text: “operational risk, conduct risk, market risk and credit 
risk […] idiosyncratic risk” (p.3) which is an industrial polity concern.  
Other criteria include “[pensions] savings of over $100million per annum”, 
“consistent coverage and risk management organisation”, both indicative of an 
industrial polity.  
The criteria of “best-in-class control and conduct capabilities” (p.5) is vague 
and to be critical to the point of being cynical, if the set of comparator banks 
includes Barclays, HSBC, RBS, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, all fined heavily 
due to conduct regulatory breaches, “best in” is meaningless.  The investment 
in this area is “up 40% year-on-year” (albeit there is no detail how this 
compares “in class” on a basis normalised to sales volumes).  A notable 
feature of banking texts is the broad range of metrics and indicators. The lack 
of comparisons to trends or to sector averages.  In these sample texts, it is not 
possible to read across the texts to compare the relative scale of investments, 
of challenges, of growth relative to sector/economies.  
Time construction: the strapline “relentless focus on execution” is suggestive 
of a perennial view of time, there is no end point envisaged and as such forms 
a domestic justification.  Similarly as found with the analysis of HSBC texts 
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above, client relationships are to be “preserved and promoted” (p.3) which is 
a construct that problematises prior constructs of market justifications relating 
to short term transactions. 
Similarly there is “no quick solution” to the performance issues at the bank 
(p.4) which again constructs the evaluation of the justifications for the bank's 
approach over the longer term." 
The “Space construction” includes China, Africa, “global experience”, 
Indonesia, [S] Korea, the reporting in US$ for a British based bank speaks to 
an international construct, or global given the role of the $ as a worldwide 
reserve currency, “Renmimbi services across the world” (p.4) – all indicating 
a market polity.  
5.2.23.2 Summary of analysis of text #23 
 
The text is somewhat weighted to market justifications (15) however with also 
a large number of industrial constructs (9).  These are followed by civic (3), 
REPUTATIONAL (2) and domestic (1).  There are no constructs for the 
inspired or green polities. The latter is particularly notable as the text analysed 
above is the same in the Annual Report and Accounts and the “sustainability” 
review texts.   
5.3 Summary of Findings Chapter 
 
The above analysis considered a number of NGO, regulatory, and banking 
texts in depth.  Within a qualitative content analysis approach, “utterances” 
were considered in relation to the orders of worth or polities (Table 1).  Whilst 
a number of assignments to polities was straightforward, a number were 
ambiguous and relied on judgement based on the context of the banking 
sector.  The following chapter uses these findings to discuss the presence and 
absence of polities in the texts and how the practices embedded in texts 
problematise or challenge aspects of the current theoretical framework of 








The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the initial findings from the qualitative 
content analysis above.   As there are many different aspects uncovered in the 
analysis, the discussion below is structured around synthesis of key themes 
identified by repeated review of the constituent findings. There are three 
sections to the chapter: one discussing the construction of social contract(s), 
followed by a section considering orders of worth and the constructs in the 
texts. The final section discusses a number of process observations: 
absence/presence of dimensions of worth characteristics, ambiguity of 
attribution, reflection on the operations required in the method and finally 
discusses an approach toward a visually accessible overview of the dominant 
polities.   
6.1.1 Contribution 
 
The analysis below contributes a richer understanding of the way in which 
stakeholders to the banking social contract develop their justifications of how 
the social contract ought to be operationalised. The results have implications 
for three areas of literature (Social Contractarianism, Pragmatic Sociology, 
and Banking & Finance), plus methodological implications.  This chapter 
discusses individual topic areas, the impact on literature is summarised in the 
subsequent chapter. 
6.2 Text constructions of social contract(s) 
 
6.2.1 Dominance of market justifications 
 
The most frequent justification regime throughout the sampled texts is that of 
the market polity.  For banks as commercial entities this finding matches 
intuitive and common sense understanding of the ways in which firms justify 
what their purposes are and how these are fulfilled.  One benefit of the visual 
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representations in Tables 11 and 12 is that it is easy to see this dominance of 
market justifications in five out of eight texts produced by regulatory actors.  
The weighting toward market justifications by regulatory actors is a surprising 
finding given the “natural” justifications for regulators may be expected to 
utilise the civic polity (though see below for consideration of the possibility of 
“regulatory capture”).  
There are a number of implications for a social contract weighted toward 
market justifications.  One implication is that the social contract so constructed 
is exclusionary, not available to some members of society that are not part of 
the financial system, the “financially excluded” (Leyshon & Thrift, 1995, 
Leyshon, French, Signoretta, 2008, Chambers, 2010).  It could be argued that 
a social contract does not have to be inclusionary (e.g. a social contract for the 
elderly). Given the pervasive and utility nature of banking as discussed above, 
it would seem appropriate to critique the construct of a social contract for the 
banking sector on market terms as being inappropriately narrow.   
Another implication, within a highly regulated sector such as banking, is the 
need for compromises with civic justifications.  Such compromise 
constructions are discussed in more detail below, however here it is worth 
reiterating the foundational nature of market and civic compromise for banks.  
Given the fragility of banks through their functions in maturity transformation, 
the presence of agreements such as the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (FSCS, 2019) serves to reassure customers regarding safety of 
deposits: a regulatory function supporting market functioning.   
One of the notable features of the texts is the relative absence of ecological or 
green considerations - as discussed below. Here it is worth noting the 
particular tensions between justifications based on green versus market 
polities.  Ever increasing profit criteria in the market polity is at odds with finite 
resources (inter alia Meadows, Meadows & Raner, 2004).  Market 
considerations are for the most part short term, at least compared to ecological 
time horizons.  Markets are nationally constructed even if the market polity has 
a more global outlook. Local rules (of origin, of safety) apply, customs checks 
operate at national borders.  In contrast, neither ecological collapse nor climate 
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change are national issues and require a globally coordinated response. 
Similar to the constraints of markets and financial inclusion above, markets 
more generally are constructed for those with liquid assets with which they 
may participate which by definition means the success criteria excludes poorer 
sections of society and elides non-human impacts e.g. on animal welfare.  
Capitalist markets commoditise nature – even to the point where some 
conservation efforts are judged on the value of “natural capital” (inter alia, 
Fuentes-George, 2013) such that “it is easier to imagine the end of the world 
than to imagine the end of capitalism”50. The tensions between the market and 
green polities are difficult to resolve, by excluding green considerations at a 
strategic level, the tensions between the polities are unlikely to be resolved in 
practice given that ecology ultimately is reality.  
In short, whilst a totally market justification (qua the philosophies of Ayn Rand) 
is not feasible, the emphasis toward market justifications means that green 
issues are less likely to be resolved and the ongoing tensions between market 
and civic justifications remain.   
 
6.2.2 Under-representation of the green polity 
 
Across the texts analysed the green polity appears under-represented.  For 
some texts, a narrow scope (e.g. consideration of branch banking in text #1) 
precludes inclusion of green concerns (albeit in that particular text there was 
“free floating” green polity related imagery). 
The BankTrack text contains the most constructs relating to the green polity.  
BankTrack is particularly concerned with financing of fossil fuels and leverages 
public relations campaigns to promote disinvestment by banks (BankTrack, 
2005).  Banks themselves (operationally) are not particularly notable direct 
polluters except for air-travel for international firms (Jeucken, 2001, Jeucken 
& Bouma, 2001). 
                                            
50 Attributed to Jameson (1994), page number unknown 
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In contrast, the regulatory and banking texts give little or no space to green 
polity concerns.  The lack of green concerns is surprising in texts that set out 
the sustainability or citizenship approach of the banks. The CEO of RBS (text 
#17) does not address green concerns at all in the initial preamble to the RBS 
Sustainability report. Whilst it should be noted that ecological concerns are 
present in the remainder of the document (and similarly for other banks), it is 
of particular relevance that the strategic communications from the banks 
ignore (deliberately or otherwise) some of the most important existential issues 
for society (IPCC, 2014, Maibach, Perkins, Francis, Myers, Engblom, Yona &  
Seitter, 2016).  Similarly, contemporaneously with text production during 2015 
the EU was actively promoting changes to how banking and finance relates to 
sustainability (European Commission, 2019).  
One of the criticisms of the concept of a social contract is the lack of third party 
enforcement (Hardin, 2014); the concept of third party enforcement is absent 
from the orders of worth framework, by definition, given the focus on 
compromise and to some extent resulting from overtones of state sanctioned 
violence in the concept of enforcement. However, there is at least implicit use 
of enforcement in the association of rules and regulations with the civic polity.  
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], pp.185-193) smuggle in enforcement 
through membership, through adherence to common will (cf the “general will 
of Rousseau), and indeed show the application of rules may, for example 
require abstraction from a domestic polity toward the civic including from 
informal (first name) relations to formalised procedures (pp.307-308). In short, 
Boltanski & Thévenot do not consider the limiting case where decline of the 
polity becomes a form of violence against justice.  In the context of the green 
polity, the lack of enforcement is felt in two ways. Firstly, the lack of 
justifications with respect to the green polities in the strategic communications 
of banks and regulators suggests, normatively, that insufficient focus, energy, 
prioritisation is given to the banking sector’s role in funding industries with 
significant negative externalities. NGOs do not have the power to be an 
“enforcer” of a social contract with respect to the green polity hence the focus 
on boycott, disinvestment campaigns, and public relations exercises in order 
to influence the strategic direction of banks through indirect means.  Secondly, 
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despite the lack of focus on green justifications, relatedly there may be two 
weak forms of enforcement relating to banks “CSR” related activities and 
reporting.  One of these is that auditor firms give at least some assurance that 
reporting of sustainability issues is representative of actual behaviour (though 
for critique see Gray, Dey, Owen, Evans & Zadek, 1997, Morimoto, Ash & 
Hope, 2005).  The other weak form of control is through compliance with 
voluntary reporting standards: generically in GRI (2019), sector related in GRI 
(2013), or in guidelines for reporting large scale lending (The Equator 
Principles Association, 2011).  These weaker forms of enforcement would be 
more effective if aligned at a strategic level with green polity justifications.  The 
lack of green polity justifications may lead to incoherent strategy execution and 
in particular to accusations of “greenwash”, see inter alia Parguel, Benoît-
Moreau & Larceneux (2011). 
“Sustainability”, depending on definitions, could be related to green 
justifications.  Throughout banks’ texts however the context and usage of the 
term is more suggestive of the continuance of the firm.  Such usage is a mild 
form of greenwash in itself given the associations with ecological sustainability: 
firms may benefit reputationally from such associations.  Whilst the discussion 
about the ineffable nature of terms such as sustainability in Ramsey (2015) is 
worthwhile, the central point Ramsey makes, of definitions not being as 
important as word use in practice, highlights further the dangers of a 
commercial definition of sustainability.  In practice, such a perspective elides 
concerns for social justice, and ecology, in favour of ongoing trading for the 
firm.  The definitions of terms set the boundaries of (to borrow terms from 
orders of worth) qualified subjects and qualified objects. Such boundaries 
prescribe and proscribe acceptable strategies toward “sustainability”.  It is 
likely that a true commitment to ecological sustainability would result in a very 
different approach to lending by the sampled banks.  
For Coulson (2009), analysing the constraints on banks with respect to inter-
firm environmental approaches, “Methodologically speaking, the act of 
governance cannot be separated from the representation” (p. 151).  For the 
above discussion then of the notable lack of representation of the green polity 
takes on more significance, the representation, or lack of green polity 
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characteristics in banking and regulatory texts is likely to result in less effective 
action toward reduced impact from banks’ activities, particularly lending.  That 
is despite social and environmental criteria being used by banks in the credit 
process - such concerns are subordinate to market outcomes.  Given the 
possibilities of highly sensitive positive feedback loops from environmental 
harm with long-term effects (p.159) it is increasingly important that a 
precautionary principle be applied by banks and that such issues are taken 
more seriously in text production/reporting more widely (Atkins & Warren, 
2018).   
Despite integrated reporting by definition requiring coverage of environmental 
issues, it is notable that van Bommell (2014, p.1174) found that green 
justifications “emerged relatively infrequently”.  The relative lack of green 
justifications echoes the findings of the current research, surprisingly even in 
the CSR/Sustainability/Citizenship texts produced by the banks. Given the 
gravity of environmental threats (IPCC 2018) this omission is not only 
surprising, the omission is part of political and business discourse that elides 
climate risks.  The lack of focus on green justifications means that there is a 
missed opportunity to change the general discourse toward addressing 
societal challenges.  
6.2.3  “The Common Good”: notable by its absence 
 
There are two usages of the term “the common good” in Boltanski & Thévenot 
(2006 [1991]): as the defining principle of specific polities, and secondly as 
overarching principle that allows compromise to develop toward a higher and 
common aim beyond specific polities. The former usage is well represented in 
texts wherein it appears in 20 out of 23 texts.  The common good discussed 
here is the second usage of the term.  Only 4 out of 23 texts (Table 9) engaged 
in an explicit manner with the concept of the common good, and then not all 
such engagement was unambiguous. The common good is a core part of the 
concept of the social contract.   
Constructions in texts characterised as “the common good” tend to be 
somewhat vague and included statements such as: “markets are for 
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"delivering for the good of society" (FCA, BoE, HM Treasury, 2015) - though 
what that "good" comprises is unclear.  The PRA stated they needed to follow 
statutory obligations “consistent with the overall health of industries whose 
firms we supervise" (PRA, 2016a, p.6) which suggests an overarching 
imperative toward market stability.  Lloyds focuses on the economic 
importance of banking for the country overall, HSBC on the broader 
implications of pollutions and hence fossil fuel investments.   
The lack of explicit constructions of “the common good” – in the second sense 
of Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) – raises questions about the utility of 
this aspect of the orders of worth from both a theoretical and methodological 
perspective. Conceptions of the common good may be immanent and 
unexpressed in particular contexts, the ambiguity of which risk that one 
metaphysical concept and intangible concept, the social contract, is 
constructed using another metaphysical and intangible concept, “the common 
good”, a risk of infinite regress.  That said, the ontological indeterminacy is 
coherent with MacIntyre (2007, p.xii, emphasis added), who contends that 
“liberal political societies are characteristically committed to denying any place 
for a determinate conception of the common good in their public discourse, let 
alone allowing that their common life should be grounded in such a 
conception”.  Further, the examples quoted above leave open three of the 
questions from Offe (2012) concerning the construction of the common good: 
who is it for (“the social referent”, p.673), by when should it be achieved (and 
for how long – “problems of temporal horizon of action”, p.675), and who 
should judge the completeness and appropriateness of the common good 
construct (the “social location of competence”, p. 679).  The final challenge 
from Offe (2012) concerns the “substantive components of the common good” 
(p.678) and here the orders of worth construct is useful given dimensions 
concerning success/investment criteria and qualified (material) objects and 
persons, for example.  In short then, the analysed texts contain limited 
engagement with the common good and when they do so theoretical concerns 
regarding the construct remain unaddressed.  
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Methodologically, limited presence of one of the dimensions of the polities 
limits the analytical power of the framework to build definitive assignments of 
texts/utterances to polities – this aspect is discussed further below. 
6.3 Practice compared to Theory (Orders of Worth)  
 
The following sections analyse the constructs found in the texts with the 
framework of orders of worth, specifically by considering investors, 
compromises, critique, time, risk, and the wide range (and large quantity) of 
qualified subjects.  
6.3.1 Investors as “Qualified Subjects” 
 
A number of analysed texts above, particularly authored by banks, feature 
investors or shareholders as “qualified subjects”, however the attribution of 
shareholders to polities within the order of worth framework is non-trivial.  The 
absence of shareholders from Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) and the 
treatment of investors/shareholders in Boltanski & Chiapello (2007, pp.365-
366 in particular) was considered above. In short, in the former investors are 
notable by their absence, and the latter excludes investors or shareholders 
from the market polity as long term (investment) relations are deemed 
irrelevant in a polity based on spot priced exchange.  Investors are excluded 
from the projective polity as shareholders are said, by acting at a distance, to 
be unconcerned with the common good of employees in shareholder-
controlled firms and hence to be unmotivated by justice in this regard.  Given 
the prevalence of shareholders as important in the banks’ texts analysed 
above, the arguments in Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) may be augmented or 
extended – or challenged.    
To sketch out the implications for orders of worth, the following discussion first 
considers the position of investors with respect to ethics and hence justice, 
initially considering MacIntyre’s trenchant critique, followed by discussion of 
some responses to this work.  Subsequently, the role of investors within the 
orders of worth is revisited.   
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MacIntyre (2015, p.7) questions narratives of lapse from virtues when financial 
crises arise. All that is required, in conventional narratives, is that 
traders/people generally better comprehend what is required to “both make 
money successfully and conform with what the virtues require”.  MacIntyre 
(2015, pp.9-10) sets out four supposed traits of good "moral character": 
realism (about oneself), courage (balance between rashness and cowardice - 
risk taking properly understood), balance between the "care and commitment 
for particular others" (p.9) and similar towards oneself, and a commitment to 
sustainability, prioritising neither short nor long term outcomes to the detriment 
of the other. In contrast with these traits, MacIntyre considers capital 
markets/forex traders as necessarily unrealistic about their own abilities (over-
confident and persuasive).  Secondly, to be poor judges of risk, over-reliant on 
others' models: "bad judgement or at least the incapacity for good judgement 
has worn the mask of mathematical sophistication […] they fail not because 
they fall short of their own professional standards, but just because and insofar 
as they meet those standards" (p.11, [edited for clarity]). Thirdly, traders are 
concerned with a narrow range of stakeholders (themselves, clients, firms, 
people they rely on) - to the potential detriment of others: "their understanding 
of the relationship of their professional actions to the common goods that they 
share with others is inevitably and radically defective" (p.11). Finally, due to 
professional and financial pressures traders focus on short-term gain: 
"Thought of and for the long term is professionally precluded" (p.11).  
From the above analysis MacIntyre (2015) concludes "were we successfully 
to impose on someone the kind of discipline that issues in the formation of 
genuine moral character, we would have disqualified that someone from 
success as a trader and, most probably from employment as a trader" (p.12).  
MacIntyre further considers that although there are differences between 
traders and other roles in the financial markets, the foundations of the markets 
are trading and hence it is "the financial sector as a whole that is from a 
Thomistic Aristotelian51 perspective a school of bad character" (p.12). 
                                            
51 The win/lose (zero sum game) of trading violates the “formal” (in contemporary terms, non-
rivalous) character of human flourishing (eudemonia).  That is, per Sison & Fontrodana (2012) 
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One challenge to MacIntyre (2015) is that in considering the financial sector to 
be in effect a homogenous superstructure on a base of capital markets trading, 
as MacIntyre does (p.12, explicitly), is a fallacy of composition (a similar 
critique may be levelled at Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007, who do not distinguish 
between types of investor).  Some traders hold investments in firms for a few 
seconds (Harford, 2012, Brogaard, Hendershott & Riordan, 2014).  Market 
makers hold investments yet are in effect fee oriented52 agents in the market 
for shares having committed to trade at published prices and hence increasing 
liquidity, and (surprisingly) can comprise the bulk of high frequency trading 
compared to a minority of “opportunistic” traders (Hagströmer & Nordén, 
2013).  Increasing use of passive funds affect principal/agent relations 
differently to active strategies (Appel, Gormley & Keim, 2016).  An important 
contribution of Rocchi & Thunder (2017), like that of Luyendijk (2015), is to 
deconstruct the heterogeneous nature of the finance/banking sector.  Rocchi 
& Thunder discuss hedgers, arbitrageurs, speculators, and within these 
groups, scalpers (very short-term holders of assets), day traders, and position 
(longer-term) investors. To this list could be added socially responsible 
investors who take a range of non-financial criteria into account (van den Brink 
& van der Woerd, 2004, Hoepner & McMillan, 2009).  Whilst singling out 
speculation as morally suspect (Rocchi & Thunder, 2017, p.93), it is far from 
clear that trades executed in a legal market between informed participants are 
necessarily immoral, especially if subject to a “no bailout with public money” 
constraint.  A flattening, homogenous view of traders and finance more 
generally limits the distinctions which may be made in analysis and may lead 
to overly general policy prescriptions. 
Whilst MacIntyre is forthright in condemnation of finance writ large as 
unethical, in contrast Rocchi & Thunder (2017, p89) argue, “there exists a 
realistic possibility of integrity and growth in moral virtue for those who work in 
the financial sector, and specifically, in financial trading”.  For the authors 
“MacIntyre’s moral indictment of financial trading is too sweeping and general 
                                            
Aquinas considers the formal/material, and actual/potential virtues (p.215) and win/lose 
trading, being rivalous is by definition a violation of “the virtues”.    
52 Where the “fee” is the bid/offer spread. Could even be described as rentier agents. 
247 
 
in scope to survive serious scrutiny” (p,90).  The authors narrowly address 
themselves to MacIntyre’s consideration of behavioural characteristics of 
traders and virtues rather than the dynamics and implications of debt.  Rocchi 
& Thunder (2017) cite Barber & Odean’s (1999) analysis of behavioural bias 
in investors as supporting MacIntyre’s characterisation of trader’s 
overconfidence.  Barber and Odean can be read as attributing over confidence 
to anyone and everyone placed in a trading situation rather than traders being 
different qua traders: “Our common psychological heritage ensures that we 
share biases […] And in our overconfidence, we act on our misguided 
convictions” (p.52, [edited for clarity]).  If a trait truly is universal, that trait could 
be judged as morally neutral.  In contrast to the findings of Barber & Odean 
(1999) regarding overconfidence, Hirsch (2018) considers that by definition 
successful traders (over the long term) must be more realistic and self-aware 
(hence fulfilling the first test of the virtues) than the caricature drawn by 
MacIntyre (2015).   
The argument of Rocchi & Thunder (2017) is that the practice of trading results 
in positive externalities (contra MacIntyre’s emphasis for practices on internal 
goods).  Further, the authors attempt to distinguish between finance for welfare 
enhancement and time shifting of consumption (e.g. mortgage to buy a home) 
in contrast to mere money-making activities for their own sake divorced from 
such projects.  This begs the question, given financialised chains of economic 
activity, how such differentiation between activities and hence judgements of 
worth could be achieved either by insiders or from an external perspective.  
The ultimate effects of apparently speculative trading and other financial 
activity may include provision of insurance (through derivatives) for projects 
that would otherwise not take place. The original use of option contracts was 
to encourage/ensure crop production nearly 2000 BCE in the Code of 
Hammurabi (Kummer & Pauletto, 2012).  Intuitively the tenuous link between, 
say, forex markets and actual international trade (the value of the former being 
circa thirty times the scale of the latter) may lead to questions of social utility 
however this “is” does not translate simply to an ought. If non-hedging trading 
were to be restricted it is far from clear what the justification for any ratio of 
financial trading value to actual goods traded value ought to be.  Ethically the 
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concern (fourth of MacIntyre’s virtues) should be with externalities however 
this begs the question about the epistemology of risk in the financial system 
and the ability of regulators to enforce real time transparency of net liabilities 
in a high-frequency trading environment. 
Hirsch (2018) makes some similar arguments to Rocchi & Thunder (2017) 
concerning the social utility of risk diversification and liquidity provision.  Hirsch 
(2018) also considers that long-term success is by definition founded on 
prudence (though does not take luck into account).  A notable point of 
departure for Hirsch (2018) is that it is unfair to apply a burden of justice toward 
the “common good” to traders given that a lack of focus on the common good 
in other commercial or public sectors.  However, “everyone else is doing it” is 
a weak defence.  What this defence does do though is illustrate how avoidance 
of discursive closure regarding how the common good is to be realised in turn 
allows the operation of the market to proceed unmolested by existential 
concerns of long-term social utility – regardless of actual utility.   
Prior research has mostly ignored (or to avoid impugning motives, missed) the 
role of investors with respect to orders of worth.  All the previous research 
analysed above, that used OOW to analyse public justifications, were 
published after Boltanski & Chiapello (2007), which is cited in only four of the 
papers.  Of these, only Nyberg & Wright (2012) and van Bommell (2014) 
discuss shareholders.  Nyberg & Wright (2012) simply analyse shareholders 
as subjects within the market polity, without further explanation and without 
reference to Boltanski & Chiapello (2007).  
Van Bommell (2014) interviews reporting managers whose broad range of 
stakeholders include investors and NGOs – one of the participants notes the 
difficulty in producing integrated reports – “how do you make integrated 
reporting relevant for a broad audience other than investors and financial 
specialists?” (p.1169). Van Bommell, commenting, notes the difficulty in 
finding a “broadly shared common goal” between the “perceived dominance 
of the financial agenda rather than a concern for sustainability” (p.1169). In the 
discussion about respondents’ views with respect to the difficulty of reconciling 
stakeholder perspectives the concern is with “private interests taking over from 
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common interests”.  Such an analysis elides the possibility of “private interests” 
combining to generate sustainable/green outcomes (private interests in grant 
income, subsidies, and in aesthetics may, for example lead to a farmer 
repurposing or rewilding land).  Later van Bommell (2014) refers to private 
arrangements as “temporary”, however it is possible that a private view of the 
common good becomes hegemonic or dominant and may not therefore be as 
fragile as the author suggests.  Market, industrial, or other polities’ criteria 
within the orders of worth framework do not in and of themselves preclude 
alignment toward a conception of the common good (indeed enduring 
compromise requires some degree of alignment). As van Bommell (2014, 
p.1170) notes the absence of direct statements of goals, aims or opinions 
especially toward the common good may be a tactic for avoiding discursive 
closure, maintaining ambiguity to allow space for (fragile) compromises to 
persist, in a way that would not be possible if ambiguity collapses to certainty 
(see also Huault & Rainelli-Weiss, 2011).  Van Bommell (2014) considers one 
of the appealing features of integrated reporting is that ambiguity may enable 
compromise justifications however if this is “pulled into a market and/or 
industrial worth” the compromise may be perceived as illegitimate. The texts 
analysed in the current research exhibit the two characteristics found in van 
Bommel (2014) of “avoiding clarification” (particularly at the level of common 
interests) and of “maintaining ambiguity” similarly.  Van Bommel (2014) does 
not directly address the exclusion by Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) of investors 
from the market (and networked or projective) polity.  By claiming (from 
evidence from participants), that investors utilise both short and long-term 
timescales the author is able (at least in part) to side-step part of the critique 
of Boltanski & Chiapello (2007), however if the approach is by design or 
omission is uncertain.  
In research on reputational (share price) impacts associated with financial 
conduct enforcement actions Armour, Mayer & Polo (2017) inadvertently shed 
unflattering light on shareholders.  When harm is to second parties (investors 
or customers that deal with the firm), there is a notable negative impact on 
share price around the event window.  If however the harm is to a third party 
(such as the state), there is no statistically significant reaction (there is a hint, 
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statistically insignificant, of “relief” at the lack of second party harm 
demonstrated by a slight increase in share values). As such investors can be 
characterised as narrowly and selfishly focussed in direct risks to franchise 
values and agnostic toward wider societal harm, which supports to some 
extent the characterisation by Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) of shareholders as 
being unconcerned (professionally, at least) with respect to broader 
conceptions of social justice (p.366).  
From the discussions above the omission of investors from Boltanski & 
Thévenot (2006[19991]), and the exclusion by Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) of 
investors from the market polity lacks warrant for two main reasons.  One is 
that the exclusion of investors, by the same logic excludes many “credence 
services” in the financial sector.  Secondly, notwithstanding centuries-old 
critique of the exploitative role of capital versus labour or the arguments from 
MacIntyre (2015) against the possibility of traders/investors as good persons, 
a descriptive framework from within which to analyse orders of worth must 
accommodate qualified persons or processes (shareholders, dividends) that 
form part of the test of situations for the participants in those situations.  The 
participants of particular concern here are the banks.   
The current study is the first53 to engage with the gap between the theory in 
Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) of investors from the market polity and the 
practice of banks54 in focussing on shareholders as qualified subjects.  As 
such, the study extends the literature regarding public justifications and orders 
of worth.  
6.3.2 Compromise Constructions 
 
The possibility and presence of compromise between polities was discussed 
above.  In contrast Boltanski & Thévenot (2006[19991]), pp.225-228) consider 
the “Monstrosity of composite setups”.  Such a monster could be in the 
inappropriate introduction of (say) industrial concepts (schedules, 
                                            
53 According to extensive searches 
54 Or other types of firm 
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stopwatches) to arranging a domestic family picnic.  Such composite 
constructions “clash” and do not lead to agreement or compromise.  
Compromise constructions arise in part because of a lack of will to “pursue to 
the end the work of going back to the principle of justice that supports […] 
arguments” (Boltanski, 2012, p.34).  Another related factor in construction of 
compromise relate to strategic ambiguity which occludes disagreements 
(Guthey & Morsing, 2014, Reinecke et al., 2017).  In the NGO documents 
above the reading of the texts suggests that compromises are not sought as 
the texts critique the tension between market forces and wider issues of 
sustainability, service to the wider community, and accountability.   
In the PRA text regarding governance (#5, above), the most notable 
compromise (in a text containing a narrow set of justifications) was between 
the domestic and the civic polities (this is also present in more limited form in 
text #4, the PRA annual report). As text #5 was discussing the governance 
function of boards of directors, hierarchical approaches from the domestic 
world strongly support the civic outcomes.  This is an example of an 
asymmetric compromise – civic outcomes would not necessarily support 
domestic evaluations to the same degree.  It may be that domestic evaluations 
can be used instrumentally in support of other polities albeit alternative 
justifications do not share the same final evaluations, which suggests there 
may be lower barriers to compromise between the domestic polity and any of 
the other polities discussed above.  A limiting factor to the dynamic of 
instrumental use of domestic justifications is that the latter polity is based on 
long standing relations, which are then in tension if placed in a dynamic and 
changeable environment.  Market relations affected family life during epochal 
shifts as the economy developed from feudalism to industrialist nature of 
production, with local contingencies affecting demography (Levine, 2013) 
through to, more recently “marketization of the self” and “indifference” of 
capital to labour’s social (family) relations (Crompton, 2002, also broad 
overview in Fine, 2012).  
In text #6 from the FCA discussing the rapidity of change, again in contrast to 
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) a compromise is present between the 
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importance of market functioning balanced against effects on or risks to 
society through bailouts. The compromise is not achieved directly in a single 
utterance such as “workers’ rights” which Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991], 
p.277) see as a direct contraction of industrial (workers) and civic (rights) 
polities.  Rather the emphasis in the text is through equal emphasis within 
paragraphs toward civic and market concerns.  There is no construct based 
on prioritisation here, both must exist and neither can be omitted, in this sense 
the compromise is foundational.  Both aspects, per Boltanski & Thévenot 
(2006 [1991], p.277) feel “familiar” – this is not apparently a “monstrous” 
composite albeit the consequences of societal risks of financial crises are now 
known all too well. 
There is a single example of compromise constructions in text #7, the FCA 
Chairman’s speech to the Trust in Banking conference.  To be the “best” 
regulated markets “in the world” leaves the investment criteria and measures 
of success underspecified. The compromise is between market success 
(indeed in a global evaluation) and the application of civic regulations. 
“Regulated markets” is a very similar construct to that discussed in Boltanski 
& Thévenot (2006 [1991], p.277) (workers’ rights) as the regulations, rules and 
policies of the civic polity are introduced are equally qualified as the 
commercial sales successes of the market.  The nature of this compromise is 
foundational to the financial sector.  Customers desire payment services and 
hence liquidity providers such as banks. Customers desire (or need) to 
manage timing differences between income and expenditure (especially in the 
housing sector) and hence require intermediaries to solve the problems of 
direct lending through market making55, maturity transformation, aggregation, 
and risk transformation (Howells & Bain, 2008, Lin, 2015).  However maturity 
transformation (long-term assets, short-term liabilities leads to fragility in 
financial intermediaries vulnerable to “bank runs” (Beck, Coyle, Dewatripont, 
Freixas & Seabright, 2010).  Bank fragility, especially of institutions deemed 
“too big to fail” raises the risk of bailouts from the public purse – hence impacts 
on civil society.  Indeed the market/civic tensions are visible in the title of the 
                                            
55 Solving the problem of “location” specifically 
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Beck et al. paper cited – “Bailing out the banks: reconciling stability [civic] and 
competition [market]” [edited for clarity].  
In text #8 (Rapidity of Change, FCA) there are a number of examples of 
compromise between market and civic polities.  The FCA is seen to have “both 
[compromise] competition [market] and more traditional [civic] regulatory 
powers” [edited for clarity, emphasis added]. As an institution then the FCA is 
a site of tension and compromise by design so it is to be expected this tension 
is apparent in FCA texts.  Another compromise discussion concerns a “level 
playing field [of civic rules and regulations]” for the fostering of competition 
[market].  This is an uncomfortable  mixing of metaphor and polities: markets, 
competition and games tend to be between two (or more) competitors however 
this both elides the presence of a third party – the customer, or society more 
generally, and downplays societal agency to influence through purchasing 
behaviour, or through democratic processes (voting for parties that promise to 
“rein in” predatory finance). This type of construct, with market concerns pre-
eminent could be suggestive of regulatory capture (Baker, 2010).  Regulatory 
capture is not explored further here as the construction of the compromise is 
of more interest in the current work, the processes leading to regulatory 
capture could be examined in future research.   
Text #9 – Second FCA Public Meeting alludes to the tension and hence 
compromise between market, civic and industrial justifications as the regulator 
requires cooperation with (for instance) data provision in order to be able to 
apply rules in an efficient manner.  The tension is apparent in the 
measurement of firms’ “satisfaction” with the performance of the regulator – a 
“two-edged sword as a metric”.  This type of compromise is present in the text 
through utterances or discussions rather than tightly bound compromise 
constructions such as “workers’ rights” as discussed previously. The 
methodological implication is that a narrow focus on semantic constructions of 
compromise would elide the presence of compromise within the situation or 
test that are indicated by utterances in texts which do not need to be closely 
situated within the text structure.  A holistic approach rather than a 
word/phrase level of analysis is vindicated by the apparent tensions and 
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compromises, explicit or implied, shown at the level of utterances and at the 
level of texts themselves.  
In Text #10 Martin Wheatley speech the fundamental tension and necessity of 
compromise between market and civic polities is starkly obvious: “ensure that 
markets work well for firms, for consumers and for the UK economy" 
(emphasis added), and, “it is not about closing down the market. We want 
credit firms to respond positively to our rules and guidance”. Similarly, there is 
an extended discussion of the consequences of reducing regulation in the area 
of “pensions freedom”. The question raised here concerns boundary 
conditions.  What if there were no regulation (pure market “laissez-faire)? 
Conversely, what if there were such stringent regulation that the market no 
longer exists? On the assumption the market currently exists because 
consumers desire the products or services in the market, the latter boundary 
would be unacceptable due to restrictions of freedom to trade and restrictions 
on utility (particularly restrictions on utility of insurance functions of banks 
through, at a minimum, safe-keeping of deposits and risk transformation 
through intermediation).  A laissez-faire approach would put consumers at risk 
by ignoring the drivers for regulation.  The main drivers are: information 
asymmetries, principal-agent issues, moral hazard, externalities/spill-over risk, 
see Brunnermeier et al., 2009, also Hanson, Kashyap & Stein, 2011 (including 
the implications of regulator indifference to capital raising/balance sheet 
shrinkage – the latter has much more impact on the economy by shrinking 
availability of credit).  By definition then the role of any regulator involves civic 
and market compromise justifications.  
The title of text #11 “Regulation - supporting vibrant markets” by Martin 
Wheatley of the FCA signals clearly the compromise inherent in the FCA’s role 
as discussed above.  Further, this is spelled out quite explicitly: “You want 
profit [market] for good firms without the envy and unrest [civic decline] that's 
created in the past”.  
The Cooperative Bank text #14 CEO review echoes the tension and 
compromises discussed in the regulatory texts above regarding civic and 
market polities. The Cooperative Bank is explicit in instrumental rather than 
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principled use of civic values in the service of market outcomes: “an effort to 
sustain our differentiation from others in the marketplace, in 2015 we took 
some key steps towards demonstrating our values and ethics in action” 
(emphasis added).  A very similar construct is found for the Coop Bank in text 
#15.  After the financial crisis and subsequent decisions regarding mergers 
and acquisitions The Cooperative Bank changed its capital and hence legal 
structure away from a cooperative organisation to a shareholder (actually, 
hedge-fund) owned firm.  The bank was fortunate in receiving dispensation to 
retain the “cooperative” moniker (Murray, 2014).  A further avenue for research 
could be to compare the constructions of the “social contract” before and after 
the ownership change.  Notably the prioritisation of market justifications is 
reversed when considering text #15 Cooperative Banks Values and Ethics 
report.  The Coop Bank is the only bank in the sample to enumerate the 
business turned away due to ethical principles: two referrals out of 304 were 
declined (compared to 4 out of 290 in the previous year).   This is not to say 
that the other banks do not have exclusion policies: they do.  However only 
the Cooperative Bank is transparent about (some of) the market implications 
from a civic stance.  
In RBS banking text there are notable although limited volume of compromise: 
text #16 (RBS annual report and accounts) contains examples of compromise: 
instrumentally between civic and market polities; between inspired and 
market, and industrial polities.  Text #17 (RBS Sustainability report, CEO 
statement) has no notable compromise constructions (similar to Barclays).  An 
emergent theme could be that the regulators, and to some extent the Co-op 
“ethical” bank, are, in their texts making the justifications of, and therefore the 
tensions between, polities more salient and more explicit.   
Compromises are notable in text #18 Fair and Effective markets review by 
their absence.  Specifically the regulatory bodies are concerned that either the 
market justifications are not working effectively in practice or that market/civic 
and other compromises are not reached.  The focus on compromise 
agreement (even if implicit in the text) speaks to the fundamental nature and 
necessity of compromise between the market polity and other polities within 
the sector.  This in turn echoes Baradaran (2013, p.1330) in a new post-crisis 
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view of the social contract of the banks.  By stating “In reviving the social 
contract, the government needs to be clear that of paramount importance in 
banking are safety and soundness, consumer protection, and access to credit” 
Baradaran  is appealing to civic and market justifications as a compromise 
construct fundamental to the role of banks.  
The frequent use of market/civic compromises has implications for regulatory 
approaches when considered in the context of the UK’s “twin peaks” approach 
to regulatory structure.  Financial stability as a public good is the remit of 
“prudential” regulation. As discussed above, whilst the FPC and PRA are 
mostly concerned with prudential regulation, the FCA is the prudential 
regulator to many smaller firms.  The foundational nature of the market/civic 
compromise in regulatory and bank texts suggests a bias toward market 
efficiency/continuation of the firm. As such the implication of the above findings 
is that regulators may need to examine further the possibility of increased 
moral hazard arising from the construction of the social contract for the banks 
being weighted toward market justifications.  Such market justifications could 
mean firms are more likely to be seen as “too big to fail” (Tett, 2012) and as 
such may take more risk as a result of implicit ‘insurance’ from regulators (and 
the Bank of England and HM Government for ‘bailouts’).  
Above, the categorization of Nyberg & Wright (2012) of the moves to reconcile 
polities, Combining, Collapsing, Coupling, Connecting (p.1830) showed a 
wider range “compromise” constructions than seen in Boltanski & Thévenot 
(2006 [1991]).  The current research has found evidence of foundational and 
instrumental compromise between the civic and market polities. Instrumental 
compromises are distinct from the Combining, Connecting, or Coupling 
categorisations in Nyberg & Wright (2012).  The example of “collapsing” as 
compromise (Nyberg & Wright, 2012, Table 4, p.1830) is similar to the 
instrumental usage found in the current research, however the definition of 
“collapsing” is more general regarding the agreement to use a particular test.  
In the Barclays texts in particular there are two forms of justification 
(compliance with regulation, monetary success).  In the instrumental form of 
compromise construction, one form of justification is explicitly used in the 
service of another “higher” worth (in this case, profit).  It could be argued the 
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example of “collapsing” in Nyberg & Wright (2012) is actually a better fit with 
an “instrumental” usage of justifications rather than “collapsing” as defined, 
which, as noted earlier, is a restatement of “ordinary” compromise in Boltanski 
& Thévenot (2006 [1991]).  The current research extends Nyberg & Wright 
(2012) to add “Instrumental” as a compromise category in addition to 
Combining, Collapsing, Coupling, Connecting, and in addition forms of such 
compromises when between market and civic polities are foundational to the 
understanding of the banking sector.  
From the above analysis compromises are fragile (Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 
[1991]) because the appeal to a common good is implicit rather than explicit.  
For Ramirez (2013) too, the mere presence of compromise objects is 
insufficient for compromise.  In the compromise situations above however the 
objects within the situation (rules, say) are not used to invoke comprise, rather 
the investment criteria, the success criteria, necessarily at a higher level of 
abstraction, are invoked as justifications for compromise.  Whilst being alert to 
the possibility of regulatory capture in which civic justifications may not be 
presented in good faith, the higher abstraction of compromises within the texts 
may allow for more stable compromises to endure by avoiding discursive 
closure (van Bommell, 2014). 
Practically, there will always be tensions between justifications of commercial 
activity and ecology.  The former relies on, and hence depletes, commodities, 
raw materials, energy sources provided by the latter.  The only actors focussed 
on ecological concerns are the NGOs and this is reflected by the presence of 
green justifications in their texts. The relative absence of green justifications 
leads to an absence of attempts to compromise with, or actual compromises 
with the other polities.  The absence of green justifications raises questions 
concerning the nature of the “common good” implicit within the texts, that such 
a construction is by definition anthropocentric and ill-suited to an appropriate 
response to global ecological challenges (Morton, 2018). 
There are two main implications from the above analysis.  The lack of 
compromise construct with the green polity follows from the absence of that 
polity as discussed above and highlights the ambiguousness nature of “the 
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common good” in the texts.  In turn, such ambiguity means that the analytic 
framework of orders of worth is somewhat incomplete.  The second implication 
is that compromise, rather than something to be sought and found as 
occasional examples in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), is foundational to 
the financial services sector and compromise is often used in an instrumental 
way.  Compromises in the texts are less comprised of qualified objects than 
recourse to investment formulae.  As such the contribution of this section is to 
alert future researchers to the foundational nature of compromise and 
therefore that research approaches should account for the a priori expectation 
of compromise, especially between market and civic polities (absent from 
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), and all polities with green justifications.  
The latter, in today’s society, may be narrowly contextual (sustainability 
reporting, reports of externalities/damage to the environment through crisis 
situations as in Patriotta et al., 2011). 
6.3.3 Presence and absence of critique 
 
The conclusion of Boltanski (2011) discussed above was that meta-reflexivity 
from spokespeople could only result in confirmation rather than critique, that 
critique would come from outside the institution which itself could not be a force 
for revolutionary change.  
In considering the texts however, it is clear that there is self-critique and indeed 
criticism present.  By way of example, the Barclays Approach document 
discusses conduct issues and the impact on stakeholder trust in the firm.  Here 
civic concerns are subordinate to market perspectives, however critique is 
present.  Similarly, RBS’s sustainability report contains self-criticism of 
restructuring costs, conduct costs (fines), and costs associated with the 
Williams & Glyn spin off. The Co-operative bank annual report and accounts 
refers to restructuring costs (though interestingly seems to frame PPI redress 
costs as coming from an exogenous event rather than a calamity of the banks’ 
own making).  
The banks’ self-criticism is a particular form of critique wherein the banks have 
(say) incurred cost, which is a violation of the market polity by reducing 
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profitability, and market competitiveness. The critique is in the abstract with no 
blame attached (certainly not to the spokesperson who is the most culpable of 
the firms’ agents in this case as either Chair of the board of directors, or CEO).  
The banks self-criticism is somewhat superficial: there is no critique of 
governance, decision-making, greed or exploitation of information 
asymmetries. The critique is aimed at effectiveness within the justificatory 
regimes assessment of effectiveness (“legacy conduct and litigation issues”, 
RBS in text #17, “conduct issues have hurt” in Barclays text #12). In this sense, 
the reflexivity is constrained to a limited form of critique that does not question 
the disputes between the polity used as justification and the range of alternate 
polities that could be brought to bear (e.g. the green polity).  The critique is not 
reflexive with respect to conceptions, however implicit, of the common good 
as articulated (by a combination of presence and absence) in the texts. In this 
sense then there is criticism present which is not the same as “critique” per 
Boltanski (2011).  Indeed as the banks are “inside” their situation their self-
criticism does not reach the level of sociological description which is “outside” 
the situation (banks’ own criticisms are therefore located in the “structure” form 
of critique in Boltanski, 2011 – see also Figure 6 below): self-criticism may be 
classified as “truth tests” (Boltanski, 2011, p.103). Such insider “truth tests” are 
coherent with the expectations discussed above of the warrant of accepting 
the texts as truthful (albeit a constructed version of “the” truth).  Annual reports 
and accounts cannot forever diverge from independent sources of information 
about a firm (for example, dividends are a form of empirical test of firm’s 
statements regarding financial reality).   
The banks’ approaches to self-criticism support the view of Boltanski (2011) 
that insiders, spokespersons for institutions are not expected to be reflexive 
and to the extent they are, will only produce a confirmatory perspective within 
the specific polity used for justification.  The implication is that the banks 
cannot be expected to be an agent for significant change: colloquially, “turkeys 
don’t vote for Christmas”, more formally, the implication from the lack of true 
critique is a continuation of the status quo. The current research acts as a way 
to open up critique by exploring the tests and justifications in the texts 
constructing the social contract for the banks. For Boltanski (2011) there are 
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two forms of critique: reformist, or more existentially, radical. In the latter case, 
the chain of exploitation explored by Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) could frame 
radical critique; in contrast, the discussion above shows that the banks’ texts 
situate critique within the reformist category. A brief overview of forms of 
critique developed by Boltanksi (2011) is included for reference as Appendix 
D.  
6.3.4 Time Construction in the market polity 
 
Previous studies have considered the “time construction” in the market polity 
to be oriented toward immediate or short-term transactions – the moments of 
product purchases (see Table 1).   There are a number of studies that 
challenge such a view and the current research both supports the challenge 
to short termism, and highlights an issue for the financial services sector.   
The discussion above of the construction of the market polity showed the 
assumption that market relations are “atemporal” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 
[1991], p.194).  The authors give reasons for avoid repeat transactions in the 
market polity view, such reasons (distinguishing from industrial polity, avoiding 
construction of a dynamic market equilibrium economic model).  However such 
rationale is insufficient in when considering the dynamic, repeat transaction 
nature of many market interactions in practice.  
Studies showing the benefits of retention predate research into pragmatic 
sociology.  Narver & Slater (1990) considered a successful business “must 
build and maintain a long-run, mutually beneficial relationship with its buyers” 
(p.21).  Zeithaml (2000, p.74) created a conceptual model used in an empirical 
study to demonstrate the effects of customer retention on profitability through, 
for instance, repeat purchases.  The conceptual model could though have 
usefully been extended to consider long-term subscription style purchases 
(e.g. life assurance, pensions) whereby customer retention is a pre-requisite 
to defray upfront costs such as sales costs (fees to advisors, sales staff, 
offices), or build capital reserves required against risk products.  A similar 
critique could be levied at Gupta & Zeithaml (2006) albeit there is more focus 
on the impact of customer retention on returns, shown to be much higher than, 
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say, reductions in acquisition costs. Eling & Kochanski (2013) do mention the 
potential adverse impact on returns if life assurance policy lapses occur before 
acquisition costs are recovered, though this is not the focus of their research.   
Whilst there is a relative lack of prior academic research in this area (despite 
being of great interest to banks as “bancassurers”) a number of practitioner 
sources cover the topic in detail such as Verma et al. (2017) which shows the 
impact of economic crises on lapse rates (which “surged” circa 20% during the 
financial crisis).  
Issues of retention for the industry go hand in hand with issues of 
comprehension for customers.  Banking products (investments, long term 
savings) are often opaque and may not be obviously good value for money or 
effective, requiring expert judgement to assess performance: such products 
and services are termed “credence services” and require more trust on behalf 
of the customer in the institution providing those services (Hoepner & Wilson, 
2012, p.427).  
In the text analysis above banks are criticised for short-termism (Move Your 
Money, 2015a), however per Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) in the market 
polity short termism is a feature, not a bug.  Other examples in banks’ texts of 
the issue of retention and longer-term “lasting” customer relations are found in 
HSBC (2016a) and Standard Chartered (2016): in the latter, client 
relationships are to be “preserved and promoted” (p.3).  The implications of 
the prior research which is made salient through the examples in banks’ texts 
is that the time construction description is Table 1 can usefully be extended to 
consider longer-term client relations.  A suggested constructed is “Short-term, 
flexibility, and retention of relationships over time”.  
6.3.5 Representations of Risk 
 
A number of texts analysed above mention risk, even “risk framework” in PRA 
(2015a).  Such representations show a gap between practice as represented 
in texts and theory – as discussed in this section, risk is not a feature of the 
orders of worth framework currently as conceived in Boltanski & Thévenot 
(2006 [1991]) or Boltanski & Chiapello (2007).  
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Risk is present in texts in a number of ways.  NGOs decry excessive risk taking 
(Move Your Money, 2015a) and appear to call for a “utility” approach to retail 
banking (Move Your Money, 2015b), also call for more understanding of 
climate risk from banking actives as well as to them (BankTrack, 2015).  Some 
representations of risk, such as cybercrime/cyber-risk are ambiguous in texts 
with respect to which polity is affected (PRA, 2016a).  Risk transformation, 
which is a core function of financial intermediaries (Lin, 2015), is present in 
regulatory texts (FCA, 2015h).  Banks discuss risk in a number of ways: 
regarding “balanced funding profile” (Barclays, 2016a), “resilience” (Co-
operative Bank, 2016a), simplification and “low risk”, Capital Ratio (CET1) – 
unclear if the latter relates to civic or industrial motivation (RBS, 2016a).  
Risk is not discussed in a substantive way in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 
[1991]) nor Boltanski & Chiapello (2007).  Risk as such is not a feature of the 
orders of worth dimensions and is not present in Table 1.  Given the gap 
between theory and practice, the question to address then is should “risk” be 
present in a sociological description of ways to reach agreement more 
generally or is the discussion of risk more localised to the financial sector.  Risk 
is a fundamental aspect of the nature of the financial sector, both as a core 
function of risk transformation (Lin, 2015) and due to risks from 
contagion/externalities (Campbell, et al., 2011).  However, in business and 
society, risk is omnipresent: for example, from food preparation/standards, 
health and safety regulations, political oppression, through to individual risk, 
such as lifetime earnings uncertainty, capital appreciation and loss, and 
idiosyncratic health risk. The “superior principle” for orders of worth may be 
assessed differently if the risks taken to reach such outcomes were known.  
market success may be regarded less favourably if huge financial risks were 
required, industrial outcomes similarly if, say, efficient supply chains  had been 
unprotected against chance disruption from weather or terrorism, say; green 
outcomes in reduction on reliance on fossil fuels for energy production may be 
invalidated if this is achieved through risky expansion of nuclear power.  Given 
the presence of risk beyond the financial sector, it would be useful to include 
risk within the orders of worth. The dimensions of worth are to an extent 
interlinked, so despite the presentation of Table 1 as “boxes” the boundaries 
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between dimensions are not well defined.  In practical terms the lack of distinct 
boundaries mean that, whilst it is reasonably uncontentious to suggest that the 
dimension for “ways of expressing judgement” includes a risk weighting or 
similar risk assessment, such judgements will also have implications for the 
“investment formula”. The assessment of risk is context dependent; Table 1 
cannot be adapted to give a normative scale of risk.  It is possible to conceive 
of the inspired polity (seldom present in the texts analysed above) as requiring 
more risk to reach a revolutionary outcome, which is the opposite of, for 
example, the industrial polity.  
Representations of risk are present in many of the texts above, but not in the 
orders of worth framework.  The gap is worth considering given risk is endemic 
in society.  From the above the practical recommendation is to extend 
considerations of “ways of expressing judgement” to consider the degree of 
risk in actions toward fulfilling the “superior principle” of the polity.  
 
6.3.6 Ontological Diffusion: heterogeneous range of qualified subjects 
 
One of the findings in the analysis of texts above is that many of the texts 
reference a broad range of subjects (economic actors) – examples are 
included in Appendix C.  The following discussion considers what implications 
there are for the dimensions of “orders of worth”, in particular “qualified 
subjects”.  
The construct of “qualified subjects” is somewhat under-examined in Boltanski 
& Thévenot (2006 [1991]), and is entirely absent in Boltanski & Chiapello 
(2007).   Qualified subjects are valid within a polity due to their “worth” set 
against the superior principle of the polity. By way of examples, a qualified 
subject in the green polity is an ecologist, within the market polity could include 
merchant, consumer, seller (see Table 1).  Qualified subjects are coherent in 
their actions with the superior principle of the polity, yet the specific 




In the banks’ texts analysed above the qualified subjects could be classified 
as external or internal to the organisation.  Employees, salespeople are 
internal, customers and regulators are external.  Customers are related to the 
market polity, regulators to the civic.  So far, so uncontentious.  However if the 
customers are considered further they have a range of characteristics that 
suggests the firm may operate differently with them.  Barclays (2016c) 
comprises 22 million retail customers, 1 million corporate customers; Co-
operative Bank (2016a) includes “vulnerable” customers.  Such varied 
subjects would be coherent with varied investment formulae, qualified objects.  
The range of subjects then suggests that even within a polity there are 
variations of proof, of relationships, and possibly of objects, space and time 
dimensions.  From a practice perspective, management would need to be 
aware of and relate to a set of dimensions for a polity that varied from one set 
of subjects to another, not unlike segmentation of the marketing mix (Jobber, 
2013).  The question remains open, however how such a diverse set of 
relations at a lower logical level of detail is reconciled with the higher levels of 
dimensions of the polity.  
The above discussion is the obverse of Patriotta et al. (2011) which raises 
concerns that too narrow a range of qualified subjects will lead to continued 
conflict or controversy.  In contrast a very broad range subjects may find 
agreement with the banks dependent on the particular nature of the relations, 
investment formulae and objects in “their” agreement, however it is less than 
clear how an ontologically diverse set of agreements coheres within a single 




6.4 Process Observations 
 
This section considers a number of observations about the process of using 
the orders of worth framework. 
6.4.1 Absence/Presence of Dimensions of Orders of Worth 
  
To evaluate the use of the orders of worth framework in textual analysis it is 
worthwhile considering if there are any noticeable features of the data 
characterisation, particular presence or absence of particular aspects of the 
orders of worth.  Tables 9 and 10 below enumerate the occurrences in the 
analysis of the codes or dimensions of the polities, based on a count of non-
null cells in the MS Access database.  Notably no aspect is “null”, all 
dimensions are represented in at least one text:- 
 
Dimension  Occurrences 
(max = 23) 
Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 23 
Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms 22 
Ways of expressing judgement 22 
Investment formula 20 
Flaws revealed by evidence 20 
Common Superior Principle 19 
Condition of Great Person 19 
Time construction 17 
Assumptions re Natural Relationships 15 
Social or National grouping 13 
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Dimension  Occurrences 
(max = 23) 
Criticisms 13 
Decline 12 
Space construction 12 
Status Relations 10 
Condition of Little Person 9 
Common Good 6 
Common Dignity 5 
Self-evaluation 2 
 
Table 9 Frequency of dimensions of OOW (source: author’s analysis) 
 
There are a number of observations to make about the relative presence of 
the characteristics of the polities.  As already noted, there is relatively little 
discussion that can be categorised under “the common good”.   The limited 
presence of this characteristic may be due to the genre (Fairclough, 2010) of 
many of the texts (corporate reporting).  Genre may also explain the relative 
lack of “criticisms” or “decline” in texts given they are (for the banks in 
particular) presenting justifications for confidence in the banks, particularly for 
shareholders, employees, and customers.  From a methodological 
perspective, there is an open question concerning how many of the polity 
characteristics are required to ensure the orders of worth framework is an 
appropriate analytic tool.  None of the prior researches above (or in Appendix 
B) appear to discuss the extent to which polity characteristics are represented 
in text, in part because the analyses in their presented form are constructed at 
the high level of polities rather than the constituent characteristics. There is no 
normative yardstick then and researchers are left (if they consider the question 
at all) with recourse to intuition and common sense: the development of a 
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normative analysis for the coverage of elements of an analytic framework is 
beyond the scope of the current research and is included as a suggestion for 
future research below.  
Further to this analysis, considering the reports themselves, it would be useful 
to understand how full, or partial, the description of the polities was within texts.  




Coverage of a dimension is shown by dark cells in the Table. 




























RBS SUST 15 15 83%
MYM 160915 14 78%
PRA ARA2015 14 78%
FCA 020615 12 67%
FCA 221015 12 67%
BARCLAYS ARA 2015 12 67%
HSBC Approach 12 67%
Lloyds ARA 2015 12 67%
Lloyds SER 12 67%
Std Chtd AR&A 12 67%
FCA 201015 11 61%
FCA 220715 2 11 61%
Coop SER 11 61%
BANKTRACK071215 10 56%
PRA CP18/15 10 56%
FCA 140715 10 56%
Coop ARA 10 56%
MYM 090115 9 50%
FCA 220715 9 50%
Barclays Approach 9 50%
BOE 2015 8 44%
HSBC15 8 44%
Dimensions count 19 6 15 13 5 22 23 19 9 10 12 20 20 13 22 2 17 12
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Table 10 shows a wide range in “completeness” with respect to the dimensions 
of polities in the analysed texts.  The RBS annual report has the most full set 
of dimensions, lacking only “common good” (in the general sense) and 
“condition of little person” (which is one of the least common constructs in the 
texts).  In contrast, the FCA/BoE/Treasury report and the HSBC Annual Report 
and Accounts texts have the least full coverage with only eight out of a possible 
nineteen aspects found in the analysis.    
6.4.2 Ambiguity of Attribution  
 
Ramirez (2013, p.854) notes that “Boltanski & Thévenot essentially use 
archetypical situations as examples, one of the problems in applying their 
theoretical framework is the difficulty of defining a real-life situation and its 
attribution to a given world of reference [polity]”.  The reasons for this difficulty 
are explored below. 
There are two forms of ambiguity noted in the sampled texts56.  Firstly, use of 
words or phrases whose meaning is inherently ambiguous and/or contested.   
For instance “sustainability” (see for example text #19 HSBC Approach): it is 
not often explicit if the term is used in an ecological sense, or in the sense of 
“continuation of the firm” (from which may be inferred continuation of margins, 
surplus, market share – indicators of “success” in the market).  Similarly 
phrases such as “financial markets work well” (Text #8, FCA) beg the 
questions – in what way, for whom, with what effects? Without primary data to 
analyse, it is difficult to assign intention to such ambiguities as potentially 
deliberately equivocal semantics or reputation management (Bull, 2008).  As 
discussed below it is by no means certain that primary data is sufficient to 
resolve the ambiguity.  Strategic Ambiguity may arise unintentionally though 
beneficially if conceptual ambiguities forestall discursive closure, which 
enables a wider set of discursive or practical responses for social actors, see 
inter alia Guthey & Morsing (2014). 
                                            
56 Linguistic ambiguities of pronouns (for example) are out with the scope of the current 
research as the current level of analysis is at the level of the “utterance” or bounded concept 
rather than at the level of singular words 
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The second form of ambiguity of attribution arises when assigning a phrase or 
theme to an “order of worth” based on Table 1. Examples include: FCA – “The 
Rapidity of Change” – the statement "the intensity and volume of regulatory 
activity over recent years is not sustainable – for regulators or for the industry" 
is superficially ambiguous: which polity is being denied here? A focus on 
disruption through frequent change may be attributable to the industrial polity 
however compliance with regulation is of the civic polity.  In this case there are 
two contextual aspects that inform the researcher attribution: firstly a local 
contextualisation regard costs/effort which relate to earnings and hence the 
market polity.  Secondly, this focus on cost is coherent with broader sectoral 
debates regarding the cost of change (Noonan, 2015) which supports this 
attribution.  In a similar manner to Ramirez (2013) the wider context is required 
to inform attribution.  The wider context is available to the actors in this case 
(the regulators) and to the researcher.  A methodological implication is that 
there is an implicit process in the current research which relies on researcher 
awareness of sectoral context.  In terms of replicating the research process 
there should be an explicit operation of contextual analysis, which echoes 
Thompson’s (2013) approach to discourse analysis and means that 
necessarily researchers must understand the sector under analysis. In turn, 
the reliance on context dependent knowledge suggests a limitation in the 
approach in that not all sectors may be assessed similarly by researchers with 
differing knowledge bases (or indeed the same sector may be analysed 
differently by more or less experienced researchers).  
Again in the same text: the judgement that financial institutions are now “safer 
and stronger” suggests a test has been applied and criteria met, however can 
be read both as supporting market and civic polity criteria.  The focus on safety 
suggests a civic polity however the context of the theme is around market 
participation, market strength and hence it is difficult to be definitive. 
In the Coop Banks CEO review (Co-operative Bank, 2016a) there is an 
ambiguity around attributing banks’ performance against “stress tests” (BoE, 
2017) to a specific polity.  The meeting of regulatory requirements could be 
attributed to civic polity, however failing stress tests also carries market risks, 
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and the focus on the skills required for deleveraging relates to the qualified 
subjects of the industrial polity.    
The above examples problematize (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2007) aspects of 
the theory – though Boltanski & Thévenot (1999, pp. 373–74) do recognise 
that situational tests may be insufficient to determine relative worth.  It is not 
immediately obvious that further empirical material acquisition such as from 
author interviews would be sufficient to resolve the ambiguity in part as post-
hoc justifications may be limited by common methods variance such as social 
desirability bias (Spector, 2006). 
6.4.3 Reflections on process of data analysis 
 
One of the potential limitations of the framework such as that in Table 1 above 
as an analytical guide is that this may constrain analysis to expected 
categories or dimensions in the text rather than being sufficiently open to novel 
constructs.  For this reason the analysis of the first text (#1) – did not use the 
MS Access database to structure the recording of analytical data, instead the 
text was simply analysed for presence of justificatory constructs.  This meant 
that each paragraph in the text was analysed in depth at a higher level (polity) 
rather than dimension initially, with subsequent drill-down to dimensions such 
as “position of little person”; additionally this encouraged quite a full narrative 
rather than the “boxes” of the database which seemed to encourage bullet 
point capture.  The pilot approach had been to scan the text multiple times for 
evidence of dimensions of the polity.   The issue with analysing the text at the 
higher level is this does not guide the analysis toward absence of dimensions 
such as the “common good”.  Hence, from the initial test of analysing text #1 
it was decided to revert to structuring the findings using the database 
categories, whilst allowing for fuller notetaking and construction of narrative 






6.4.4 Visual Overview 
 
The following Tables 11 and 12 show the presence and absence of orders of 
worth in texts.  The darker the colour the more the polity was represented in 
the text. As the text (number of words) varies from one text to another, a simple 
count would be misleading; the “heat map” of Table 11 is constructed using 
the count for each polity divided by the total instances of polities for that text.  
The operation produces an ordinal range of positive numbers (there is no base 
mean/median around which the values are distributed).  Table 11 illustrates 
the frequent use of market justifications.  The visual representation in Table 
11 shows where certain texts relied very heavily on a particular type of 
justification (e.g. HSBC AR&A #19) and where a more even distribution occurs 
(e.g. PRA #4).   
As the frequencies of polities are in a narrow range, the visual display does 
not discriminate well between the most and least present polities.  A further 
iteration (Table 12) uses the log values from Table 11, in effect exaggerating 
the differences between polities (and obscuring those with minimal presence 
in texts).  Table 12 is a much more stark representation.   
The usefulness of such a visual is context dependent: in a presentation format, 
Tables 11 and 12 are more accessible than a lengthy narrative.  In the context 
of a long form document however there is relatively limited value (in academic 
contexts a picture does not always paint a thousand words as much as raise 






Table 11  Visualisation overview of distribution of polities in texts (Source: author’s own 
analysis) 
 
Table 12 Representation of Log values view of distribution of polities (Source: author's own 
analysis)   
# Organisation Market Industrial Civic Domestic Inspired Green Fame
1 Move Your Money










12 Barclays CEO review
13 Barclays Approach (SEA) 
14 Cooperative Bank
15 Cooperative Bank Sustainability







23 Std Chartered AR&A
# Organisation Market Industrial Civic Domestic Inspired Green Fame
1 Move Your Money










12 Barclays CEO review
13 Barclays Approach (SEA) 
14 Cooperative Bank
15 Cooperative Bank Sustainability







23 Std Chartered AR&A
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The previous chapter discussed the findings from the analysis: this chapter 
concludes the study by evaluating how these findings fulfil the objectives of 
the research.  The limitations of the study are acknowledged.   This chapter 
fulfils the aim of objective RO6: Develop an overview of findings from practice 
in order to develop recommendations for further research in, and development 
of, “the social contract for the banking sector”.  
7.2 Achievement of Objectives 
 
This section considers in turn how the findings and discussion above have 
fulfilled the objectives for the study set out in Chapter 1.   
7.2.1 Analyse contemporary understanding of “banks and the social 
contract” 
 
The following section summarises the initial contextual discussion above 
regarding banks, the social contract, and the social contract for the banks. 
There are four ways in which banking institutions in particular play key roles in 
the economy and only the first two in the following could be described as 
common knowledge:  
 Banks feature in almost all transactions in a credit based economy 
(Jeucken & Bouma, 2001, p. 27).   
 Bank interest rates are an important transmission mechanism for policy 
rate changes by the central bank;  
 Credit is a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for commercial 
firms to realise profits (Bruun and Heyn-Johnsen, 2009, Keen, 2010) 
 Most “money” is created by commercial banks (Ryan-Collins et al., 
2012, McLeay et al., 2014).   
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Regulation of banks is important to financial stability and customer 
utility/protection and has undergone significant change since the “Great 
Financial Crisis” (Chennells & Wingfield, 2015).  Alessandri & Haldane (2009) 
and Baradaran (2013) focus on the inherent fragility of banks arising from the 
maturity transformation function of financial intermediaries.  Banking and credit 
creation is endogenous within a modern economy and hence its utility, and 
financial stability may be considered a “public good” (Schinasi, 2005, Griffith-
Jones, 2009 and to some extent Keen, 2010, and from a moral hazard 
perspective, Mullineux, 2011)57.   
Conceptions of the Social Contract have deep historical roots, notably through 
the works of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and latterly through Gauthier, and 
Rawls.  The characteristics of the concept of a social contract are informed by 
the contrasting “State of Nature”.  Hobbes’ perspective is one of war of all 
against all (hence, allegiance required to a strong government/monarch).  
Locke envisages a gentle pastoral scene, proceeding from which means there 
is relatively little required of a limited form of government.  Rousseau considers 
the state of nature as a paradise lost to the institutions of modernity: society is 
rescuable by way of a social contract formed voluntarily by “the general will” 
(albeit dissenters will be “forced to be free”).  Social contract theories, as 
abstract and dependent on group-oriented decision making have been 
criticised: by David Hume in the 1700s on the grounds inter alia of a-
historicism; from a libertarian perspective (Capaldi & Lloyd, 2011); as utopian 
and redundant (Frederick, 2013); unrealistic with respect to “the general will” 
(Brown & Tregidga, 2017); the difficulties associated with assigning agency to 
social constructs (Sacconi, 2006, 2007, 2012, Boullion, 2011); vague 
definitions of “the common good” (cf Friedman, 1953, Frederick, 2013); as a 
convention rather than a “contract” (Hardin, 2014); and more narrowly 
regarding Rousseau’s concepts as emanating from a hypocrite, and worse 
(McManners,1968, Hunter, 2007).  
                                            
57 N.N. Taleb is a vocal advocate for utility banking however does not seem to have 




In contrast to “classical” perceptions of a singular “social contract”, particularly 
between a sovereign or government and “the people” as described in, for 
example, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, multiple social contracts may be 
operant in society depending on historical relations (Granovetter, 1985).  The 
particular form of a social contract is dependent on conceptions of justice and 
acceptable levels of inequality (Rawls, 1971).  Whilst personal utility 
maximisation strategies may point to “success” in theoretically perfect 
markets, in scenarios that are more realistic a group or social focus is more 
successful (Gauthier, 2013). As a society, we cannot refer to a single 
homogenous social contract.    
Alessandri & Haldane (2009) and Tucker (2009) emphasise the support from 
the state for the banking sector through lender of last resort mechanisms is 
one side of the “social contract”.  The social contract for the banks (like many 
other contracts) is incomplete and constantly renewed.  Classically contracts 
are incomplete due to time variance, and incompleteness of definitions of 
scope and success criteria (e.g. Tirole, 1999).  In addition one of the findings 
in the current study, that the “common good” as a feature of a social contract 
or public justification is most often not present, or ambiguous if present, is a 
further reason why “social contracts for banks” are incomplete.  The tension 
between market concerns and civic or societal effects from moral hazard and 
the externalities from banking failures is present in Tucker (2009), Baradaran 
(2013) and Glinavos (2013).   
For the current study, the most salient aspects of the contemporary 
understanding of the “social contract with the banks” are the importance of 
banking to society, the necessarily incomplete definitions of social contracts 
given the ambiguity of “the common good”, and the tension between market 
and civic values.  The latter has analogues in the findings discussed further 
below in the frequent compromise constructions found in texts between market 




Critical analysis of the conceptual relation of public justifications to 
“the Social Contract” 
 
Public justifications have been suggested as a way that constructs of the social 
contract may be expressed (Gaus, 2013).  In the current research the 
framework of public justification types, or “orders of worth” is used as the 
analytical frame applied to texts of stakeholders to analyse the social contract 
for the banks.  Developed by Boltanski & Thévenot, further by Thévenot et al., 
then Boltanski & Chiapello, the orders of worth are archetypal justifications or 
“polity” that are present in any “test” situation where approaches need to be 
justified.  Orders of Worth are constructed toward a “common good” – at least, 
sufficiently common to allow for compromise constructions, however fragile, to 
be agreed by participants in the “test” situation.  The polities constructed as 
orders of worth are made up of dimensions that are analogous to the 
dimensions of commercial contracts.  Dimensions include aims, criteria for 
proceeding (investment), the contractees (qualified subjects), and evaluation 
processes (qualified processes, criteria for evaluation), the material objects 
are clear (qualified objects) and boundaries are set out (time and space). The 
power relations of parties are included as “condition of great/little person”.  In 
this, the orders of worth follow Rawls’ (1971) “difference principle” which allows 
for inequalities albeit if these are not injurious to the poorer/weaker party to the 
contract.  In outline then, the orders of worth are shown to be a good fit with 
the concepts of contracts and further, with the inclusion of criteria for common 
dignity and the common good, form a suitable framework to analyse the 
dimensions of social contracts.  
An issue brought into focus in the current study concerns how the polities in 
orders of worth accommodate – or otherwise – shareholders as “qualified 
subjects”.  Shareholders are absent from Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), 
and are explicitly excluded from the market and projective polities by Boltanski 
& Chiapello (2007, pp.365-366).  The orders of worth framework needs to cater 
for all the “qualified subjects” in the analysed texts as the authors of texts 
include shareholders – which means that shareholders are important in 
constructing the authors’ justifications.  One approach would be to extend the 
argument of Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) to exclude justifications based on 
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shareholders.  The argument would be that as shareholders are the “peak 
exploiters” (p.365) in a chain of exploitation, any justification based on 
shareholder requirements would be a justification based on exploitation, on a 
form of financial violence (Marazzi, 2011) and not oriented toward conceptions 
of “the common good” nor Hobbes’ injunctions toward peace.  Such an 
argument appears unsatisfactory for a number of reasons.  Firstly, that 
shareholding is ubiquitous in current capitalist economies without producing a 
Hobbesian dystopia58.  Secondly, that many workers are themselves 
shareholders in the firm within which they work, through workplace pensions. 
Thirdly, that it is in the interest of all shareholders that the firm is well run.  Even 
intraday-trading, algorithm-operated market participants are at least minimally 
exposed to the consequences of badly run firms. If dividends are anticipated, 
a positive value depends on the firm avoiding ruin.  It is possible to argue 
against capitalist ownership of the means of production a la Marx, however the 
scope of the current research is to consider existing modes of production, 
existing relations between banks, NGOs, regulators, to aspire toward 
development through better understanding of how the social contract is 
constructed within actually existing economic and regulatory relations. Finally, 
as discussed above the exclusion of investors by constructing market 
transactions as spot price activities only implies exclusion of long term, 
complex, financial products that are “credence services” also.    
The final limitation in using orders of worth to analyse the construction of public 
justifications in the texts above concerns the absence and presence of 
dimensions of the polities actually found in the texts.  There was little evidence 
of the following dimensions in the texts: Self-evaluation, Common Dignity, 
Condition of Little Person, Common Good, Space Construction, or Status 
Relations. Given the original orders of worth were constructed from analysis 
of particular texts (Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), the relative absence of 
the above dimensions raises a number of questions.  That all dimensions are 
present, in a small sample size, lends support for the constructions from 
                                            
58 The author recognises this may appear a privileged view and that exploited workers toiling 
for anonymous multinationals or layered shell corporations fictively residing in tax havens, 
would disagree.  However, whilst not being complacent, many macro indicators of human 
flourishing have improved over recent decades   
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Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]).   There is a possibility of a bias toward a 
subset of dimensions of orders of worth given the nature of the topics in the 
texts, specifically banking and finance. Other studies in other business sectors 
may find a different pattern of presence and absence of polities.  The original 
construction in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) is at a business rather than 
sector level and so variation amongst different sectors could be expected.  
That said, when actors are promoting their own organisation, a form of 
impression management (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007), the absence of 
“self-evaluation” and “condition of little person” could be anticipated.  
In short, the above discussion concludes with two recommendations: that the 
dimensions of the market polity be enhanced to cater for both shareholders 
and credence service products, and that further research be undertaken to 
better understand the relationship between business sectors and genres 
(types of texts) with the coverage of the dimensions of the orders of worth.    
7.2.2 Critical analysis of the construction of justifications produced by 
UK Banks regarding their social contract   
 
Intuitively it may be anticipated that commercial firms such as banks justify 
their approach predominantly with respect to the market polity.  For RBS and 
Barclays this bias toward market-oriented justifications extends to texts that 
are primarily concerned with justifying the banks’ approaches to sustainability 
or “citizenship”.  Only Co-operative bank and HSBC include green justifications 
to a notable degree in sustainability texts.  Whilst there is some limited 
presence of this polity in the Barclays citizenship reporting, the green polity is 
notably absent from all RBS, Lloyds, and Standard Chartered texts.  Whilst it 
is acknowledged that environmental concerns do feature more frequently in 
banking texts not analysed in the current research59, the absence of such 
topics at a strategic communication level is significant for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, strategic communication sets the priority for resource allocation and 
hence activity. Topics absent from strategic communication are likely to less 
highly prioritised and hence have reduced impact compared to a notional high 
                                            
59 For all sampled banks except Standard Chartered.    
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priority resource allocation.  Secondly, absence is suggestive of support for 
the status quo.  Such implicit support is problematic as there is ample evidence 
that status quo approaches to environmental impacts is inadequate given the 
ecological challenges faced by society (IPCC, 2018).  Absence also suggests 
a lack of accountability for social impacts and other externalities caused by the 
firm’s operations (see inter alia Gray, Owens & Adams, 1996).    
In contrast to Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), the analysis above found 
frequent instances of compromise constructions between market and civic 
polities.  The need for compromise reflects the regulatory concerns from 
societal actors.  Such concerns include: banks risk costly externalities 
Campbell et al. (2011), which may be unforeseeable (Taleb, 2012); deposit-
taking institutions are inherently fragile; information asymmetries act in both 
directions but particularly can lead to exploitation of customers by financial 
institutions, and moral hazard exists, as banks are too big or too systemically 
important to be allowed to fail. Additionally, per Hoepner & Wilson (2012), 
banks provide “credence services” with associated time lags and complex, 
opaque processes and outcomes that are difficult to assess. 
Compromise between market and civic polities appears to be foundational to 
the financial sector (and arguably, to other sectors).  Such compromises 
illustrate the depth of social contract between the banks and regulators.  The 
law-like nature of financial regulation imbues the social contract with a 
Hobbesian inevitability, however regulation is a contested space.  In some 
texts (e.g. Barclays) it appears that civic justifications are used instrumentally, 
that compliance with regulation is important not as a good in itself but in so far 
as market justifications are supported. Hence, fines for misconduct violate the 
market oriented criteria of profit as well as civic adherence to rules and 
regulations.  Fines can also damage reputation: it is somewhat notable that 
the “reputation” polity is only present in banks’ texts as some banks draw on 
awards to bolster their standing, a form of “impression management” (Merkl-
Davies & Brennan, 2007, 2011).  
Banks engage with a wide range of “qualified subjects” (see Appendix 2) which 
means that there remain open questions about how such ontological diffusion 
results in a lack of clarity of who the banks are contracting with, and how. The 
281 
 
emergent complexity is not best served by framing within a singular social 
contract for the banking sector: in future it may be best to refer to “the 
regulatory social contract”, “the customer’s social contract”, “employee’s social 
contract” and “partner firms’ social contract”.  One of the important types of 
qualified subjects for the banks are shareholders or investors.  The focus on 
shareholders is problematised in Boltanski & Chiapello (2007, pp.365-366).  
Investors are not involved in spot price exchange of goods and services (at 
least, investors are not, speculators may be much more focussed on the long 
term).  Investors are mobile and hence by definition a “threat to firms” (p.366) 
in that capital may be withdrawn from the firm.  Although authors are not 
specific in this regard the most egregious examples are through private equity 
investors (Froud & Williams, 2007).   The exclusion of investors by Boltanski 
& Chiapello (2007, pp.365-366) has not been considered in prior research 
using orders of worth: the current research problematises a gap between 
theory and practice.    
Overall the banks’ constructions of their social contract is dominated by market 
and then civic concerns (and compromises).  The distinguishing characteristic 
of banks texts, in contrast to those of regulators, is the additional emphasis on 
industrial perspectives (due to pressures on cost to income ratio).   
7.2.3 Critical analysis of the construction of justifications from the 
regulatory agencies regarding the social contract of the banking 
sector 
 
Given the law-like nature of regulations (Glinavos, 2013), and the associations 
of law and regulation with the civic polity, the notable finding from the above 
analysis is the dominance of market justifications in regulatory texts.  There 
are a number of possible reasons for this. One is, as the discussion of 
compromise constructions has shown, that the compromise between market 
and civic worlds is foundational to the financial sector in general and banking 
in particular. Consider boundary conditions: no regulation at all would result in 
risks from externalities, asymmetric information and moral hazard and would 
likely cause harm to consumers.  The opposing boundary condition is where 
regulations are so onerous or expensive as to render a market unviable, which 
means that consumers are denied safe deposit functions as well as denied 
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access to liquid debt markets such as mortgages. A non-functioning market 
would look like the financial system as Lehman Brothers collapsed in October 
2008 – the availability of credit would be severely restricted with consequences 
beyond the financial sector.     
The concept of a foundational compromise between the justifications of the 
market and the civic worlds is not the same as “regulatory capture”.   
Regulatory capture occurs when regulators are biased towards firms rather 
than consumers or other stakeholders, resulting in inequitable relations 
between capital and labour.  Prior work on financial regulatory capture (Baxter, 
2011) considered the concept to be “seductive” yet “difficult to define” (and a 
“matter of degree”) (p.176).  The contention of the current research is that 
compromise between market and civic polities is foundational and as such 
exists independently of the degree of regulatory capture in the banking sector.  
The foundational nature of the compromise between market and civic polities 
means that one justification cannot hold without the other.  In contrast, 
Glinavos (2013, p.63) considers that state intervention (regulation) should be 
judged “independent of economic efficiency” as the intervention is intended to 
deliver public or “social needs”.  However, to ignore or remove all market (or 
industrial) justifications begs the question(s) around the nature of provision of 
financial services including possible nationalisation (to remove the profit 
motive).  It is difficult to define in advance what the normative balance should 
be between market and civic polities.  Glinavos’ (2013) focus on following the 
“popular will” (pp.62-63) (cf Rousseau and the “general will”) is appropriate 
(the author calls for increased democratic oversight of financial markets).  
What is clear is that a foundational compromise or tension between polities is 
ever present, which means that policy and future research should 
acknowledge and be framed within such a paradigm.  
The near absence of green justifications in banking texts is noted above, 
similarly there is a notable and indeed complete absence of green justifications 
within the regulatory texts.  There are a number of questions that arise given 
the lack of ecological aims, subjects and objects within the regulatory texts.  
Firstly, we can ask how important it is that the strategic texts from regulators 
take into account broader concerns.  With apologies to Primo Levi, if not them, 
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who?60 Such concerns echo Hardin’s (2014) critique of the metaphor of a 
social contract – it is not clear which agency is out with the contracting parties 
and hence the ultimate arbiter of contractual dispute.  Regulators could 
consider ecological issues within the sector.  Whilst banks in their own 
operations are not significant polluters, there are a number of concerns 
regarding the links between finance and environmental outcomes. Scholtens 
(2006) is concerned that environmental externalities are not captured by the 
cost of finance, that third party ownership of production (shareholders, lenders) 
reduces demand for sustainability best practice (market versus green 
justifications) and that innovative “green” projects experience financial 
exclusion (loans, insurance).  Banks may find they own polluting assets that 
were pledged as collateral to loans.  As such, it is notable that some 
jurisdictions actively exempt banks’ management from responsibility for 
externalities from such assets: CERCLA (the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act) in the U.S. specifically exempts 
financial institutions for clean-up responsibilities and costs of sites which they 
fund, as long as the lender does not actively participate in the management of 
the site.  
The lack of green justifications in the regulatory texts suggests a policy gap 
between Britain’s commitment to a range of environmental goals (Department 
for Environment Food & Rural Affairs, 2019) and the active promotion and 
policing of lending practices in line with those goals.  
7.2.4 Critical analysis of the construction of justifications from Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs) regarding the social contract 
of the banking sector 
 
For NGOs, civic justifications dominate in promotion of the civic good, 
compliance with regulation and law.  Whilst market justifications are frequently 
invoked this tends to be for the purposes of critique and contrast to alternative 
polities.  In contrast to banks and regulators, green justifications are present.   
                                            
60 Primo Levi (1985) “If not now, when”  
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NGO texts comprise a form of test whereby justifications are in the public realm 
and may be accepted or rejected and as such are a form of procedural 
normativity (Boltanski, 2011).  A narrow form of critique falls short of a meta-
critique that could extent to include concerns over infinite growth within a finite 
ecosystem (inter alia Meadows et al., 2004). 
The implications of differences in justifications between NGOs and banks, and 
regulators, and banks and regulators fall into two categories.  Firstly that the 
critique of market polities from a civic perspective, echoing perspectives from 
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) suggests that compromise between the 
current constructs of civic and market polities in banking and NGO texts cannot 
easily be reached.  Secondly, the banks’ relatively narrow conception of the 
social contract does not cater for green justifications in the NGO texts.  In the 
absence of compromise, a social contract between the NGOs and banks 
around expectations of banking is unachievable. If NGOs such as BankTrack 
have a meaningful and useful perspective, the implication for banks is to 
consider further the range of justifications and understand, and act on, the 
increasing importance of ecological concerns.  Whilst banks’ activities are to 
some extent guided by, for example, the Equator Principles with respect to the 
environmental impacts of (large scale) lending, the absence of such 
justifications at the highest level of strategic communication is significant and 
the NGO construction of texts, of the social contract, could be a catalyst for a 
strategic commitment from the banks.   
 
7.3 Achievement of overall aim 
 
The overall aim of the research has been to explore public justifications of “the 
social contract for the UK banks”.  Exploration is a suitable approach given the 
ambiguous and even contested ontological and epistemological nature of “the 
social contract”.    
As exploratory work, the current research is intended as an initial analysis of 
an under-examined topic.  In exploring moral claims that are made public and 
hence available to “test”, the current research enables a sociological 
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perspective on the constructs within actors’ justifications (texts).  The 
exploration has shown the utility of the orders of worth framework and 
suggested potential improvements, in particular with respect to considering 
products that are credence services, as well as considering the role of 
shareholders.  The use of an a priori framework allows for a systematic data 
gathering and comparative analysis.  Applying a framework to a context 
constrains what can be said about that context - the frame brings its own 
limitations.  At first sight the orders of worth framework is largely descriptive, 
however the discussion of Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) in particular has shown 
the construct of some of the polities include ideological (normative) 
judgements regarding shareholder capitalism.  
The ontological and hence epistemological ambiguities of the social contract 
motivate the current study, yet the ambiguities remain.  It may be ambiguity 
will always be present for a multi-faceted dynamic social construct.  A useful 
avenue of future research could be to examine the implications of replacing 
vague terms such as the common good (a more positive and substantive label 
than is warranted) with conceptions from Hobbes’ first law of nature: to seek 
peace, to “do no harm”.  Having begun with, and appreciating, Rousseau’s 
dynamic, contestable form of a democratic social contract, somewhat 
surprisingly the final word goes to Hobbes (2013 [1651], chapter XIV), "Do not 




The following section considers the findings with respect to the main 
conceptual topics considered thus far: Social Contractarianism, Pragmatic 
Sociology, and Banking & Finance.  Additionally the methodological 
implications of the research are discussed.  
                                            
61 Labelled “The Silver rule” (as opposed to the Golden Rule) in, for instance, Taleb (2018) 
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7.4.1 Social Contractarianism Implications 
 
“A” singular, generalised social contract is unrealisable: multiple, contingent 
and compromising articulations of social contracts are present in texts – similar 
to arguments in Donaldson & Dunfee (1994), Dromi & Illouz (2010), and 
Boltanski (2011).  Discursive constructions of singular views of social contracts 
are open to critique from alternative polities and cannot encompass the range 
of qualified subjects and objects used to construct a coherent justification.  The 
current research then reinforces perspectives calling for contingent 
constructions of social contracts rather than a totalising single contract – this 
is in contrast to the traditional constructions seen in, say, Hobbes and 
Rousseau and more recently such as in Rawls (1971).  
One of the features of social contracts is the qualified subjects “party to” the 
contract. Notably there is a diverse range of qualified subjects discussed in 
texts (see Appendix C).  Ontological diversity is problematic for understanding 
the construction of “a” social contract for the banks and such difficulty from 
diversity and hence in prioritisation is reminiscent of some of the more 
trenchant critique of stakeholder theory.  A consideration for future research is 
how the “ontological diffusion” present in justificatory texts produced by banks 
may further be operationalised: is there really a social contract for the bank, or 
multiple social contracts with respect to (say), investment clients and for retail 
clients and for regulators and for local, branch-serviced communities? A 
further research question could be to understand how executive managers 
conceive of and operationalise such micro social contracts and broad 
statements toward mission/vision and values of the corporate entity: further, 
how such perspectives through an orders of worth “lens” relate to stakeholder 




7.4.2 Pragmatic Sociology Implications 
 
Given the metaphysical nature of a socially constructed “social contract”, the 
current research usefully sets out and uses an approach to empirical analysis 
of justifications of the social contract.  There are limits to the approach, notably 
that tests or justifications are operant only in the absence of violence (orders 
of worth do not comprise a sociology of everything) and that there is a 
normative aspect to the orders of worth framework that problematises one of 
the dominant corporate organisational forms from the framework (shareholder 
controlled firms).   
That the market order of worth is dominant would not be surprising if confined 
to banking texts, however this polity is also dominant in the construction of 
regulatory texts, which is a surprising result for civic institutions.  
NGOs texts show a broader range of justifications and NGOs feature green 
justifications – such approaches are notably absent or most often minimally 
represented in other actors’ texts, even within Social & Environmental 
Accounts.  
The current research demonstrates that the orders of worth framework, with 
roots in pragmatic sociology, is a useful framework for analysing conceptions 
of social contract(s).  Whilst claims to “generalisability” are avoided in the 
(weakly) constructivist research paradigm the current research has 
methodological applicability beyond the banking sector. As such, the work 
supports the development and enhancement of the theoretical base of 
pragmatic sociology: there are both findings that support and challenge the 
literature, and pointers to future research questions raised by gaps or tensions 
between theory and practice.  
Per Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), compromise constructions are 
commonplace though there are two differences found compared to their 
seminal work.  Firstly, that there are many compromises between civic and 
market polities in contrast to Boltanski & Thévenot who did not find, or 
therefore consider further, the construction of such.  Secondly, that a variant 
on compromise is constructed, wherein polities are instrumentally promoted in 
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the service of a dominant polity – for instance, civic (compliance with 
regulations) as a way to protect financial performance – a market justification: 
means rather than ends.  Above, the categorization of Nyberg & Wright (2012) 
of the moves to reconcile polities: Combining, Collapsing, Coupling, 
Connecting (p.1830) showed a wider range “compromise” constructions than 
seen in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]).  In the instrumental form of 
compromise construction, one form of justification is explicitly used in the 
service of another “higher” worth (in this case, profit).   The current research 
then extends Nyberg & Wright (2012) to add Instrumental as a compromise 
category in addition to Combining, Collapsing, Coupling, and Connecting.  
Future research could be framed with expectations of a broader range of 
compromise than in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) or Boltanski & 
Chiapello (2007).   
The findings that banks in particular construct their justifications around 
shareholders highlights a gap between theory and practice – the current study 
is the first to engage with the implications of Boltanski & Chiapello (2007). The 
orders of worth as originally constructed explicitly exclude shareholder firms 
as not being oriented toward justice, toward a common humanity.  The 
discussion by Boltanski & Chiapello treats shareholders as homogeneous, 
which seems a limited basis from which to judge the motives or justice 
orientations of widely differing groups of economic agents. The current 
research then problematises current theoretical boundaries concerning 
investors in a way not found in the current literature (cf Alvesson & Kärreman, 
2007) and calls for further theorisation and empirical research on this topic.  
In a similar vein, the findings above raise questions about the 
operationalisation of the “common good” in texts.  The “common good” is 
present in two forms: firstly as the superior principle relating to a specific polity 
as in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]), secondly as a more general principle 
under which compromises may be formed (pp.278+) – this latter conception is 
the usage here.  Table 9 above shows only 6 out of 23 texts engaged in an 
explicitly with the concept of the common good, and then not all such 
engagement was unambiguous.  The lack of explicit constructions of “the 
common good” raises questions about the utility of this aspect of the orders of 
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worth – that this aspect is immanent and unexpressed in contexts.  
Ontologically there is a risk that one metaphysical concept, the social contract, 
is replaced with another metaphysical and intangible concept, “the common 
good”.  That said, the ontological indeterminacy is coherent with MacIntyre 
(2007, p.xii, emphasis added), who contends that “liberal political societies are 
characteristically committed to denying any place for a determinate conception 
of the common good in their public discourse, let alone allowing that their 
common life should be grounded in such a conception”. 
There is no readily available analogue for “risk” within the orders of worth, 
however risk is an essential characteristic of financial instruments. Within the 
banking sector the Independent Commission on Banking (2011) and 
subsequently Tyrie et al. (2013) called for reduced risk through “ring-fencing” 
banking activities and increasing capital held against potential depreciation of 
assets. Reducing risk of bailouts of banks by the taxpayer is a theme running 
through the regulatory response to the crisis.  Risk appears in the sample texts 
above with respect to risk appetite of firms, risk control/risk officers, risk 
culture, risks from “speculative lending”, and risks of climate change.   The 
consideration of risk in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) comprises the risks 
of new novel activities in the inspired polity (p.161), of excess bureaucracy in 
industrial/civic compromise, risk of seeking  glory (hence being “inauthentic”) 
in critique from the inspired world (p.282), the risk of betraying anger rather 
than reaching agreement (p.350), risk of lack of ontological agreement (p.351), 
and risk of being seen to abuse power if a judgement is seen as not time bound 
or time context specific (p.354).  Similarly, in Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) risks 
are for capitalism due to inequality (p.511) – which stretches the evaluation of 
great and little “person” to breaking point, the risk of an “opportunistic profit-
taking by a wage earner” (breaking the bonds of the projective networked 
polity) (p.389), the importance of reporting healthy profitability to deter 
takeovers (p.407) – in effect promoting the benefits of the status quo; the risk 
to individuals in not sufficiently portable skills for the projective world (p.370).  
Risk was not a part of the public justifications analysed in prior research using 
the orders of worth framework.  In the analysis above, there is no “risk 
weighted returns” equivalent in the market polity.  It may be that the “forms of 
relevant proof” (Table 1) could be amenable to development of risk weightings 
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or risk adjustments.  Such an approach would be familiar to the world of 
banking and finance from a market perspective; such a concept is not 
immediately applicable in the other polities.  In the green polity, a high-risk 
justification would violate the test of “sustainability”.   From the above the 
current research finds a gap between practice and theory.  Practice includes 
a risk orientation or dimension in public justifications.  In theory, risk has limited 
salience or a different meaning. The finding directs attention to future research 
questions regarding how a risk based approach affects the test criteria and 
other dimensions of the orders of worth approach.  
A notable feature of some of the banks’ texts is the focus on longer-term client 
relations. Such constructs are antithetical to the original construct for “time 
construction” in Table 1.  As discussed above, the findings can usefully be 
positioned with respect to general marketing literature such as Zeithaml (2000) 
and with respect to practitioner literature such as Verma et al. (2017). Retained 
clients may increase the number of purchases but most importantly in a 
financial sector context, policy persistence is necessary to defray acquisition 
costs (Gupta & Zeithaml, 2006).  The findings problematise prior constructions 
of “time construction” for the market polity (a suggested alternative is include 
in the above discussion).  
7.4.3 Banking and Finance Implications 
 
The justifications produced by the banks are weighted toward market 
justifications.  Such findings support a common sense or intuitive view of 
industry: there is some value in the confirmation of such a view through an 
analytical framework. Further, the correspondence between a common sense 
view and the results of the formal analysis support the appropriateness of the 
framework which is being used with respect of the banking sector for the first 
time.  
An orientation toward market functioning in the regulatory texts could be seen 
as “regulatory capture” (inter alia Barth, Caprio & Levine, 2008).  The primacy 
of market functioning seems more fundamental than the concept of regulatory 
capture however as the latter concept is suggestive of a fall from grace, that 
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there was some putative time without regulatory capture. There is no evidence 
that such a state existed.  Without considering a full analysis of the historical 
relations between regulators and the regulated, two examples are illustrative: 
in the Financial Services and Markets Act (2000), it is meaningful that the role 
of the regulator has as the initial aim, smooth functioning of the market.  
Secondly, restricted competition was intended to avoid a “reach for yield” as 
reduced franchise values induced moves to riskier assets and at the same 
time favoured oligopolistic incumbents, and markets have consolidated further 
after the financial crisis (Mullineux, 2011, 2014).  The foundational 
compromise between market and civic polities will persist in future regardless 
of specific institutional forms and relationships.  
The current research has identified a process of “ontological diffusion” in the 
construct of banks’ social contract(s) for the first time. That is, the constructs 
of the social contract for the banks often feature a large and heterogeneous 
set of “qualified subjects”.  The number of subjects raises a question regarding 
the coherence of a single polity from the perspective of so many stakeholders.  
A wide range of stakeholders raises coordination costs, so ontological 
diffusion may be associated with reduced accountability for institutions such 
as banks.  In a similar vein, Patriotta et al. (2011) are concerned that a firm 
avoiding ontological diffusion by narrowing the range of qualified subjects may 
result in weak grounds for justification: “Discursive strategies aimed at 
maintaining a controversy within a purely technical arena or in a domain 
related to the organization’s core business may appear to be safe options, yet 
they may fail to restore legitimacy when the heterogeneity of organizations 
involved in a controversy is high” (p.1832).  The managerial and regulatory 
implications arising from the ontologically diffuse constructs in banking 
justifications could form a useful avenue for future research, the start point for 
which could comprise how segmentation of the marketing mix (Jobber, 2013) 
is reconciled with superior principles and constructions of the “common good” 
for the polity.  
Discussed above, banking and finance research journals contain limited to 
almost nil discussion of matters beyond market and technical efficiencies and 
outcomes.    By using a hermeneutical approach reliant on an understanding 
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of the banking sector, the current study adds to knowledge regarding the 
relationship between banks and stakeholders, and other agents/agencies and 
bank stakeholders, and may help promote greater breadth of research 
questions as well as methodological diversity.  
Earlier, Boltanski (2011, pp.95-96) was seen to consider the use of “the 
common good” as a generalising trope which elides the particular effects of 
institutional behaviour on actors. The common good can be used as a 
“pacifying” move semantically and can be part of a process of abstraction away 
from personal accountability to corporate behaviour “out there”.  As such, it is 
interesting to note the lack of engagement with the generalised “common 
good” in any way explicitly in the banking texts.  One explanation is that the 
banks see the market justification as synonymous with the “common good”, at 
least for their stakeholders, who are the only people that are worthy of 
consideration - such a perspective echoes the initial usage of common good 
in Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]). The definition of the common good 
(explicitly or implicitly, through valorisation of salient stakeholders, or objects, 
or processes) becomes then a rhetorical device to define “reality”, and 
simultaneously a challenge to another’s “reality” (Boltanski, 2011, p.97).  The 
common good then in Boltanskian terms is a “horizon of pacification without 
residues” (p.95) however through the tension between the need for 
generalisation, and the limited scope of conceptions of the common good, the 
dispute(s) between the NGOs on one hand and the banks on the another 
cannot be resolved.   
The above analysis suggests the need to examine attribution of the term 
“social contract”.  If a “common good” is in practice determined with respect to 
a narrow section of society then the term “common” is a misnomer.  Groups, 
institutions or individuals professing to promote the common good, ought to be 
interrogated with respect to definitions of who, and what, are contained in the 
set of “common” qualified subjects and objects (see also Offe, 2012).  A 
contribution of the current research in this regard is to problematise the lack of 
agreement or even explicit discussion of “the common good” and to point to 
further research with banking stakeholders regarding their conceptions of the 
common good – and how truly “common” this is.   
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Perhaps the most alarming finding, and one that warrants further, urgent 
investigation, is that at the strategic level of public justifications few banks and 
none of the regulators construct their social contracts in relation to ecological 
criteria.  Given the urgency of actions to ameliorate the effects of climate 
change (IPCC, 2018) and the role of the banking and financial sectors in 
supporting fossil fuel sectors a positive rather than normative approach to 
research questions in this area may be untenable.  London has outsized 
influence on capital markets and a significant number of global, systemically 
important banks are under the purview of the PRA.  It could be argued the key 
future research question arising from the current research is in respect of the 
nature and scale of regulatory and commercial change required to support 
achievement of (de minimus) the Paris Climate Agreement goals (Rogelj et 
al., 2016).  Such questions ought to be of concern to banks given risks to 
investment projects from climate change (Nieto, 2019) and the possibility of 
green “supporting” or “brown” penalty in risk weighting of assets by European 
regulators (Thomä & Gibhardt, 2019)62. 
There are a range of perspectives considered above, from banks, regulators 
and NGOs, and the difficulty in developing singular social contract for the 
banks has been observed. The difficulty arises from potentially 
incommensurable perspectives such as the clash between a strongly green 
justification and a market justification, and more simply from current 
conceptions of the social contract as expressed in public justifications.  The 
difficult in answering an overarching question such as what “is” the social 
contract for the banks, is illustrated by the Venn diagram, Figure 5, 
representing the gap or “empty set” between the parties to the social contract 
for the banks: 
                                            





Figure 5: incommensurability of public justifications (Source, author's own) 
Figure 5 is derived as a high level summary of the findings chapter above: the 
“empty set” represents the overarching lack of agreement between the three 
parties to the social contract for the banks.  A singular, social contract cannot 
simply be “read off” texts due to the range of justifications (polities) and the 
range of qualified subjects: the social contract for the banks is constructed, 
dynamic and contested.  The foundational market/civic compromise leads to 
government agencies’ support for markets (Alessandri & Haldane, 2009, 
Tucker, 2009, Baradaran, 2013); the lack of “green” justifications from 
regulators and most banks not only does not meet NGO concerns but also 
fails to meet the challenges of our times; regulations narrowly conceived as 
compromise with market justifications fail to address wider calls for social 
justice (Glinavos, 2013).  Given the damaged reputation of the banking sector 
after the financial crisis and subsequent scandals it is important that trust is 
restored in the banking sector, which means that the banks and regulators 
need to give more attention to societal demands for social justice, including 
ecological concerns, within a framework of a “social contract for the banks”.  
There are many theoretical perspectives that could be taken in considering the 
banks’ and society: CSR, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, shareholder 
value maximisation, actor-network theory, feminist theory (meso or micro 
levels), corporate reputation, image management, resource dependence, 
system theory to name a few.  The start point for the current research is the 
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call for a new social contract for the banks (Tucker, 2009): one of the findings 
for banking and finance is that the social contract, especially as justified by 
regulators and banks themselves, is too narrowly drawn – an alternative 
theoretical lens would doubtless shed different light on the relationships 
between actors in the banking sector.  Banks and regulators, in the sampled 
text, do not engage sufficiently with, much less compromise (in orders of worth 
terms) with the green polity.  Given the foundational nature of the compromise 
between market and civic justifications more consideration is required of the 
potential conflict of interest for a regulator that may be required to hinder the 
efficient operation of the market by penalising a firm for conduct or other 
regulatory breach.  In short banks and regulators need to draw on a more 
holistic conception of a social contract, and regulators need to critically 
examine the Janus like position they occupy as justifiers of market and civic 
perspectives in the light of the instrumental use of civic means of justification 
toward market ends.  
 
7.4.4 Methodological Implications 
 
Ontologically, a social contract is immanent, constructed, and contingent and 
hence impossible to measure directly. The current research addresses the 
difficulty of analysis by considering texts as epistemologically and axiologically 
meaningful representations of how firms and institutions conceptualise the 
(their) social contract. Using the orders of worth framework in a qualitative 
content analysis provides a structured approach to analyse the dimensions of 
orders worth in texts and analyse coherent or antagonist elements. The current 
research provides support for such an approach as producing trustworthy 
results.  The study also challenges some aspects of the orders of worth 
framework, for instance that shareholders are not included as discussed 
above, and also that analysis showed (Tables 9 & 10) that not all texts had 
equal coverage of the dimensions of the polity.  Some texts such as HSBC 
Annual Report and Accounts contained less than half of the dimensions of the 
polities.  Such texts provide weaker alignment between texts and polities 
assigned.  Whilst the current work is the first to utilise the orders of worth 
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framework in the banking sector, prior research shows the applicability of the 
framework to other contexts of public justification.  As such, the current 
research comprises an initial attempt to develop the data analysis method 
herein as an approach to understanding constructs of social contracts and the 
dimensions of orders of worth beyond the banking sector.  
One of the methodological observations is the influence of domain knowledge. 
A naïve content analysis (counting words/concepts) would not allow for the 
relations between orders of worth to be understood. In particular, where civic 
(regulatory) justifications are used instrumentally in the service of market aims, 
an understanding of the nature and context of regulations is required.  In short, 
the current research demonstrates that domain specific knowledge is a 
prerequisite for the qualitative researcher.  
In ensuring that analysis of texts using orders of worth is trustworthy it is 
notable that some text constructions are difficult to assign simply to one polity 
or another, or one dimension of a polity, though such difficulties of attribution 
may signal a challenge to the current bounds of theory (Ramirez, 2013).  By 
using human coding rather than software (see Alceste software approach 
above) compromise constructions were more readily observed, notably the 
above analysis found compromise between market and civic worlds to be 
foundational – in contrast to Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) wherein this 
compromise is notable by its absence.  The “foundational” nature of this 
compromise extends the discussion in Nyberg & Wright (2012).     
There are three specific ways in which the orders of framework proved limited 
when attempting to analyse the social contract through justifications in texts 
relating to the banking or financial sector.  Firstly, articulation of the “common 
good” is absent from many of the texts analysed.  This absence is problematic 
as the orders of worth are oriented toward sense of justice broadly understood.  
Justice solely for one stakeholder set at the expense of other stakeholders is 
no justice at all when considered in terms of the “common good”. The lack of 
definition of the common good is also prevalent not only in the texts analysed, 
but also in prior research and is used in two contrasting forms in Boltanski & 
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Thévenot (2006 [1991])63.  If the common good is ill defined and even 
contingent rather than universal then the concept seems to have little 
analytical power or utility.  The lack of positive definition may be that positive 
universals are difficult to agree.  In contrast, Narveson (2013) takes as the 
guiding pole for the social contract Hobbes “First Law of Nature” which could 
be paraphrased in Hippocratic terms as “first, do no harm”.  For Hobbes, and 
later in Boltanski & Chiapello (2007) the exploitation of others is disavowed – 
for Hobbes exploitation is a form of warfare, in Boltanski & Chiapello a form of 
violence.   The problematic of “the common good” in the orders of worth 
framework is much reduced if the concept is replaced with a form of Hobbes’ 
first law: “seek peace” (Narveson, 2013)64. 
The current research is the first to demonstrate that orders of worth, as 
normatively constructed cannot account for actually existing shareholder firms 
(by absence in Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 [1991], and explicitly in Boltanski 
& Chiapello, 2007, pp.365-366).  It is worth considering if the absence of such 
a result previously was by chance, by omission, or that the scope of prior 
research meant there was no focus on shareholders. A review of titles and 
abstracts of prior research discussed above suggests that none of the prior 
research was concerned with justifications aimed at shareholders, most often 
as the actors were not listed firms.  Where there was the potential for the issue 
of shareholders as legitimate stakeholders in, for example, Patriotta et al. 
(2011) the focus was on communication aimed toward a broad range of 
stakeholders.  Nyberg & Wright (2012) allocated shareholders as qualified 
subjects to the market polity, however such allocation is directly contra the 
perspectives in Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007, pp.365-366) and is not justified in 
the authors’ research as presented.  The current research finds the framework 
of orders of worth limited, and points the way to future research to consider if, 
and if so how, shareholders may be incorporated into a framework oriented 
toward justice broadly understood.  It is noteworthy that in much of the 
investor/shareholder literature such agents are treated as homogenous 
                                            
63 With no definition of the second sense of the more generalised form “common good” in 
Boltanski & Thévenot (2006 [1991]) 
64 In personal correspondence Narveson appeared to approve of the replacement of “the 
common good” with Hobbes injunctions to seek peace/avoid war.   
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whereas it may be fruitful to consider differences between intra-day trading, 
high-frequency algorithmic trading, value investors/long term investors and 




In the discussion of populations and samples above it was noted there a 
limited number of banks that produce suitable reporting that can be analysed 
as secondary data.  Similarly, with a small sample of NGOs and NGO related 
texts some caution is required when interpreting findings.  That said, small 
sample sizes are a feature of the type of qualitative analysis above and as 
such the main implication from small sample sizes is to be wary of over-
claiming generalisability of the results.   
A methodological limitation is the potential “fallacy of internalism” (Ferguson, 
2007, p.918) which raises concerns regarding interpretations of texts without 
analysis of reception of those texts by recipients.   Denzin & Lincoln (2011, 
p.11) express similar concerns, especially if within mixed methods research 
the qualitative aspects are exploratory and quantitative work confirmatory, that 
stakeholders are “excluded from dialogue […which…] decreases the 
likelihood that previously silenced voices will be heard”.  Relatedly, the current 
research does not include an equivalent to “respondent validation” (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011, p.618) hence validation of the interpretation(s) herein may be wildly 
misconstrued: however, the current author’s experience in the sector, 
combined with peer/team review of the analysis, should ensure that the 
research findings have sufficient trustworthiness. In addition, the process of 
text production is not analysed.  In order to achieve the level of analysis that 
Thompson (1990, 2013) suggests is desirable, access to texts’ authors would 
be required.  For the banks in particular, commercial sensitivities may make 
access problematic.  
Per Potter (1996, p.3) the current research, reliant as it is on construction of 
meaning through the double hermeneutics of creation and interpretation of 
texts, cannot truly be considered an attempt at a “neutral and objective picture 
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of this set of social relations”.  However the meanings interpreted are 
developed from both a research perspective and (to some extent and albeit 
tangentially) from praxis – the researcher’s prior experience in co-creating and 
analysing professional discourses in the financial sector.   
A further consideration of the above approaches is the distance from actors 
as a result of the use of secondary data - an “etic” approach (Morris, et al., 
1999, p.781).  Silverman (2000, p.822) considers the need to focus on 
descriptions of “societal members’ actual methods for achieving whatever they 
do achieve”.  The texts analysed in the current research do relate to achieving 
organisational outcomes however they are only part of the range of activities 
undertaken by the actors producing or responsible for the organisations 
producing the text. The directors of the regulatory bodies for example will, in 
addition to producing speeches, meet with politicians, business leaders and 
representatives of NGOs in the course of their work, and will influence and be 
influenced by, such third parties.  Regulators will enact some of their vision of 
(one side of) the social contract for banks through new and amended 
regulations, though these, like law itself, will always be incomplete (Pistor & 
Xu, 2002).   
Thévenot et al. (2000) note “the configuration of public space and the 
dynamics of discourse depend heavily on the mode of acting [which is] 
privileged in a political culture” (p.239, emphasis added, [edited for clarity]).  
The implication for the current research is to recognise the embeddedness of 
institutions within current political and broader society, hence occupying a 
privileged space, at least to some degree, in public discourse.  Privilege for 
one set of “voices” by definition suggests other voices are suppressed, 
marginalised or at least in the background.  A potential critique of the 
conceptual model used above includes issues of power and access (Abulof & 
Kornprobst, 2017, p.6).  Power and access relate to agency and voice of 
disenfranchised stakeholders such as the “unbanked”: ontologically invisible 
in the above conceptualisation and hence to an extent subject to 
“epistemological violence” (Dotson, 2011, p.236). The inclusion of NGOs as 
representatives of societal issues only addresses such limitations partially.    
More generally, no matter the form of violence, epistemological per Dotson, or 
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financial (Marazzi, 2011) a limitation of the orders of worth framework is that 
in effect a boundary is reached beyond which violent acts are no longer in 
scope of the framework.   
 
7.6 Suggestions for future research 
 
The word choices of actors on societal concerns such as banking are 
indicative of how authors view the world and how they wish to be viewed.  
Given the importance of the social contract with the banks, the effects on “the 
social contract” through communications from key stakeholders warrants 
further enquiry. Following the guidance from Ferguson (2007), Fairclough 
(2010), and Thompson (1990, 2013), it is important to understand the 
reception and understanding of texts for audiences. A future direction for 
research is to extend the current research to understand interpretations of the 
texts from NGOs, banks, and Government/regulators by stakeholders such as 
policy makers, other active participants in the regulatory dialogue, and 
customers of banks. 
Further, given the influence the linguistic/discursive construction of texts can 
have on audience perceptions of organizational reputation there could be the 
possibility of combining the orders of worth perspective above with frameworks 
to consider reputation construction (Craig & Brennan, 2012); with linguistic 
devices (Merkl-Davies & Koller, 2012) that “guide audiences’ interpretations 
and legitimize and normalize violence and destruction” (Tregidga et al, 2012, 
p.151); or with constructions of rhetoric including dimensions of ethos, logos, 
or pathos (Higgins & Walker, 2012). A combination of approaches could yield 
deeper understanding and insight into the way in which orders of worth link to 
building and sustaining reputation, or to how the orders of worth are 
constructed, not only in the detailed construction of the polities but how such 
construction is embedded in persuasive approaches to language.  
Throughout there is an ambiguity in the literature, and in the analysed texts, 
as to what construes “the common good”.  Whilst there is extensive debate 
about this, there is value in understanding more fully how the common good 
301 
 
is construed by actors and how this relates to orders of worth.  The research 
question here could concern how common the “common good” really is, and 
how the common good is constructed across differing polities and by different 
agents. 
It is not clear, from an ecological or “green” perspective how “sustainability” 
may be operationalised at a societal level.  The trivial answer – Government 
responsibilities, policy and oversight in coordination with supranational bodies, 
seems inadequate for two reasons.  One is that the evidence from around the 
world is current arrangements are ineffectual (Harari, 2018).  The other, more 
specifically rooted in the current research, is that the construction of social 
contracts by significant commercial and regulatory actors largely excludes 
consideration of key sustainability themes.  The research question for the latter 
is around why this may be the case: why there is no substantive “greening” of 
the economy to date (Murray, 2012).  More narrowly, given initiatives such as 
the “Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth” from the European 
Commission (2018), the increasing demand for green justifications of the 
social contract for the banks warrants further investigation.  
The discussion above of the deliberate exclusion in Boltanski & Chiapello 
(2007) of shareholders from justifications oriented toward justice or the 
common good leads to questions regarding future research in this area.  The 
authors may well demur at any attempt to bring shareholders into the fold given 
the categorical exclusion in “New Spirit of Capitalism” (pp.365-366).  However 
not all shareholders are the same in terms of scale of holdings/control, of 
distance from the firm (some may well be workers within the firm), or time 
horizons and investment aims.  To exclude all shareholders seems totalising 
with respect to the concept of shareholders and investment.  Future research 
then could be centrally concerned with categorisation of shareholders and the 
relationship between investors and commitments to “justice” broadly 
understood.  
There is a range of international bodies that feature in the text and that 
influence the processes of regulation.  Whilst it is out of the scope of the current 
research, this suggests there is merit in considering further how such influence 
affects the boundary conditions of nationally constructed “social contracts”. 
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Moreover, discussed above is the possibility that UK banks, regulators and 
NGOs are in some way idiosyncratic and as such there an international 
comparison of social contract constructions could be worthwhile.  
Earlier it was noted that Hardin (2014) argued for the efficiency of conventions 
and constitutions over the loose terminologies of social contracts, in part 
because conventions and constitutions impose costs on non-conformists 
without third party enforcement (in contrast to business contracts, to a large 
degree).   What is not clear from the analysis in the current research is to what 
extent the public justifications analysed can be viewed as conventions with 
such “automatic” powers of enforcement.  Given the roots of the orders of 
worth framework in conventions theory a useful line of future enquiry could be 
to explore when and how such justifications in the texts analysed herein form 
conventions – if at all.  
The current research finds a gap between practice, in which justification 
constructs include a risk orientation or dimension, and theory of orders of worth 
in which this dimension has limited salience. The finding directs attention to 
future research questions regarding how a risk based approach affects the test 
criteria and other dimensions of the orders of worth approach.  Further, given 
that the point of departure for Mullineux (2011, 2014) was the current practice 
of the banks, there may be a fruitful line of research that deepens the 
understanding of the processes of banks (e.g. payments) by considering the 
detailed characteristics and implications (e.g. for taxation revenues, for 
financial inclusion) in relation to the qualified subjects and qualified objects 
(processes too) of the orders of worth polities.  
Noted above was a newly identified characteristic of banks’ public 
justifications, that of the ontologically diffuse nature of the sets of “qualified 
subjects”.  The managerial, accountability and regulatory implications of such 
a characteristic could be worthy of further research given the potential 
implications arising from increased coordination costs amongst stakeholders 
leading to reduced accountability of the banks.  Further the role of NGOs may 
be worth investigating in this regard, they may to some extent act as 
coordinators of some stakeholders albeit there was no evidence in the limited 
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sample of NGO texts that the NGOs “represented” the emic subjects within the 
banking sector, rather the NGOs adopt an etic viewpoint.  
Methodologically, there was found to be no normative analytical process to 
assess the usefulness of a framework such as orders of worth.  The potential 
usefulness of a “framework for frameworks” arises given the uneven coverage 
of dimensions of the OOW framework in the analysed texts (see Table 10).  A 
further avenue of research is to consider the discriminatory power of 
frameworks including the range of qualitative categorisations.  Prior work on 
converting qualitative self-assessments (survey data), or qualitative biological 
indicators into quantitative scales has been done, however these types of 
research whilst useful in themselves do not give a systematic way of assessing 
the completeness or appropriateness for an a priori set of categories given a 
particular sample text (or to generalise, to all possible sample texts). In the 
review of prior research using orders of worth above, the analyses were at the 
polity level rather than “dimensions of polity” level, which suggests an avenue 
for future research comprised of fine-grained analysis of the dimensions of 
orders of worth in texts as in the current study.  There may be value in 
exploring the relationship between genres of texts and business sectors with 
coverage of the dimensions of orders of worth.  
7.7 Summary 
 
This final chapter has considered the achievement of the outcomes of the 
current study as well as the claimed contributions to the literature regarding 
the social contract, pragmatic sociology, banking & finance, and qualitative 
methodologies.  Whilst, in common with all research on any scale from single 
researcher to international programmes the current research contains 
limitations as discussed above, these limitations do not reduce the value of the 
contribution of the current research to theory.  Finally, suggestions for future 
research are made: it is hoped the current research is the beginning rather 
than the end in understanding the construction of the social contract through 
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Appendix A – List of Banks 
 
Banks incorporated in the United 
Kingdom (excluding 
subsidiaries) 
Scope Comment Public SER? 
Large, universal banks65 
Barclays Bank Plc Globally important 
financial institution 
 Yes 
HSBC Bank Plc Globally important 
financial institution 
 Yes 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, The Globally important 
financial institution66  
Part nationalised Yes 
Standard Chartered Bank Globally important 
financial institution  
 Yes 
Retail and Commercial Banks 
Airdrie Savings Bank Retail and Commercial 
(Central Scotland) 
 No/now defunct 
                                            
65 whilst the Bank of England and PRA (2013) consider Santander UK one of the seven major banks and building societies in the UK it has been 
excluded above as a subsidiary of a foreign bank 




Banks incorporated in the United 
Kingdom (excluding 
subsidiaries) 
Scope Comment Public SER? 
Aldermore Bank plc Retail and Commercial 
(National) 
 Limited, in strategic review 
in annual report 
Co-operative Bank Plc, The Retail and Commercial 
(National) 
Formerly a subsidiary of 
the Co-op Group 
however demerged in 
2014   
Yes 
Lloyds Bank Plc Retail and Commercial 
(National) 
Part nationalised. Also 
some wholesale activity 
but not a universal bank 
Yes 
Metro Bank PLC Retail and Commercial 
(London/online) 
Opened in 2010 No (brief mention 
community involvement on 
website) 
Sainsbury’s Bank plc Retail (National)   No 
Scottish Widows Bank Retail (National)  Limited scale No 
Tesco Bank plc Retail (National)   No 
TSB Bank plc Retail (National) Recently bought by 




Banks incorporated in the United 
Kingdom (excluding 
subsidiaries) 
Scope Comment Public SER? 
Virgin Money plc Retail (National)  No (though community 
contribution on the company 
website) 
Independent Private Banks 
Arbuthnot Latham & Co Limited Private Banking  No 
C Hoare & Co Private Banking  No (however ESG policies 
including downstream 
agents ratings are in a 
paper August 2014) 
Close Brothers Limited Private Banking  No 
Statement of principles (3 
pages) within Annual 
Statement of Accounts 
Hampden & Co plc Private Banking  No 
Harrods Bank Ltd Private Banking  No 
R. Raphael & Sons Plc Private Banking  No 
Weatherbys Bank Limited 
 
Private Banking  No 
cccxlv 
 
Banks incorporated in the United 
Kingdom (excluding 
subsidiaries) 
Scope Comment Public SER? 
Commercial Banks 
British Arab Commercial Bank 
Plc 
SME Arab Mediterranean 
focus 
 No 





Havin Bank Ltd Cuban trade financing   No 
BIRA Bank Limited 
SME focussed bank Trade Association 
owned bank 
No 
Smith & Williamson Investment 
Services Limited 
Banking services within 
an accounting group 
 No 
Brief statement on website 
United Trust Bank Limited Commercial banking  No 
Cause related banks 





Charity Bank Limited, The  Charities Banking ** No 
cccxlvi 
 
Banks incorporated in the United 
Kingdom (excluding 
subsidiaries) 
Scope Comment Public SER? 
European Islamic Investment 
Bank Plc 
Wholesale banking in a 
Sharia context 
 No 
Gatehouse Bank Plc 
Islamic Banking  Limited information on 
charitable projects on 
website 
Islamic Bank of Britain Plc Islamic Banking  No 
Kingdom Bank Ltd 
Christian ethics banking  No (limited ethics statement 
on website) 
Methodist Chapel Aid Limited 
Christian ethics banking  No (statement of ethical 
investment policy) 
Reliance Bank Ltd 
Christian ethics banking 
(Salvation Army) 
 No (statement of ethical 
investment policy) 
Unity Trust Bank Plc Union movement banking 
(social enterprise lending 
specifically) 
 No (statement of ethical 
investment and ethical 
business operations policy; 
cccxlvii 
 
Banks incorporated in the United 
Kingdom (excluding 
subsidiaries) 
Scope Comment Public SER? 
impact statements of 
lending) 
 
** It could be argued the need for CSR reporting is much reduced for such organisations since their raison d’être is in 
itself, ethical and welfare promoting.  That said, there are environmental and employee issues that could be addressed 




Table 13 Parent Company Banks in the UK grouped by scope of activities. Source, author's own analysis  
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Appendix B – Analysis of Jagd (2011) – selection of prior research into OOW 
 
Author(s) (year) Title Subject summary per Jagd 
(2011) 














Sociology of schools. The main 
justifications civic, domestic, 
and industrial  (inspiration, 
fame and market only to a 
limited degree) 
In French (hence not 
accessible to the author), 






munipalite´ de gauche 
Study of a left wing council or 
municipality – finding the 
coexistence of civic, industrial 
and market worlds   





Les jugements dans 
l’octroi de crédit 
Study within a credit co-
operative found domestic, 
civic, industrial and commercial 
polities. 
In French, not notably 
influential. Rousseliére & 
Vézina (2009, p.245) note 
“The loan applications are 
the moment of the 
expression of the various 






Author(s) (year) Title Subject summary per Jagd 
(2011) 







(1987 & 1989) 
Le camembert: normand 
ou normé. Deux 
modéles de production 
dans l’industrie 
fromagére, and Un 
compromis d’innovation 
entre tradition et 
standardisation dans 
l’industrie laitiére 
Exploring local, regional 
French cheese production in 
the context of increasing 
globalisation and hence 
competition.  The authors 
found conflict between 
domestic and industrial orders 
of worth (the “standardisation” 
of the second title is 
associated with the industrial 
polity). 







S’accorder avec les 
usager: á l’interface d’un 
office HLM et de ses 
locataires and Les 
régles en action: entre 
une organisation et ses 
usagers 
Business forms of coordination 
in a social housing office – 
Jagd (2011) does not explicate 
further however it would be 
reasonable to assume Civic 
and Domestic orders of worth 
are challenged by Industrial or 
Market considerations.  
In French hence 
inaccessible  
0.5 & 6.13 
respectivel





“Competing orders of worth in non-profit organizations and co-operatives” 
Emmauelle 
Marchal (1992)  
 
L’entreprise associative 
entre calcul économique 
et désintéressement 
In considering cooperative 
organisations these authors 
show civic, domestic, 
In French 2.76 N 
cccl 
 
Author(s) (year) Title Subject summary per Jagd 
(2011) 






Vers une théorie socio-
économique de 
l’association 
industrial, and markets orders 
of worth co-exist  




Economie sociale et 
organisation industrielle: 
Le cas des 
groupements 
coopératifs d’entreprises 
In French 0.21 N 
Dodier and 
Camus (1998)  
Openness and 
specialisation: dealing 
with patients in a 
hospital emergency 
service 
This study is not actually a 
good fit with orders of worth, 
comprising an interesting 
however only peripherally 
relevant study of 
prioritisations (patient 
“worth”) in hospital 
admissions.  Was reviewed 
by Rousseliére & Vézina 
(2009, p.245) who noted of 
the results: “Tensions 
between a civic logic (to 
answer with the needs for 






Author(s) (year) Title Subject summary per Jagd 
(2011) 







Les arts de la rue inspired, civic, and domestic 
orders of worth co-exist in non-
profit theatres 
In French 1.06 N 
Provost, 2002 
 
(also follow up 
study by Moursli 
and Cobbaut, 
2006) 
Analyse de la 
coexistence 
d’organismes non-
lucratives, lucratives et 
publiques dans le 
secteur de maisons de 
repos. Une approche 
par les logiques de 
qualité also “Analyse de 
la coexistence 
d’organismes non-
lucratives, lucratives et 
publiques dans le 
secteur des maisons de 
repos” 
Differing care home 
organization types can be seen 
as a way of accommodating 
differing perspectives on 
orders of worth: “between civic 
and domestic orders of worth 
(non-profit organizations), 
between market and industrial 
orders of worth (profit 
organizations), and between 
civic and fame (public 
organizations)” 
PhD Thesis in French – also 





La fabrication de 
l’accord entre art et 
management dans les 
organisations 
artistiques: une analyse 
A surprising result – a single 
“industrial” order of worth 
despite expectations of 
differences between artists and 
management which is 
explained by the purpose of 
the documents studied – 
For the current research, 
this result is interesting due 
to the structuralist 
overtones: form follows 
function.  This means that, 
in understanding regulatory 
or firm communications it 




Author(s) (year) Title Subject summary per Jagd 
(2011) 




conventionaliste de trois 
plans stratégiques 
investor orientated strategic 
plans.   
can be considered that the 
potential range of orders of 
worth is not open to the 
authors as the nature of the 
text – the genre in discourse 
analysis necessarily 
constrains the available set 
of expressions of orders of 
worth 
Rousseliére &  
Vézina (2009) 
Constructing the 
legitimacy of a financial 
cooperative in the 
cultural sector: a case 
study using textual 
analysis 
A quantitatively oriented study, 
classifying related “chunks” of 
text (a rather vague term 
considering the discussion of 
unit of analysis below).  This 
study is the only prior research 
to find the presence of a 
“projective” or project-oriented 
order of worth given the 
flexible nature of the 
organisation.   
Worth exploring further to 
understand how units of 





Showdown at Kykuit: 
field-configuring events 
as loci for 
Exploration of tension between 
Civic, and Industrial and 
Market orders of worth in a 
non-profit foundation.   
Interesting for the current 
research as McInerney 
identifies institutional 
justifications in a field – 




Author(s) (year) Title Subject summary per Jagd 
(2011) 






justifications of the FCA 
within the regulatory sphere 
 
 




I am not your hero: 
change management 
and culture shocks in a 
public sector 
corporation.  
The authors considered a 
public sector organisation over 
a 10 year period.  Having 
found the presence of “three 
worlds which appear hard to 
reconcile: the industrial, the 
commercial and the civic 
world” they sum up the 
reaction to change as “culture 
shock” and illustrate how this 
results in varied resistive 
practices (e.g. “go slow”)  
There is a focus on 
individual actors’ reactions 
and understandings in 
contrast to the current work 
focussed on public 






Institution and change: 
possible coexistence 
Within a Canadian health care 
facility the successful 
navigation, through “strategic” 
and “professional” competence 
of potential conflicts between 
the domestic, the industrial and 
The way competence is 
used to sequence 
valorisation of orders of 
worth has echoes of the 




Author(s) (year) Title Subject summary per Jagd 
(2011) 




fame orders of worth are 
explored.  
There is a notable lack of 
detail methodologically 
regarding how “values and 
indicators of social 
acceptance” and “social 
worlds” were also analysed 
– simply “[t]hey were 
gathered through interviews 
and administrative 
documents” (p.141).  This 
lack of detail means that the 
study is not analysed in 
detail. 
 




Appendix C – Repertoires of qualified objects and subjects in texts 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
FCA 020615 
In this text the objects comprise firms, some of 
which are categorised as banks, others as 
"shadow banks" 
Regulators - priorities include reducing barriers to entry 
The UK (as a place to do business, implicitly in 
competition with other nations) 
Banks 
  "The City" 
  Customers 
  Big banks - existing customers 
  Challenger firms "hungrier" 
  Established brands "without legacy issues" such as M&S, 
Post Office and Tesco (elides the fact that Tesco started 
by using RBS as banking provider behind Tesco brand). 
  New or revived brands - Williams and Glynn mentioned 
however this was work in progress by RBS (which has 
now been cancelled - results 2016?) 
  P2P 
  Shadow banks 
ccclvi 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
  Small and mid-size firms 
  fintech innovators 
  fintech incubators 
  optimists and pessimists 
MYM 090115 Society; Economy; Planet; 
Banks (traditional plc), specifically failed banks; p2p 
lenders; community banks; stakeholder banks (neither if 
which delineated); "values based principles" for 
investment; Competition and Markets Authority; 
"mutuals"; Pension funds; Savings and Investment 
vehicles; State investment banks; Green Investment 
Bank; Fund managers; 
 
RBS SUST 15 
Royal Bank of Scotland Stakeholders 
Nat West 
Customers: are customers in effect viewed as rational, 
utility maximisers? What assumptions are there behind 
customer advocacy as a key goal? 
(Other brands such as Coutts, Adam and Company 
are not mentioned). 
Ross McEwen himself. 





Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
Branches are mentioned as "core" (p.3) however 
also regrettably contingent. 
  
European Commission (which forces RBS to divest 
of branches due to state aid received) is mentioned 
but not the state: the European action could be 
interpreted as arbitrary, such a construction 
distances the bank from an official institution. 
  
New technologies such as ApplePay, bank apps 
with fingerprint authentication, "accessible cards 
accredited by the Royal National institute for Blind 
People (RNB)" (p.3) 
  
RBS15 
UK and Irish retail and commercial bank I (Chairman) recently arrived (not my fault) 
RBS Capital Resolution (RCR) Predecessor Philip Hampton - thanks 
Citizens Financial Group Implicitly "the state" as in "state aid" 
NatWest European Commission 
Coutts Williams & Glyn 
Royal Bank of Scotland Banks Shareholders 
Ulster Bank RCR Oversight Committee (toward closure) 
RBS in jersey The Board (the board decided p11) 
ccclviii 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
"other linked entities" (note no mention of Adam 
and Co) 
independent Commission on banking 
The "global regulatory and supervisory 
environment" 
Department of Justice 
  Federal Reserve 
  Federal Housing Finance Agency 
  National Credit union Administration 
  "several" states Attorneys General 
  Shareholders Action Groups 
  Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
  UK Government 
  UK Financial Investments 
  the UK electorate (in respect of the EU referendum) 
MYM 160915 
big banks which "dominate" the UK market Banks 
the UK market Government 
regulations Regulators 
government ownership Local communities 
ccclix 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
Nominalisation of branches. See also discussion of 
reading to London train 
  
BANKTRACK071215 
Voluntary principles (document) Civil Society 
Coal (mining and coal fired power) Global Banks 
Paris COP Summit "The sector" (Banks) 
Paris Pledge to Quit Coal (document) Climate and Energy Campaign Coordinator at BankTrack 
It is noteworthy that when mentioning objects or 
mechanisms they are not always explicitly qualified 
(or disqualified). However contextually, as "coal 
mining and coal power" are within a paragraph 
discussing drivers of climate change, it is 
reasonable to assess these as not qualified objects 
and processes within a green order of worth 
Private Banks  
Campaigner at Friends of the Earth France 
  Climate & Energy program director at Rainforest Action 
Network 
  The Equator Principles "only adopted language 
referencing climate change in 2013 […] still have no 
requirements for banks to reduce their financing of 




Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
PRA ARA2015 
National regulation International bodies 
EU Solvency II Directive for insurers The EU 
EU Capital Requirements Directive PRA 
Basel III Firms 
Pillar 2 Capital Requirements 
The Bank of England as a synthesising entity between 
aspects of regulation? 
Depositor Protection Policy "Our staff" 
Coverage Ratio colleagues 
Stable Funding Ratio Bank of England Resolution Directorate 
Ring-fencing arrangements Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. 
Stress tests Parliament 
Senior Managers Regime "boards of firms" 
Senior Insurance Managers regime intra-firm "legal entities" 
CBEST framework to improve resilience in the 
sector 
new entrants 
Household debt and mortgage borrowing 




Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
The life assurance market EEA 
"A prolonged low interest rate environment" - 
there's perhaps a lot to unpack here? 
The MPC 
"The official bank rate"   
the crisis  
PRA CP18/15 
regulated firms boards 
UK corporate Governance Code management 
PRA approach documents Financial Reporting Council 
robust and well targeted management information Chairman 
Senior Managers and Chief Executive 
Senior Insurance Managers Regimes recovery and resolution strategies 
Culture (of the firm) employees 
boards of "material subsidiaries" (of firms) 
"relevant sub-committees" - somewhat ambiguous as to 
what comprises "relevant". 
  Dedicated risk committee 
Statement of risk appetite Chief Risk Officer 
  Non-exec Chairman 
ccclxii 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
Risk control framework   
Threshold conditions Financial Services Markets 
Act 2000. 
  
Ring fenced banks   
BOE 0615 
Fixed Trading teams 
Income, Currency and Commodities (FICC) 
markets 
Second or third line defence 
Market Abuse and Sell side firms 
European Market Infrastructure Regulations (MAR 
and EMIR) 
Buy side firms 
and the new Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive and 
End users 
Regulation (MiFID2) in Europe and the Dodd-
Frank Act in the 
G20 
United States international foreign exchange 
Senior Managers and Certification Regimes. committees 
board levels including "tone from the top" Banking Standards Board ("established by leading firms") 
ethical and conduct training, peer reviews, FSB (Financial Stability Board) 
ccclxiii 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
‘balanced scorecards’ Parliamentary 
EMIR, MiFID2 Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS). 
continuing senior executive and board levels 
professional development   
new FICC Market Standards Board (FMSB)   
producing guidelines, practical case studies   
sharing   
and promoting good practices on control and   
governance structures around FICC business lines   




FICC Debt Management Offices 
MAR "global bond markets" 
MiFID 2 Governments (as borrowers) 
Dodd-Frank Act (US) Investors 
  Bob Diamond (calling for "remorse" to be over) 
ccclxiv 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
A new global FX code. Traders 
  Bank chiefs ("appalled") 
  Chancellor of the Exchequer 
    
  International standard setting bodies like FSB and IOSCO 
  Bank of England 
  FCA 
    
  RBS, BP 
  Bank for International Settlement’s Market Committee 
FCA 201015 
Firms, Industry Regulators 
Price cap for pay day lending Industry 
Responsibility for consumer credit now with the 
FCA 
"Leaders of our banks" 
  FOS (Financial Ombudsman Service) 
  Customers 
ccclxv 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
  EY (Ernst and Young) 
  Centre for Compliance and Trust (Cambridge Judge 
Business School) 
  Shareholders, boards, management and employees. 




  Regulator 
Regulated 
London's financial markets 
consumers 
FICC Market Standards Board 
Banking Standards Board 
FCA 220715 
A majority of firms now have cultural change 
programmes 
CEO 





Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
people in order to help them deliver on their job FCA 
  (then) OFT (transferred consumer credit to FCA 
    
  Simon Davis [David Review] 
    
  Martin Wheatley (then CEO of FCA) 
FCA 220715 2 
Senior Managers Regime FCA 
Certification Regime Firms 
(new) conduct rules Directors 
Culture change Government 
  Smaller firms including credit unions 
credit cards, cash savings, PRA 
retirement income, as well as looking at the current 
account switching service 
Retail Distribution Review (RDR) 
Pensions freedom Financial Advisors 
Mortgage Market review Treasury, the Department for Work and 
ccclxvii 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
FCA Mortgage Conference Pensions and The Pensions Regulator 
Mortgage Credit Directive   
five add-on   
markets like travel, gadget insurance, GAP 
insurance for the motor industry, home emergency, 
  
personal and accident add-on insurance   
Consumer Credit Regime   
Pay day loans (and cap of 2x borrowings as 
maximum total repayable) 
  
Scams and national campaign   
BARCLAYS ARA 
2015 
legacy products and businesses that are neither 
sufficiently profitable nor strategic for Barclays 
Shareholders 
 debt investors in Barclays 
Barclaycard Barclays Africa Group Limited 
Barclays UK 22 million retail customers, and almost one million 
Barclays Corporate & International Business banking clients. 
ccclxviii 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
UK ring-fencing requirements 
Barclaycard is the number one card issuer in Britain with 
close to 11 million UK card customers. 
Coop ARA 
Stress Tests - a literal test  SME customers 
Individual Bank Of England 
Capital Guidance (ICG) by 2019 and the 
Regulator’s PRA buffer 
The Core Bank 
the Risk Management IBM (outsourcing IT) 
Framework customer facing colleagues 
Senior Managers Regime YouGov 
Barclays Approach 
Stress testing Stakeholders 
risk "frameworks, policies and standards" Customers 
  Financial Policy Committee of Bank of England 
Coop SER 
The Ethical Policy as mechanism for referral, 
consultation albeit not spelled out in this text. It is 
not apparently "embedded [] into 
Customers, businesses and organisations 
our Articles of Association" (edited for clarity) "Vulnerable customers and those in financial difficulty" 
Workplace values, codes of conduct and culture Suppliers and external organisations 
ccclxix 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
Overdrafts, credit cards and new current account Regulators 
The Hive launched in October [business support 
programme for people keen to start or grow a co-
operative or community enterprise] 
Colleagues 
  Government 
  Shareholders 
  Values and Ethic Committee 
  Refuge (charity) - "My Money, Mylife" campaign (p.6) 
  Fundraising "festive fundraiser" activity generated 
£100,00 - note specifically there is mention of (some form 
of) bank match funding - that is to some extent the bank 
matches volunteer money raising. 
HSBC15 
Development of Asia business Investors 
Higher return businesses 
Departments or business units such as: Global Banking & 
Markets, Commercial Banking, Principal Retail Banking, 
Wealth Management 
US Consumer Lending and Mortgage portfolio Clients 
Industrial Bank (stake now sold) NAFTA 
RW Assets   
ccclxx 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
HSBC Approach 
Product Governance Processes (p.36) Customers 
Alert customers by text message p.36 
"50,000 businesses" (customers and potential customers) 
p.36 
Customer complaints (and "tools for understanding 
their causes") 
Apple 
Seeking feedback from customers (p.36) Extel 
Commercial banking research programmes (p.36) HSBC France 
Competitor benchmarking Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 
Brand Tracking Team dedicated to bus rapid transit systems 
Customer surveys 
United Nations Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon 
Transport 
RBWM (p.36 - Retail Banking & Wealth 
management 
Parents returning to work 
"350,000 customer surveys" International Labour Organisation 
Technology   
Climate Change (note as "challenge" as risk) - also 
stated as "opportunity" for customers (presumably 




Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
Innovation and digital capabilities   
Enhancing security   
Financial Transactions   
Customer Data   
Apple Pay mobile payment   
Live-chat online customer service   
Online banking platform   
Extel survey   
Asset management business joined the Montreal 
Pledge to disclose the carbon intensity of its 
portfolio (p.36).  
  
Green bond issued 2015 for the first time   
Investment sectors: renewables, energy efficiency, 
sustainable waste and water management, 
sustainable land use, climate change adaptation, 
and clean buildings and transportation. 
  
Flexible working programmes   
"agenda free exchange meetings" (p.38)   
ccclxxii 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
Webcasts with senior executives   
Training programmes (including “values led 
leadership training for all employees" p.38) 
  
HSBC Confidential Whistleblowing platform   
Performance review processes   
Variable pay considerations   
At our best online recognition tool for all employees 
(p.38) 
  
    
Certified, sustainable palm oil   
Training on sustainability risk policies (2,300 
attendees) 
  
Suppliers' code of conduct   
Project finance lending policies   
Sustainability risk policies   
International Slavery Act   
International Bill of Human Rights   
ccclxxiii 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
UN declaration of human rights   
International Labour Organisations Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
  
Community Investment Activities   
UK Code of Practice for the taxation of banks   
US/Foreign Account Tax compliance act   
OECD Standard for Automatic Exchange of 
Financial Account information 
  
CRD IV   
OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting ("BEPS") 
Initiative 
  
Lloyds ARA 2015 
Key customer segments; SME customers Customers (the best bank for… p.9) 
Helping Britain Prosper Plan Shareholders 
"time barring" (PPI) Financial Conduct Authority 
low interest rates - can be seen as a mechanism 
constraining 
The UK Government 
ccclxxiv 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
bank profitability (amongst the other effects of low 
interest rates otherwise known as "financial 
repression" ) 
Competition and Markets Authority 
the UK economy SME customers 
EU referendum Financial Policy Committee 
 TSB (Trustee Savings Bank, now sold) 
ring-fencing Fitch, Moody's, and Standard & Poor's (ratings agencies) 
Minimum Requirements for own funds and Eligible 
Liabilities (MREL) 
Suppliers 
capital requirements   
Credit Default Swaps   
Multi-brand and multi-channel [approach]   
Remote advice proposition   
Online real-time mortgage approval in principle   
Simplification programme   
Consumer Finance business   
Help to Buy (Govt scheme)   
ccclxxv 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
Funding for Lending (Govt scheme)   
Scottish Widows with profits fund   
Lloyds SER 
Britain Construction Industry 
Social Housing First Time buyers 
UK economy SMEs 
the pensions market António Horta-Osório, Group Chief Executive 
"Our Group" [Charitable] Foundations 
Branches 
Sara Weller CBE, Independent Director & Chair, 
Responsible Business Committee 
Online [services]   
Stakeholders   
Senior Leaders   
External Partners   
Independent Stakeholder Panel   
Scottish Widows   
Opinion formers   
ccclxxvi 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
colleagues   
community formers   
Responsible Business Committee   
Std Chtd AR&A 
External environment (also "economic and geo-
political backdrop") (p.3) and "underlying 
demographic trends" (p.5) 
Clients (and client relationships) 
each "set of results" Bankers 
Chinese equity markets Management Team 
commodity markets "Rising affluent populations in our markets" (p.3) 
Balance sheet Mark Smith Group CRO 
Rights issue 
Simon Cooper to head Corporate and Institutional 
Banking 
"these [idiosyncratic risk] positions are being 
assertively managed out" 
Shareholders 
Corporate and Institutional Banking "Small and medium sized corporate clients" 
Commercial Banking "experienced regional managers" 
"Special Retirement Plan" "emerging affluent client segments" 
ccclxxvii 
 
Repertoire per text 
Text Repertoire Objects and Mechanisms Repertoire of Subjects Agents and Motives 
UK Bank Levy Priority Clients (as a subset of Retail Clients) 
Regulatory costs 
Shinsegae (one of the largest retailers in Korea. SCBK 
agreed to place small banking units in the retailer's stores) 
Cash management and financing mandates US Authorities 
Renmimbi services Financial Conduct Authority 
credit risk approach   
Corporate and Institutional Banking; Private 
Banking; Wealth Management (divisions) 
  
Table 15 Repertoire of qualified objects and subjects in texts 
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Appendix D – Overview of Boltanski’s (2011) paradigm of “Critique” 
 
In considering Boltanski’s (2011) discussion of the nature of critique, Figure 6 
illustrates the Kantian critique of rebellion against the law/sovereign (Williams, 
2003) as a form of “substantive normativity”.  From Figure 6 and the above 
discussion, the current research is concerned with a non-constructivist form of 
the social contract that allows for examination of tests of “procedural 
normativity” (Boltanski, 2011) – as highlighted in Figure 6 below.  The orders 
of worth framework provides a means of examining the testing of ideals or 
norms developed from a non-constructive perspective on the social contract.   
 
Figure 6 Approaches to "Critique", author’s interpretation of Boltanski (2011, pp.10-17) 
 
